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WTO World Trade Organizationthose leaving the farm, growth and modernization
of agriculture create jobs in agricultural processing
and marketing, as well as the expansion of other
nonfarm jobs.
Although most successful developing countries
have not relied on agriculture for export expansion
and growth, growth in agriculture has a dispropor-
tionate effect on poverty because more than half of
the populations in developing countries reside in
rural areas and poverty is much higher in rural
areas than in urban areas. Some 57 percent of the
developing world’s rural population lives in lower-
middle-income countries, and 15 percent lives in
the least-developed countries. Even though histo-
rical trends show that agriculture’s importance
diminishes over time and the share of population
in rural areas declines, there will still be more poor
people in rural areas than in cities for at least a
generation.
Why This Book?
This book explores the outstanding issues in global
agricultural trade policy and evolving world
production and trade patterns. Its coverage of agri-
cultural trade issues ranges from the details of
cross-cutting policy issues to the highly distorted
agricultural trade regimes of industrial countries
In recent years, agricultural protection and its
impact on developing countries have attracted
growing attention. While manufacturing protec-
tion has declined worldwide following substantial
reforms of trade policies, especially in developing
countries, most industrial and many developing
countries still protect agriculture at high levels.
Agricultural protection continues to be among the
most contentious issues in global trade negotia-
tions, with high protection in industrial countries
being the main cause of the breakdown of the
Cancún Ministerial Meetings in 2003.
Why Highlight Agriculture?
What happens in the global agricultural market is
important for developing countries beyond the
pricechangestriggeredbyglobalreforms.Forcoun-
trieswithasmallurbanpopulation,increasingagri-
cultural exports can accelerate growth more than
expanding domestic market demand can.Although
food production for home consumption and sale in
domestic markets accounts for most agricultural
production in the developing world, agricultural
exports and domestic food production are closely
related. Export growth contributes significantly to
the growth of agriculture overall by generating cash





M. Ataman Aksoy and John C. Beghinand detailed studies of agricultural commodities
of economic importance to many developing coun-
tries. The book brings together the background
issues and findings to guide researchers and policy-
makers in their global negotiations and domestic
policies on agriculture. The book also explores the
key questions for global agricultural policies, both
the impacts of current trade regimes and the impli-
cations of reform. It complements the recent agri-
cultural trade handbook that focuses primarily on
the agricultural issues within the context of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations
(Ingco and Nash 2004).
The first part of the book replies to the broad,
cross-cutting questions raised by researchers and
policymakers about agricultural trade regimes and
trade performance. What has happened to the
structure of agricultural trade over the last two
decades? What is the level of protection across
commodities and countries? Do tariff preferences
make a big difference in the levels of protection fac-
ing developing-country agricultural products? Has
the move toward decoupling agricultural support
from production reduced the effects of agricultural
support? Do stricter food safety standards consti-
tute a new barrier to market access by developing
countries? How big are the potential gains from
global liberalization, and how sensitive are esti-
mates to various assumptions? While these topics
have been analyzed before, much of the work here
relies on new information. The answers to these
questions give a clearer picture of global agricul-
tural policies and reforms.
However,broad answers to these questions typi-
cally do not convince the critics and, more impor-
tant, provide little implementable guidance on
specific policy issues. Micro details and partial
equilibrium analyses at country and commodity
levels are necessary to ensure that these broad
results are credible and specific enough to be a basis
for policies. The second part of the book comple-
ments the broad answers with detailed studies of
commodities that are of considerable economic
importance to many developing countries and that
are representative of the export bundle of develop-
ing countries. The commodities selected are sugar,
dairy, rice, wheat, groundnuts, fruits and vegeta-
bles, cotton, seafood, and coffee. Most of the prod-
ucts selected have highly distorted policy regimes
in industrial and some developing countries. The
generalissuesof competition,entry,andexit,which
are major issues for products with distorted poli-
cies, are equally important for the less-protected
traditional export products such as coffee, tea, and
c o c o a .E x p o r t e r so fs u c hp r o d u c t ss t i l lf a c el o n g -
term price declines, price volatility, and other
problemsusuallyassociatedwithproductswithdis-
tortedpolicyregimes.Seafoodalsofacesfewertrade
distortions but is included as representative of the
problems facing new,expanding sectors in the pres-
ence of domestic subsidies in industrial countries.
The commodity studies analyze the current
trade regimes in key producing and consuming
countries, document the magnitude of distortions
in these markets, and assess the distributional
impacts(acrosscountriesandacrossgroupsof con-
sumers, taxpayers, and producers within countries)
of trade and domestic policy reforms in developing
and industrial countries. These assessments are
based on rigorous quantitative analyses of various
reform scenarios and disaggregated partial equilib-
rium models. The impacts of current agricultural
trade policies and of policy reforms vary substan-
tially across commodities, and different reforms
result in very different gainers and losers.
Some Key Findings
Despite the diversity of the cross-cutting analyses
and commodity studies, it is possible to draw some
general conclusions. First, these commodity mar-
kets exhibit a complex political economy, both
domestically and internationally. The arcane nature
of many policy interventions in these commodity
markets and the many heterogeneous interests exac-
erbate this complexity. Identifying superior policy
options is not difficult, but the feasibility of reform
depends on the power of vested interests and the
ability of governments to identify tradeoffs and pos-
sible linkages that will allow them to pursue multi-
ple goals (food security,income transfers,expansion
of domestic value added) more efficiently.
Second, a narrow sectoral or product approach
is unlikely to be fruitful in WTO negotiations. The
commodity studies illustrate why. They also illus-
trate that potential tradeoffs exist even within agri-
culture, as interests differ across commodities.
Third, and perhaps most important, the studies
reveal the importance of microanalysis for identify-
ing both the key policy instruments that distort
2 Global Agricultural Trade and Developing Countriescompetition and the likely winners and losers from
global reforms (producers, consumers, taxpayers
within and across countries).Knowing who is likely
to gain or lose from reform is critical for sequenc-
ing reforms and putting in place complementary
policies, including assistance to reduce the cost of
adjustment in noncompetitive sectors.
Fourth, the studies identify trade distortions
(border protection) and domestic subsidies as
major factors affecting world markets and thus
developing-country consumers and producers. A
common theme is that border protection is more
distorting in most markets, with the notable excep-
tionsofcottonandseafood(corroboratingthefind-
ings of Hoekman, Ng, and Olarreaga 2002). Both
domestic subsidies and border protection con-
tribute to making commodity markets artificially
thin, with small trade volumes and a small number
of agents,inturnleadingtohighvariabilityinprices
and trade flows. Large trade distortions impede
trade flows, depress world prices, and discourage
market entry or delay exit by noncompetitive pro-
ducers.Borderbarriersarehighinmostof thecom-
modity markets studied (the exceptions are cotton,
coffee, and seafood), including industrial countries
and many developing countries. For example, the
global trade-weighted average tariff for all types
of rice is 43 percent and reaches 217 percent for
Japonica rice. Many Asian countries remain bas-
tionsof protectionismintheiragriculturalandfood
markets.
Subsidies have similar effects, depressing world
prices and inhibiting entry by inducing procyclical
surplusproductionbynoncompetitive(oftenlarge)
producers.Indairyandsugarmarkets,theeffectsof
export subsidies have been smaller than those of
tariffs and tariff rate quota schemes, partly because
of the export subsidy disciplines introduced in the
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture. Many
domestic subsidies in Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) coun-
tries, such as cotton subsidies in the United States,
are countercyclical.
Domestic support and protection policies have
substantial negative effects on producers in devel-
oping countries, because of the sheer size of the
subsidies relative to the size of the market. Cotton
subsidies in the United States and European Union
(EU),for example,reached $4.4 billion in a $20 bil-
lion market. Such large subsidies shield noncom-
petitive producers from exit decisions, making
decoupling of these policies a moot point. If U.S.
cotton subsidies were abolished, revenues for cot-
ton farmers in West and Central Africa would
increase by some $250 million. Total official devel-
opment assistance (ODA) to the region in 1999 was
$1.9 billion, 15–25 percent of which typically goes
to agricultural assistance,not all of it directly reach-
ing producers. One can see the incompatibility
between ODA and farm policy in donor countries
that subsidize their rich farmers.
Fifth, a development strategy based on agricul-
tural commodity exports is likely to be impoverish-
ing in the current agricultural policy environment
in which policymakers in many countries have
mercantilist and protectionist reflexes that, when
aggregated,compromise world trade in agricultural
and food products. The emergence of competitive
producers in developing countries does not lead to
a rationalization of production among noncom-
petitive producers as it would in a liberalized
market. Instead, noncompetitive producers remain
in business, buffered by extensive protection and
support.
Potential Winners and Losers
from Trade Liberalization
Agricultural trade liberalization would create win-
ners and losers. The studies conclude that reform
would reduce rural poverty in developing eco-
nomies, both because in the aggregate they have a
strong comparative advantage in agriculture and
because the agricultural sector is important for
income generation in these countries.
Resource reallocation within agriculture would
be substantial. For example, production of ground-
nutproductsinIndiawouldlikelycontractaswould
vegetableoilproductioninChina,butdairyproduc-
tion and exports would expand in India, and rice
production and exports would expand in China.
Liberalization of value-added activities is crucial for
expanding employment and income opportunities
beyond the farm gate. Such findings illustrate the
importance of a multicommodity approach to
reform, as gains and losses will differ by market.
They also illustrate the importance of social safety
nets and other complementary policies.
Consumers in highly protected markets will
benefit greatly from trade liberalization as domestic
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expands. Consumers in poor, net-food-importing
countries could face higher prices if these markets
were not protected before liberalization, because of
higher import unit costs.In practice,however,such
concerns have often been exaggerated.For example,
dairy consumption in the Middle East and North
Africa would be little affected by trade liberaliza-
tion because, while world prices would rise, high
import tariffs would be removed, so that the net
impact on dairy consumer prices would be negligi-
ble. Consumer prices would rise for rice, however,
since the removal of low tariffs would not offset the
increase in border prices.
Other winners and losers would also emerge.
Multilateral trade liberalization erodes the benefits
from preferential bilateral trade agreements and
pits low-cost producers in some developing coun-
tries (such as sugar producers in Brazil and
Thailand) against less efficient producers in the
least-developed countries who are currently helped
by preferential access. The actual gains from such
preferences, however, have been smaller than
expected because of efficiency differences.
How these reforms occur will have important
consequences for developing countries. The best
approach is coordinated global liberalization of
policies.This approach would yield the largest price
increases to offset some of the lost rents. For exam-
ple, world sugar price increases alone would offset
about half the lost quota rents, or about $0.45 bil-
lion, for countries with preferential access. The
analysis shows that losses in rents would be much
less than is commonly expected, because high pro-
duction costs eat up much of the potential benefit
from preferential access to the high-price markets.
Moreover, the cost to the European Union and the
United States of each $1 in preferential access is
estimated at more than $5, a very inefficient way to
provide development assistance. Global liberaliza-
tion of primary commodity markets should be
accompanied by further effective opening of value-
added markets,along with some targeted assistance
to overcome supply constraints. Supply constraints
are particularly acute in Africa and some Latin
American countries but are not insurmountable,as
success stories in horticultural and seafood markets
in Kenya show.
Although the commodity case studies provide
evidence that higher market prices would prevail in
traditional agricultural commodity markets (sugar,
cotton, dairy, groundnuts, rice, and to a lesser
extent, wheat) if trade and domestic distortions
were removed, prospects of continuing high prices
are limited because of the nature of these markets
(a large number of low-cost competitors and
inelastic demand). The bulk-commodity route to
export expansion requires low-cost conditions and
achievement of economies of scale. These markets
face a long-term decline in prices as economies of
scale and competitive pressures yield lower costs
and margins.Domestic farm subsidies in industrial
countries have exacerbated this low-price tendency
by fostering production beyond what free markets
would demand,with dramatic immiserizing conse-
quences in some cases, such as cotton.
Better opportunities exist in new markets such
as horticulture and seafood and in more differenti-
ated products (niche coffee markets, confectionary
peanuts). The high-quality differentiated-product
alternative requires quality upgrades and the neces-
sary infrastructure and institutions to certify prod-
ucts. These new markets imply increased costs to
meet quality standards and higher rewards. Pro-
ducers have to be able to demonstrate quality, an
institutional challenge in many countries. This sec-
ond strategy can be successful only when supply
constraints are alleviated. Trade barriers also exist
in these new markets, especially with higher safety
standards. However, while the findings show that
food safety standards are becoming more stringent,
the view that standards are simply new barriers to
trade has been somewhat oversold.
What the Book Covers
Part 1 contains six chapters on cross-cutting issues,
and Part 2 includes nine commodity studies. While
the chapters in Part 1 are sequenced to provide a
detailed picture of cross-cutting issues in global
agricultural trade, they can be read individually as
self-contained pieces. The accompanying CD-ROM
containsdetailedsupplementarytablesandannexes.
Changes in Agricultural Trade Flows
Chapter 2, “The Evolution of Agricultural Trade
Flows,”by Ataman Aksoy, gives a bird’s-eye view of
the changes in global agricultural trade flows since
the early 1980s and contrasts these with the pro-
gressiveglobalintegrationof manufacturing.World
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the book to include seafood, processed foods, and
some agro-processing such as wine and tobacco
products, was $467 billion in 2001–01, up from
$243 billion in 1980–81. During the 1980s real
manufacturingandagricultureexportsexpandedat
similar rates of 5.7 and 4.9 percent a year.However,
during the 1990s real agricultural export growth
decelerated to 3.7 percent a year,falling well behind
the 6.7 percent annual growth in manufacturing.
Developing countries increased their share in
manufacturing exports during the 1990s but saw
little expansion in agricultural exports,barely main-
taining their share of around 36 percent after losing
market shares during the 1980s.All of their gains in
agriculture during the 1990s came from expansion
of their exports to other developing countries.More
than 48 percent of world agricultural trade is still
accounted for by trade between industrial coun-
tries—about the same share as in 1980–81.
This stability of trade shares comes as a surprise,
since it was during the 1990s that Uruguay Round
commitments in agriculture began to be imple-
mented and rapid trade reforms were introduced in
developing countries. More than a third of world
agricultural exports are traded within EU member
nations and among the three signatories of the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
Low-income countries’ agricultural trade
surpluses against both middle-income and indus-
trial countries has increased. Low-income develop-
ing countries now export more to middle-income
countries than they do to the European Union,their
largest export market in the early 1980s. The agri-
cultural trade surpluses of middle-income countries
have diminished.Among industrial countries,Japan
has the largest agricultural trade deficit (almost
$50 billion in 2000–01); the European Union, once
the largest net buyer of agricultural commodities,
has seen its deficits decline; and NAFTA’s trade sur-
plus has shrunk considerably. Developing-country
regions,after losing market shares during the 1980s,
regained most of them by the end of 1990s. The
only exception is Sub-Saharan Africa, which lost
market shares during the 1980s and did not regain
them during the 1990s.
The structure of world trade has changed, espe-
cially for developing countries. Nontraditional
products, especially seafood and fruits and vegeta-
bles, now constitute almost half their exports.Also,
exports of temperate-climate products (grains,
meats, dairy products, edible oils and seeds, and
animal feed) have surpassed exports of traditional
tropical products (coffee, tea, cocoa, textile fibers,
sugar, and nuts and spices). More important,
exports of fruits and vegetables are now greater
than total exports of traditional products. Seafood
exports are larger still, with a growing portion of
exports coming from aquaculture.
State of Agricultural Protection
Chapter 3,“Global Agricultural Trade Policies,” by
Ataman Aksoy,summarizes the state of agricultural
protection,using data on domestic support policies
from the OECD and tariff data from the WTO for a
large set of developing and industrial countries.
The analysis of experience with the new rules on
market access, export subsidies, and domestic sup-
port indicates that the effects of implementation of
the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture
have been modest. Within OECD countries, pro-
ducer support in agriculture was about $230 billion
in 2000–02, or almost 46 percent of production
value (evaluated at world prices), down from
approximately 63 percent in 1986–88, but still very
high. Of producer support, 63 percent came
through higher prices associated with border pro-
tection (so-called Market Price Support or MPS)
and 37 percent from direct subsidies.
While protection remained high in industrial
countries, many developing countries have signifi-
cantly liberalized their agricultural sectors since the
early 1980s. Average agricultural tariffs, the main
source of protection in developing countries,
declined from 30 percent to 18 percent during the
1990s. In addition, these countries eliminated
import restrictions, devalued exchange rates, aban-
doned multiple exchange rate systems that penal-
ized agriculture, and eliminated almost all export
taxes. As overall taxation of agriculture declined
in developing countries, reactive protection in
response to industrial-country support to agricul-
tural producers increased, especially in food prod-
ucts. All these measures increased incentives for
agricultural production in many developing coun-
tries. However, without compensating reductions
in protection in industrial and some middle-
income countries, the result was overproduction
(beyond competitive and undistorted market
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reducing opportunities for competitive developing
countries to expand exports and rural incomes.
The structure of agricultural tariffs is compli-
cated and nontransparent. More than 40 percent of
the agricultural tariff lines in the European Union
and the United States contain specific duties,which
make it difficult to calculate average tariffs,obscure
true levels of protection, and penalize developing
countries that supply cheaper products. Specific
duties, which are rare in manufacturing, are also
used to hide high rates of protection in agriculture.
The ad valorem equivalents of specific duties,when
they can be measured, are much higher than the
average ad valorem duties.Also,a much higher pro-
portion of tariff lines in final products than in raw
and intermediate products have specific rates.Low-
income countries have more transparent tariff
regimes and tend to use ad valorem tariffs.
Average agricultural tariffs in industrial coun-
tries, when they can be measured, are some two to
four times higher than manufacturing tariffs.
Developing-country exports confront tariff peaks
as high as 500 percent in some industrial countries.
High variance and high peaks make it difficult to
measure the real impact of protection on key prod-
ucts, whose high tariff rates are buried in lower
average tariffs. This is why the OECD measure of
protection, market price support, which compares
local and international prices, shows much higher
rates of protection than do average tariffs. Tariffs
also increase by the degree of product processing,
creating an escalating tariff structure that impedes
access to processed food markets. In addition,
almost30percentof domesticproductioninOECD
countries is protected by tariff rate quotas.
Trade Preferences
Industrial countries have established tariff prefer-
ence schemes to create market access opportunities
for developing countries, especially for low-income
countries.In chapter 4,“The Impact of Agricultural
Trade Preferences on Low-Income Countries,”Paul
Brenton and Takako Ikezuki examine the impacts
of these preferences. For most developing coun-
tries, preferences have provided limited gains at
best. Many agricultural products exported from
developing countries, especially traditional tropical
products, are subject to zero duties in industrial
countries, so tariff preferences are irrelevant.
Although duties on other primary agricultural
products and processed products are often very
high, few of these products receive preferences.
Nevertheless, for a small number of products
substantial preferences are available for certain
countries, usually within strict quantitative limits.
Countries that produce sugar and tobacco, for
example, have received large transfers as a result of
these preferences.
Comparison of different preference schemes is
difficult because the schemes differ substantially.
They differ in the group of eligible countries, the
products covered, the size of the preferences
granted, and administrative requirements, espe-
cially rules of origin. These differences are a major
weakness of the current system of preferences. Dif-
ferences between preference schemes constrain the
ability of developing-country suppliers to develop
global market strategies.
In general,preferences are unilateral concessions
by industrial countries. The agreements require
renewal, and specific products can be withdrawn at
short notice. This uncertainty has impeded new
investment. The most highly protected products,
which would have the highest potential margins of
preference, are often excluded or preferences are
small. Rules of origin for processed products often
constrain the ability of countries to expand into
these products.
The value of preferences is largest in the EU mar-
ket, driven mainly by the very high EU prices for
sugar.For some countries,such as Mauritius,prefer-
ences seem to explain at least part of the relatively
strong economic performance and economic diver-
sification. For the majority of low-income coun-
tries, however, EU, Japanese, and U.S. preferences
have had little impact and have done little to stimu-
late the export of a broader range of products.
Decoupling Agricultural Support
One key challenge is to lower the effect of domestic
subsidies on world production and prices.Although
official export subsidies may be small and shrink-
ing, implicit export subsidies created by domestic
support are increasing, lending unfair advantage to
producers in industrial countries. More generally,
there is a move toward supporting agriculture
through direct subsidies rather than through border
6 Global Agricultural Trade and Developing Countriesbarriers. Some domestic support to agriculture has
moved away from being directly linked to produc-
tion to being partially decoupled, with payments
made based on historical production levels and
other mechanisms. Decoupling should reduce the
output effects of support and thus increase world
prices for the exports of developing countries. The
move to decoupled agricultural support policies is
therefore a step in the right direction.
How much has the world actually moved to
decoupled payments? What has been the net effect
on resource use, efficiency, and trade distortions? In
chapter 5, “Experience with Decoupling Agricul-
tural Support,” John Baffes and Harry de Gorter
evaluate the impact of decoupling measures in
industrial and developing countries. From 1986–88
to 2000–02, domestic subsidies paid to farmers in
OECD countries increased 60 percent. Output and
input subsidies (“large”impact programs) increased
moderately compared with the substantial increases
in payments linked to land area or number of ani-
mals, decoupled historical entitlements, or input
use and overall farm income (“smaller”impact pro-
grams). Payments based on area planted and num-
ber of animals have increased most,followed by his-
torical entitlements.
The United States took the first step toward
decoupling in the 1985 Farm Bill, which shifted the
base of support from current yields to historical
yields. In the 1996 Farm Bill the United States
replaced deficiency payments with decoupled sup-
port. The European Union partially replaced inter-
vention prices with decoupled payments following
the Common Agricultural Policy reform of 1992.
Mexico replaced price supports with decoupled
payments in 1994 with the introduction of the
National Program for Direct Assistance to Rural
Areas (Programa de Apoyos Directos al Campo
[PROCAMPO]). More recently, Turkey replaced
some price supports and input subsidies with
decoupled payments. In addition to broad decou-
pling attempts,there have been numerous one-time
buyouts, including New Zealand’s exit grant in
1984, the buyout of Canada’s grain transportation
subsidy in 1995, and the buyout of the U.S. peanut
marketing quota under the 2002 Farm Bill.
Experience designing and implementing these
programs has been mixed.Although decoupling has
led to a reallocation of resources in agriculture, its
effects have been modest. In many cases, overpro-
duction has continued. One-time buyouts have had
greater success in eliminating very inefficient
arrangements,buttheirrangeislimited.Moreatten-
tion should be given to constraints on input use,
government credibility, other support programs,
and time limits. Unless these aspects are addressed,
decoupledsupportislikelytohavethesamekindsof
undesirable effects as other subsidy programs. Pay-
ments should be time limited,provided only to help
producers adjust. The European Union and Turkey
have no time limit. The United States had (at least
implicitly) a time limit in the 1996 Farm Bill but
violated it three years later. Mexico has a time limit
and has complied with it so far.
The coexistence of coupled and decoupled pro-
grams means that incentives to overproduce
remain. In the four decoupling cases examined, all
either left some coupled support programs in place
or added new ones.Eligibility rules need to be fixed
and clearly defined. Updating the bases for pay-
ment of subsidies and adding crops results in a gov-
ernment credibility problem and reduces the effect
of the decoupling programs.
Food Product and Safety Standards
With the decline in traditional barriers to trade,
attention has focused on the potential role of stan-
dards as technical barriers to trade. Zero-duty
access means little if countries cannot meet prod-
uct standards. Chapter 6,“Agro-Food Exports from
Developing Countries: The Challenges of Stan-
dards,” by Steven M. Jaffee and Spencer Henson,
provides an overview of the impact of food safety
and agricultural health standards on developing
country agro-food exports. Standards have become
an increasingly important influence on the interna-
tional competitiveness of developing countries,
especially in the context of high-value agricultural
and food products. Some well-established sectors
that are highly export dependent have been hurt by
new and stricter standards. In several cases, devel-
oping countries have faced restrictions because of
their inability to meet food safety or agricultural
health requirements.At the same time,other devel-
oping countries have gained access to high-value
markets in industrial countries despite these
stricter standards.
The evidence in this chapter suggests a less pes-
simistic picture for developing countries than that
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riers to developing-country trade. Rising standards
accentuate underlying supply chain strengths and
weaknesses and thus have different effects on the
competitive position of different countries. In this
perspective, food safety measures must be viewed
within the context of more general capacity
constraints.
Much of the impetus for stricter food safety and
agricultural health standards is coming from con-
sumer and commercial interests, magnified by
advances in technology and new security concerns.
Thus prospects are slim for slowing this movement
or allowing poorer countries to meet lower stan-
dards. Developing countries need to find ways to
develop and improve food safety and agricul-
tural health management systems to meet these
standards.
A crucial need is for management capacity, not
only to comply with the different requirements in
different markets but also to demonstrate that
compliance has been achieved. While many coun-
tries have struggled to meet ever-stricter standards,
even some very poor countries have managed to
implement the necessary capacity, especially where
the private sector is well organized and the public
sector supports the efforts of exporters. Many poor
countries have successfully entered the demanding
seafood and fresh fruit and vegetable markets.Most
violations reported at border controls involve fail-
ures to meet simple hygiene standards.
There is no single model for all countries striv-
ing to meet the challenges posed by standards.
Institutional frameworks are required, however, to
overcome the problems associated with being poor
or small. These can include outgrower
1 programs
for smallholder farmers, systems of training and
oversight for small and medium-size enterprises
established through associations and other groups,
and twinning and regional networking for small
countries. Such efforts undoubtedly need to be
improved and refined, but they offer useful guid-
ance on effective ways to proceed.
The chapter clearly demonstrates the need for
developing countries to be proactive when facing
new food safety and agricultural health standards.
By thinking strategically, countries can program
capacity enhancement into wider and longer-term
efforts to enhance domestic food safety and agri-
cultural health management systems and export
competitiveness. Failing this, countries face the
need for potentially large-scale investments over
long periods of time to remedy violations of stan-
dards as they arise.In all of this,the public and pri-
vate sectors need to work together to identify the
most efficient and effective ways to develop capac-
ity. Food safety and agricultural health controls
must be seen as a collaborative effort in a system
that is only as strong as its weakest link.
Welfare Gains from Global Agricultural Reform
Given the magnitude of the distortions in agricul-
tural sectors in all countries, an obvious question
concerns the net impact of status quo policies and
of global reform. Models of global trade and
domestic policy reforms often yield very large
welfare gains for both industrial and developing
countries. Critics argue that many of the assump-
tions of these studies are exaggerated and that
their results should be treated with caution. In
chapter 7,“Global Agricultural Reform: What Is at
Stake?”Dominique van der Mensbrugghe and John
C. Beghin look beyond the estimates of aggregate
welfare gains to structural changes that would
emerge from multilateral trade liberalization in
agricultural and food markets, including cross-
regional patterns of output and trade.They address
some of the common criticisms of these aggregate
models and explore the implications for welfare,
trade, output, and value added of changing key
modeling assumptions. The real gains often
amount to 1 percent or less of base income,
whereas the structural changes (resource realloca-
tion) can be greater than 50 percent. The chapter
decomposes the impacts of partial reforms both
regionally and across instruments to determine the
share of the global gains that comes from reform in
industrial countries and the share from reform in
developing countries. It also examines the extent to
which border protection and various forms of
domestic support drive global gains.
The second part of the chapter addresses some of
the issues raised by critics of trade reform—notably,
thattheestimatedgainsfordevelopingcountriesare
too optimistic and that the transitional costs for
industrial-country farmers are high and too often
ignored.Theanalysislooksatthreeassumptionsthat
could influence the level of gains: the consequences
of lowering agricultural productivity growth in
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output supply response in low-income countries,
and the assumptions on the magnitude of trade
elasticities. The chapter also examines the impact of
lowering the rate of exit of industrial-country farm-
ers,includingadjustmentstotransition.
The results are broadly robust to the range of
sensitivity analyses undertaken, but trade elastici-
ties are the most important.Assuming low produc-
tivity gains in agriculture in developing countries
leads to a reversal in the estimated impact of global
liberalization for industrial countries, with an
increase in the net food trade surplus.If productiv-
ity grows slowly in developing countries, they
become much larger importers of food and agricul-
tural products, and trade reform accentuates this
tendency. Low-income developing countries expe-
rience an increase in net food trade surplus that is
much smaller than under the higher productivity
assumption. Thus different assumptions about
productivity could lead to different conclusions
about the direction of food self-sufficiency in the
aftermath of reform. Supply constraints do not
qualitatively affect the estimated impact of trade
reform on agricultural output, although estimated
changes tend to be smaller. Higher trade elasticities
dampen the adverse terms-of-trade shocks from
reforms, leading to larger income gains and higher
variations at the country level.
Commodity Studies
Nine chapters analyze the impact on global markets
of policies for selected commodity groups. The
commodity groups were selected to provide a
broad range of policy environments, to deal with
different groups of countries, and to show the
diversity of gainers and losers.
Sugar Chapter8,“Sugar:OpportunityforChange,”
by Donald O. Mitchell, looks at the sugar market,
one of the most distorted markets in the world.The
European Union, United States, and Japan together
protect sugar at some $6.4 billion a year, about the
value of total developing-country exports.On aver-
age, domestic producers in these countries receive
more than triple the world price for their output.
Among middle-income countries, Mexico, Poland,
Turkey, and almost all beet-producing, northern
developing countries also provide significant
support to their producers. Thus 80 percent of
world production and 60 percent of world trade
take place at prices much higher than world prices.
There are pressures on the European Union and
the United States to reform their sugar markets
because of internal market changes and interna-
tional commitments already made under NAFTA,
the EU Everything but Arms Program, and the
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture. Their
protectionism is unravelling, another case of
border opening forcing domestic policy discipline.
Needed reforms could be carried out in conjunc-
tion with scheduled reviews of the EU Common
Agricultural Policy in 2006 and expiration of the
U.S.Farm Bill in 2007,which could provide a target
period for getting reforms agreed on and in place.
Japan remains a bastion of protectionism, with tar-
iffs, price surcharges, and trade management by
state agencies.
Preferential and regional agreements often bar
low-cost producers from entering the internal mar-
kets covered by the agreements. Quota allocations
are concentrated in a few,often high-cost countries,
which are generally not the poorest. For example,
Mauritius has 38 percent of EU quotas. Thailand, a
very low-cost producer, is limited to a 15,000 ton
quota in the United States, whereas the Philippines
has a quota 10 times larger that often goes unfilled.
Multilateral negotiations provide an opportu-
nity to rationalize the proliferation of preferential
agreements, by phasing in multilateral liberaliza-
tion and allowing markets to allocate access on a
competitive basis. Reforms would result in a con-
traction of output in both industrial countries and
beet-producing developing countries. World prices
would rise by about 40 percent. The big gainers
would be producers in Thailand, Latin America,
and southern Africa among developing countries
and Australia among industrial countries. Con-
sumers would gain in almost every country, since
even competitive producers cover their export
losses with higher-price domestic sales. The losses
to quota holders,many of them very high-cost pro-
ducers, would be much smaller because of the
world price increases.
Dairy In chapter 9, “Dairy: World Markets and
the Implications of Policy Reform for Developing
Countries,” Tom Cox and Yong Zhu analyze the
dairy market, which is the most distorted of all the
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distorted by a complex system of domestic and inter-
national trade barriers,including surplus disposal in
the Quad countries (Canada, Japan, the European
Union, and the United States) and the Republic of
Korea. OECD support totaled $41 billion in 2002,
and tariff rates are above 30 percent worldwide. The
Quad countries and Australia and New Zealand
dominate the export market.Although Australia and
New Zealand are competitive exporters, with few
distortions, dairy interest groups in the Quad coun-
tries are strongly entrenched. Prospects for policy
reforms appear dim, especially in the European
Union and Japan. Domestic price discrimination
schemes in the European Union, the United States,
and Canada rely on the ability to close borders, sug-
gesting that the emphasis in the Doha Round negoti-
ations should be on commitments to lower border
protection.
Despite high distortion levels, the global dairy
market is dynamic, with much growth potential.
Dairy consumption in Asia has been expanding dra-
matically with income growth, urbanization, and
the westernization of diets.Innovations in foodpro-
cessing also contribute to the sector’s dynamism,
with new value-added opportunities such as dry
whey and lactose, for which trade barriers are low.
Innovations have also expanded trade opportunities
for traditional milk products such as milk powder
and butter-oil, which are transformed into final
products after importation to circumvent protec-
tion on finished products. Concentration and verti-
cal integration in industrial countries are also
important sources of economies in procurement,
processing, and logistics and lead to high levels of
foreign direct investment. Global reforms could
raise prices by 20–40 percent and lead to production
declines in the Quad countries and increases in
Australia,New Zealand,Latin America,and India.
Rice In chapter 10, “Rice: Global Trade, Protec-
tionist Policies, and the Impact of Trade Liber-
alization,” Eric J. Wailes analyzes rice, the most
important food grain in the world.On average,con-
sumers in low-income food-deficit countries get
28 percent of their calories from rice. Production
and consumption are concentrated in Asia (China,
India, and Indonesia). The rice market is a mature
market, with static demand in industrial countries
and growing demand in developing economies
driven by demographics rather than by income
growth. Prospects for growth in trade therefore rely
on policy reforms.
Tariff and related border protection are very
high,averaging about 40 percent globally and rising
to 200 percent in some markets. Support in OECD
countries is almost $25 billion. Support in Japan,
expressed in ad valorem form, is a staggering
700 percent of world prices. Tariff escalation is
systematically practiced (from paddy to milled rice)
in many countries. In the European Union the
tariff on milled rice (80 percent) is prohibitive,
except for small preferential import quotas granted
to a few countries.Tariff escalation is also prevalent
in Central and South America.Mexico has a 10 per-
cent tariff on paddy rice and a 20 percent tariff
on brown and milled rice. This pattern of protec-
tion depresses world prices for milled high-quality
long grain rice relative to prices for brown and
rough rice, creating economic hardship for millers
of high-quality long grain rice in exporting coun-
tries such as Thailand, the United States, and
Vietnam.
Net rice consumers would be negatively affected
by trade liberalization if the new consumer price
rises with reform. Prices would rise wherever cur-
rent ad valorem tariffs are lower than the potential
world price increase following liberalization, such
as in the Middle East.
Wheat In chapter 11,“Wheat: The Global Mar-
ket, Policies, and Priorities,” Donald O. Mitchell
and Myles Mielke analyze the world wheat market,
which has become less distorted since 1990. A
number of countries have undertaken reforms uni-
laterally or as a consequence of commitments
under the Uruguay Round. The European Union
and the United States have ended their export sub-
sidies,but other surplus-disposal programs,such as
nonemergency food aid and export credits, are still
in place. Most importing countries have reduced
their tariffs on wheat or allowed duty-free imports
from regional trading partners and thus benefit
from low world market prices. A few importers,
such as Japan, continue with high levels of protec-
tion that raise internal prices to more than five
times world market levels.
While wheat trade has become less distorted,
tariff escalation is high. Tariffs on flour are well
above those on wheat, and tariffs on bakery and
10 Global Agricultural Trade and Developing Countriespasta products are even higher.Consequently,trade
in wheat products is confined largely to free-trade
areas such as the European Union and NAFTA.
A major concern for wheat-importing countries
is the lack of assured access to wheat markets in
periodsof highprices.Inthe1970stheUnitedStates
imposed an export embargo on wheat, to protect
domestic consumers from high world prices. In
1995 the European Union imposed an export tax on
wheat for a similar reason. Such actions increase
international price volatility and reinforce the desire
for self-sufficiency in importing countries. Import-
ing countries need to pressure exporting countries
forassuredmarketaccessaspartof theDohaRound
of multilateral trade negotiations.
OECD countries still provide substantial sup-
port to wheat producers,but the production effects
have been partially offset by land set-aside pro-
grams and by the way support is provided. Global
liberalization is expected to raise world wheat
prices by a relatively small amount (5–10 percent)
because of large surplus capacity in major
exporters.This capacity could return to production
following policy reforms, preventing prices from
rising significantly.Big gainers would be Argentina,
Kazakhstan,and Ukraine,with some output reduc-
tion by the United States and the European Union.
Further reforms of the global wheat market should
focus on ensuring access to wheat exports during
price spikes, reducing producer support in OECD
countries,reducing protection in the few remaining
highly protected markets, and reducing tariff esca-
lation on wheat products.
Groundnuts In chapter 12,“Groundnuts:Policies,
Global Trade Dynamics, and the Impact of Trade
Liberalization,” Ndiame Diop, John C. Beghin, and
Mirvat Sewadeh analyze groundnuts, an important
product for many low-income producers and con-
sumers. There are two main groundnut markets,
one for edible groundnuts (confectionary,processed
butter and paste) and one for crushed groundnuts
(oil and cakes) used in livestock feed.The peanut oil
market is declining because of the availability of
lower-priced vegetable oils, but the confectionary
nuts market is expanding. African producers have
considerable potential in this sector, but supply
volatility, inefficient processing, and uneven quality
are challenges to their becoming dependable
exporters of confectionary products.
The policy dimension of international ground-
nut markets is a challenge largely for developing
countries. India and, to a lesser extent, China are
large, protected groundnut markets, and low-cost
producers in Argentina and Sub-Saharan Africa are
potential gainers from global reforms. The United
States, which once strongly supported the peanut
sector, eliminated major distortions with a one-
time buyout in 2002, but a now-redundant tariff of
160 percent remains. Liberalization would make
India and China net importers of some peanut
products. With trade liberalization, the bulk of
world welfare gains would occur with groundnuts
rather than with derivative products, although lib-
eralization of the value-added markets (groundnut
oil and meal) would lead to larger welfare gains
and higher rural incomes for African countries
($72 million in aggregate welfare and $124 million
in farm profits). Consumers in OECD countries
would pay higher prices for these products, but
there would be little effect on poverty. Consumers
in India and southern China, who pay for heavy
and inefficient government intervention in the sec-
tor, would be better off.
The major challenge in successful negotiations
to open groundnut product markets is to overcome
entrenched interests in India and China. Except for
the United States, industrial countries have limited
interests at stake in these markets and should not
be an impediment to reform. Moreover, U.S. pro-
ducers would benefit from the higher world prices
that would prevail under free trade, helping to off-
set reductions in U.S. tariffs.
Fruits and vegetables In chapter 13,“Fruits and
Vegetables: Global Trade and Competition in Fresh
and Processed Products,” Ndiame Diop and Steven
M. Jaffe look at another dynamic product group,
which now constitutes almost 21 percent of devel-
oping-country exports.World imports of fruits and
vegetables grew 2–3 percent a year during the 1990s,
a slowdown over the 1980s. Low population and
incomegrowthintheEuropeanUnion,whereprod-
uct markets were already mature and saturated, had
muchtodowiththeslowdown.Adversepricemove-
ments for fresh and processed products from the
mid-1990s onward also contributed to the decelera-
tion. Trade growth remained robust among NAFTA
countries, for exports to high-income Asian coun-
tries and for trade between developing countries.
Introduction and Overview 11Although many developing-country suppliers
have entered this market, relatively few countries
have achieved significant success on a sustained
basis. This is a highly competitive and rapidly
changing industry, with multiple influences on
competitiveness.
Unlike the case in many other agricultural sec-
tors, production and export subsidies are not per-
vasive in horticulture. Border controls are the main
instrument of protection. The United States, the
European Union,and Japan use a range of complex
tools, including highly dispersed ad valorem tariffs,
specific duties,seasonal tariffs,tariff escalation,and
preferential access with tariff rate quotas. Many
industrial countries have set up complex systems of
preferential access to provide a few privileged trade
partners with favorable entry without undermining
protection of domestic producers. The product
coverage of preferential access schemes is wide, but
entry is often limited by quotas for “sensitive prod-
ucts.” Tariff escalation is widespread, although its
extent varies significantly across countries.
Further tariff liberalization would be needed to
reducetariff peaks,especiallyintheEuropeanUnion
and the Republic of Korea. Changes in domestic
support will not affect the sector significantly
becausemostcountrieshavelowlevelsof directgov-
ernment intervention. Reductions in tariffs and
other import restrictions are thus critical for deter-
mining the impact of trade agreements and policies
onworldhorticulturaltrade.Still,asexperiencesug-
gests,themainbeneficiariesof suchreformswillbea
limited number of middle-income countries that
have developed strong production, post-harvest
processing, logistical marketing, and sanitary and
phytosanitary management systems and that con-
tinue to attract new investment. With few excep-
tions, low-income countries still face substantial
supply-side challenges in taking advantage of exist-
ing and future international market opportunities.
Cotton In chapter 14, “Cotton: Market Setting
and Policies,”John Baffes explores cotton, a market
with minimal border restrictions but considerable
domestic support. Cotton production is an impor-
tant source of rural income and exports in Africa
and Central Asia. In 1998–99, cotton accounted
for more than 30 percent of merchandise exports
in Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Togo, and
Uzbekistan, and 15 percent in Tajikistan. Cotton
faces intense competition from synthetic fibers,
especially following the technological improve-
ments of the early 1970s that brought prices down
to those for cotton.Since 1975 polyester and cotton
have traded at roughly the same price levels. Cot-
ton’s share of total fiber consumption has dropped
from 68 percent in 1960 to 40 percent in 2001–02.
Cotton demand has grown at the same rate as pop-
ulation growth during the last 40 years.
The major challenge for cotton is to cut back
support policies, particularly in the United States,
which subsidized cotton at a cost of $3.7 billion in
2001–02, and the European Union (Greece and
Spain), which provided subsidies of almost $1 bil-
lion.These are extremely high subsidies in a market
in which production was valued at $20 billion in
2001–02. At this level of support, U.S. and EU cot-
ton producers receive prices that are 87 percent and
160 percent,respectively,above world prices.China
has also supported its cotton sector. Many cotton-
producing developing countries have reacted to low
world prices by introducing offsetting support.
Support in Brazil,Egypt,India,Mexico,and Turkey
totaled $0.6 billion in 2001–02.
Cotton support policies reduce world prices by
some 10–15 percent, cutting the incomes of poor
farmers in West Africa and Central and South Asia.
Cotton has important implications for poverty
reduction in these countries as it is one of the most
important sources of cash in these economies. If
support were removed completely, Africa would
increase production by 6 percent and Uzbekistan
by 4 percent, while the United States would reduce
production by 7 percent and the European Union
by 10 percent.
Seafood In chapter 15,“Seafood: Trade Liberal-
ization and Impacts on Sustainability,” Cathy A.
Roheim looks beyond global trade policies to
examine the complementary issues of management
and sustainability. Seafood is one of the most
traded food commodities in the world. Developing
countries account for more than 50 percent of the
global fish product trade by value. This trade now
constitutes 20 percent of their agricultural and food
processing exports, more than tropical beverages
(coffee,cocoa,and tea),nuts and spices,cotton,and
sugar and confectionary combined. Aquaculture
has expanded to 30 percent of world seafood
production. The most valuable component of the
seafood trade is shrimp, with total world trade of
more than $10 billion in 2000.
12 Global Agricultural Trade and Developing CountriesCapture fisheries still supply the majority of fish
production, but 60 percent of the world’s fisheries
are either overused or fully used. Even with the
establishment of the 200-mile exclusive economic
zones in 1977, which brought a third of the world’s
oceans under the jurisdiction of coastal states,most
fisheries management plans have not achieved their
stated goal of maintaining sustainable fisheries.
Most seafood product trade flows from develop-
ing countries to industrial countries. In several
developing countries, fish products are a primary
source of export earnings. Trade barriers may have
significant potential for harm for these countries.
Among trade barriers, tariffs are low compared
with the effects of sanitary and phytosanitary
measures and, increasingly, countervailing and
antidumping measures. Many industrial countries
heavily subsidize their fishing sector, including
buying access to the waters of developing nations.
These subsidies and other fishing arrangements
mean that industrial countries capture a significant
portion of fishing value added. Many developing
countries do not have management policies or lack
the resources to enforce them, with the result that
capture fisheries are being depleted. Increased
aquaculture production in developing countries,
particularly of shrimp, has had adverse environ-
mental impacts along coastal areas.
The effects of trade liberalization will differ by
country, depending on domestic policies for fish-
eries and aquaculture. If trade liberalization in fish
products leads to higher prices for exporters, fish
catchesmaydeclineasalreadyoverstressedresources
are pushed past sustainable levels. This in turn will
lead to a decline in food security and, ultimately, to
unsustainable international seafood markets.
Coffee In chapter 16,“Coffee:Market Setting and
Policies,” John Baffes, Bryan Lewin, and Panos
Varangis look at a traditional tropical product, one
that does not have major trade distortions. Tariffs
are low, and there is only slight tariff escalation on
processed coffee.Yet despite this, coffee prices have
been highly volatile. This volatility reflects mainly
weather-related conditions (and to a lesser extent
currency fluctuations) in Brazil.
Coffee consumption has been stagnant (com-
mon among primary commodities), in part
because of competition from the soft drink indus-
try. Except in Brazil, Colombia, Ethiopia, and Mex-
ico, little coffee is consumed in developing coun-
tries. Efforts to expand coffee consumption in
developing countries are likely to come at the
expense of tea, a commodity produced by the same
countries that produce coffee.
Although a few large producers produce most of
the coffee, several small countries depend heavily
on coffee.In Burundi,Ethiopia,and Rwanda,coffee
accounts for more than half of total merchandize
exports. The coffee market had supply controls in
place longer than any other important commodity.
In addition to stabilizing (and perhaps raising)
prices in the short term, these agreements brought
new entrants into the coffee market. With the
exception of Colombia, Ethiopia, and, to a lesser
degree, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, and Tanzania, the
marketing regimes in coffee-producing countries
are liberal. Some 6–8 percent of coffee output is
traded outside of traditional marketing channels,as
organic, fair-trade, gourmet specialty, and eco-
friendly products. These new markets provide
higher prices to producers.
During the 1990s, Brazil expanded its coffee
production to areas less subject to frost, reducing
weather-induced supply disruptions. Vietnam
emerged as the dominant supplier of robusta
coffee, currently producing as much coffee as
Colombia. New technologies on the demand side
have enabled roasters to be more flexible in switch-
ing quickly among coffee types, implying that
premiums for certain types of coffee cannot be
retained for long. Thus the so-called coffee crisis is
more a case of new entry, faster technological
change, and so far, little exit.
Note
1.Outgrower refers to farmers producing for a larger proces-
sor under some contractual arrangement and technical advice or
oversight.
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Agriculturethe least-developed countries (table 2.1). Although
most of the world’s poor countries are in Sub-
Saharan Africa, the region accounts for only about
12 percent of the developing world’s rural popula-
tion.Asia accounts for 65 percent.
Although the share of the population in rural
areas is declining, more poor people will live in
rural areas than in cities in developing countries for
at least a generation. With urbanization, the rural
share of poor households will decline,but based on
current trends that share will not fall below 50 per-
cent before 2035 (Ravallion 2001).
Poverty
By the international $1-a-day poverty line, most of
theworld’spoorliveinChina,India,and“otherlow-
income”countries (see table 2.1). Least-developed
countriesconstitute15percentof theworld’spopu-
lation but almost 24 percent of the world’s poor.
National poverty data,which disaggregate informa-
tion by rural and urban households but are not
availableforallcountries,yieldsimilarresults.They
Despite tremendous change in the past 20 years in
global specialization and trade in manufacturing,
remarkably little structural change has occurred in
global agricultural trade flows. This chapter exam-
ines the growth and structure of agricultural trade
since the 1980s, looking at the performance of
industrial and developing countries and of specific
commodity groups.To place arguments about agri-
cultural policies in perspective, it also presents
basic statistics on rural income and poverty.
Agriculture and Rural Income
The share of agriculture in global trade has been
shrinking, as has its share in global gross domestic
product.Most successful developing countries have
not relied on agriculture for their exports. Yet for
most developing countries, growth in agriculture
has a disproportionate effect on poverty because
more than half of the people in developing coun-
tries reside in rural areas.
1 Some 57 percent of the
developing world’s rural population lives in lower-
middle-income countries, and 15 percent lives in
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India,andIndonesia—accountfor75percentof the
world’s rural poor. It is in Asia, therefore, that rural
income growth will have the greatest impact on
poverty.
In the 52 countries for which separate rural and
urban income data are available, 63 percent of the
population lives in rural areas, slightly more than
the 56 percent for developing countries as a whole
(table 2.2). Some 73 percent of poor people live
in rural areas and the incidence of poverty is higher
in rural areas in all groups of developing coun-
tries, whatever their income level. In the least-
developed countries, 82 percent of the poor live in
rural areas.
On average,farmers are poorer than nonfarmers
in developing countries but are better off than non-
farmers in industrial countries. In almost all devel-
oping countries, rural households have lower aver-
age incomes than nonrural households (figure 2.1).
The ratio of rural incomes to nonrural incomes
ranges from 40 to 75 percent, a relationship that
remains consistent across groups of developing
countries. The same relationship holds for the
middle-income OECD (Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development) countries,
such as Greece, the Republic of Korea, and Turkey.
2
Farm household incomes are around 75–80 percent
of nonfarm incomes.
The opposite is true in many high-income
OECD countries.Average farm household incomes
are higher than average household incomes
(figure 2.2). Average farm household incomes are
almost 275 percent of average household incomes
in the Netherlands, 175 percent in Denmark,
160 percent in France, and 110 percent in the
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TABLE 2.1 Distribution of Poor People in Developing Countries, 1999
Poverty Headcount
Percentage of (under $1/day)
Population 2001 Developing Number of (millions) World’s Rural Rate Poor People
Country Category National Rural Urban Population (percent) (millions)
Least-developed countries 596 443 153 74 15 49 292
Other low-income countries 839 501 338 60 17 26 218
excluding India
Middle-income countries 1,435 478 957 33 16 8 114
excluding China
China 1,272 805 467 63 27 18 226
India 1,032 745 288 72 25 35 358
Total 5,175 2,972 2,203 57 100 23 1,209
Source: World Bank data.
TABLE 2.2 Rural Population and Poverty for a Sample of 52 Developing Countries
(percent)
Sample Countries All Developing Countries
Share of Rural Share of Poor Share of Rural
Income Group Dwellers in Rural Areas Dwellers
Upper-middle-income countries 19 37 22
Lower-middle-income countries 64 72 61
Low-income countries 65 74 60
Least-developed countries 76 82 68
All developing countries 63 73 56
Note: Sample consists of 52 countries for which separate rural and urban income data are available.
Source: World Bank data.The Evolution of Agricultural Trade Flows 19
FIGURE 2.1 Ratio of Farm Household Income to Nonfarm Household Income for
Selected Developing Countries, Various Years













FIGURE 2.2 Ratio of Farm Household Income to All Household Income for Selected
High-Income Countries 











Note: The ratio is for farm household income to all households except in Japan, where it is farm household
income to workers’ household income. 
Source: OECD 2002 and 2003.
Source: Eastwood and Lipton 2000.United States and Japan. In most other high-
income countries, average farm incomes are either
equal to or very slightly lower than the average
household income (OECD 2002).
Structure of Income Sources
In addition to these differences in relative rural and
nonrural income levels between developing and
industrial countries, the two groups of countries
have different structures of income sources. Most
rural households in poor countries are dependent
on agriculture. Rural households in Ethiopia,
Malawi, and Vietnam, for example, derive about
three-quarters of their income from agricultural
activities, mainly subsistence farming (table 2.3).
Wages are the second-largest income source, with
some of the wage income originating in agricul-
ture. For example, in Malawi, where 8 percent of
total income is from wages, 3 percentage points of
that income is from agriculture. In Mexico, where
40 percent of total income is from wages and only
26 percent is directly from agriculture, 24 percent-
age points of wage income is from agriculture,
bringing agriculture’s contribution to almost
50 percent.
As countries develop, the share of nonfarm
income in rural households increases, so that agri-
cultural price and output variations have a smaller
direct impact on rural households (figure 2.3).
3 In
most industrial countries,the share of farm income
in total household income declines even further, as
other sources of income gain a larger share (salaries
andwagesfromotheractivities;investmentincome;
and social transfers from health, pension, unem-
ployment, and child-allowance schemes). While
ratios of farm to nonfarm income are higher for
some European countries, definitional differences
make reliable comparisons across countries very
difficult (OECD 2002).
Income Distribution
It is often argued that income distribution in rural
areas of developing countries is highly unequal and
thatthegainsfromglobalreformscouldaccruepri-
marily to the well-to-do rather than to the rural
poor. Gini coefficients for a group of developing
andindustrialcountriesindicatethatdespiteclaims
to the contrary, income distribution in most devel-
oping countries is more equitable in rural house-
holds than in nonrural households (table 2.4). This
is true for both low- and middle-income countries.
The opposite is true in industrial countries.
In industrial countries the largest farm
operations, generally the most profitable and
wealthiest, receive most of the benefits of support
systems.Subsidy programs are not intended to keep
small, struggling family farms in business but to
provide large rents to large-scale farmers. Current
production-basedpolicies,byincreasinglandprices,
also encourage the creation of larger farms and the
elimination of small family farms. The unintended
spillover effects of these policies on other countries
and on global markets are large and negative.
Agricultural protection in rich countries would
appeartoworsenglobalincomedistribution.Farm-
ers in industrial countries earn more on average
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TABLE 2.3 Structure of Rural Household Incomes, Selected Developing Countries
(percent)
Ethiopia Malawi Vietnam Pakistan Mexico
Type of Income 2000 1997 1993 1989 2000
Total agricultural income 77 76 63 45 26
Agricultural cash income 18 16 — — 22
Subsistence farming 59 60 — — 4
Transfers 16 7 1 9 23
Wages 3 8 21 31 40
Other 4 9 15 15 11
Total 100 100 100 100 100
— Not available.
Source: World Bank household data.than the national income average, and most farm
aid goes to the largest and wealthiest farmers.At the
other end of the global income spectrum, more
poor people in developing countries tend to live in
ruralareas.Agriculturalsupportinindustrialcoun-
tries tends to depress world prices and demand for
the agricultural products of developing countries
andtolowerruralincomes.Globaltradereforms,to
the extent that they transfer resources from well-to-
dofarmersinindustrialcountriestopoorerfarmers
in developing countries, will thus improve global
income distribution while reducing global poverty.
Broad Trends in Agricultural Trade 
The last two decades have been a period of very
rapid export growth from developing countries,
aided by the growth of the world economy and the
lowering of trade barriers, as well as by increasing
supply capabilities in developing countries. The
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Note: Data are averages of three most recent years available.
Source: OECD 2002.
TABLE 2.4 Urban and Rural Income Inequality, Selected Countries and Years
Low-Income Rural Urban Middle-Income Rural Urban High-Income Rural Urban
Countries Gini Gini Countries Gini Gini Countries Gini Gini
Bangladesh 1996 0.26 0.36 Mexico 1996 0.34 0.40 Australia 1994/95 0.36 0.31
Pakistan 1991 0.41 0.39 Turkey 1994 0.46 0.58 Canada 1994 0.30 0.29
Sri Lanka 1990/91 0.28 0.35 Colombia 1988 0.47 0.49 Denmark 1992 0.32 0.23
Indonesia 1990 0.26 0.35 Costa Rica 1984 0.41 0.48 Finland 1995 0.26 0.22
Lesotho 1993 0.55 0.58 Peru 1994 0.37 0.35 France 1994 0.29 0.29
Madagascar 1980 0.44 0.49 India 1997 0.30 0.36 Ireland 1987 0.37 0.32
Tanzania 1993 0.35 0.42 China 1995 0.34 0.28 Italy 1995 0.43 0.34
Uganda 1992 0.35 0.44 Rep. of Korea 1987 0.12 0.42 Netherlands 1994 0.31 0.26
Malawi 1997–98 0.33 0.52 Thailand 1986 0.45 0.46 Norway 1995 0.20 0.24
Nigeria 1996 0.42 0.50 Malaysia 1987 0.42 0.43 Spain 1990 0.28 0.31
Burkina Faso 1995 0.40 0.45 Philippines 1991 0.39 0.47 United States 1994 0.37 0.37
Source: OECD 1999 for the high-income countries; National Statistics Office for Malawi; World Bank data for
Nigeria; Ozmucur and Silber 2000 for Turkey; and Eastwood and Lipton 2000 for the remaining countries.resulting increased import and export shares in
total output have been a key source of growth in
many developing countries. This growth has been
fastest in manufacturing, where global levels of
protection have been reduced significantly. Growth
has been slower in agriculture, where significant
protection still remains.
4
While the 1990s were a period of rapid trade
reform in developing countries and of implemen-
tation of Uruguay Round commitments, the
Uruguay Round seems not to have yielded any
meaningful reduction in protection in industrial
countries (see chapter 3). Protection in OECD
countries increased during the 1960s and 1970s,
reaching its peak in the late 1980s. There is little
evidence that protection decreased significantly in
the 1990s. In many cases, protection might even
have increased in the 1990s through “dirty tariffica-
tion”(Nogues 2002; Ingco 1997).
Growth in Agricultural Trade
World agricultural trade in 2000–01 was $467 bil-
lion, up from $243 billion in 1980–81.
5 Real manu-
facturing and agriculture trade expanded at similar
rates during the 1980s (5.7 and 4.9 percent a year),
but real manufacturing export growth accelerated
to 6.7 percent a year during the 1990s, while agri-
cultural export growth decelerated to 3.4 percent
(table 2.5).
The picture is similar for developing countries.
Their manufacturing export growth accelerated
and agricultural export growth stagnated during
the 1990s. Manufacturing export growth rates
increased both to other developing countries and
to industrial countries, while agricultural export
growth rates increased to other developing coun-
tries but decreased to industrial countries.
These differential growth rates are reflected in
the shares of exports in world trade in developing
countries (table 2.6). Their share in manufacturing
exports rose dramatically, from 19 percent in
1980–81 to 33 percent in 2000–01, with higher
exports to both developing countries and industrial
countries. In agricultural trade, developing coun-
tries lost market shares during the 1980s and barely
recovered during the 1990s to their 1980–81 level of
around 36 percent. All of this gain in the 1990s
came from expansion of exports to other develop-
ing countries. Despite these changes in the shares,
nearly half of world agricultural trade takes place
among industrial countries.
The deceleration in growth of world agricultural
trade reflects the decline in real import growth
rates of industrial countries,from 4.8 percent a year
in the 1980s to 2.3 percent in the 1990s.
6 Over that
same period, real import growth rates for develop-
ing countries accelerated from 4 percent to 6.1 per-
cent a year.
Two explanations have been proposed for the
decline in import growth in industrial countries: a
lower elasticity of demand for agricultural products
in industrial countries and the decline in commod-
ity prices in the 1990s. Gross domestic product
(GDP) growth slowed from 3.0 percent a year in
the 1980s to 2.3 percent a year during the 1990s in
industrial countries, while rising from 3.1 percent
to 3.7 percent in developing countries. Unless there
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TABLE 2.5 Average Annual Real Export Growth Rates, 1980s and 1990s
(percent)
Developing Countries
Developing to Developing to
World Total Developing Countries Industrial Countries
1980–81/ 1990–91/ 1980–81/ 1990–91/ 1980–81/ 1990–91/ 1980–81/ 1990–91/
Sector 1990–91 2000–01 1990–91 2000–01 1990–91 2000–01 1990–91 2000–01
Agriculture 4.9 3.4 5.3 5.3 4.2 7.2 5.9 4.4
Manufacturing 5.7 6.7 7.4 10.9 7.1 12.1 7.5 10.3
Note: Manufacturing imports are adjusted by the manufactures’ unit value. World agricultural trade is
adjusted by commodity price index with world trade weights, and developing country exports are
adjusted by the same index with developing country trade weights. 
Source: COMTRADE. was a significant change in income elasticities
between 1980s and 1990s, however, these changes
in GDP growth rates are not large enough to
explain the declines in real import growth rates.
Faster liberalization in developing countries can
explain some of the increases in their faster import
growth rates. However, experience in the last two
decades also shows that the correlation between
demand and trade growth is not very high over the
medium and short run, when changes in trade
regimes and competitiveness will have bigger
impacts (box 2.1 shows the relationship between
demand and import growth for selected products
in industrial countries).
As for the decline in commodity prices, these
were greater during the 1980s than the 1990s and so
could not have been the cause of the decline in
growth rates (table 2.7).
Intheabsenceof specialization,slowingdemand
growthwillleadtoslowingimportgrowthif output
growth does not also slow.Agricultural production
indexes show a slight acceleration of production
growth rates for industrial countries and no change
fordevelopingcountries(table2.8).Thusthedecel-
eration in import growth rates is not reflected in a
decelerationinsupply,andasignificantcomponent
of demand is met by domestic supply.
Agricultural Trade Shares
The evidence that the agricultural trade shares
of developing countries have not increased is
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TABLE 2.6 Shares of Developing and Industrial Countries in World Exports,
1980–81 to 2000–01
(percent)
Developing Countries Industrial Countries
Sector by Destination 1980–81 1990–91 2000–01 1980–81 1990–91 2000–01
Agriculture
Total 37.8 33.0 36.1 62.2 67.0 63.9
To developing countries 13.4 10.5 13.7 18.9 14.5 15.6
To industrial countries 24.3 22.4 22.4 43.4 52.5 48.3
Manufacturing
Total 19.3 22.7 33.4 80.7 77.3 66.6
To developing countries −6.6 7.5 12.3 21.7 15.2 19.0
To industrial countries 12.7 15.2 21.1 59.0 62.1 47.6
Source: COMTRADE.
TABLE 2.7 Changes in Agriculture Price Indices, 1980s and 1990s
(percent)
Item 1980–81/1990–91 1990–91/2000–01
U.S. farm products (producer price index) 4.7 −6.8
Raw commodities (world trade weights) −8.3 −6.6
Raw commodities (developing countries’ weights) −22.7 −15.2
Source: World Bank.
TABLE 2.8 Average Annual Agricultural







Source: FAO Agriculture Production Index.A trade flow matrix for the years 1980–81,
1990–91,and 2000–01 shows the details of nominal
agricultural trade flows among different groups of
countries (table 2.9). The European Union is the
largest trader, with exports of $181 billion and
imports of $197 billion. Developing countries as a
block are the second largest trader, with exports of
$162 billion and imports of $128 billion.
Trade among industrial countries dominates
global agricultural trade,most of it within the trade
blocs such as the European Union and NAFTA
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BOX 2.1 Role of Demand and Changes in Market Share 
Low income elasticities for agricultural products,
especially in industrial countries, are identified as
the primary reason for the slowdown in global
agricultural trade growth. These low income
elasticities are contrasted with higher income
elasticities for manufactured products. While
trade and demand growth are highly correlated
in the long run, it is not clear whether they are in
the medium run. Variables such as level and
changes in protection and the degree of com-
parative advantage play an important role. 
If world trade expands primarily because of
increases in demand, then slower agricultural
trade can be explained by lower income elastici-
ties and lower income growth in industrial coun-
tries. But if the primary cause of trade expansion
over the medium run is restructuring of produc-
tion and changes in both imports and exports,
without commensurate changes in total demand,
then changes in trade regimes can explain a sig-
nificant part of trade growth. Since the mid-
1970s merchandise trade has expanded much
faster than demand, showing the importance of
production restructuring. Unfortunately, the sys-
temic information that is necessary to decom-
pose the determinants of export growth exists
only for manufacturing. The information for agri-
culture is very limited.
When manufacturing (including food process-
ing) import growth to industrial countries
(Canada, Germany, Japan, and the United States)
is decomposed between demand and market
share changes, demand growth accounted for
32 percent of import growth and changes in
market share for 68 percent. For imports from
developing countries, growth contributed only
21 percent while changes in market share con-
tributed 79 percent (Aksoy, Ersel, Sivri 2003).
consistent with other partial findings.Within a nar-
rower definition of agriculture, and focusing
mostly on key commodities, OECD (2001) data
show that import shares of these agricultural com-
modities in key industrial countries have not
increased since 1986. For many agricultural com-
modities, imports as a share of world consumption
stagnated. For some commodities, such as sugar
and wheat, there has been significant import sub-
stitution since the 1960s and 1970s, when the
OECD countries greatly increased their protection.
Demand and Import Growth in Selected Industrial Countries, 1991–99
(percent)
Import Import Growth 1991 Market Shares
Industrial Country Growth from from Developing Developing
Sectors Demand Growth
a the World  Countries World Countries
Food processing 15.82 26.65 14.46 6.41 2.42
Garments 14.35 57.29 73.08 43.19 33.80
Glass products  13.06 63.54 71.99 14.24 4.30
a. Includes Canada, Germany, Japan, and the United States. 
Source: Aksoy, Ersel, Sivri 2003. 
The examples of food processing, garments,
and glass products illustrate the lack of a strong
relationship between import and demand
growth. The three subsectors have similar
demand growth rates but very different import
growth rates. The import growth rates are differ-
ent not only for imports from developing coun-
tries but for imports from the rest of the world as
well. Depending on policy regimes and changes
in policy regimes, trade growth rates can be very
different from growth rates in demand.The Evolution of Agricultural Trade Flows 25
(North American Free Trade Agreement). This
intrabloc trade accounts for more than a third of
global agricultural trade. In 2000–01 industrial
country agricultural exports to other industrial
countries totaled $226 billion. Of that, $131 billion
was intra-EU trade (almost 58 percent) and $35
billion was intra-NAFTA trade. Agricultural trade
among industrial countries excluding intra-EU and
intra-NAFTA was only $60 billion.
Agricultural trade within trade blocs as a share
of total trade is not only high, but it has increased
during the last 20 years. Intra-EU agricultural
imports increased from 51 percent of total agricul-
tural imports in 1980–81 to 66 percent in 2000–01;
intra-NAFTA imports rose from 29 percent to 44
percent. This increase shows how removing tariff
barriers can stimulate trade.
Trade among developing countries is also
increasing,with more than 50 percent of their agri-
cultural imports coming from other developing
countries. Only 39 percent of their agricultural
exports are to other developing countries, however,
showing the continuing importance of industrial-
country markets for their exports. Other develop-
ing countries accounted for 39 percent of exports
from low-income countries and 51 percent of
imports in 2000–01,increases from  26 percent and
41 percent, respectively, in 1980–81. Shares for
middle-income countries were similar, with other
developing countries accounting for 39 percent of
their exports and 50 percent of their imports in
2000–01. Developing countries have become major
players in the world agricultural trade, especially if
intra-EU and intra-NAFTA trade is excluded.
TABLE 2.9 Global Agricultural Trade Flows
(US$ billion)
Exporters Low- Middle- Other
Income Income Developing Industrial Total
Importers Countries Countries
a Countries EU-15 Japan NAFTA Countries Imports
Low- 1980–81 0.86 2.16 3.03 2.19 0.20 1.42 0.63 7.47
income 1990–91 0.81 2.52 3.33 1.17 0.06 1.22 0.73 6.52
countries 2000–01 1.50 4.48 5.98 2.01 0.06 1.99 1.78 11.82
Middle- 1980–81 3.05 25.73 28.78 14.55 1.02 20.03 6.51 70.88
income 1990–91 4.05 29.72 33.77 17.41 1.32 19.30 7.18 78.99
countries
a 2000–01 9.20 48.44 57.64 22.85 1.74 23.42 10.71 116.36
Developing 1980–81 3.91 27.89 31.80 16.74 1.21 21.45 7.14 78.34
countries 1990–91 4.85 32.25 37.10 18.59 1.39 20.52 7.92 85.51
2000–01 10.70 52.92 63.63 24.86 1.80 25.41 12.49 128.18
EU-15 1980–81 7.20 22.89 30.09 53.82 0.24 15.44 5.55 105.15
1990–91 7.66 33.76 41.42 116.81 0.28 9.99 9.42 177.92
2000–01 9.65 37.81 47.46 131.33 0.15 9.57 9.38 197.89
Japan 1980–81 1.13 6.64 7.77 1.22 — 9.20 2.56 20.74
1990–91 1.85 14.61 16.47 3.78 — 14.65 4.32 39.23
2000–01 2.52 19.21 21.73 4.83 — 17.61 5.11 49.28
NAFTA 1980–81 2.62 11.67 14.30 4.42 0.37 8.86 2.78 30.73
1990–91 2.06 15.02 17.08 7.96 0.42 15.52 3.54 44.53
2000–01 3.72 21.95 25.67 12.60 0.54 34.80 4.77 78.38
Other 1980–81 0.47 1.68 2.14 3.79 0.06 1.53 0.62 8.15
industrial 1990–91 0.40 2.31 2.71 7.01 0.07 1.66 1.09 12.54
countries 2000–01 0.54 3.24 3.79 7.22 0.08 2.15 1.70 14.94
Total 1980–81 15.33 70.77 86.10 79.99 1.89 56.48 18.64 243.10
exports 1990–91 16.81 97.95 114.77 154.16 2.15 62.35 26.29 359.72
2000–01 27.14 135.13 162.27 180.84 2.57 89.55 33.45 468.67
— Not available.
Note: All data are import-based and all the exports and imports are evaluated at c.i.f. (cost, insurance, and
freight) prices.
a. Includes China and India.
Source: COMTRADE.26 Global Agricultural Trade and Developing Countries
Since 1980–81 the biggest change in net agricul-
tural trade flows has been the relative decline in EU
imports from the rest of the world and the increase
in its export share (table 2.10). In 1980–81 the
European Union was the largest importer in the
world, accounting for 32 percent of world imports.
By 2000–01 its import share had dropped to 23 per-
cent and its export share had increased to 16 per-
cent (from 13 percent). Its trade deficit declined as
well, from $25 billion in 1980–81 to $19 billion in
2000–01. The opposite has happened in NAFTA,
whose trade surplus has decreased. Japan has been
the world’s largest net importer of agricultural
products since 1990–91, and Australia and New
Zealand combined have surpassed NAFTA as net
exporters.
The combined trade surplus of developing
countries increased to $34 billion in 2000–01, from
$8 billion in 1980–81. They have a trade surplus
with all groups of countries except Australia and
New Zealand.
Distribution of the Trade Expansion
A contentious issue in the literature has been the
trade performance of low-income countries. Many
analysts have argued that the low-income countries
have not benefited from the expansion in global
trade.Thisisonlypartiallytrueinagriculture.Low-
income countries’ share of world exports fell from
6.3 percent in 1980–81 to 4.3 percent in 1990–01
and barely recovered to 5.8 percent in 2000–01.
TABLE 2.10 Agricultural Trade Flows (excluding Intra-EU and Intra-NAFTA Trade), 1980–81
to 2000–01
(US$ billion)
Country Group and Period Exports Imports Net Imports
Low-income developing countries
1980–81 15.33 7.47 −7.86
1990–91 16.81 6.52 −10.30
2000–01 27.14 11.82 −15.32
Middle-income developing countries
a
1980–81 70.77 70.88 0.11
1990–91 97.95 78.99 −18.96
2000–01 135.13 116.36 −18.77
EU-15
1980–81 26.17 51.32 25.16
1990–91 37.34 61.10 23.76
2000–01 49.51 66.56 17.06
NAFTA
1980–81 47.62 21.86 −25.75
1990–91 46.83 29.01 −17.82
2000–01 54.75 43.57 −11.17
Japan
1980–81 1.89 20.74 20.74
1990–91 2.15 39.23 39.23
2000–01 2.57 49.28 49.28
Other industrial countries
1980–81 18.64 8.15 −10.49
1990–91 26.29 12.54 −13.76
2000–01 33.45 14.94 −18.51
a. India and China are included under the middle-income developing countries.
Source: COMTRADE and computations by the author.The Evolution of Agricultural Trade Flows 27
However, if intra-EU and intra-NAFTA trade are
excluded, their share increases from 8.5 percent in
1980–81 to 8.9 percent in 2000–01.As measured by
export and import performance, the 1980s were a
period of decline for low-income countries, while
the 1990s were a period of major expansion.
Their overall trade surpluses, however, have
risen throughout the period, from $7.8 billion in
1980–81 to $15 billion in 2000–01. Low-income
developing countries have a trade surplus with
industrial countries and with middle-income
developing countries, and both of these surpluses
have increased since 1980. Their exports have
increased as well, primarily to other developing
countries. In 2000–01 low-income countries
exported more to other developing countries than
to the European Union, while in 1980–81 they
exported only half as much. Some analysts have
argued that it is primarily small low-income coun-
tries that have performed poorly, but the results do
not change if the low-income countries are divided
into small and large countries. Trade expanded
for both groups during the 1990s, and both have
increased their trade surpluses in agriculture
(table 2.11).Smaller low-income countries did per-
form much worse than large low-income countries
during the 1980s, however, when their exports and
imports declined.
TABLE 2.11 Agricultural Trade Flows of Developing Countries, by Groups, 1980–81 to 2000–01
(US$ billion) 
Group and Period Exports Imports Net Imports
Low-income, small
1980–81 10.63 3.26 −7.37
1990–91 10.06 2.39 −7.67
2000–01 14.95 4.45 −10.5
Low-income, large
a
1980–81 4.7 4.21 −0.49
1990–91 6.75 4.13 −2.62
2000–01 12.19 7.38 −4.81
Middle-income, large exporters
b
1980–81 20.26 17.73 −2.53
1990–91 25.94 18.47 −7.47
2000–01 38.4 18.11 −20.29
Middle-income, Asian importers
c
1980–81 5.28 12.62 7.34
1990–91 9.54 22.77 13.23
2000–01 7.22 28.49 21.27
China and India
1980–81 7.14 5.87 −1.27
1990–91 15.13 6.56 −8.57
2000–01 23.67 14.12 −9.55
Other middle-income
1980–81 38.09 34.65 −3.44
1990–91 47.34 31.19 −16.15
2000–01 65.85 55.64 −10.21
a. Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Pakistan.
b. Argentina, Brazil, and Thailand.
c. Republic of Korea, Hong Kong (China), Singapore, Taiwan (China).
Source: COMTRADE and World Bank calculations.28 Global Agricultural Trade and Developing Countries
Middle-income countries, however, performed
worse during the 1990s, becoming smaller net
exporters, with a shrinking trade surplus with the
rest of the world.There are large differences in agri-
cultural trade performance among the middle-
income countries. Argentina, Brazil, and Thailand
are becoming major exporters (see table 2.11).
These countries,which do not have highly distorted
agricultural trade regimes, are frequently cited as
potential gainers from global liberalization. The
upper-middle-income manufacturing exporters in
East Asia, another group of developing countries,
are becoming major importers of agricultural com-
modities, along with Japan. Of these, the Republic
of Korea and Taiwan (China) have distorted trade
regimes, while Hong Kong (China) and Singapore
have liberal trade regimes. With liberalization,
China and India,with one-third of the world’s pop-
ulation, could emerge as major global exporters
and importers.While they have trade surpluses,the
surpluses did not increase significantly during the
1990s. The remaining middle-income countries
experienced rapid trade growth during the 1990s,
but their trade surpluses shrank considerably dur-
ing this period. The significant trade liberalization
among developing countries since the 1980s, espe-
cially among middle-income countries, could
explain some of the expanding imports of these
countries.
Disaggregated Export and Import Performance
To get an accurate sense of changes in trade, it is
important to measure the contributions of differ-
ent product groups to those changes.
7 Many ana-
lysts argue that the markets for traditional exports
to industrial countries are static because of both
low income elasticities and product substitution.
For example, coffee and tea have been partially
displaced by soft drinks, cotton by synthetic fibers,
and sugar by high-fructose corn syrup (see com-
modity chapters).
Toexaminethedetailedflows,agriculturalprod-
ucts were separated into four groups. One group
consists mainly of developing-country tropical
products,suchascoffee,cocoa,tea,nuts,spices,tex-
tile fibers (mostly cotton), and sugar and confec-
t i o n a r yp r o d u c t s .As e c o n di sm a d eu po fh i g h l y
protected temperate zone products of industrial
countries, such as meats, milk and milk products,
grains, animal feed, and edible oil and oilseeds. A
third category consists of dynamic nontraditional
products,suchasseafood,fruits,vegetables,andcut




Import growth rates in industrial countries have
declined across all these agricultural product
groups (table 2.12). The decline does not originate
with price declines, which were greater during the
1980s than the 1990s,or with slower import growth
of tropical products, whose share was only 16 per-
cent in 1990–91. Industrial countries’ growth in
imports from both developing and other industrial
countries declined during the 1990s,while develop-
ing countries’import growth rates accelerated in all
four product groups. Again, the differences in
import growth rates of developing countries
between the 1980s and the 1990s are striking, sug-
gesting a significant role for the trade liberalization
of the late 1980s and 1990s (see chapter 3).
Changes in Trade Structure
The structure of world trade in agriculture has
changed since the 1980s along with overall trade
growth rates. Expanding groups include fruits and
vegetables, which now have the largest share of
world exports at 19 percent; fish and seafood, at
12 percent; and alcoholic and nonalcoholic bever-
ages, at almost 9 percent (table 2.13). While these
product groups tend to have high income elastici-
ties,they also have low rates of protection in indus-
trial and large developing countries.
Product groups that show significant declines
are grains, from 17 percent to 10 percent; coffee,
cocoa, and tea, from 8.5 percent to 5.4 percent;
sugar and confectionary products,from 6.4 percent
to 3.1 percent;and textile fibers,from 5.9 percent to
2.8 percent. These declines result from a combina-
tion of price declines, low demand elasticities, and,
in the case of sugar and grains, expanded produc-
tion in industrial countries.
For developing countries the biggest decline in
export shares has come in their traditional tropical
products,such as coffee and cocoa,while the biggest
gains have come in nontraditional exports, such as
seafood and fruits and vegetables. For protected
products, such as grains, the increase in exportThe Evolution of Agricultural Trade Flows 29
shares during the 1990s are due exclusively to
expanding trade among developing countries; these
products lost shares in industrial-country markets
and gained them in developing-country markets.
Market share gains for beverages come primarily
from expanding exports of wine and beer to both
developing- and industrial-country markets.
Whatever the causes for these changes, analysis
of agricultural trade for developing countries now
needs to focus on the new commodities, such as
seafood, fruits, vegetables, and cut flowers, and on
other processed products, which together consti-
tute almost 50 percent of the exports of developing
countries. Temperate zone products constitute
another 28 percent, while the traditional products
that have received most of the attention in the liter-
ature now constitute only 19 percent of the exports
of developing countries. Attention also has to be
placed on further expanding trade within develop-
ing countries in temperate zone products such as
milk, grains, and meats, whose trade within devel-
oping countries has already increased significantly.
TABLE 2.12 Annual Import Growth Rates for Four Classifications of Agricultural Products,
1980s and 1990s
(percent) 
Developing Countries Industrial Countries
1980–81/ 1990–91/ 1980–81/ 1990–91/
Product Classification 1990–91 2000–01 1990–91 2000–01
Tropical products
Coffee, cocoa, and tea, 1.9 5.1 −0.6 1.6
raw and processed
Nuts and spices 1.4 4.7 5.0 3.8
Textile fibers 3.8 0.8 0.2 −5.9
Sugar and confectionary −5.7 3.7 0.4 0.2
Subtotal  0.3 2.9 0.2 0.1
Temperate products
Meats, fresh and processed 2.2 2.9 6.1 1.2
Milk and milk products 1.9 3.0 6.3 1.8
Grains, raw and processed −1.3 1.6 0.4 1.8
Animal feed 5.3 5.9 3.8 1.2
Edible oil and oil seeds 2.0 6.8 1.3 1.0
Subtotal 0.7 3.5 3.6 1.4
Seafood, fruits, and vegetables
Seafood, fresh and processed 8.8 7.7 10.4 3.3
Fruits and vegetables,
fresh and processed 2.8 6.4 8.3 1.9
Subtotal 4.4 6.8 9.0 2.4
Other processed products
Tobacco and cigarettes 8.5 4.1 6.6 3.3
Beverages, alcoholic 4.9 6.6 8.8 4.6
and nonalcoholic
Other processed food 5.6 11.9 13.6 4.9
Other −2.0 2.6 0.2 0.6
Subtotal 3.9 6.0 7.4 4.0
Total 1.4 4.3 5.1 2.0
Source: COMTRADE. 30 Global Agricultural Trade and Developing Countries
These developments show that many developing
countries can compete in the product categories
historically dominated by industrial countries and
that trade reforms in industrial sectors could lead
to a large expansion of exports from these develop-
ing countries.
Industrial-country export structures have also
changed, with a decline in exports of protected
productsandexpansioninexportsof beveragesand
fruits and vegetables (including intra-EU trade).
Greater domestic production of sugar, grains, and
other protected products has made many industrial
countries more self-sufficient and reduced their
exports to each other.
Degree of Processing
Despite significant tariff escalation in processed
products,trade has moved toward processed (final)
agricultural products and away from raw material
and intermediate products.
8 In 1980–81 final prod-
ucts made up slightly more than a quarter of world
exports, and raw and intermediate products made
up two-thirds. By 2000–01 the share of final prod-
ucts had increased to 38 percent of total exports
(table 2.14). The share of final products in exports
increased for both developing and industrial coun-
tries, but in 2000–01 final products still constituted
only 10 percent of the exports from low-income
TABLE 2.13 The Structure of Agricultural Exports, 1980–81 to 2000–01
(percent of total world trade) 
Developing-Country Industrial-Country
Exports Exports World Exports
1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000
Product Classification –81 –91 –01 –81 –91 –01 –81 –91 –01
Tropical products
Coffee, cocoa, and tea, 18.3 11.0 8.5 2.5 2.9 3.6 8.5 5.6 5.4
raw and processed
Nuts and spices 2.4 2.7 2.8 0.7 0.7 0.8 1.3 1.3 1.5
Textile fibers 8.0 6.2 3.3 4.5 3.9 2.6 5.9 4.7 2.8
Sugar and confectionary 10.5 4.6 4.3 3.9 2.8 2.3 6.4 3.4 3.1
Subtotal 39.2 24.4 18.9 11.6 10.3 9.3 22.0 14.9 12.7
Temperate products
Meats, fresh and processed 7.2 8.3 6.0 14.8 15.7 15.4 11.9 13.2 12.0
Milk and milk products 0.3 0.7 1.1 7.9 7.9 7.6 5.0 5.5 5.2
Grains, raw and processed 9.3 4.9 7.0 21.6 13.8 11.6 16.9 10.9 9.9
Animal feed 7.5 7.9 8.5 7.7 5.1 5.3 7.7 6.0 6.4
Edible oil and oil seeds 4.6 5.7 5.5 4.8 4.4 4.4 4.7 4.8 4.8
Subtotal 28.8 27.5 28.1 56.9 46.8 44.2 46.3 40.4 38.3
Seafood, fruits, and vegetables
Seafood, fresh and processed 6.9 15.9 19.4 5.5 8.2 8.0 6.0 10.8 12.2
Fruits, vegetables, and cut 14.7 22.2 21.5 13.1 17.2 17.3 13.7 18.9 18.9
flowers
Subtotal 21.6 38.2 41.0 18.7 25.5 25.4 19.8 29.7 31.0
Other processed products
Tobacco and cigarettes 2.6 3.1 3.3 3.0 4.2 4.8 2.8 3.8 4.2
Beverages, alcoholic and 1.1 1.8 3.6 6.9 9.5 11.5 4.7 6.9 8.6
nonalcoholic
Other products and 6.7 5.0 5.2 3.0 3.8 5.0 4.4 4.2 5.1
processed food
Subtotal 10.4 9.9 12.1 12.8 17.5 21.2 11.9 15.0 17.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: COMTRADE.The Evolution of Agricultural Trade Flows 31
countries, compared with 46 percent from indus-
trial countries.
Tariff escalation has slowed the growth of trade
in final products.Shares of final products are much
higher within trading blocs,where there are no tar-
iffs, than as shares of exports to the rest of the
world.For example,in 2000–01 final products con-
stituted 49 percent of intra-EU exports but 39 per-
cent of EU exports to the rest of the world. For
NAFTA final products constituted 38 percent of
intra-NAFTA exports but 32 percent of NAFTA
exports to the rest of the world. For developing
countries, however, the share of final products in
2000–01 exports was the same (around 25 percent)
for exports to developing countries and to indus-
trial countries (table 2.15).
More detailed disaggregation of export flows by
degree of processing does not yield much more
information than the aggregate flows. The export
share of final products increased for tropical and
temperate product groups. For seafood and fruits
and vegetables, the shares of final product stayed
the same because of the higher value of fresh pro-
duce. In tropical products trade among industrial
countries is now primarily trade in final products.
Export Shares by Product and Region
Developing countries lost agricultural market
shares during the 1980s, mainly because the
increase in their shares of seafood and fruit and
vegetable exports was not great enough to compen-
sate for the decline in tropical product exports
(table 2.16).During the 1990s developing countries
increased their export shares for most product
groups, while the loss of market share in tropical
products slowed.
The geographical structure of developing-
country exports has changed little since the 1980s.
Sub-Saharan Africa is the only region that has not
made up the market share losses of the 1980s.
Despite preferential access, Africa’s export share in
industrial-country markets has halved. The other
regions made a comeback in the 1990s.
Conclusion
The incidence of poverty is much higher in rural
areas than in urban areas in developing countries,
the average incomes are much lower,and even with
rapid urbanization, the rural share of the poor will
not fall below 50 percent before 2035. In industrial
countries average farm household incomes are
higher than average household incomes.The shares
of nonfarm income in total farm household
incomes are much higher in industrial countries
than in developing countries, partially shielding
farmers from price and supply shocks. Finally, the
distribution of income is more equitable in rural
areas in developing countries than in urban areas,
while the opposite is true for industrial countries.
Remarkably little structural change has occurred
in global agricultural trade since the early 1980s,
unlike the significant changes in global specializa-
tion and trade in manufacturing. Unlike the case
with manufacturing,developing countries have not
been able to increase their export shares in agricul-
ture. They have maintained their global trade
shares by expanding exports to other developing
countries. Again unlike the case with manufactur-
ing and services, trade-to-output ratios in agricul-
ture have not increased. Import growth rates accel-
erated in developing countries and decelerated in
industrial countries during the 1990s. These results
are consistent with significant trade liberalization
inmanufacturinginbothdevelopingandindustrial
countries and reforms in agricultural trade regimes
only in developing countries. Developing countries
TABLE 2.14 Share of Agricultural Final Products in Exports, 1980–81 to 2000–01
(percent)
Developing Developing Low- Developing Middle- Industrial
Years World Countries Income Countries Income Countries
a Countries
1980–81 27.3 15.5 6.6 17.4 33.8
1990–91 33.2 19.1 7 21.2 39.8
2000–01 38.3 24.8 10.4 27.8 45.6
a. Includes China and India.
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TABLE 2.16 Export Shares by Product and Region, 1980–81 to 2000–01
(percent of world trade)
Exports to Exports to
Developing Countries Industrial Countries Total Exports
1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000
Item –81 –91 –01 –81 –91 –01 –81 –91 –01
Tropical products
Industrial countries 2.4 1.9 1.8 4.4 4.6 3.7 6.8 6.5 5.5
Developing countries 4.4 2.5 2.6 10.0 5.0 3.7 14.4 7.5 6.3
Americas 1.8 0.7 0.8 4.9 2.2 1.5 6.7 2.9 2.4
East Asia And Pacific 1.1 0.7 0.6 1.5 0.9 0.8 2.5 1.6 1.3
Europe and Central Asia 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.7 0.4 0.5
Middle East and North Africa 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.2
South Asia 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.9 0.8 0.5
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.5 0.3 0.5 2.8 1.4 0.9 3.2 1.7 1.4
Subtotal 6.8 4.4 4.5 14.4 9.6 7.4 21.2 14.0 11.8
Temperate products
Industrial countries 12.7 8.8 8.4 22.7 22.5 19.8 35.4 31.3 28.2
Developing countries 5.4 4.3 5.8 5.5 4.8 4.4 10.9 9.1 10.2
Americas 2.2 1.3 2.7 2.1 2.3 2.2 4.3 3.7 4.9
East Asia And Pacific 1.7 1.9 1.7 2.0 1.4 1.2 3.7 3.2 3.0
Europe and Central Asia 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.6 1.3 1.2 1.2
Middle East and North Africa 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3
South Asia 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.4 0.6
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.8 0.3 0.3
Subtotal 18.1 13.1 14.2 28.2 27.3 24.2 46.3 40.4 38.3
Seafood, fruits, and vegetables
Industrial countries 1.8 1.6 2.5 10.2 15.9 14.0 12.0 17.4 16.5
Developing countries 2.0 2.4 3.3 6.6 10.7 12.1 8.6 13.1 15.4
Americas 0.4 0.4 0.8 2.2 3.8 4.3 2.6 4.1 5.1
East Asia And Pacific 0.8 1.3 1.4 2.3 3.8 4.3 3.0 5.1 5.7
Europe and Central Asia 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.7 1.2 1.3 0.9 1.4 1.7
Middle East and North Africa 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.9 0.8
South Asia 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.8
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.8 1.0 0.8 0.9 1.2
Subtotal 3.8 3.9 5.8 16.8 26.6 26.1 20.6 30.5 31.9
Other processed products
Industrial countries 2.0 2.2 2.9 6.0 9.5 10.6 8.0 11.7 13.5
Developing countries 1.7 1.4 2.0 2.3 1.9 2.3 3.9 3.3 4.4
Americas 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.9 0.5 0.6 1.4
East Asia And Pacific 1.2 0.9 1.0 1.3 0.8 0.8 2.5 1.7 1.8
Europe and Central Asia 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.4
Middle East and North Africa 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2
South Asia 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4
Subtotal 3.6 3.6 4.9 8.3 11.4 13.0 11.9 15.0 17.9
Total
Industrial countries 18.9 14.5 15.7 43.4 52.5 48.1 62.2 67.0 63.8
Developing countries 13.4 10.5 13.7 24.3 22.4 22.5 37.8 33.0 36.2
Americas 4.6 2.6 4.8 9.5 8.8 9.0 14.1 11.4 13.8
East Asia And Pacific 4.7 4.8 4.8 7.1 6.9 7.1 11.8 11.7 11.9
Europe and Central Asia 1.4 0.9 1.4 2.0 2.4 2.4 3.4 3.3 3.7
Middle East and North Africa 0.7 0.6 0.9 0.6 0.8 0.7 1.3 1.4 1.5
South Asia 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.9 1.0 2.1 2.0 2.0
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.9 0.7 0.9 4.2 2.6 2.3 5.1 3.3 3.3
Total 32.3 25.0 29.4 67.7 75.0 70.6 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: COMTRADE.34 Global Agricultural Trade and Developing Countries
lost export market shares during the 1980s, mainly
because of the collapse in the value of tropical
products,and made up the loss during the 1990s by
increasing their shares of other commodities.
Trade among industrial countries still domi-
nates world agricultural trade flows, with much of
the trade taking place within trading blocs, such as
the European Union and NAFTA. Trade among
developing countries has expanded, especially dur-
ing the 1990s, when most developing countries
grew faster than they had in the past and liberalized
their trade regimes.The middle-income developing
countries have now become the biggest single mar-
ket for the exports of low-income developing coun-
tries. Despite the belief of many to the contrary,
low-income countries have increased their trade
surplus in agricultural commodities over the last
two decades,especially during the 1990s.
Some change has taken place in the product mix
of global agricultural trade.The shares of nontradi-
tional products, such as seafood, fruits, and vegeta-
bles, have increased, and the shares of traditional
tropical products have decreased. Seafood, fruits,
and vegetables,and processed foods now constitute
about 50 percent of the agricultural exports of
developing countries. Temperate zone products,
such as grains, dairy, and meats, constitute another
28 percent. Traditional exports, such as tea, coffee,
cocoa, sugar, cotton, nuts, and spices, now consti-
tute a very small share of exports. This suggests the
need for more attention to global and country poli-
cies for nontraditional product groups.
There is also a move toward greater trade in final
products. However, most of this trade takes place
within trade blocs,such as the European Union and
NAFTA, primarily because of steeply escalating tar-
iffs. Despite significant reforms, the European
Union has become more self-sufficient in agricul-
ture,and its net trade deficit has shrunk.During the
1990s, Japan became the biggest net importer of
agricultural commodities, followed by the Asian
Tigers:theRepublicof Korea,Taiwan(China),Hong
Kong (China),and Singapore.Sub-SaharanAfrica is
the only developing-country region that has not
regained the market share lost during the 1980s.
Althoughlinkingthislackofchangetotradepoli-
cies is not straightforward, the next chapter shows
thatagriculturaltradepoliciestendtobemuchmore
restrictive than manufacturing policies. This very
high protection in agriculture has slowed the move-
ment of production to more competitive producers
andcreatedmuchmorestaticglobaltradeflows.
Notes
1. Global poverty rates estimated on a consistent interna-
tional poverty line of $1 a day are not disaggregated by rural and
urban populations. Such disaggregated data are available only
for national poverty rates, which vary across countries, and the
country coverage of these surveys is limited. Data here are from
52 country household surveys conducted between 1990 and
2001.
2. The information and data are not identical, however.
There is a difference between rural households and farm house-
holds. One is a locational definition, while the other is defined
by the sources of income.
3. Of course, in most regions where agriculture is the pri-
mary activity, income from nonfarm sources is also related to
agriculture. In regions where there are other nonfarm-related
activities, or other transfers, the relationship between off-farm
income and farm income will not be so close.
4. Annex 2 in the attached CD-ROM has detailed product
coverage by degree of processing, description of the commodity
groups, the concordance between nomenclatures, the country
coverage, country income and geographic classifications, and
detailed trade flows by more detailed commodity groups.
5. This study uses a broad definition of the agricultural sec-
tor that includes fisheries as well as raw agricultural commodi-
ties and processed food products. This classification includes all
stages of processing and results in economically consistent data
series. See the CD-ROM for the details of the coverage and defi-
nition of subgroups.Data for the European Union-15 have been
used for all periods. Mexico is included in NAFTA and not in
developing countries. For comparability over time, trade within
the Commonwealth of Independent States is excluded from
developing-country trade data for 1990–2001, as is trade within
the former Yugoslavia and within the Southern African Customs
Union. Data on imports are used in most cases, but export data
are used for the following countries and years: United Arab
Emirates 2000–01, Bulgaria 1980–81 and 1990–91, German
Democratic Republic 1980–81, Iran 1980–81 and 1990–91,
Kuwait 2000–01, Lebanon 1980–81 and 1990–91, Libya
2000–01, Romania 1980–81, Sudan 1990–91, Soviet Union
1980–81, South Africa 1990–91, China 1980–81, and intra-EU
flows for 2000–01.
6. The deceleration of the world trade growth rates was not
caused by price declines in the 1990s. In nominal terms, import
growth declined from 5.1 percent a year in the 1980s to 2.1 per-
cent in the 1990s in industrial countries, while rising from
1.4 percent to 4.3 percent in developing countries.
7. The price series are not consistent with the trade cate-
gories so the disaggregated flows discussed in this section are
based on nominal trade data.
8. To have consistent data going back to 1980, this analysis
uses Standard International Trade Classification (SITC 1),which
is not as precise as the Harmonized System in separating the
products by degree of processing.Thus the results are not as pre-
cise as they are under the Harmonized System classification.
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2 In industrial countries the higher returns
created by protection led to capital-intensive and
supposedly efficient agricultural sectors, creating
the impression that their higher yields reflected
comparativeadvantageratherthanpublicsupport.
This pattern of incentives began to change with
the reforms in developing countries. Over the last
two decades many developing countries have
moved from taxing agriculture to protecting it.
Agricultural protection continues to be the most
contentious issue in global trade negotiations.
1
The high protection in industrial countries was the
main cause of the breakdown of the Cancún Minis-
terial Meetings in 2003. Although protection for
manufacturing products in both industrial and
developing countries has declined significantly and
overall trade reforms have been adopted in devel-
oping countries, agricultural protection in indus-
trial countries has changed very little.
Untilthe1990sindustrialcountriesgenerallypro-
tected agriculture while developing countries gener-
ally taxed it (Krueger,Schiff,andValdes 1992;World
Bank 1986). Industrial countries supported their
agricultural sectors through subsidies to producers,
high tariffs, and other nontariff measures such as
importrestrictionsandquotas.Whilethisprotection
was acknowledged in the economic literature and in
global discussions, its implication for developing
countriesreceivedmuchlessattention.
Until the late 1980s and 1990s many developing
countries generated a large portion of their agricul-
tural gross domestic product (GDP) in lower-
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Most of this change has come not through increas-
ing protection on agricultural products but
through eliminating import restrictions and lower-
ing tariffs on manufactured products, devaluing
exchange rates, abandoning multiple exchange rate
systems that penalized agriculture, and eliminating
export taxes (World Bank 2001; Jansen, Robinson,
and Tarp 2002; Quiroz and Opazo 2000).
Meanwhile,reforms in most industrial countries
have been modest—despite the inclusion of agri-
culture under the World Trade Organization
(WTO) Uruguay Round of international trade
negotiations. Increasing the incentives for agricul-
tural production in many developing countries
without lowering the incentives in industrial coun-
tries led to overproduction and price declines for
many commodities, reducing opportunities for
many developing countries to expand exports and
rural incomes (see chapter 2).
This chapter evaluates both the broad trends
in agricultural protection and the structure of
protection in key industrial and developing
countries. Specific issues, such as the impact of
preferences, decoupled support, and other forms
of protection,are covered in the following chapters,
as are the structure and levels of protection for
selected individual commodities.
Uruguay Round Agreement on
Agriculture
Since the 1980s major reforms have been made in
protection regimes around the world,both through
unilateral reform of tariffs and quantitative import
restrictions and through undertakings within the
Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations.
Most developing countries have eliminated export
taxes; average tariffs have declined rapidly; and
other import restrictions, such as foreign exchange
allocations for import, have effectively disappeared
(World Bank 2001).
Industrial countries have also started to reduce
distortions in their agricultural trade policies.
Agricultural trade policies were brought into the
global trade negotiations for the first time in the
1994 Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture
(URAA). Before then, import barriers in agricul-
ture were coupled with the widespread use of
production-related subsidies,such as price supports,
which in some countries increased production above
the competitive market equilibrium level.
With the intention of aligning agricultural trade
rules with the rules applying to trade in other goods,
negotiators agreed that all barriers to imports,other
than those in place for health and safety reasons,
should be subject to tariffs only. Before agreeing on
tariff reductions,countries had to convert all border
measures to their tariff equivalents—a process
called tariffication—by calculating the difference
between domestic and world market prices (the
price-gap method). Once tariff equivalents were
established, reductions were applied to bound tar-
iffs.Developed countries were to reduce tariffs by an
average of 36 percent and a minimum of 15 percent
over 6 years.Developing countries had lower targets
of a 20 percent reduction and a minimum of 10 per-
cent over 10 years.
3 For cases of very high tariffs or
import quotas that had allowed in some imports,
minimum and current market access opportunities
were also negotiated. Usually, a minimal tariff rate
(called a tariff rate quota,or TRQ) was set for a lim-
ited volume of imports.
With the removal of nontariff measures, some
countries were concerned about not being able to
prevent sudden surges in imports. To allay these
concerns, negotiators agreed that a special agricul-
turalsafeguardcouldbeappliedtocertainproducts.
The URAA offered limited opportunities for
undertaking minimum import commitments
for certain products rather than adopting tariffs for
them.This option was taken by Japan,the Republic
of Korea, and the Philippines for rice and by Israel
for certain sheep and dairy products. Japan and
Korea have now tariffed their rice imports.
Similar efforts were made to reduce the distort-
ing effect of subsidies. Subsidies were classified by
degree of distortion: a Red Box for prohibited sub-
sidies, an Amber Box for subsidies that had to be
reduced, and a Green Box for nondistorting subsi-
dies.The negotiators decided to treat export subsi-
dies separately, so the Red Box disappeared, and
the Amber Box became the core of the negotia-
tions. A new Blue Box was created to cover direct
payments to producers under production-limiting
programs that were considered to be less trade dis-
torting than pure market price supports (Ingco
and Nash 2004).
Amber Box
To measure domestic support and establish a basis
for reductions,a total aggregate measure of supportwas created based on support to agriculture during
the base period, 1986–88. The measure covered
market price support and production-related
subsidies to farmers.Each country agreed to reduce
its supports on the basis of this measure. Industrial
countries committed to reduce support by 20 per-
cent by 2000, and developing countries committed
to a 13.3 percent reduction by 2004.Countries with
no Amber Box supports agreed not to use supports
over a de minimis level of 5 percent (10 percent for
developing countries) of the total value of agricul-
tural production.
Green Box
To qualify as a Green Box measure, requiring no
reduction, a subsidy must have no or almost no
trade-distorting effect and must be provided
through publicly funded government programs.
Despite these general requirements, the Green Box
covers a wide range of programs.
Blue Box
A special exemption from reduction commitments
covers payments made under production-limiting
programs, provided that the payments are based
on fixed areas, crop yields, livestock numbers, or, if
the payments are variable, on 85 percent of the
base level of production. These payments replaced
traditional market support payments in the Euro-
pean Union (EU) and elsewhere that had led to
overproduction or had become too expensive to
maintain.
Evolution of Agricultural Protection
in Industrial and Developing
Countries
Review of the experience with the new rules on
market access, export subsidies, and domestic sup-
port shows only modest effects. One reason is that
support levels were at historically high levels during
the base period selected (1986–88). In some coun-
tries,such as the United States,reforms undertaken
before the negotiations were adequate to achieve
compliance with the new rules on reducing domes-
tic support (OECD 2001).
OECD Countries
Two different sets of data are available to estimate
the degree of protection in agriculture. The most
comprehensive coverage is for OECD (Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development)
countries: all the industrial countries and a few
middle-income developing countries. The focus is
on selected agricultural commodities that constitute
60–70 percent of domestic agricultural output.
Food processing and seafood are generally not
covered.
Agricultural protection in OECD countries is
measured using three instruments. One is market
price support, the difference between domestic and
international prices caused by border barriers such
as tariffs and quantitative restrictions. It measures
the total impact of border barriers on the prices of
domestic production and is equivalent to border
protection weighted by domestic production. Bor-
der barriers are the major tool of protection and
account for about 70 percent of total protection in
OECD countries. A second instrument is direct
support, the direct production-related subsidies
given to farmers. A third is the general support
given to agriculture through research, training,
marketing support,and infrastructure.This instru-
ment is not usually included in overall production
support estimates.In addition,many countries have
subsidies for consumers. These subsidies generally
do not affect production and so are not included in
producer support estimates.
The second measure of support is the border
protection measured by average tariffs, a measure
available for all countries.Both the market support
price and the average tariff rate are used to com-
pare protection across time and across countries.
Both measures have limitations. Average tariffs
measure protection on all agricultural commodi-
ties, including products that are not produced
domestically,while the market price support meas-
ures show only the protection rate for locally pro-
duced commodities. In countries such as the
United States that produce a large number of agri-
cultural commodities and have a diversified agri-
cultural sector or in which the degree of protection
on locally produced and imported commodities is
similar, these two measures tend to be very close
(figure 3.1). In countries such as Japan where local
production is highly specialized or locally pro-
duced commodities have different rates of protec-
tion from imported commodities, the two meas-
ures will differ much more. Average tariffs also fail
to give a clear picture of real protection for domestic
producers when the variances in tariff rates are large
Global Agricultural Trade Policies 39and the peaks on key domestically produced com-
modities are very high.
Average tariffs underestimate the real degree of
protection given to local producers in industrial
countries and overestimate protection in the
OECD developing countries (see figure 3.1). Thus
the low average tariffs in industrial countries,
which are compared with higher average tariffs
in developing countries, are highly misleading.
Industrial countries protect commodities produced
domestically much more than commodities that
are not produced locally. Developing countries, in
contrast, seem to protect commodities that are not
produced locally more than commodities that are.
Most of the analysis of protection in OECD
countries covers the post-1986 period because sys-
temic data have been collected since then. Other
estimates, though not exactly comparable over
time, indicate that the 1986–88 baseline was a
period of peak protection levels in the OECD (fig-
ure 3.2) and that the significant increase in protec-
tion took place during the 1960s and 1970s.
Since 1986–88, when data become more consis-
tent, overall protection (total support) for agricul-
tural producers in the OECD, including border
protection and direct subsidies,fell from 63 percent
of gross agricultural output at world prices to
45 percent in 2000–02 (table 3.1).The contribution
of border barriers to total protection came down
from 77 percent to about 63 percent. If the 1960s
and 1970s are used as the base, however, protection
has risen in most OECD countries.
The overall protection rate, which declined rap-
idly after 1986 to a low of 42 percent in 1995–97,
began to rise after 1997 as world agricultural prices
declined (figure 3.3). This recent increase is driven
both by higher domestic prices compared with
international prices and by increases in direct sup-
port. This overall cyclical movement is observed in
most major countries and groups (European
Union, Japan, and the United States). The counter-
cyclical movement of border protection indicates
that the concept of full ad valorem tariffication is
not complete and that the instruments for increas-
ing protection as global prices decline are still oper-
ative.Direct subsidies also increased as world prices
declined because most direct subsidies are tied to
the differences between a floor and a world price
and increase when world prices decline.
The European Union and the United States
marginally reduced their overall support during
1986–2002. In the European Union the prices
40 Global Agricultural Trade and Developing Countries























Market price support Average tariffs
Note: Market price support figures are calculated using the 2000 and 2001 average except for the Slovak
Republic, which uses just the 2000 average.
Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and World Trade Organization Integrated
Database.received by farmers were 65 percent higher than
international prices in 1986–88 and 30 percent
higher in 2000–02. Similarly, in the United States
domestic prices declined from 16 percent higher
than international prices to 9.3 percent higher. In
the United States the primary source of support is
direct subsidies to farmers. The level of subsidy
stayed around 17 percent, much higher than the
level of border barriers. The prices are set at world
or close to world levels. During the 1990s the
European Union also lowered many domestic
prices and moved to support farmers through
direct subsidies, some coupled and some partially
decoupled. Thus, direct production-related pay-
ments to farmers increased from 10.5 percent to
23 percent, partially compensating for the decline
in border barriers. So, while the type of support
changed from border measure to different forms of
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FIGURE 3.2 Nominal Rates of Agricultural Support in OECD Countries 1965–2002
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Source: OECD PSE database, except ABARE (1999) for 1965–74 and author’s calculation for 2000–02.
TABLE 3.1 Percentage of Farm Gate Prices Attributable to Border Protection and
Direct Subsidies by Country and Group, 1986–2002, Evaluated at World
Prices
Market Price Support Total Producer
(Border Protection) Direct Subsidies Support Estimate
1986 1995 2000 1986 1995 2000 1986 1995 2000
Country or Group –88 –97 –02 –88 –97 –02 –88 –97 –02
OECD 48.2 28.2 28.1 4.3 13.3 16.7 62.5 41.5 44.9
European Union 65.3 28.3 30.3 10.5 20.4 23.1 75.8 48.8 53.4
United States 16.0 7.5 9.3 18.3 7.4 16.9 34.3 14.9 26.2
Japan 145.4 131.7 131.5 16.8 13.0 14.4 162.1 144.7 146.0
Eastern European 45.2 8.7 14.1 18.3 4.8 8.0 63.6 13.5 22.1
countries
a
Australia and 4.2 2.8 0.3 6.4 3.9 3.2 10.6 6.8 3.6
New Zealand
Canada 53.1 42.6 10.9 11.1 12.8 12.1 64.2 55.4 23.0
Other developing 31.4 38.1 44.2 6.4 8.0 8.4 37.8 46.1 52.6
OECD
b countries
a. Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and the Slovak Republic.
b. Republic of Korea, Mexico, and Turkey.
Source: OECD. PSE Database.direct support, there was very little reduction in
overall protection (see chapter 5).
Among the middle-income countries of the
OECD, the Eastern European countries had the
largest reductions in protection,from about 64 per-
cent in 1986–88 to 18 percent in 2000–02. The
Republic of Korea always had very high protection,
and it has stayed high, with small variations.
Mexico and Turkey, which started with low protec-
tion, increased it over this period, mainly through
higher border protection.
These numbers support the hypothesis that the
Uruguay Round did not have a significant impact
on the levels of agricultural support in OECD
countries, especially the large industrial countries
(Ingco 1997; Messerlin 2002; Nogues 2003; OECD
2001). Thus, despite the implicit promise by indus-
trial countries that agriculture would follow the
path of manufacturing, with protection rates con-
tinuously declining—one of the reasons developing
countries embraced trade liberalization—this has
not happened.
Other Developing Countries
In contrast to the modest changes in agricultural
protection in OECD countries, changes in protec-
tion in most developing countries have been signif-
icant. From the 1960s to the 1980s, despite high
tariffs on agricultural products, most developing
countries had negative total protection rates on
agriculture, a result of both direct protection,
including tariffs and taxes on agricultural products,
and indirect protection caused by protection of
industry and exchange rate overvaluation (Schiff
and Valdes 1992; World Bank 1986). In a sample of
15 developing countries studied by Schiff and
Valdes (1992), all but the 3 OECD middle-income
countries had negative direct protection rates and
negative total protection rates on agriculture. Of
the 3 OECD middle-income countries, the total
protection rate was marginally positive for the
Republic of Korea and Portugal (table 3.2).
The average agricultural tariff in developing
countries declined from 30 percent in 1990 to
18 percent in 2000, a significant drop (figure 3.4).
4
These reductions were complemented by elimina-
tion of import licensing, most export taxes, and
many quantitative restrictions (World Bank 2001).
Overvaluation of exchange rates, the main source
of the bias against agriculture, decreased or was
eliminated during the 1990s in most developing
countries. On average, tariffs are now much higher
in agriculture than in manufacturing, a reversal of
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Source: OECD for 1986–2001; author’s calculation for 2002. Agricultural price data is from the U.S.
Department of Agriculture and is deflated by the manufacturing unit value index.the tendency during the 1980s of greater protection
for the industrial sector.
A study of 15 developing countries by Jansen,
Robinson, and Tarp (2002) also concludes that the
bias against agriculture had been largely elimi-
nated. They find that by the end of the 1990s the
economywide system of indirect taxes, including
tariffs and export taxes, significantly discriminated
against agriculture in only one country, was largely
neutral in five, provided a moderate subsidy to
agriculture in four,and strongly favored agriculture
in five. Quiroz and Opazo (2000), updating Schiff
and Valdes (1992) for Latin America, also conclude
that direct protection and protection due to higher
tariffs in manufacturing have fallen but that
exchange rates appreciated, reversing some of the
lower protection for exportable commodities.
Current Structure of Agricultural
Protection
The overall support given to agricultural producers
in OECD countries through higher domestic prices
and direct production-related subsidies was $228
billion during 2000–02 (table 3.3). About 63 per-
cent, or $143 billion, of this came from border bar-
riers and market price support, and 37 percent
from direct subsidies to farmers. The bulk of the
support went to temperate-climate products such
as milk, meats, grains, and sugar.
Aggregate support levels in OECD countries vary
significantly. Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland have
very high levels of support,through both high border
protection and high direct payments. At the other
extreme, Australia and New Zealand have very low
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FIGURE 3.4 Average Most-Favored-Nation Applied Tariffs for Agricultural and



















Note: Tariff rates are simple averages of countries’ unweighted tariffs.
Source: TRAINS.
TABLE 3.2 Agricultural Protection Rates in Selected Developing Countries
Tax Due to
Group Direct Protection Industrial Protection Total Protection
Developing countries
a −13.0 −27.8 −35.7
OECD middle-income countries
b 17.8 −28.4 −3.6
a. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Ghana, Malaysia, Morocco,
Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Zambia.
b. Republic of Korea, Portugal, and Turkey.
Source: Schiff and Valdes 1992, table 2-1.support levels. Japan and the Republic of Korea have
high support levels mainly through higher tariffs and
quantitative restrictions. In between are the European
Union toward the higher end and Canada toward the
lower end.
This section evaluates tariff regimes for agricul-
tural products for 6 industrial and 24 developing
countries within the context of the objectives of the
Uruguay Round. The selection of countries was
constrained by the lack of recent detailed tariff
schedules for most countries.
5
The countries are placed in four groups for
analysis:theQuadcountries(Canada,theEuropean
Union, Japan, and the United States); eight large
middle-income countries with significant agricul-
tural sectors (Brazil, China, India, the Republic of
Korea, Mexico, South Africa, Russian Federation,
and Turkey); eight other middle-income countries,
to ensure regional balance (Bulgaria, Costa Rica,
Hungary, Jordan, Malaysia, Morocco, Philippines,
and Romania); and eight low-income countries
(Bangladesh,Guatemala,Indonesia,Kenya,Malawi,
Togo,Uganda,andZimbabwe).Theanalysisfocuses
on tariffs because they are the only comparable
measure of protection and support across countries
and because lower, more transparent tariff struc-
tures were a key objective of the Uruguay Round.
Tariff Transparency
The objective of achieving greater transparency of
protection levels through tariffication has not been
fully realized, especially in the key industrial coun-
tries and some middle-income countries. Many
tariffs are still specific,compound,or mixed,making
it almost impossible to estimate real protection lev-
els,since these will change with the price of imports.
Protection rates rise as the world prices of products
decline, increasing protection levels for lower-priced
products originating from developing countries.
6
Transparency in agriculture is significantly
greater in developing countries than in industrial
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TABLE 3.3 Agricultural Support in OECD Countries, 2002–02
(billions of U.S. dollars)
Eastern
United European Emerging European




Producers 46.97 92.19 47.50 30.49 4.41 227.54
General services 24.29 8.02 12.25 5.98 0.57 53.08
Consumers 22.24 3.64 0.42 0.97 0.06 34.26
Total 93.50 103.85 60.17 37.44 5.05 314.88
Products that receive support
Milk 11.25 16.11 4.63 2.53 1.03 40.14
Beef and pork 1.99 25.05 3.50 2.63 0.73 36.65
Rice 0.92 0.25 16.47 7.21 na 25.00
Wheat 3.99 8.97 0.89 0.36 0.31 15.31
Corn 6.80 2.41 na 1.32 −0.10 10.64
Other 22.02 39.40 22.00 16.46 2.45 99.81
Source of producer support 
Border measures
c 16.63 52.24 42.80 25.60 2.81 142.66
Domestic measures
d 30.34 39.95 4.70 4.89 1.60 84.89
na – not applicable.
a. Republic of Korea, Mexico, and Turkey.
b. Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovak Republic.
c. Tariffs and tariff equivalents of other border measures.
d. Direct payments to producers.
Source: OECD 2003 and authors’ calculations.countries (figure 3.5). Of the 24 developing coun-
tries in the sample, only 4 have non-ad-valorem
ratesinmorethan5percentof tariff lines—Bulgaria
(13.5 percent), South Africa (25 percent), Russian
Federation(31percent),andTurkey(6percent)—all
of themmiddle-incomecountries.Of theremaining
20 countries, 4 have them in less than 5 percent of
tariff lines, 5 in less than 1 percent; 11 have none.
Within the Quad, Japan has specific, compound, or
mixed rates in 15 percent of its tariff lines, Canada
in 24 percent, the United States in 40 percent, the
EuropeanUnionin44percent,andNorway,withthe
highest share of any industrial country, in 54 per-
cent. The European Union also has duties that vary
accordingtothecontentof theproductsin4percent
of itstariff lines,andtheUnitedStatesin1percentof
its tariff lines. Thus, transparency of tariff rates is
consistently weaker for industrial countries and a
few middle-income countries than for most devel-
oping countries.
The pattern of specific duties varies across coun-
tries. In the United States almost all categories of
products have non-ad-valorem rates between 30
and 60 percent of tariff lines. In the European
Union some product groups, such as milk, grains,
sugar, and beverages have non-ad-valorem duties
in more than 90 percent of tariff lines.In the devel-
oping countries that have specific duties, they are
clustered within a few product groups. For exam-
ple, in Malaysia they are on tobacco and alcohol
products, in Mexico on chocolate and confec-
tionary products, sugar, nuts, and spices.
Specific duties are found almost exclusively
in agriculture. For example, in the United States,
which has the highest percentage of non-ad-
valorem duties in manufacturing, only 8 percent of
tariff lines in manufacturing are non-ad-valorem,
compared with 43 percent in agriculture. The
European Union has almost no non-ad-valorem
duties in manufacturing, but 44 percent of its tariff
linesinagriculturehavenon-ad-valoremrates.Thus
theuseof specificdutiesisnotageneraladministra-
tive arrangement but is limited to agriculture.
More detailed analysis of the incidence of spe-
cific duties suggests that they are being used prima-
rily as an instrument of disguised protection. First,
the average ad valorem equivalents of specific
duties, where available, are much higher than the
average ad valorem rates, as shown for four coun-
tries that reported the ad valorem equivalents of
non-ad-valorem rates (table 3.4).This suggests that
reported average duties are seriously underesti-
mated for countries with a large proportion of
non-ad-valorem duties.
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Note: Covers tariff lines with specific, compound, or mixed duties.
Source: World Trade Organization Integrated Database (most-favored-nation applied duties).Second, the share of tariff lines with non-ad-
valorem duties increases with the degree of pro-
cessing and is highest in final products, which are
generally classified under food-processing indus-
tries. For example, in the European Union, the
share of non-ad-valorem tariff lines is 22 percent
for raw materials but 43 percent and 58 percent for
intermediate and final products (table 3.5). In the
Russian Federation the share of non-ad-valorem
duties in tariff lines is 12 percent for raw materials
but 53 percent for final products.
Levels of Tariff Protection
The conversion of nontariff barriers to tariffs under
the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture was
an important step forward, but in most industrial
and developing countries average agricultural tar-
iffs are much higher than average tariffs for non-
agricultural products and continue to restrict trade
(table 3.6).
The tariff data presented here, especially for
industrial and some middle-income countries,
seriously underestimates actual border protection
for domestic producers. Specific duties are not
reflected in the averages, and they are generally
higher than ad valorem rates (see table 3.4). The
reported ad valorem equivalents of specific duties
for the European Union and the United States are
much higher than the ad valorem rates. Assuming
the same pattern for Canada and Japan,which have
non-ad-valorem rates for 25 percent and 15 percent
of their tariff lines, respectively, Quad average
tariffs are being significantly underestimated. The
degree of bias is indicated by the third column in
table 3.6 showing the proportion of tariff lines to
which the average tariffs apply.
Except for Canada, which has a large proportion
of non-ad-valorem tariffs without equivalents, aver-
age tariffs are much higher in agriculture than
in manufacturing. The difference is especially
pronounced in the European Union, where the
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TABLE 3.4 Average Ad Valorem and Specific Duty Rates
(percent)
Country or Average ad Valorem Average ad Valorem Tariff Share of Non-ad-
Group Tariff Equivalent of Specific Duties Valorem Lines
Australia 1.2 5.0 0.9
United States 10.6 35.2 43.6
European Union 21.6 58.0 40.4
Jordan 8.1 11.7 0.8
Note: Average applied, out-of-quota, ad valorem, and ad valorem equivalents of non-ad-valorem tariffs for
which equivalents are reported.
Source: World Trade Organization Integrated Database (most-favored-nation applied duties).
TABLE 3.5 Proportion of Non-Ad-Valorem Tariff Lines by Degree of Processing 
(percent)
Country or Group Raw Intermediate Final
Norway 41.39 58.84 68.53
European Union 22.05 45.27 57.54
United States 37.91 43.05 41.34
Canada 17.14 23.01 30.20
Russian Federation 11.79 9.74 53.06
Turkey 0 5.22 12.70
Note: Tariff Lines containing specific, compound, or mixed duties, as a percentage of all lines.
Source: World Trade Organization Integrated Database (most-favored-nation applied duties).average tariff is 19 percent in agriculture and 4.2 per-
cent in manufacturing. Among developing countries
the results are similar, with a few exceptions such as
Brazil and Indonesia, whose manufacturing tariffs
are marginally higher (less than 1 percentage point).
Only in Malaysia are tariffs much higher in manufac-
turing (9.7 percent) than in agriculture (2.8 percent).
Developing countries in the sample have higher
agricultural tariffs than industrial countries, with
Morocco (64 percent), the Republic of Korea
(42.2 percent), and Turkey (49.5 percent) having
the highest average tariff rates, and Indonesia
(8.5 percent) and Malaysia the lowest (2.8 percent).
Again,it is important to recall that average tariffs in
countries with a high share of non-ad-valorem
rates in tariff lines are seriously underestimated;
examples are the Russian Federation (a non-ad-
valorem rate in tariff lines of 31 percent), South
Africa (25 percent), Bulgaria (14 percent), and
Turkey (6 percent).
Inaddition,averagetariffsarenotreflectiveofpro-
tection because the tariffs have wide dispersion and
very high peaks.While tariffs on average are lower in
industrial countries, significant tariff peaks indicate
highratesofprotectionforspecificproducts—almost
1,000percentintheRepublicof Korea,506percentin
the European Union, and 350 percent in the United
States.
7Manylow-incomecountrieshavelowerpeaks
and variance than many of the middle-income coun-
tries (table 3.7). Furthermore, actual protection for
localproducersismuchhigherthantheseaveragetar-
iffs in industrial countries and much lower than the
average tariffs in selected developing countries, as
shownpreviously(seefigure3.1).
The difference between average rates and maxi-
mum tariff rates and the relative domestic price dif-
ferences for local production measured by market
price support data from the OECD indicate that
protection is very uneven, with domestic produc-
tion being protected much more significantly.
Japan, with an average tariff of 10 percent and a
maximum ad valorem tariff of 50 percent, has esti-
mated market price support of 130 percent.The dif-
ference can only be attributed to specific duties not
included in the data set. The situation is similar for
the European Union,with an average tariff of about
19 percent and market price support of 30 percent.
For both Japan and the European Union, tariffs
for many locally produced items are very high. For
example, in the European Union average tariffs are
34.6 percent for grains, 54.6 percent for milk and
milk products,and 32.5 percent for meats.
Another issue is the product coverage of the tariffs
presented here and included in the market price sup-
port measures used by the OECD. The tariffs
reported here include seafood,tobacco and cigarettes,
wine, and tropical products, none of which is
included in the market price support measures for
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TABLE 3.6 Average Agricultural Tariffs, Selected Country Groups and Years
(percent)
Share of Lines Covered
Country or Group Agriculture Manufacturing in Agriculture
Quad countries 10.7 4.0 86.7
Canada (2001) 3.8 3.6 76.0
Japan (1999) 10.3 3.7 85.5
United States (2001) 9.5 4.6 99.4
European Union (1999) 19.0 4.2 85.9
Large middle-income countries
a 26.6 13.1 91.3
Other middle-income countries
b 35.4 12.7 97.7
Lower-income countries
c 16.6 13.2 99.8
Note: Most-favored-nation, applied ad valorem, out-of-quota duties.
a. Brazil (2001), China (2001), India (2000), the Republic of Korea (2001), Mexico (2001), Russian
Federation (2001), South Africa (2001), and Turkey (2001).
b. Bulgaria (2001), Costa Rica (2001), Hungary (2001), Jordan (2000), Malaysia (2001), Morocco (1997),
Philippines (2001), and Romania (1999).
c. Bangladesh (1999), Guatemala (1999), Indonesia (1999), Kenya (2001), Malawi (2000), Togo (2001),
Uganda (2001), and Zimbabwe (2001).
Source: World Trade Organization Integrated Database (most-favored-nation applied duties).the OECD countries. If seafood, beverages, tobacco,
and noncompetitive tropical products are excluded,
the average tariff rises from 3.8 percent to 10.4 per-
cent in Canada and from 10.7 percent to 24.7 percent
in Japan (excluding specific tariffs).This supports the
hypotheses that the low average tariffs are misleading
and that protection is uneven and focused primarily
on selected domestically produced commodities.
Tariff Escalation
Protection escalates with the level of processing in
almost all countries and across all products
(table 3.8). Escalation slows diversification into
value added and processed products.The manufac-
turing component of agriculture and food process-
ing have very high rates of protection.
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TABLE 3.7 Tariff Peaks and Variance in Selected Countries
(percent)
Average Maximum Standard Share of Lines
Country or Group Tariff Tariff Deviation Covered
Canada 4.1 238.0 13.5 74.2
Japan 10.9 50.0 10.1 84.8
United States 9.9 350.0 26.5 99.5
European Union 19.0 506.3 27.3 85.9
Republic of Korea 39.9 917.0 107.9 97.9
Brazil 13.2 55.0 5.6 100.0
Costa Rica 14.2 154.0 18.0 100.0
Morocco 67.4 376.5 70.6 100.0
Indonesia 8.9 170.0 25.6 100.0
Malawi 16.5 25.0 8.5 100.0
Togo 15.6 20.0 6.1 99.9
Uganda 13.6 15.0 3.2 100.0
Note: Most-favored-nation, out-of-quota, applied tariffs.
Source: World Trade Organization Integrated Database.
TABLE 3.8 Tariff Rate Escalation in Agriculture, Selected Country Groups and Years
(percent)
Share of Lines
Country or Group Raw Intermediate Final Average Covered
Quad countries 6.1 9.3 14.8 10.7 86.7
Canada 1.4 3.4 6.5 3.8 76.0
Japan 4.2 10.2 15.9 10.3 85.5
United States 5.5 7.1 12.6 9.5 99.3
European Union 13.2 16.6 24.3 19.0 85.9
Large middle-income countries
a 21.9 23.3 34.4 26.6 91.3
Other middle-income countries
b 21.6 31.7 49.0 35.4 97.7
Lower-income countries
c 13.2 14.8 23.0 16.6 99.8
Note: Most-favored-nation applied, ad valorem, out-of-quota duties.
a. Brazil (2001), China (2001), India (2000), the Republic of Korea (2001), Mexico (2001), Russian
Federation (2001), South Africa (2001), and Turkey (2001).
b. Bulgaria (2001), Costa Rica (2001), Hungary (2001), Jordan (2000), Malaysia (2001), Morocco (1997),
Philippines (2001), and Romania (1999).
c. Bangladesh (1999), Guatemala (1999), Indonesia (1999), Kenya (2001), Malawi (2000), Togo (2001),
Uganda (2001), and Zimbabwe (2001).
Source: World Trade Organization Integrated Database (most-favored-nation applied duties).Tariff escalation occurs in all types of products,
notjustthoseproducedinindustrialcountries.Data
on products with low tariffs on raw commodities,
both traditional products (coffee and cocoa) and
new products (fruits and vegetables, seafood), show
that tariff escalation is common to both (table 3.9).
Tariffs are extremely low on the raw stages of tra-
ditional products, whereas the final stages and
processedproductshaveextremelyhightariffs.Sim-
ilar tariff escalation is apparent in fruits and vegeta-
bles, which are supposed to be less protected and in
which developing country exports have expanded.
In addition, these averages mask very high peaks
on individual products. In the United States maxi-
mum tariffs are 136 percent on final fruit products
and 186 percent on cocoa products. In the European
Union the maximum rates are 98 percent and 146
percent on processed fruits and vegetables and 63 per-
cent on cocoa products. And again, many of the final
product tariffs are non-ad-valorem, meaning that the
averages underestimate the full extent of high tariffs.
Tariff Rate Quotas
Tariff rate quotas,designed to ensure some degree of
market access despite protection, have resulted in
more complex tariff regimes. While the number of
tariff lines under tariff rate quotas is small, these
lines cover some of the main commodities produced
in OECD countries. According to OECD data,
almost 28 percent of domestic agricultural produc-
tion is protected by tariff rate quotas. Rates range
from a high of 68 percent in Hungary to 38 percent
in the European Union and 26 percent in the United
States to 13 percent in Japan (figure 3.6). Australia
and New Zealand have no tariff rate quotas.
Export Subsidies
Although lower tariffs and the move toward direct
production subsidies are beginning to reduce the
need for export subsidies in agriculture (they have
been illegal on nonagricultural products since
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TABLE 3.9 Tariff Escalation in Selected Agricultural Product Groups 
(percent)
Product European Union United States Japan
Traditional tropical products
Coffee 
Raw 7.3 0.1 6.0
Final 12.1 10.1 18.8
Cocoa
Raw 0.5 0.0 0.0
Intermediate 9.7 0.2 7.0
Final 30.6 15.3 21.7
New expanding products
Fruits
Raw 9.2 4.6 8.7
Intermediate 13.3 5.5 13.2
Final 22.5 10.2 16.7
Vegetables
Raw 9.9 4.4 5.0
Intermediate 18.5 4.4 10.6
Final 18.0 6.5 11.6
Seafood
Raw 11.5 0.6 4.9
Intermediate 5.1 3.2 4.3
Final 16.2 3.5 9.1
Note: Most-favored-nation applied, ad valorem, out-of-quota duties. 
Source: World Trade Organization Integrated Database.1955), export subsidies continue to distort world
markets. The European Union accounts for almost
90 percent of all OECD export subsidies. The
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture placed
limits on export subsidies for individual commodi-
ties but allowed some flexibility. With usage levels
low early in the implementation period,when world
prices were high, several countries carried forward
unused export subsidy credits for later use.Circum-
vention, through the subsidy elements of export
credits, export restrictions, and revenue-pooling
arrangements in major products,is a concern.
Even if tariffs were eliminated altogether along
with the official export subsidies, current agricul-
tural production subsidies would keep the domestic
and export price of many commodities lower than
their costs of production in industrial countries. By
lowering production costs, production subsidies
favorindustrial-countryproducersoverdeveloping-
country producers, who do not receive direct subsi-
dies. Consider cotton subsidies in the European
Union and the United States. Tariffs are zero, and
domestic prices are the same as world or export
prices (Baffes 2004;Watkins 2003).Yet in the United
States in 2001, production subsidies effectively
increased the prices farmers received (or reduced
their costs of production) by 51 percent, leading to
increased production that depressed the world
price.U.S.export prices were 58 percent of the aver-
age costs of production for wheat, 67 percent for
corn, and 77 percent for rice (Watkins 2003). The
move toward replacing border barriers with direct
subsidies in industrial countries will increase the
importance of these implicit export subsidies.
8
Implications of Reform
One trade reform proposal that would have cut
agricultural tariffs substantially was put up by
Stuart Harbinson, chairman of the agricultural
negotiations in the Doha Round of the WTO trade
negotiations (DRIFE 2003). The proposal was
rejected by industrial-country trade ministers as
too radical, however, and brought the Cancún
Ministerial Meetings to a close. The implications of
this proposal in terms of actual tariff outcomes is
presented below as an illustration.
Harbinson proposed that industrial countries
cut average agricultural tariffs 60 percent on bound
tariffs above 90 percent,50 percent on bound tariffs
between 15 and 90 percent, and 40 percent on
bound tariffs below 15 percent.
9 For developing
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Source: OECD, Agricultural Market Access Database (AMAD).countries and for products that are not considered
strategic,average tariffs would be cut 40 percent for
bound tariffs above 120 percent, 35 percent for tar-
iffs between 60 percent and 120 percent, 30 percent
for tariffs between 20 percent and 60 percent, and
25 percent for tariffs below 20 percent. These cuts
would be implemented over 5 years for industrial
countries in equal installments and over 10 years
for developing countries (WTO 2003).
While the proposed cuts look significant—some
groups have called them radical—their impact
would not be as great as might appear.For develop-
ing countries the key issue is reductions from the
bound, not the applied, rates. Most developing
countries have bound their tariffs at relatively high
rates, but applied rates are much lower. If cuts are
made to the bound rates,countries would get credit
for the unilateral reforms,but the reductions would
not lead to significant actual reductions in tariffs.
For the United States and the European Union,
average effective tariffs would be halved by the end
of the reform process under an optimistic scenario
in which all tariffs are cut by the average rate from
the applied rates (table 3.10).
10 EU tariffs would
come down from 20 percent to about 10 percent,
while U.S. tariffs would drop from 9 percent to
below 5 percent. Even so, the average agricultural
tariffs in both areas would remain significantly
higher than the average manufacturing tariffs of
4.2 percent in the European Union and 4.6 percent
in the United States. Tariff peaks would remain
above 200 percent in the European Union and
above 140 percent in the United States.
For developing countries the optimistic scenario
lowers all the bound rates by the amount of the
average cut. Cuts from bound rates do not signifi-
cantly lower protection in most developing coun-
tries. At the end of 10 years the Harbinson reform
would leave bound tariffs significantly above the
currently applied rates in Costa Rica and India and
only marginally below the current applied rates in
Jordan and the Republic of Korea (table 3.11).
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TABLE 3.11 Tariffs in Selected Developing Countries Before and After Average
Reductions from Bound Rates 
(percent)
Costa Rica India Jordan Korea, Rep. of
Category Average Peak Average Peak Average Peak Average Peak
Before Harbinson 49.0 245.0 115.3 300.0 21.5 180.0 50.8 917.0
After Harbinson 33.8 147.0 72.3 180.0 14.9 108.0 33.2 550.2
Current applied rates 13.1 154.0 36.7 115.0 18.5 120.0 42.7 917.0
Note: The analysis excludes cigarettes and alcoholic drinks. 
Source: World Trade Organization Integrated Database.
TABLE 3.10 Tariffs in the European Union and the United States Before and After
Average Reduction from Applied Tariffs under the Harbinson Proposal
(percent)
United States European Union
Before Harbinson After Harbinson Before Harbinson After Harbinson
Product Average Peak Average Peak Average Peak Average Peak
Raw 5.5 350.0 2.7 140.0 13.2 131.8 6.9 52.7
Intermediate 7.1 159.3 3.8 63.8 16.6 284.8 8.3 113.9
Final 11.7 180.8 6.2 72.3 26.8 506.3 13.1 202.5
Overall 8.8 350.0 4.6 140.0 19.7 506.3 9.9 202.5
Note: The analysis excludes cigarettes and alcoholic drinks. 
Source: World Trade Organization Integrated Database.Because these results would hold for most develop-
ing countries, existing levels of protection in the
developing world would not be significantly
reduced under the Harbinson proposals or under
any other proposals that start with bound rates.
Thus even significant cuts in tariffs by industrial
and developing countries will leave agricultural
sectors with highly distorted tariff structures. In
addition to average cuts, however designed, there
has to be an agreement on tariff peaks, which
should be capped at reasonably low rates.
Conclusion
Within OECD countries, budgetary subsidies and
subsidies from consumers (through high tariffs and
quantitative restrictions on domestic production of
selected commodities) to agricultural producers
totaled about $228 billion in 2000–02,or 45 percent
of farm revenues. That was down from 62 percent
in 1986–88 but is still very high. Some 63 per-
cent of this support was through the higher prices
associated with border protection and 37 percent
through direct subsidies. In developing countries
almost all support is generated through border
barriers.
Average agricultural tariffs in industrial coun-
tries, when they can be measured, are two to four
times higher than average manufacturing tariffs.
Even at that,these averages seriously underestimate
the actual level of protection to local producers.
Almost 30 percent of domestic production in
OECD countries is protected by tariff rate quotas.
More than 40 percent of the tariff lines in the
European Union and the United States include spe-
cific duties, which make it difficult to calculate
average tariffs, obscure actual levels of protection,
and penalize developing countries that supply
cheaper products. Tariff peaks as high as 500 per-
cent confront imports from developing countries.
Tariffs also rise by degree of processing, creating a
highly escalating tariff structure that limits access
to processed food markets.
Developing countries, too, have maintained
high border protection and have higher average
agricultural tariffs than industrial countries. What
is worse, many of the protectionist developing
countries are middle-income economies,where the
demand for agricultural products is growing rap-
idly. These countries are beginning to resemble
industrial countries in their structure of protection.
More generally, as taxation of agriculture dimin-
ishes in developing countries,reactive protection in
response to industrial-country agricultural support
is increasing. Many developing countries have
increased protection of domestic food products
against cheaper, subsidized exports from industrial
countries.
Although official export subsidies may be small
and shrinking, implicit export subsidies resulting
from domestic support are increasing, lending
unfair advantage to industrial-country producers.
In the United States and the European Union,
domestic and export prices of cotton are the
same—but those prices are less than half the aver-
age cost of production. Similar differences exist for
many other products, a gap that will increase as
industrial countries move from protection through
border barriers and high support prices to support
through coupled or partially decoupled subsidies.
Two other dynamics complicate protection.
First, many agricultural policies are anticyclical,
with protection increasing when agricultural prices
are low. Thus protection levels fell as commodity
prices increased in the early 1990s and then rose
again as prices declined in the late 1990s. Second,
rapid and sustained technical progress in agricul-
ture has lowered the costs of production and thus
lowered prices. Countries that have been able to
enjoy the benefits of technological change have
managed to maintain their production and com-
pete with subsidized production.
Significant reforms are needed to make a dent in
rural poverty in most developing countries (see
chapter 2). Given the magnitude of the distortions
in the agricultural sectors in all countries, the pro-
posals for reform have been quite modest.Yet even
the modest proposals have not been accepted by the
key industrial countries.
A few simple issues stand out. Given the com-
plexity of the protection regimes, all non-ad-
valorem tariffs should be converted into ad
valorem tariffs. Variances in tariff rates are so high
that the only way to reduce protection significantly
is through binding ad valorem, nonseasonal tariff
caps that are gradually reduced to zero or to very
low levels. Otherwise, high tariffs on selected prod-
ucts will continue under all modalities of reform.
Finally, direct support programs have to be fully
decoupled from production in industrial and
52 Global Agricultural Trade and Developing Countriesmiddle-income countries (see chapter 5),and other
instruments have to be used to support the rural
sector in these countries.
Notes
1. Annex 3 in the attached CD-ROM contains detailed tariff
tables for 31 countries.
2. For example, most of the policy work on agricultural poli-
cies in the World Bank in the 1970s and 1980s focused on supply
enhancement and the elimination of taxation of agriculture.
3. These were simple averages and were not weighted for the
volume of trade. Thus some countries made large reductions in
tariffs that were already low (from 2 percent to 1 percent, for
example,for a 50 percent reduction),while making only the min-
imum reduction in sensitive product groups with high tariffs.
4.It has not been possible to generate consistent agricultural
manufacturing and agricultural tariffs for earlier years.
5. The annex in the attached CD-ROM presents the detailed
structure of tariffs for the individual countries and the year for
which the tariff information applies for each country. The years
are also presented in table 3.6.
6. For example, EU duties on wine are 13 euros a hectoliter,
or about $0.15 a bottle. For a $1 (c.i.f.) bottle of wine from
developing countries such as Bulgaria and Moldova, that gives a
high tariff rate of 15 percent. For a $10 dollar bottle of wine
from California, the tariff rate would be just 1.5 percent, a very
low one.
7.Peaks for the European Union and the United States are all
specific tariffs, whereas the variance and peaks for Canada and
Japan probably do not reflect the real peaks because specific
duties are excluded.
8. Elimination of the Peace Clause, which effectively prohib-
ited legal action against implicit export subsidies, could change
the legality of having domestic costs much higher than export
prices.Decoupling payments to producers from production lev-
els is another alternative that would allow income support to
farmers but eliminate its link with production decisions (see
chapter 5).
9. These are average cuts, so actual cuts in each line could be
lower.
10. The European Union and United States were selected
because there are tariff equivalents for the specific duties. The
data for the European Union are for 1999,the last year for which
the tariff equivalents were available. The difference between
bound and effective rates is very small in most industrial coun-
tries and for ease of presentation, the reductions were taken
from the effective rates.
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Global Agricultural Trade Policies 53of origin for many processed products, have
severely limited the role of trade preferences in
encouraging agricultural diversification in develop-
ing countries. Many countries remain dependent
on the export of staple products, for which world
prices have fluctuated wildly.
While the United States, the European Union
(EU), and Japan all offer preference schemes, com-
paring them is difficult since each scheme differs in
important respects: the group of eligible countries,
the products covered, and the magnitude of the
preference granted. Administrative requirements,
especially rules of origin, also vary across schemes
and across products. These differences are a major
weakness of the current system of preferences.
This chapter reviews these schemes, concentrat-
ing on the preferences offered to least-developed
countries, and discusses some of the key problems
with preferences:
• They are unilateral concessions from industrial
countries that must be renewed, and specific
products can be withdrawn at short notice,
creating too much uncertainty to stimulate new
investment.
Improving the ability of the least-developed coun-
tries (LDCs) to participate fully in world markets
can accelerate development and poverty reduction.
Their dependence on agriculture, together with the
high duties levied on many agricultural imports by
industrial countries, suggests that preferences on
agricultural products could help boost exports and
growth in developing countries.
In practice, however, preferences have had little
impact for most developing countries. First, many
agricultural products produced in developing
countries are subject to zero duties in industrial
countries, and therefore no trade preference can be
given. Usually these are tropical products that
are not produced in industrial countries. Second,
the primary agricultural products and processed
products with very high duties are typically
excluded from preferences or the preference margin
is very small.For a small number of products,how-
ever, preference margins are substantial, although
usually within strict quantitative limits and only for
certain countries.Countries that have been granted
preferential access for sugar and tobacco, for exam-
ple, have received large transfers because of prefer-
ences. These factors, together with restrictive rules
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• The most highly protected products, with the
highest potential margins of preference, are
often excluded or receive only small preference
margins.
• Rules of origin for processed products constrain
the ability of countries to expand into these
products.
• Differences and inconsistencies between prefer-
ence schemes prevent developing-country sup-
pliers from developing global market strategies.
If trade preferences are to assist developing
countries,
• The schemes should be made permanent and
comprehensive, with no product exclusions.
• They should be harmonized, preferably at the
World Trade Organization (WTO), with com-
mon and simple rules of origin.
• The domestic investment environment in bene-
ficiary countries must be improved so that
producers and investors can exploit the oppor-
tunities that arise from trade preferences to
develop competitive businesses that will survive
once those preferences are eroded.
• Developing countries need to diversify into a
broader range of exports and not become
dependent on the preferential access granted for
a narrow range of products.
• Beneficiaries should ensure preferences are inte-
grated as one element of a strategy for broad-
based export expansion.
• Preferences for a small group of developing
countries should not act as a brake on the multi-
lateral liberalization of agricultural products
under the WTO. Many developing countries
receive little or nothing from preferences but
would gain from a reduction of subsidies in rich
countries (which, for example, would benefit
cotton producers in Western Africa) and from
multilateral tariff reductions in all countries.
Such liberalization can be achieved only through
negotiations at the WTO.
Trade Preferences in Principle and
in Practice
Trade preferences allow products from developing
countries to enter industrial-country markets with
lower import duties than are applied to other
countries’ products under the importing country’s
most-favored-nation (MFN) tariffs. The principal
scheme governing such preferences is the General-
ized System of Preferences (GSP), which originated
in the work of the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in the 1960s
to introduce a harmonized preference scheme
across donor countries (UNCTAD 2001). Because
preferences for particular countries are at odds
with the fundamental nondiscrimination principle
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) and the WTO,the Decision on Differential
and More Favorable Treatment, Reciprocity, and
Fuller Participation of Developing Countries
(called the Enabling Clause) was adopted under the
GATT in 1979 to allow industrial countries to offer
more favorable treatment to developing countries
on a nonreciprocal basis.
Potential Benefits of Trade Preferences
Tariffs introduce a wedge between the world price
of a product and the price in the domestic market.
Tariff preferences give suppliers in beneficiary
developing countries access to part or all of this
price premium that normally accrues to the
importing-country government as tariff revenue.
The acquisition of these rents raises returns in the
developing country and, depending on the nature
of competition in domestic product and factor
markets, stimulates expansion of the activity
concerned, with implications for wages and
employment.
The arguments underlying trade preferences are
that the small scale of industry and the low level of
development in developing countries lead to high
costs, which reduce the ability to compete in global
markets, and to lack of diversification, which
increases risks. Developing countries, especially
least-developed countries, face much higher trade-
related costs than other countries in getting their
products into international markets. Some of these
costs may reflect institutional problems within the
countries themselves, such as inefficient practices
and corruption, and these problems require a
domestic policy response. But some costs also
reflect weak transportation infrastructure in many
countries and firms’ lack of access to standard
trade-facilitating measures such as insurance and
trade finance.Trade preferences can provide the premium over
the normal rate of return that is required to
encourage investment in these economies. The
increase in trade attributable to preferences leads to
more output and, if there are scale economies, to
lower costs, which stimulate further trade.
1 It is
important, however, that the sectors that receive
preferences and investment are those in which the
country has a comparative advantage in the long
term and that investment not be based on a false
comparative advantage based on the margin of
preference.
Why Do Trade Preferences Fall Short
of Their Potential?
Assessments of the impact of trade preferences sug-
gest that they have not transformed the export and
growth performance of most developing-country
beneficiaries,although performance may have been
worse without them and a few countries may have
benefited substantially. Trade preferences have not
enabled beneficiaries as a group to increase their
market shares in the main preference-granting
markets.
2 Why?
UNCTAD’s objectives of harmonizing prefer-
ence regimes across countries and making prefer-
ences general and nondiscriminatory among devel-
oping countries were never achieved. Industrial
countries have often excluded the most heavily pro-
tected products, many of which offer the greatest
scope for gains by developing countries. The seg-
mented markets for preferential-access goods make
the program a weak mechanism for integrating
developing countries into the world economy.
Industrial countries that grant preferences uni-
laterally determine which countries and which
products are included in their schemes and what
rules govern the provision of preferences—and
graduation from the program. Preference schemes
typically are not permanent programs but require
legislative renewal. And preference-granting coun-
tries have the discretion to remove countries and
products from the program, creating uncertainty
and discouraging investment in developing coun-
tries to exploit available opportunities. Recently,
however,theEuropeanUnionintroducedtheEvery-
thing but Arms program for the least-developed
countries, introducing an element of permanency
into preference schemes for the first time.
Most highly protected products are excluded
from preference schemes. When preferences are
granted on some products for which domestic
prices in industrial countries are much higher than
world prices, such as sugar in the European Union,
traded quantities are limited to avoid undermining
the distortionary policies that generate the large
divergence between domestic and world prices.
Nevertheless, in these instances preferential access
can lead to substantial gains for preferred suppliers.
How much of the available rents are actually
obtained by suppliers in developing countries
depends on the nature of competition in the indus-
try and the rules and regulations governing the
granting of preferential access, among other fac-
tors. If there is little effective competition among
buyers, then exporters may be unable to acquire
much of the price premium. Ozden and Olarreaga
(2003) find that only a third of the available rents
for African exports of clothing to the United States
under the African Growth and Opportunity Act
(AGOA) actually accrue to exporters.Furthermore,
satisfying the rules governing preferences raises
costs and reduces the extent to which the prefer-
ences raise actual returns. The cost of satisfying the
rules of origin in preferences schemes is a major
reason for low rates of utilization (UNCTAD 2001;
Brenton and Imagawa 2004).
3
Undesirable Effects of Preference Schemes
Tariff preferences can lead to several adverse effects.
Negotiations under the Doha Round have shown
that preferences can be used to bolster external sup-
port for highly protectionist policies in industrial
countries and to weaken proposals that would sub-
stantially reduce such levels of protection. Prefer-
ences can also create a degree of dependence that
constrains flexibility and diversification and results
in high-cost production of preferred products
(Topp 2001). And the beneficiaries of trade prefer-
ences are not always the poorest constituents in
developing countries. When rents do accrue to the
developing country,they tend to accrue to the own-
ers of the most intensively used factors. With
agricultural preferences, the main beneficiaries are
the owners of land. Preferences could have a strong
impact on poverty if the landowners are poor or,
when they are not poor, if policies for redistribu-
tion are in place. So even when preferences create
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countries, they may not necessarily stimulate the
long-term growth of exports or reduce poverty,and
they can lead to a less-diversified export base.
The Nature and Impact of
Preferences Offered by the United
States, the European Union,
and Japan
The impact of a particular scheme of trade prefer-
ences on individual countries is determined by
several factors:
• The scope of preferences in terms of the range of
products covered.
• The importance of products eligible for prefer-
ences in the export and production structure of
the beneficiary country.
• The margins of preference, determined by the
height of the MFN tariff and the size of the
preference.
• Actual utilization of preferences. To a large
extent this reflects the costs of satisfying the
rules, mainly the rules of origin, governing pref-
erences. If the costs of compliance exceed the
margin of preference, the preference will not
be used.
• The extent to which preferences facilitate diver-
sification into a broader range of products. This
is determined by the coverage of the scheme,the
margins of preference on products not currently
exported, and the rules of origin relating to
these products.
Whether such preference opportunities are
actually exploited depends on the domestic invest-
ment environment in the beneficiary country and
the extent to which legal characteristics of the pref-
erence scheme constrain investment decisions. The
economic impact of the preferences offered by the
United States, the European Union, and Japan vary
enormously across beneficiary countries. For some
countries exports are dominated by products that
do not receive preferences, and there has been little
success in diversification. This is especially the case
for countries dependent on products that are cur-
rently subject to zero import duties in developed
countries,such as coffee and cocoa.For other coun-
tries, however, all exports are eligible for prefer-
ences to a particular market and the potential
impact of preferences is much greater. The actual
utilization of preferences,from very low rates to full
utilization, also varies substantially across coun-
tries. Also of importance is that utilization rates
tend to be lower for processed products.
The Scope of Preferences
Whether trade preference schemes assist the inte-
gration of developing countries into world markets
depends on the breadth of the preferences offered
in terms of the number and importance of eligible
products.
Products subject to tariff quotas complicate the
assessment of the impact of trade preferences.Dur-
ing the Uruguay Round of world trade negotia-
tions, industrial countries agreed to reduce tariffs
on a range of sensitive agricultural products but
only for limited quantities of imports, often creat-
ing two or more tariff lines for each product: the
duty on in-quota quantities and the duty (often
very high) on additional out-of-quota imports.
Preferences are offered on the in-quota quantities
only, and once the quota is reached, preferences are
no longer available. Quotas can be global (available
to all eligible countries) or bilateral (limits are spec-
ified for a particular country).With bilateral limits,
quantities may not be sufficient to induce invest-
ments in raising capacity, whereas for preferences
based on global tariff quotas, uncertainty over
when the quota will be filled dampens interest in
investment or even in exporting.
Thus the lack of preferences for out-of-quota
quantities is important in assessing the impact of
preference schemes. The analysis here includes out-
of-quota rates in calculating the average duty on
products not covered by preferences even if the quo-
tas are not exceeded, because of the discouraging
impact of the tariff quotas. This approach differs
from that of preference-giving countries,which typ-
ically assume that if exports from a preference-
receiving country or group of countries do not
exceed the preferential quota, the product is fully
covered by the scheme and the out-of-quota rates
are not relevant. Of course, the obvious response is
that if the out-of-quota rates are not relevant, there
is no reason not to offer full duty- and quota-free
access.
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The United States has offered preferences under the
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) since the
mid-1970s, with a significant increase in coverage
for low-income countries in 1997.The current GSP
program expires at the end of 2006. In 2003, 143
developing countries were eligible for preferences
under the GSP. There are no partial preferences, so
the preferential rate on all included products is
zero.However,the preferences can be withdrawn at
any time. In addition, the GSP contains safeguards
in the form of benefit ceilings for each product and
country, known as competitive need limitations
(these do not apply to LDCs). A country loses its
GSP eligibility for a product if it supplies more than
50 percent of U.S. imports of that product or if its
exports exceed a certain dollar value.
4
The African Growth and Opportunity Act of
2000 offers improved market access to 48 Sub-
Saharan African countries subject to certain criteria
regarding basic human rights and the rule of law.
The competitive needs limitations of the GSP do
not apply to AGOA preferences. The current
scheme expires in 2015. So far, 38 countries have
been granted eligibility for AGOA preferences.
The average duty on agricultural goods from
countries that do not receive preferences in the
United States is 7.3 percent (table 4.1). The prefer-
ences available under the GSP for non-LDCs
reduce the average tariff to 6.2 percent. The impact
of the GSP on LDCs is more substantial, reducing
the average tariff to just under 4 percent.AGOA has
little impact on the LDCs, reducing the average
tariff by just 0.2 percentage points, but it offers
non-LDCs enhanced preferences similar to those
available to LDCs under the GSP. All these average
tariffs include the out-of-quota duties for tariff
quota products.
Comparing MFN duties on the products cov-
ered by preferences and average duties on products
excluded from preferences shows that the average
margin of preference on products under the GSP is
3.6 percent for non-LDCs and 5 percent for LDCs
(table 4.2). AGOA enhances the preferences avail-
able for non-LDCs by including products subject to
an average duty of 7 percent. However, the average
tariff on products excluded from preferences is
more than 30 percent. The GSP and AGOA do not
affect the maximum duty that can be applied to
imports from LDCs (more than 160 percent for
groundnuts,an important product for a number of
African countries).
The duties shown in tables 4.1 and 4.2 are
unweighted averages. They do not capture actual
duties being levied on developing-country exports
but rather the duties that would apply if developing
countries exported a completely diversified bundle
of agricultural products. In practice, the duties
actually levied on many countries are close to zero
since these countries export a bundle of exports
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TABLE 4.1 Average Unweighted Tariffs on
Agricultural Products in the
United States, 2003 
(percent)
Category Non-LDC LDC
MFN rates 7.3 7.3
GSP beneficiaries 6.2 3.9
AGOA beneficiaries 3.8 3.7
Note: Because of the potential effect on decisions
to export and invest, average tariffs include out-
of-quota tariffs on tariff quota products even if
quotas are not filled.
Source: Calculated using data from U.S. Interna-
tional Trade Commission dataweb.
TABLE 4.2 Average Unweighted MFN
Tariffs on Agricultural Products
Covered by GSP and AGOA in
the United States, 2003 
(percent)
Category Non-LDC LDC
Total GSP 3.6 5.4
GSP 3.6 3.6
GSP LDC — 7.0
Total AGOA 7.0 9.4
Excluded lines 32.5 32.8
— Not available
Note: Data for calculated duties and customs
value for the GSP group were used to derive ad
valorem equivalents for specific duties. When
there are zero duties from the GSP group of
countries, data for total imports were used to
calculate the ad valorem equivalent.
Source: Calculated using data from U.S. Interna-
tional Trade Commission dataweb.concentrated on zero or low-duty products. Devel-
oping countries in Africa currently export almost
no products that are subject to tariff quotas—the
main exceptions are sugar and tobacco. But this
may simply reflect the fact that very high duties can
be levied once the quota is reached.
5 Liberalization
of many of these products under AGOA or GSP is
unlikely to have a substantial impact on trade in the
short term, but it could encourage investment in
future capacity in certain countries.
Data on the number of tariff lines liberalized
under U.S. preference programs show that a quar-
ter of tariff lines already have zero MFN duties
(table 4.3). For the LDCs,AGOA liberalizes only an
additional 26 agricultural tariff lines, or less than
2 percent of the total number of agricultural lines
and just under 12 percent of the remaining dutiable
lines (those lines for which the MFN duty is not
zero). The main products liberalized under AGOA
have already been liberalized for LDCs under the
GSP. For non-LDCs, AGOA adds 541 products to
the 519 products already eligible for duty-free pref-
erences for developing countries under the GSP.
Hence, the potential impact is much greater for
non-LDCs.
6
Under AGOA more than 200 agricultural tariff
lines have MFN duties but no preferences. These
amount to 17 percent of the number of dutiable
agricultural tariff lines in the U.S. schedule,
although they protect much more than 17 percent
of U.S. agricultural production. More than 150 of
these lines relate to the over-quota rates for prod-
ucts subject to tariff rate quotas. These products
include certain meat and dairy products, many
sugar products, chocolate, prepared foodstuffs, and
tobacco products.
EU Preferences under the GSP and Cotonou
Agreement
The current GSP scheme of the European Union,
which runs to the end of December 2004, has two
categories of products: nonsensitive, for which
duties are suspended; and sensitive, which face a
flat rate reduction of 3.5 percentage points from the
MFN rate.A number of products, including meats,
dairy products, certain vegetables, cereals, some
prepared foodstuffs, and wine are entirely excluded
from the scheme.Among eligible products,propor-
tionate reductions are high for most industrial
products,for which the average MFN tariff is 4 per-
cent, but relatively low for many agricultural prod-
ucts, for which the average MFN tariff is almost
20 percent. The EU tariff structure for agricultural
products is extremely complicated, with more than
45 percent of product lines subject to non-ad-
valorem duties. This complexity is reflected in sim-
ilar complexity in preferences granted.
Specific duties, those based on physical rather
than monetary values, are reduced by 30 percent,
except when they are combined with ad valorem
duties (as in a range of processed agricultural prod-
ucts of interest to developing countries),when they
are not reduced. Typically, the specific duties pro-
vide the greatest part of the protection on these
products. For a number of products, primarily
fruits and vegetables,the European Union applies a
system of minimum reference prices that vary by
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TABLE 4.3 Number of Agricultural Tariff Lines Liberalized under GSP and AGOA
Programs in the United States, 2003
Category Non-LDCs LDCs
Total tariff lines 1,723 1,723
Total GSP 519 1,038
GSP LDC 519 (38) 547 (158)
AGOA 541 (120) 26
Duty-free lines 440 440
Dutiable lines (MFN) 223 219
Note: The numbers in parentheses are the number of product lines relating to in-quota duty rates for
products subject to tariff quotas.
Source: Calculated using data from U.S. International Trade Commission dataweb.The Impact of Agricultural Trade Preferences, with Particular Attention to the Least-Developed Countries 61
season, despite the dubious compatibility of the
approach with WTO rules. This can lead to a very
complex structure of preferences (box 4.1). Mini-
mum duties specified in the European Union’s
Common Customs Code do not apply to products
covered under the GSP.
Within the GSP, the European Union discrimi-
nated in favor of the least-developed countries. All
imports of industrial products and a range of agri-
cultural products from these countries entered
duty free, but a significant number of agricultural
products still faced some market access barriers.
These were removed under the Arms initiative
introduced in 2001, which grants duty-free access,
without any quantitative restrictions, to imports of
all products from the least-developed countries,
except arms and munitions. Liberalization was
immediate except for three products (fresh
bananas, rice, and sugar), for which tariffs gradu-
ally will be reduced to zero (in 2006 for bananas
and in 2009 for rice and sugar). The effect of the
Arms initiative will be limited in the short run since
the LDCs were not exporting the products that
were immediately liberalized (Brenton 2003).
Because preferences for the least-developed
countries are granted for an unlimited period and
are not subject to periodic review, the Everything
but Arms program should provide greater certainty
of market access and therefore stimulate a greater
production response by existing products and a
conducive environment for exports of a wider
range of products. This is a crucial aspect of the
program. The challenge for developing countries is
to create a climate that allows investment to take
place in activities in which a comparative advantage
can be sustained in the long run.
However, these changes may be partly under-
mined by the inclusion of a new reason for sus-
pending preferences: “massive increases in imports
of products relative to the usual levels of production
and export capacity” (our emphasis). This could
constrain large-scale investment to transform the
production capacity in a particular country and
discourage diversification into new products.
7
The European Union offers enhanced prefer-
ences beyond those of the GSP to Sub-Saharan
African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries (the ACP
countries) under the Cotonou Agreement. There
are individual protocols for bananas,beef,veal,and
sugar. These products accounted for three-quarters
of the value of ACP preferences in the late 1990s,
including industrial products, which are all eligible
for duty-free access (McQueen 1999).
The average duty in the European Union is very
high, at more than 17 percent. Countries eligible
for GSP benefits on agricultural products face a
slightly lower average duty of 15.3 percent, and
ACP countries face a much lower average duty of
about 7 percent (table 4.4). The average duty that
would be levied on products covered by the GSP if
those preferences were removed is about 14 percent
(table 4.5). Full preferences tend to be granted on
agricultural products with lower MFN rates,
whereas those with higher MFN rates tend to
receive only partial preferences. Products not
granted preference under the GSP scheme tend to
be very-high-duty products, with an average tariff
of more than 25 percent.
The average duty on products covered by the
Cotonou Agreement is more than 21 percent, and
the preferences available are much deeper than
those under the GSP. And while very-high-duty
products tend to receive only partial preferences,
many high-duty products excluded from the GSP
receive preferences under Cotonou. The average
duty on excluded products is just under 10 percent.
Nevertheless, preferences do not reduce the
TABLE 4.4 Average Unweighted Tariffs
on Agricultural Products in






Note: For seasonal rates, the duty applied on July
1 is used, the high season for most fruits and
vegetables. For products for which it is not
possible to calculate an ad valorem equivalent
of the complex duties that are applied (for
example, for chocolate the duty depends on the
milk and sugar content), an ad valorem duty of
30 percent was assigned for the MFN rate and
20 percent for the ACP rate. These are conserva-
tive assumptions since many of these complex
duties are likely to be prohibitive. In 2002 there
were 161 lines for which the ad valorem
equivalent could not be computed.
Source: Calculated from EU Commission data and
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Box 4.1 The EU System of Entry Prices: The Example of Tomatoes 
The EU entry price system for imports of vegeta-
bles such as tomatoes consists of two sets of
tariffs that vary according to the price and sea-
son. If the import price is higher than a specified
level (which varies by season), only an ad valorem
duty is applied. If the import price is lower than
this level, then a specific duty is applied as well,
which varies by price and season. No preferences
are granted under the GSP. For African,
Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries, prefer-
ences are granted from January to April and in the
final 10 days in December. The preference takes
the form of a reduction in the ad valorem duty;
there is no reduction in the specific duty. This
form of entry price system is applied to 34 agri-
cultural products, mainly fruits and vegetables.
Entry Prices and Duties for Tomatoes
Entry Price
Time (euros per 100 kg) MFN ACP GSP GSP LDC
Jan–Mar 84.6 8.8 3.5 No preference 0
April 112.6 8.8 3.5 No preference 0
May 1–14  72.6 8.8 No preference No preference 0
May 15–31  72.6 14.4 No preference No preference 0
June–Sept 52.6 14.4 No preference No preference 0
Oct 62.6 14.4 No preference No preference 0
Nov 1– Dec 20  62.6 8.8 No preference No preference 0
Dec 21–Dec 31  67.6 8.8 3.5 No preference 0
Specific Duties When Import Price Falls below Set Levels 
Import Price (euros per 100 kg) MFN Duty ACP Duty
January
82.9 to 84.6 8.8% + 1.7 euro/100 kg 3.5% + 1.7 euro/100 kg
81.2 to 82.9 8.8% + 3.4 euro/100 kg 3.5% + 3.4 euro/100 kg
79.5 to 81.2 8.8% + 5.1 euro/100 kg 3.5% + 5.1 euro/100 kg
77.8 to 79.5 8.8% + 6.8 euro/100 kg 3.5% + 6.8 euro/100 kg
0 to 77.8 8.8% + 29.8 euro/100 kg 3.5% + 29.8 euro/100 kg
July
51.5 to 52.6 14.4% + 1.1 euro/100 kg 14.4% + 1.1 euro/100 kg
50.5 to 51.5 14.4% + 2.1 euro/100 kg 14.4% + 2.1 euro/100 kg
49.4 to 50.5 14.4% + 3.2 euro/100 kg 14.4% + 3.2 euro/100 kg
48.4 to 49.4 14.4% + 4.2 euro/100 kg 14.4% + 4.2 euro/100 kg
0 to 48.4 14.4% + 29.8 euro/100 kg 14.4% + 29.8 euro/100 kg
For example, an ACP exporter of tomatoes that
tries to sell in the EU market in January at a price
of, say, 67 euros per 100 kilograms would face
an ad valorem equivalent duty of 49.8 percent
with the MFN rate being 53.3 percent. A higher
cost non-ACP producer who sells at 80 euros per
100 kilograms would face a duty of 13 percent.
The duty-inclusive price of the low-cost supplier,
even with preferences, is higher than the duty-
inclusive price of the high-cost supplier. Hence,
specific duties act as an implicit preference
toward high-cost suppliers and against lower-
cost developing countries, although in this case,
if sufficient information is available, there is an
opportunity for the low-cost ACP supplier to
raise its price and pay a lower duty.maximum duty that can be applied (a duty of more
than 200 percent on milk and cream).
Cotonou preferences cover 81 percent of agri-
cultural tariff lines (table 4.6). Of the remaining
lines, 14 percent have zero MFN duties, and 5 per-
cent cover products excluded from preferences.
Again, this 5 percent of lines will be protecting
much more than 5 percent of EU agricultural out-
put. Cotonou provides full preferences (100 per-
cent duty reduction) for 50 percent of the total
number of tariff lines and partial reductions for
31 percent of products (typically removal of the ad
valorem component but not the specific duty).
Most of the products are highly sensitive and highly
taxed imports. The ad valorem equivalent of these
specific duties is often very high (see table 4.5).
Japan’s GSP Scheme
Japan offers GSP preferences to 164 developing
countries. The current scheme expires in 2011. The
scheme provides enhanced preferences for LDCs,
with partial preferences deepened to 100 percent
cuts and (since April 2003) greater product coverage
(which is not captured here). There are no explicit
quantitative ceilings on preferences, although there
are safeguard mechanisms and a country’s exports
are excluded if they exceed 25 percent of Japan’s
total imports and 1 billion yen in value.
The average MFN tariff on Japanese imports of
agricultural products in 2002 was 15.6 percent
(table 4.7). GSP preferences reduced this to
15.1 percent for non-LDCs, an average preference
margin of 0.5 percentage point. The average mar-
gin for the slightly deeper preferences for LDCs was
1.4 percentage points. Again, it must be noted that
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TABLE 4.5 Average Unweighted MFN
Tariffs on Agricultural Products





Lines with full preferences 7.0
Lines with partial preferences 15.2
Excluded GSP lines 26.3
Total Cotonou 21.3
Lines with full preferences 13.7
Lines with partial preferences 33.0
Excluded Cotonou lines 9.6
Source: Calculated using data from EU Commis-
sion and World Trade Organization Integrated
Data Bank.






MFN duty-free 334 14
Total ACP 1,905 81
Full reduction preferences 1,181 50
Partial reduction preferences 724 31
Dutiable MFN lines 115 5
Main sectors containing products excluded from preferences Wine





Source: Calculated using data from EU Commission.these are not average duties paid since few imports
are in the high-duty categories.
The average duty on products covered by the
GSP was 10.4 percent for non-LDCs and 9.8 per-
cent for the LDCs (table 4.8).The duty on products
excluded from preferences is high relative to duties
on products covered by preferences, even when
conservatively estimated, at about 21 percent (see
note to table 4.7).
Some 20 percent of agricultural tariff lines in
Japan are subject to zero duties, while preferences
under the GSP cover 11 percent of agricultural
products for non-LDCs and 15 percent for LDCs
(table 4.9). The 2003 reform of the GSP added an
additional 198 products (or 10 percent of total tar-
iff lines) to preferences for LDCs. For non-LDCs
most products under preferences receive only a
partial reduction in duties, and 71 percent of agri-
cultural products are excluded from preferences,
while preferences were not available for 67 percent
of tariff lines for LDCs in 2002 (falling to 57 per
cent in 2003).
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TABLE 4.7 Average Unweighted Tariffs on




Average MFN 15.6 15.6
Average applied 15.1 14.2
preferential duty
Note: Specific duties were converted to ad
valorem equivalents based on the total value
and quantity of imports from developing
countries. When that information was not
available, the value and quantity of imports
from all sources was used. For tariff lines for
which there were no imports, an ad valorem
equivalent of 30 percent was assumed—
probably an underestimate since these duties
are likely to be prohibitive.
Source: Calculated using data from United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development TRAINS.
TABLE 4.8 Average Unweighted MFN
Tariffs on Agricultural Products
Covered by GSP in Japan, 2002 
(percent) 
Category Non-LDCs LDCs
Total GSP 10.4 9.8
Full preference 7.3 9.8
Partial preference 12.0
Excluded lines (MFN) 20.8 21.5
Source: Calculated using data from United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(TRAINS).
TABLE 4.9 Tariffs Lines Liberalized under Japan’s GSP Preferences, 2002
Non-LDCs LDCs
Number of Share of Total Number of Share of Total
Category Tariff Lines (percent) Tariff Lines (percent)
Total lines 2,014 2,014
MFN duty-free 393 20 393 20
Total GSP 221 11 298 15
Full preferences 80 4 298 15
Partial preferences 141 7 0
Dutiable lines (MFN) 1,400 70 1,323 66
Main sectors containing products Meat, fish, dairy, cereals, prepared meat and fish, sugar, cocoa,
excluded from preferences prepared food products
Source: Calculated using data from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (TRAINS).Proportion of Trade Covered
by Preferences
U.S.Preferences 
Examination of the proportion of developing-
country exports covered by U.S. preference pro-
grams shows that (table 4.10)
• Exports of processed agricultural products are
much smaller than exports of primary agricul-
tural products.
• For a large proportion of primary product
exports (more than 70 percent for the three
groups of countries), there are no preferences
since the MFN duty is zero. A much larger
proportion of processed exports is eligible for
preferences.
• Preference use is high for primary products
(more than 80 percent) and higher than the rate
of preference use for processed products.
• Products not eligible for preferences constitute a
small proportion of current exports.
EU Preferences 
Several findings stand out in an examination
of the proportion of exports covered by EU
preferences (table 4.11) and show the following:
• The value of agricultural exports to the Euro-
pean Union is much larger than that of exports
to the United States, for both processed and pri-
mary products. Again, the value of exports is
smaller for processed products than for primary
products.
• A much larger proportion of exports are eligible
for preferences than in the United States because
fewer export products have MFN duties of zero.
Two-thirds or more of exports are eligible for
preferences.
• Products not eligible for preferences constitute a
very small proportion of current exports.
Japanese Preferences 
An examination of the proportion of developing
country exports covered by GSP exports to Japan
shows the following: (table 4.12)
• As a market for the exports of agricultural prod-
ucts of African LDCs, Japan is smaller than the
European Union and about the same size as the
United States.
• Exports from other LDCs, including those in
Asia, are considerably smaller than those from
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TABLE 4.10 Exports to the United States under AGOA and by other LDCs under the
GSP, 2002
(US$ millions)
GSP and AGOA Preferences
Category GSP+AGOA Non-LDCs GSP+AGOA LDCs GSP LDCs
Basic agricultural commodities
Total exports to United States 600 247 122
Exports duty free 431 (72) 190 (77) 114 (93)
Exports for which preferences requested 149 (25) 47 (19) 7 (6)
Exports eligible, but preferences not requested 15 (1) 11 (4) 1   (1)
Exports not eligible for preferences 6 (1) 0 (0) 0   (0)
Processed agricultural products
Total exports to United States 133 51 2.3
Exports duty free 55 (41) 9 (18) 0.9 (41)
Exports for which preferences requested 61 (46) 31 (61) 0.6 (29)
Exports eligible, but preferences not requested 11 (8) 10 (20) 0.7 (30)
Exports not eligible for preferences 5 (4) 0 0
Note: Numbers in parentheses are shares of exports for each category of agricultural exports.
Source: Calculated using data from U.S. International Trade Commission dataweb.African LDCs. This may reflect the structure of
protection and preferences in Japan.
• For African LDCs, more than 50 percent of
exports of basic agricultural products enter the
Japanese market at zero duty MFN rates. Of the
remaining exports to Japan, 23 percent are eligi-
ble for preferences, and 26 percent are excluded
from preferences. For other LDCs, only 5 per-
cent of exports of basic agricultural products
enter duty free under zero percent MFN rates,
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TABLE 4.11 Exports to the European Union from ACP Beneficiaries, 2002 
(US$ millions)
Africa
Category Africa LDC Africa Non-LDC Caribbean Pacific
Basic agricultural commodities
Total exports to the European Union 1,904 5,159 1,018 310
Exports duty free 533 (28) 2,065 (40) 55 (5) 68 (22)
Exports for which preferences requested 
ACP+GSP 1,188 (62) 2,623 (51) 874 (86) 223 (72)
Exports eligible, but preferences not 
requested 183 (10) 471 (9) 89 (9) 19 (6)
Exports not eligible for preferences 0.2 (0) 0.5 (0) 0.18 (0) 0 (0)
Processed agricultural products
Total exports to the European Union 303 1,414 455 15
Exports duty free 30 (10) 16 (1) 8 (2) 1 (10)
Exports for which preferences requested 
ACP+GSP 235 (78) 1,186 (84) 416 (92) 8 (57)
Exports eligible, but preferences not 
requested 37 (12) 212 (15) 30 (7) 5 (34)
Exports not eligible for preferences 0.1 (0) 0 (0) 0.1 (0) 0 (0)
Note: Numbers in parentheses are shares of exports for each category of agricultural exports.
Source: Calculated using data from EU Commission.
TABLE 4.12 Exports to Japan from LDCs in 2002
(US$ millions)
Category All LDCs African LDCs Other LDCs
Basic agricultural commodities
Total exports to Japan 381 241 140
Exports duty free 131 (34) 124 (51) 8 (5)
Exports for which preferences requested 62 (16) 52 (22) 10 (7)
Exports eligible, but preferences not requested 3.7 (1) 3 (1) 0 (0)
Exports not eligible for preferences 184 (48) 62   (26) 122 (87)
Processed agricultural products
Total exports to Japan 40.8 39.4 1.4
Exports duty free 36.7 (90) 36.2 (92) 0.5    (35)
Exports for which preferences requested 3.5 (9) 2.8 (7) 0.6 (44)
Exports eligible, but preferences not requested 0.3 (0.8) 0.3 (0.7) 0.1 (3.8)
Exports not eligible for preferences 0.3 (0.7) 0.1 (0.2) 0.2 (16.5)
Note: Numbers in parentheses are shares of exports for each category of agricultural exports.
Source: Calculated using data from Ministry of Finance, Japan.just 7 percent are eligible for preferences and
87 percent are excluded from preferences.
• Exports of processed products to Japan are a
very small share for African LDCs and are non-
existent for non-African developing countries.
Within the overall figures for each preference-
granting market, there are large variations across
countries. For example, while the value of exports
eligible for preferences exceeds 20 percent of total
exports to the European Union for non-LDC
African countries, it is less than 20 percent for 11
LDC African countries and higher than 80 percent
for 11 other LDC African countries. There are also
important differences across schemes for the same
country. For example, 90 percent of Guinea-
Bissau’s exports to the European Union are eligible
for preferences, yet none of its current exports to
the United States receive preferences because the
exports are subject to an MFN rate of zero. For
Mozambique, by contrast, 97 percent of exports to
the European Union and 86 percent of exports to
the United States are eligible for preferences.
There are also substantial variations across
countries in their use of available preferences. For
example, in 2002, only 10 percent of Ethiopia’s
exports to the European Union that were eligible
for preferences made use of those preferences,
while 85 percent of eligible exports to the United
States did. Botswana used 99 percent of available
preferences in the European Union but only 22 per-
cent of those in the United States.
The Value of Preferences
An estimate of the value of trade preferences to the
exporting countries was also calculated, using the
amount of exports actually receiving preferences
and the margin of preference to derive the tariff
revenue that would have been paid without prefer-
ences. This overstates the actual transfers to devel-
oping countries because some of the rent will be
acquired by importers in the preference-granting
country, especially if there is a single buyer, and
because of the administrative costs incurred by
exporters, such as compliance with rules of origin.
8
Average transfers to LDCs under AGOA and the
GSP amount to less than 1 percent of their agricul-
turalexportstotheUnitedStatesin2002(figure4.1).
For most countries, preferences have a negligible
impact under the current structure of exports.Pref-
erences of this magnitude will not encourage addi-
tionalinvestmentinthesecountriesandwilldolittle
tomitigatethehightransactioncoststhesecountries
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FIGURE 4.1 The Value of Preferences Requested under GSP and AGOA Programs of





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































AGOA US Non-LDC Group  UN LDCs Group AGOA LDC Group
Source: Calculated using data from USITC dataweb.face in accessing world markets. Malawi may be an
exception. It receives a transfer equivalent to just
over 7 percent of the value of exports to the United
States, thanks largely to exports of processed prod-
ucts(mainlytobacco).HaitiistheonlyotherLDCto
receive significant preferences. It is granted more
favorable treatment than the GSP under the
Caribbean Basin Initiative, mainly for exports of
tropicalfruitssuchasmangoes.Preferencesfornon-
LDCs in the United States are also small, with the
averagetransferbeinglessthan1percentofthevalue
of exportstotheUnitedStates.
Under the Cotonou and GSP preference
schemes, the highest transfers go to non-LDCs,
mainly as rents on sugar exports (figure 4.2). Mau-
ritius, for example, is a major beneficiary receiving
transfers in 2002 equivalent to more than 52 per-
cent of the value of its agricultural exports to the
European Union in that year. The value of prefer-
ences for sugar accounted for more than 30 percent
of the value of exports for Fiji, the Republic of
Congo, Swaziland, and a number of Caribbean
countries. Among LDCs, preferences on sugar
resulted in substantial transfers to Burkina Faso,
Malawi, and Mozambique.
While transfers to a small number of LDCs
under the Cotonou Agreement are substantial, the
average transfer across all LDC beneficiaries
amounts to 6 percent of the value of their exports
to the European Union. A large number of coun-
tries receive little or no benefit from EU preferences
on agricultural products. For 10 of the LDCs,
including Chad, Niger, and Rwanda, the value of
EU preferences amounts to less than 2 percent of
the value of exports.
As with the U.S. and EU programs, Japanese
preferences for a few countries under the GSP pro-
gram in 2002 are substantial, primarily for fish
products (figure 4.3). For the majority of LDCs,
however,transfers due to preferences are zero.Only
6 of the 46 LDCs receive a transfer greater than 1




A key problem for the least-developed countries
has been their export reliance on a small number of
agricultural commodities. This export concentra-
tion leaves them vulnerable to external shocks and
the downward trend in commodity prices. Prefer-
ences could provide incentives for investment in
sectors in which countries have a comparative
advantage but that are not being exploited because
of difficulties in accessing export markets.
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FIGURE 4.2 The Value of Preferences Requested under Cotonou and GSP Programs













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































LDC Group Non-LDC Group
Value of preferences from sugar exports 
Source: Calculated using data from EU Commission.Preferenceshavedonelittletoincreasethediversi-
fication of agricultural exports. Only 4 of the 38
countries eligible for preferences under AGOA have
significantly diversified their exports of agricultural
products over the last 20 years (Ghana, Nigeria,
South Africa,and Tanzania).For the other 34 coun-
tries,fiveorfewerproductsaccountedformorethan
90 percent of their agricultural exports in both 1982
and 2002.
9 The same pattern holds for African
exportstotheEuropeanUnion.In1982,for37ofthe
44 African ACP countries, five or fewer products
accountedformorethan90percentof exportstothe
EuropeanUnion.By2002onlytwoofthesecountries
had diversified their exports to the European Union
to reduce the importance of the main five export
products.None of the LDCs had diversified exports
toJapan.In2002thefivetopproductsaccountedfor
90percentormoreof everycountry’sexports.
Much of this failure to stimulate export diversifi-
cation likely results from several features of the pro-
grams. The uncertain duration of the preferences
granted, the exclusion of many products with the
largest preference margins, and the inadequacy of
preference margins for making investments in new
activities attractive, given the high transaction costs
of operating in the least-developed countries. Also
possibly contributing are the administrative rules
governing the granting of preferences, described
below.However,the main factor constraining diver-
sification is likely to be the poor domestic invest-
ment climate in most of the beneficiary countries.
Constraints on Preferences and
Diversification: Rules of Origin
Rules of origin are essential to ensure that prefer-
ences are granted only to exporters from eligible
countries. The nature of the rules of origin, how-
ever, are a key element determining the extent to
which countries are able to take advantage of the
preferences available to them. For a product pro-
duced in a single stage or wholly obtained in one
country, origin is relatively easy to establish. Pri-
mary agricultural products typically fall into this
category. Proof that the product was produced or
obtained in the preferential trade partner is nor-
mally sufficient. The process of proving conform-
ity, however, may incur costs that reduce the value
of the preferences.
For processed manufactured products, rules of
origin stipulate how much or what kind of domes-
ticprocessingmusttakeplace.TheU.S.GSPscheme
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FIGURE 4.3 The Value of Preferences for LDCs under the GSP Program of Japan, as













































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Calculated using data from Ministry of Finance, Japan.has a value-added requirement of 35 percent for all
products. The U.S. scheme also allows for cumula-
tionbetweenselectedcountries,sothatvalueadded
in those countries can be counted toward the over-
all value-added requirement for the product
exported to the United States. AGOA permits such
cumulation among all Sub-Saharan preference
trade partners. In practice, many processed food
products are excluded from the GSP andAGOA.
EU rules of origin are product specific and
sometimes complex. Some products require a
change of tariff heading, some have a value-added
requirement, and some are subject to a specific
manufacturing process requirement. In some cases
these methods are combined. For certain industrial
products, a choice among alternative methods is
permitted—for example, either a change of tariff
heading or satisfaction of a value-added require-
ment. This more flexible approach is not available
for agricultural products.
For many products, the EU rules require a
change of chapter, which is even more restrictive
than a change of heading. Some of the EU rules
exclude some changes in tariff classification by pro-
scribing the use of certain imported inputs. For
example, the rule of origin for bakery products
such as bread, pastry, cakes, and biscuits requires a
change of tariff heading except for any heading in
chapter 11 (products of the milling industry),
meaning that bakery products cannot use imported
flour, a restrictive requirement for countries with-
out a competitive milling industry. Products that
include sugar have to demonstrate that the value of
any imported sugar does not exceed a certain pro-
portion of the price of the product.
While the European Union has sought to har-
monize the processing requirements for each
product across preference programs, a number of
general rules vary substantially across different
schemes, particularly those on the nature and
extent of cumulation and the tolerance rule. There
are important differences in the rules of origin
among the Everything but Arms program, the GSP,
and the Cotonou Agreement. For example, the
Cotonou Agreement permits full cumulation. The
GSP has more limited partial cumulation that can
take place only within four regional groupings
(Association of South-East Asian Nations, Central
American Common Market, the Andean Commu-
nity, and South Asian Association for Regional
Cooperation), but it excludes the ACP countries.
Hence LDC members of the ACP that are eligible to
export to the EU under Everything but Arms may
often prefer to continue exporting under the Coto-
nou Agreement because of the more liberal rules of
origin (Brenton 2003).
The rules of origin for the Japanese GSP require
a change of tariff heading to demonstrate that a
substantial transformation has taken place,
although there is a list of products for which spe-
cific criteria are defined.Thus,for example,flour or
similar products cannot be produced from
imported grains. Cumulation is allowed among a
limited group of Southeast Asian countries
(Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, and
Vietnam).
An important feature of these preferential trade
schemes is the requirement of direct consignment
or direct transport. This stipulates that goods for
which preferences are requested be shipped directly
to the destination market. If they are in transit
through another country, documentary evidence
may be required to show that the goods remained
under the supervision of the customs authorities of
the country of transit, did not enter the domestic
market there, and did not undergo operations
other than unloading and reloading. In practice, it
can be very difficult to obtain the necessary docu-
mentation from foreign customs.
In general, preferences are more effective when
the rules of origin are simple and easy to apply.Fur-
ther, the value of OECD (Organisation for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development) preferences
would be enhanced by greater uniformity in the
way given products are treated in the different
schemes. Thus a product that qualifies for prefer-
ences in one market should be granted preferential
access to all other OECD countries. The WTO
would be an appropriate forum for discussing and
agreeing on a common set of rules of origin.
Preference Erosion by Multilateral
Tariff Reductions
As multilateral tariff reductions are negotiated at
the WTO, the margins of preference available to
developing countries decline. Whether developing
countries lose overall from multilateral liberaliza-
tion depends on the extent of negotiated tariff
reductions on products that currently receive
70 Global Agricultural Trade and Developing Countriespreferential access and on the importance of prod-
ucts excluded from preferences or not using current
preferences. The analysis here makes clear that the
impact of reducing tariffs will vary substantially
across countries but that most countries will not
lose because they currently gain very little from
preferences.
10 For the countries that receive sub-
stantial transfers from preferences, the commodity
impact of tariff liberalization is crucial. For exam-
ple,significant reductions in EU tariffs and internal
prices for sugar would have a significant impact on
a number of countries, especially if existing quotas
were maintained.
The impact of reducing tariffs on products
excluded from preferences will tend to be positive
for the least-developed countries. These products
have very high tariffs,and a reduction in protection
would stimulate exports from countries with a
comparative advantage in these products. Whether
the least-developed countries would gain more
from the inclusion of these very-high-duty prod-
ucts under preferences and the continuation of
high levels of protection is difficult to assess, but
the uncertain duration of many nonreciprocal
schemes and the difficulties of satisfying rules of
origin are likely to limit the value of preferences on
these products.
Wainio and Gibson (2003) estimate that, as a
group, countries receiving nonreciprocal trade
preferences on agricultural products in the United
States would gain from multilateral trade liberaliza-
tion because losses from preference erosion would
be exceeded by gains on products on which these
countries pay the MFN tariff. Within this group, a
country will tend to lose on balance from multilat-
eral liberalization only if more than 80 percent of
its exports to the United States receive preferences,
while it would tend to gain if less than 50 percent of
its exports benefit from preferences. For countries
in between, whether there was a net gain or a loss
from reducing MFN tariffs would depend on the
particular tariff-cutting formula and the structure
of exports.
Conclusion
In principle, trade preferences can assist develop-
ment if they provide temporary margins of prefer-
ence to enable industries to adjust and compete
more effectively in global markets. Multilateral
trade liberalization contributes to this outcome by
ensuring that preferences have a short “half-life”
11
and that inefficient, high-cost industries with
entrenched lobbies do not constrain flexibility and
adjustment. Multilateral liberalization is also
important for limiting the long-term trade divert-
ing impact of preferences on other countries (typi-
cally these will be other developing countries).
In practice, only a small number of countries
receive large transfers as a result of preferences in
OECD markets. The values of preferences are
largest in the EU market, driven by a narrow range
of products and the very high EU price for sugar.In
a few countries, such as Mauritius, preferences
appear to have contributed to a relatively strong
economic performance and economic diversifica-
tion (Subramanian 2001). In other countries, even
though preferences have led to large transfers,
domestic industries have experienced rising costs
and declining output and have accumulated large
debts.
12 Nevertheless, the majority of beneficiaries
of U.S., EU, and Japanese preferences have experi-
enced little or no impact. Preferences have done
nothing to stimulate the export of a broader range
of products.
The key issues for improving trade preference
schemes are as follows:
• How to enhance the value of preferences under
current export structures,which would be facili-
tated by
–Extending coverage to all agricultural products.
–Liberalizing the rules of origin and simplifying
the process of certifying compliance.
–Removing sources of uncertainty concerning
product and country coverage and the
duration of preference schemes.
• How to strengthen the impact of existing prefer-
ences on developing countries, which would be
facilitated by 
–Improving the domestic investment
environment.
–Addressing the internal barriers that raise
the costs of trade for developing countries—
inadequate and high-price transport services,
reflecting lack of infrastructure and lack of
effective competition in many countries,ineffi-
cient and corrupt customs practices, and lack
of trade-supporting financial and telecommu-
nications services.
13
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with multilateral liberalization, which would be
facilitated by
–Developing mechanisms for helping countries
that incur significant losses from preference
erosion adjust.
–Not using fear of preference erosion to main-
tain high levels of protection in industrial
countries.
The challenge is to find preference schemes that
complement the domestic reforms that developing
countries must undertake to improve the returns to
exports without stifling diversification and multi-
lateral trade liberalization. Trade preferences are
not a panacea for success but rather should be seen
as just one part of a strategy to boost export-led
growth and development. Realizing the full poten-
tial of trade also requires improving customs clear-
ance procedures, reducing the costs of transporta-
tion and other trade-related services, ending
corruption, and removing other disincentives to
investment. Addressing these issues will permit
broad-based export growth and will ensure that as
preferences decline with multilateral liberalization,
the economic structure needed for continued
export expansion is in place.The Integrated Frame-
work for Trade-Related Technical Assistance, when
incorporated into poverty reduction strategies,
provides a vehicle for addressing these issues,defin-
ing appropriate policy responses, and mobilizing
relevant resources.
Notes
1. By providing a stimulus to increased trade, preferences
can lead to lower transportation costs, which in turn lead to a
further trade impact. Hummels and Skiba (2002) discuss how
economies of scale in transportation can lead to a virtuous circle
involving increased trade and lower transportation costs.
2. For example, the share of Sub-Saharan African countries
in U.S. imports of agricultural products fell from 4.3 percent in
1982 to 2.5 percent in 2002. Similarly, the share of the African,
Caribbean, and Pacific countries in total EU agricultural
imports fell from 11.7 percent in 1982 to 7.8 percent in 2002.
And the share of low-income countries in Japanese imports fell
from 1.2 percent to 0.5 percent over the same period. More sys-
tematic empirical studies of the impact of trade preferences
are rare and seldom separate out the impact on agricultural
products.
3. The rate of utilization of preferences is the proportion of
exports from developing countries to the European Union, the
United States, and Japan that are recorded at the border as
requesting preferences. Therefore, the underutilization of pref-
erences (the fact that some exports do not request and therefore
are not granted the preferential access for which they are in prin-
ciple eligible) cannot reflect the inability to meet other require-
ments to access the relevant market, such as health and safety or
sanitary requirements or deficiencies in their infrastructure,as is
sometimes suggested. Lack of infrastructure might explain a
muted response from trade to preferences but cannot explain
why, at the border, some products that are eligible for prefer-
ences do not request those preferences.
4. For a comprehensive description of U.S. preferences for
agricultural products, see Wainio and Gibson (2003)
5. Many of the tariff quota products are also subject to safe-
guard measures. Once quantities exceed the quota, exports to
the United States are subject to both the high MFN duty and an
additional, often high, safeguard duty.
6. A number of lines shown as AGOA products are likely to
be economically meaningless. These are lines that refer to Gen-
eral Note 15 of the U.S. tariff schedule, which excludes from the
in-quota quantity for a product subject to a tariff rate quota and
to safeguard amounts that are imported by the U.S.government,
by individuals in quantities of less than five kilograms,and sam-
ples for exhibition or for display at trade fairs. If such products
are imported from AGOA countries, they are eligible for zero
duty access.In the 2002 tariff schedule,85 agricultural lines des-
ignated as AGOA products referred to General Note 15, or 14
percent of AGOA-designated agricultural tariff lines. In 2002
imports from AGOA countries were recorded in only one of
these categories, and the amount was negligible. For a more
accurate representation of the impact of AGOA, these lines are
excluded from the analysis.
7. This clause was initially discussed in the context of com-
bating fraud. However, this is not made clear in the legislation,
and it appears that the clause could be invoked in more general
circumstances.
8. The value of preferences will also be overstated for prod-
ucts for which there are no nonpreferential imports and for
which the duty exceeds the prohibitive level—the gap between
the internal price in the importing country and the world price.
9. The analysis was undertaken at the 5-digit level of the
Standard International Trade Classification (SITC). There are
around 250 agricultural products in this classification. The 34
countries include 3 that did not export any agricultural products
to the United States in 2002.
10. Stevens (2003) notes that the flip side of the preference
coin is agricultural protectionism in OECD countries,which has
led to cheaper imports for African countries of a number of
agricultural products, such as cereals. There are two impacts:
preferences increase export receipts to pay for imports, and
OECD protectionism reduces the prices of those imports. Even
countries that gain little from preferences may lose from multi-
lateral trade reform.
11. Taken from Schott (2004), who presented the notion in
terms of free trade agreements.
12. Mitchell (2004) shows that the sugar industry in the
Caribbean is dominated by high-cost producers, few of which
can profitably export to the European Union, even at four times
world prices.Sugar production has been declining,and efforts to
diversify away from sugar have generally been unsuccessful. A
serious problem in a number of countries is the high level of
accumulated debt of the state-owned sugar industries, which
can amount to a substantial proportion of gross domestic
product.
13. These issues are highlighted in diagnostic trade studies
undertaken in the context of the Integrated Framework for
Trade-Related Technical Assistance for the least-developed
countries (see www.integratedframework.org).
72 Global Agricultural Trade and Developing CountriesReferences
Brenton, P. 2003.“Integrating the Least Developed Economies
into the World Trading System: The Current Impact of EU
Preferences under Everything but Arms.” Journal of World
Trade 37: 623–46.
Brenton, P., and H. Imagawa. 2004.“Rules of Origin, Trade and
Customs.”In J.Sokol and L.de Wulf,eds.,The Customs Mod-
ernisation Handbook.Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
Hummels, D., and Alexandre Skiba. 2002. “A Virtuous Circle?
Regional Tariff Liberalization and Scale Economies in Trans-
port.” Purdue University, West Lafayette, Ind., www.mgmt
.purdue.edu/faculty/hummelsd.
McQueen, M. 1999.“After Lome IV: ACP-EU Trade Preferences
in the 21st Century.”Intereconomics 34: 223–32.
Mitchell, D. 2004.“Sugar in the Caribbean: Policies and Diversi-
fication Strategies to Cope with Declining Preferences.”
World Bank,Washington, D.C.
Ozden, C., and M. Olarreaga. 2003.“AGOA and Apparel: Who
Captures the Tariff Rent in the Presence of Preferential Mar-
ket Access?”World Bank,Washington, D.C.
Schott, J. 2004. “Free Trade Agreements: Boon or Bane of the
World Trading System?” In J. Schott, ed., Free Trade Agree-
ments: US Strategies and Priorities. Washington, D.C.: Insti-
tute for International Economics.
Stevens, C. 2003. “Agricultural Reform and Erosion of Prefer-
ences.”Institute of Development Studies, Brighton, U.K.
Subramanian, A. 2001.“Mauritius: A Case Study.” Finance and
Development 38(4): 22–25.
Topp, V. 2001.“Trade Preferences: Are They Helpful in Advanc-
ing Economic Development in Poor Countries?”Australian
Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Canberra.
UNCTAD. 2001. “Improving Market Access for LDCs.”
UNCTAD/DITC/TNCD/4, http://www.unctad.org/en/docs//
poditctncd4.en.pdf.
Wainio, J., and P. Gibson. 2003.“The Significance of Nonrecip-
rocal Trade Preferences for Developing Countries.” Paper
presented at the International Conference “Agricultural Pol-
icy Reform and the WTO: Where Are We Heading?” June
23–26, Capri, Italy.
The Impact of Agricultural Trade Preferences, with Particular Attention to the Least-Developed Countries 73deem necessary. Perhaps the only effective way to
achieve socially acceptable and politically feasible
reform is to decouple payments from current pro-
duction levels,input use,and prices.Thus,the rele-
vant question is how support can be given without
creating negative effects for the rest of the world—
how to increase farmers’ incomes without distort-
ing production and consumption.
Thischapteranalyzestheexperiencewithdecou-
pling, making a clear distinction between decou-
pling that replaces domestic support and
decoupling that replaces border support. It reviews
a number of one-time buyouts, the best form of
decoupling, and looks at the externalities of decou-
pling,especially for middle- and low-income coun-
tries, in reducing poverty, instituting land title
reform,and providing credit.
What Is Decoupling?
Decoupling has different meanings to economists,
policymakers,andtradenegotiators.Someseeitasa
transition mechanism to a fully competitive sector.
For most of the past half century industrial coun-
tries have had high levels of agricultural protection,
provided by import tariffs, quantitative restric-
tions, and domestic subsidies. Among the many
claimed objectives of these policies, boosting the
income of small family farms is by far the most fre-
quently cited (Winters 1989–90). Because most of
this support is based on current output, input use,
and prices, it also induces overproduction. Given
the weight of industrial countries in the global
trading system,the aggregate effect of such support
is to depress world commodity prices, reducing the
export shares of countries that do not protect their
agricultural sectors. Such support is costly and
often goes to unintended recipients, thus exacer-
bating rather than eliminating the presumed
income inequalities that justified support in the
first place.
Considering the harmful effects of such support
on world markets and the mismatch between stated
objectives and ultimate outcomes, its outright
elimination is sometimes advocated. But societies
have the right to transfer income to groups as they
75
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Others see it as another support program, with
fewer production- and trade-distorting effects.
Some use decoupling only to refer to programs for
transferring income to producers; others use the
term much more broadly, to include, for example,
programs to improve the environment. Sometimes
decoupling is assessed according to the policy’s
long-run impact on output through such factors as
uncertainty,investment,and expectations.
Decoupling was discussed in the literature as
early as 1945, when the American Farm Economic
Association announced 18 awards for papers on“a
price policy for agriculture, consistent with eco-
nomic progress, that will promote adequate and
more stable income from farming.” Nicholls and
Johnson(1946)—recipientsof thefirst-andsecond-
placeawards—summarizedthemainfindingsof the
award-wining papers. Several recommendations
closely resembled decoupled support. For example
(p.281),
Cochrane presents a special formula for pro-
gressively smaller income payments for aiding
producers in adjusting their operations from a
support level to a free market situation. These
declining payments would be based on produc-
tion during 1939–41,so that the producer would
not be “tied to commodity in surplus to receive a
payment benefit.” Thus, he could shift to some
other product during the payment period with-
out losing the specified payments.
Perhaps the first analyst to explicitly advocate
decoupled support in U.S. agriculture was Swerling
(1959). Two characteristics of Swerling’s proposal
are especially interesting. First, he advocated a
safety net mechanism for agriculture, similar to
safety nets in other sectors of the economy (such as
unemployment insurance). Second, he proposed
linking the benefits of the decoupled support to
income declared in tax returns during the recent
past (not to historical production or area). Specifi-
cally (pp. 179–80), he wrote:
Removal of this price stimulus is long over-
due. . . . An income-insurance plan for farm-
operators [should be in place] that include[s]
the following elements: (1) . . . benefits will
be related to income experience of the particular
individual during the recent past; (2) the
purpose would not be to support income at arti-
ficially high levels but to prevent a severe tempo-
rary decline in individual income; (3) the right
to benefits would attach to the person, not to
farm land or the farm enterprise, and would
accordingly not be transferable; (4) the benefit
to be enjoyed by any individual would not
exceed a modest maximum; (5) benefits would
not be conditioned upon the production of par-
ticular commodities or even upon continued
employment in agriculture....
Another early decoupling proposal was put for-
ward by Nash in Europe (1961, p. 188):
Instead of obstructing the withdrawal of farmers
from an industry which cannot adequately
reward them, . . . an unconditional payment
[could be made] to all those at present engaged
in farming, or to those of them deemed to be in
need of compensation, calculated by the refer-
ence to the difference between the incomes now
earned under the protective system and those
capable of being earned under a system of free
market prices.An annuity calculated in this way
and payable for life to all engaged in farming,
but not transferable to their successors, would,
in theory at least, make it possible to bring the
protective system to an end while fully making
good the loss of income to its present beneficiar-
ies. There is no doubt that compensation of this
kind is feasible.
The proceedings of the workshop “Decoupling:
The Concept and Its Future in Canada” contains
numerous definitions of decoupling (Finkle and
Cameron 1990). Consider the following two rather
contrasting views. Van Donkersgoed (1988, p. 40),
of the Christian Farmers Foundation of Ontario,
defined decoupling as “a program in which eligibil-
ity is not linked to production, the production
potential of resources or the production effort of a
farm entrepreneur; rather eligibility is linked to
stewardship farming practices, marketing, the
maintenance of rural communities, diversified
ownership of the assets of production, moderate-
sized family enterprises and other rural, non-
production valuables that add to the quality of
Canadian life.”Spriggs and Sigurdson (1988,p.93),
in contrast, simply stated: “In fact, a program toeliminate subsidies would be the ultimate in decou-
pling. It is the only truly decoupled program that
there is.”
Cahill (1997, p. 351) defines as fully decoupled
from production a policy that “does not influence
production decisions of farmers receiving pay-
ments, and that permits free market determination
of prices (facing all farmers, whether or not receiv-
ing income support).” A policy is effectively fully
decoupled if “the provision of the compensatory
payment package results in production that,for any
crop, does not exceed that level that would exist
without compensation.”The Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD
2000a) defines decoupling in a similar way.
Hennessy (1998) includes as decoupling pay-
ments triggered by ex post market or production
conditions, as long as the payment level is not con-
ditioned on an individual’s specific level of produc-
tion. Disaster relief measures, for example, would
be considered decoupled because they are not
affected by the individual’s level of production.
Goodwin and Mishra (2002) argue that a fully
decoupled payment must be fixed and guaranteed
and thus is not influenced by ex post realizations of
market conditions (such as low prices or area
yields). This is the narrowest definition because
neither payments nor the rules of eligibility and the
base criteria can be changed.If a time limit is added
to this definition, then decoupling simply implies a
number of annual payments to producers. Where
financial markets function efficiently, these bonds
can be converted into a single payment. In such a
setting,decoupling would consist of an administra-
tive decision to remove distortions followed by a
single payment—a radical policy initiative. In fact,
a number of analysts have advocated a fundamental
reform of the European Union’s Common Agricul-
tural Policy (CAP), with the last step consisting of
payment of a bond (see, for example, Beard and
Swinbank 2001, Swinbank and Tangermann 2001,
and Tangermann 1991).
The Politics of Decoupling
Politicians are reluctant to subsume all agricultural
policies into a universal social welfare program,
including job retraining and the like, even though
these types of programs to help small farmers
would be ideal and truly compatible with World
Trade Organization (WTO) policy in being mini-
mally trade distorting (as Swerling originally sug-
gested in 1959).It is very difficult to end farm sub-
sidy programs, however; there is always a bias to
maintain current policies because politicians lose
more support if they take away subsidies than they
gain if they introduce new ones. Furthermore,
governments like to concentrate the benefits of
subsidies and diffuse the costs to as many people as
possible in order to maximize political support.
And small groups are better able to organize and
control free riders. All this appears to make it
inevitablethatgovernmentswillfavorcommodity-
or sector-based policies over all other forms of
agricultural support. So, fully decoupled payments
and one-time buyouts, even more than universal
programs, have the political disadvantage of not
being able to continue to favor incumbent farmers.
They also look like corporate welfare, whereas
trade barriers and price supports reduce visible
taxpayer costs and hide the fact that large farms get
most of the transfers. Politicians also lack the
commitment mechanism to keep such policies in
place—politicians are tempted to reintroduce sup-
port later in its original form or with new distort-
ing programs.
Under many current systems, a complex web of
policies, including payments not to produce, subsi-
dies,and production controls,help to obfuscate the
policies’true nature in terms of who benefits and to
what extent.Another class of subsidy programs,the
whole farm insurance program used in Canada and
the revenue stabilization programs used in the past,
has the economic advantage of not singling out
specific sectors. And because all farms are eligible,
taxpayer constraints dilute the per farm benefits
thereby reducing the political support for such pro-
grams. Thus Canada has eliminated perfectly func-
tioning revenue insurance programs, and other




family member, who experienced severe adjust-
ments in the past 50 years.Thus it is much easier to
maintain the status quo of subsidies in agriculture.
Politicians also play on insecurities related to food
self-sufficiency in case of war, food safety issues
arising because of new technologies and genetically
modified organisms, and the multifunctional
Experience with Decoupling Agricultural Support 77benefits of farms in providing landscape amenities
and rural livelihoods.
The Economics of Decoupling
Decoupling can be viewed as two distinct transition
mechanisms: one replacing domestic support and
one replacing border measures. The key variable
driving this distinction is the source of financing
for the original support measures: consumers, tax-
payers, or a combination.
Replacing domestic support measures such as
production subsidies with decoupled support is
straightforward in the small country case and can
be shown to be Pareto improving. Instead of pro-
viding output-based subsidies, the government
makes lump-sum payments to producers based on
some historical criteria without any constraint or
requirement on the current use of their resources.
Under the lump-sum scheme, producers can
receive higher payments because welfare losses (the
so-called Harberger triangles) disappear. Taxpayers
can also be better off if part of the efficiency gains is
translated into lower taxes.Because both producers
and taxpayers can be made better off,decoupling in
the production subsidy case is clearly a Pareto-
improving move.
Decoupling in the case of an import tariff, how-
ever, is more complicated as it involves eliminating
tariffs, raising additional taxes, and distributing the
tax revenues to producers. Producers are no worse
off (they receive the same amount of support),con-
sumers are better off (they pay lower prices), but
taxpayers are worse off because they lose the tariff
revenue and must finance the decoupled support.
Assuming that welfare losses arising from border
measures are higher than welfare losses arising
from domestic subsidies, decoupling of border
measures is welfare improving. It is not a Pareto
improvement, however. Furthermore, while the
removal of the import tariff implies welfare gains,
introduction of the tax to finance decoupled sup-
port implies welfare losses.Alston and Hurd (1990,
p. 155) contend the following:
Currently it is fashionable to argue for “decou-
pling” farm programs in the sense that income
transfers should be achieved with minimal
consequences for commodity markets. Along
with the benefits from transparency,the benefits
from decoupling may be illusory. The issue here
is whether the costs of distortions in commodity
markets are necessarily greater than the costs of
distortions introduced elsewhere in the econ-
omy to finance “decoupled”transfers.
Moschini and Sckokai (1994) claim that the wel-
fare losses of raising new taxes to finance decou-
pling are unlikely to be larger than the welfare gains
from decoupling. Beghin, Bureau, and Park (2003)
estimate that in the Republic of Korea it costs
taxpayers $1.61 for every $1 transferred to produc-
ers. Using a general equilibrium model, Parry
(1999) finds that the efficiency cost of taxpayer-
financed lump-sum transfers to agriculture equals
27 percent of the amount of the income transfer.
Since most of the support is at the border,
decoupling is likely to be a complicated exercise
with mixed outcomes. Although the costs of
taxpayer-financed programs are shown to be signif-
icant, welfare gains depend on how decoupled pro-
grams are financed. But the general result from the
public finance literature is that trade taxes have
much higher inefficiencies relative to other forms
of taxation or sources of revenue for farmers.
Experience with Broad
Decoupling Attempts
Early attempts at decoupling failed. The 1949
Brannan Plan in the United States, which proposed
cash payments to farmers whose overall income fell
below a certain level, was defeated in the U.S.
Congress. Similarly in Europe, the Mansholt Plan
of 1968, which advocated support in order to
finance mandatory retirement for older farmers,
also failed.
The first attempt at decoupling came in the
United States with the 1985 Farm Bill, which
shifted the base of support from current yields to
historical yields (see timeline in table 5.1). The
European Union (EU) partially replaced interven-
tion prices with direct payments following the
Common Agricultural Policy reform of 1992.
Mexico replaced price supports with direct pay-
ments in 1994 with the introduction of the
National Program for Direct Assistance to Rural
Areas (Programa de Apoyos Directos al Campo, or
Procampo). The United States replaced deficiency
payments with decoupled support in the 1996
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price support and input subsidies with direct pay-
ments. In addition to broad decoupling programs,
there have been numerous one-time buyouts,
including New Zealand’s exit grant in 1984, the
buyout of Canada’s grain transportation subsidy in
1995, and the buyout of the U.S. peanut marketing
quota under the 2002 Farm Bill.
Decoupling Efforts in the United States
The budgetary outlays for most U.S. commodity
programs are authorized by Congress (and subse-
quently approved by the president) every few years
through farm bills. There have been 20 such bills
since the first one in 1929.The central feature of the
New Deal farm programs of the 1930s was price
supports achieved through taxpayer-funded pro-
duction subsidies and supply controls (acreage set-
asides, accumulation, maintenance, and disposal of
public stocks). Payments were based on the differ-
ence between the target price set by the government
and the higher of the market price or the price at
which the government would value crops used as
collateral for loans made by a public corporation.
The total payment was equal to the yield per acre
multiplied by a farm’s eligible payment acreage (the
amount of land devoted to cultivation of the crop
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TABLE 5.1 Chronology of Broader Decoupling and Recoupling Episodes,
1985–2004
Year Country Policy change
1985 United States 1985 Farm Bill introduces “frozen” government payment yields
per acre.
1992 European Union Mac Sharry reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy reduce price
supports and introduce direct payments linked to historical area
planted (with “frozen” government payments for the output per
hectare) or number of animals (but farmers still need to produce to
receive payments).
1994 Mexico Procampo introduces payments based both on historical acres and
yields up to 2008 with a phase-out of import barriers under the North
American Free Trade Agreement, input subsidies, and activities of the
state trading monopoly.
1996 United States 1996 Farm Bill eliminates target prices, replacing them with decoupled
historical entitlements, the so-called production flexibility contract
payments, to end in 2002.
1996 Mexico Base acres can be switched to other crops or enterprises, and rural
development policy is launched to foster productivity.
1998 United States Emergency market loss assistance payments effectively reverse the
1996 Farm Bill.
2000 European Union Agenda 2000 extends, deepens, and widens the Mac Sharry reforms.
2001 Turkey Direct income support program reduces some administered prices and
input subsidies. Only minor changes in border policies.
2002 United States 2002 Farm Bill extends production flexibility contracts, formalizes
emergency payments as countercyclical payments, adds new crops
to production flexibility contracts program, allows base acres and
payment yields to be updated, increases price supports for coupled
subsidies, and introduces three new crops to the coupled subsidy
program.
2002 Mexico Target prices and input subsidies are reintroduced. Procampo remains
largely unchanged.
2002 European Union Mid-term review, resulting in June 2003 agreement to switch most
direct payments to decoupled payments, with entitlements sold with
or without land; level of payments and some support prices to decline
in 2005–07.
2004 European Union Decoupled payments are introduced for the so-called Mediterranean
products (cotton, olive oil, and tobacco).
Source: Authors’ compilations.in question). This portfolio of policy instruments
was the primary means of price support for the
major field crops for decades until the 1980s.
The Food Security Act of 1985 set a new trend
for major field crops by reducing the role of acreage
set-asides and public stockholding and moving
toward decoupling, with a “freeze” on payment
yields (farmers were paid on the basis of fixed out-
put per acre regardless of what was actually pro-
duced). Payment yield was established for each
farm by the Department of Agriculture, based on
average yields in 1981–85.
Acreage set-asides and public stockholding were
largely abandoned by the mid-1990s and elimi-
nated soon thereafter with the introduction of the
Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform
(FAIR) Act in 1996. FAIR also banished the target
price used in calculating deficiency payments but
maintained the lower fixed price, called the loan
rate, which had triggered public stock purchases in
the past. In place of the links between support,
prices, and production, production flexibility con-
tract payments were introduced. Participating pro-
ducers received payments in proportion to what
they had received during 1990–95 or would have
received had they been enrolled. These historical
benefits were in turn determined by a farmer’s his-
torical production levels. Each participating pro-
ducer received a fixed schedule of payments, which
was to decline gradually through 2002. Although
not specifically stated, it was implicitly assumed
that the payments would end by 2002.
The effect of the 1996 Farm Bill on the structure
of budgetary outlays is shown in table 5.2. It breaks
the producer support estimate down into market
price support (a measure of border protection) and
budgetary support (a measure of domestic sup-
port). Budgetary support is further decomposed
into support based on output and input use (con-
sidered as having a large impact on production and
trade, or fully coupled support) and support based
on area, historical entitlements, input constraints,
and overall farm income (considered as having a
smaller impact on production and trade, or par-
tially decoupled support; for further details and
definitions, see OECD 2000b).
Historical entitlements, which did not exist
before 1996, represented more than a third of total
budgetary support in 1996–98. They are exempt
from disciplines in the WTO (they are in the Green
Box; see chapter 3). Area payments declined from
$5.4 billion in 1993–95 to $1.2 billion in 1996–98
and are also exempt from reduction commitments
in the WTO (they are in the Blue Box). During
these two periods, output payments under disci-
pline in the WTO (in the Amber Box) also
increased, from $0.2 billion to $1.6 billion, a reflec-
tion primarily of declining commodity prices and
consequently increased loan rate payments.
Although payments were made on a crop-by-
crop basis, planting was not required or restricted
to any particular crop. Payments were tied to
85 percent of the fixed-base area (average of acres
planted or prevented from being planted for
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TABLE 5.2 Composition of Agricultural Support in the United States, 1986–88 to
1999–2001
(US$ millions)
Category 1986–88 1989–92 1993–95 1996–98 1999–2001
Value of production 113,537 168,615 184,239 199,990 192,417
Total support estimate 68,540 72,779 79,060 81,715 95,455
Producer support estimate 41,839 34,326 31,091 36,384 51,256
Market price support 19,533 17,825 16,969 17,864 18,662
Budgetary support 22,306 16,501 14,123 18,519 32,594
Output 2,919 510 241 1,644 9,285
Input use 6,516 6,574 6,003 6,088 6,877
Area 11,313 6,897 5,396 1,247 2,722
Historical entitlements 0 0 0 6,647 10,085
Input constraints 637 1,776 1,963 1,940 1,844
Overall farm income 912 743 520 954 1,780
Source: OECD database.covered crops of wheat, feed grains, rice, and cot-
ton) and fixed-payment yields. Because the pay-
ments were independent of current production,
farmers had far greater flexibility to make planting
decisions (or to not plant at all). Farmers were free
to allocate their land to any crops on the “contract
acres” except fruits and vegetables, but they had to
maintain their land in “agricultural use.”Thus pro-
ducers were to depend more heavily on the market
and also bear greater risk from increased price
variability.
The FAIR Act was meant to be a transition
toward a new policy environment with a dimin-
ished government role in commodity markets.
Commodity prices declined sharply in the late
1990s, however, triggering three major policy
events that reversed much of what had been
accomplished by the FAIR Act. First, emergency
payments were introduced, approximately equal to
50 percent of decoupled payments in 1998 and 100
percent of decoupled payments in 1999, 2000, and
2001. These were designated as non-product-
specific support and so escaped reduction under
the de minimis proviso of the WTO. Second, when
market prices fell below the loan rate, the govern-
ment extended the marketing loan program by
issuing loan deficiency payments, which had the
same economic effects as the previous deficiency
payment scheme. Third, the 2002 Farm Bill was
introduced, increasing several loan rates, introduc-
ing three more crops into the loan rate scheme,and
allowing base acres and payment yields to be
updated and soybean acreage to be added to the
base. The bill formalized the emergency payments
into a new countercyclical scheme in which pay-
ments vary with price but not with quantity.
The emergency measures introduced in 1998
(and later the 2002 Farm Bill) changed the structure
of the budgetary outlays considerably. Between
1996–98 and 1999–2001, historical entitlements
increased by more than 50 percent (from $6.6 bil-
lion to $10.1 billion, area payments increased
twofold, and payments based on output increased
more than fivefold (see table 5.2), implying that
support is less decoupled now than it was after 1996.
Decoupling Efforts in the European Union
The principal vehicle of support in the European
Union has been the Common Agricultural Policy.
Following the Spaak Report of 1956, which sug-
gested that agriculture requires special treatment,
the Stresa Conference of 1958 outlined CAP’s three
guiding principles: free flow of agricultural com-
modities within the common market, preference
to member states, and common financing. CAP,
formally put in place in 1962, had multiple objec-
tives: increase agricultural production,ensure a fair
standard of living for the agricultural community,
stabilize markets, guarantee a regular supply of
agricultural commodities, and ensure reasonable
prices for consumers. The objectives were to be
achieved through domestic price supports, export
subsidies,and common trade barriers.The first and
last objectives were fully met within a few years,but
concerns were soon raised about excess production
and the unsustainable level of CAP budgetary
requirements if policies did not change.
Reform of the CAP was attempted in 1972, fol-
lowing the recommendations of the 1968 Mansholt
Plan. The plan proposed, among other reforms,
lump-sum transfers to 5 million farmers to retire
them from farming and reduce active farmland by
5 percent. The Mansholt Plan, the first attempt to
decouple, was never implemented.
The first major reinstrumentation of the CAP
took place in 1992. The reform, known as the Mac
Sharry reform after the EU’s Commissioner for
Agriculture, together with the Blair House Accord
of the United States, paved the way for the signing
of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture
in 1994. For cereal, oilseed, and protein crops
and for beef and veal, price supports provided by
import levies or export refunds were reduced, and
farmers were compensated with direct payments.
For crops, payments were based on 85 percent of
historical plantings (with a paid minimum area
set-aside requirement, a further paid voluntary
set-aside of up to 30 percent of historical area,
and a base acre limit for payments set at the
national or regional level). The area-payment rates
varied by crop type, and the set-aside payments
were initially higher but are now equal. The only
requirement is the land had to be set aside or
planted in crops or temporary grass. Small-scale
farmers producing less than 92 tons of cereals
annually are exempt from set-asides and receive
“all cereals” payments irrespective of crop planted
(representing 25 percent of area but 70 percent of
farmers).
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port in the EU increased threefold, from $13.4 bil-
lion to $40.3 billion, while border support declined
from $80 billion to $76 billion (table 5.3). Most of
the increase in budgetary support was attributable
to area payments and, to a more limited extent, to
historical entitlements and input constraints (des-
ignated Blue Box payments and so exempt from
reductions in the WTO).
Following the 1992 reforms, the level of support
remained unchanged, but its structure changed
considerably. For example, while estimated pro-
ducer support averaged $117 billion for 1989–92
and 1993–95, border protection support declined
from $93 billion in 1989–92 to $76 billion in
1993–95. Support based on output declined from
$7 billion to $3 billion, and area payments
increased from $7 billion to $24 billion. Thus
the 1992 CAP reform was a good step toward
decoupling.
Under Agenda 2000, price support to crops
declined, direct payments increased and were
realigned across all crops, and reference yields were
changed in some countries. A push toward more
investment in rural development was also made. A
large transformation has occurred away from bor-
der protection and input subsidies to direct pay-
ments. Total support has been declining, especially
in grains and oilseeds. More than the increase in
budgetary allocations, which remains moderate
compared with other expenditures, the growing
importance of rural development seems to follow
from the official reference to it as the “second pillar
of the CAP.”
The European Union now has greater flexibility
to overhaul any policy element in light of changes
in market developments, costs, enlargement, WTO
(and other) trade negotiations, food crises, and
other pressure for reform. The budget for Agenda
2000 did not include any provision for extending
direct payments to farmers in Eastern Europe,
making reform a requirement. Meanwhile, the
European Union has launched free trade negotia-
tions with Mercosur, and it established the
Everything but Arms initiative with low-income
developing countries. Because Mercosur includes
some major agricultural exporting nations and the
Everything but Arms program will increase
imports,especially for sugar,rice,and bananas,fur-
ther reform of the CAP is necessary.
Recent food crises underline the need for
reform, sometimes for more regulation and con-
trols over production practices, including animal
welfare. Against this background, the European
Commission’s midterm review of Agenda 2000
proposed a set of reforms that include further
decoupling, continuing set-asides, and more cross-
compliance rules with statutory environmental,
food safety, and animal health and welfare
standards.
Current EU compensatory payments still influ-
ence farmers’decisions on how much land to plant.
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TABLE 5.3 Composition of Agricultural Support in the European Union, 1986–88
to 1999–2001
(US$ millions)
Category 1986–88 1989–92 1993–95 1996–98 1999–2001
Value of production 214,849 275,770 286,658 291,427 237,990
Total support estimate 109,654 138,927 133,050 129,328 112,628
Producer support estimate 93,719 117,097 116,519 111,966 99,343
Market price support 80,257 93,282 76,084 64,989 60,863
Budgetary support 13,446 23,327 40,279 47,468 38,693
Output 5,009 6,769 2,999 3,945 3,644
Input use 5,025 7,135 8,133 8,446 6,540
Area 2,701 6,987 24,326 29,419 24,733
Historical entitlements 0 559 1,466 1,007 597
Input constraints 711 1,877 3,356 4,650 3,178
Overall farm income 0002 0
Source: OECD database.This results not only because farmers are obligated
to produce cereals on the base acres to receive the
payments, but also because area payments in the
European Union are made on an aggregate, fixed-
area basis that is set at the national or regional level.
Individual farmers do not have a base area—just
eligible acres for which they receive payments and
have area set-asides. If the regional base area is
exceeded, the per-unit subsidy is prorated down-
ward proportionately for all farmers in  the region.
Because the prorating occurs on the total area
planted ex post, farmers have an incentive to over-
plant in order to maximize their share of fixed
budget outlays or to defend against share erosion
due to overplanting by other producers. This
means that the area payments are fully coupled to
plantings because individual farmers are not penal-
ized for their own decisions to overplant.Area pay-
ments with a national base area are therefore not a
limit on total acres planted.
For EU cattle, the headage payments under
“production-limiting” arrangements are anything
but production limiting because farmers are
allowed to keep more cattle than are eligible for
payments, so there is no absolute production con-
trol, and the number of eligible animals is not lim-
ited to the number on farms prior to the introduc-
tion of payments in 1992. Where numbers of
animals are below the maximum that could be
claimed per farm, farmers have an incentive to
expand their stock up to the limits on which pay-
ments are made. Thus incentives in the program
have been to encourage initial expansion of animal
numbers and then to lock production in at around
the levels that are consistent with the maximum
number of animals eligible for payments. Those
numbers reflect the very high levels of support for
several decades as well as the incentives inherent in
the headage payments.
The CAP reform agreement of June 2003
requires decoupling at least 75 percent of payments
in the arable sector and at least 50 percent in the
beef and sheep sectors. Dairy premiums will be
added into the single farm payment after 2007.The
decoupled single farm payment will be based on
average payments claimed over the three-year refer-
ence period, 2000–02, and will be paid per eligible
hectare of land. Entitlements can be sold with or
without land. Member states are offered some flex-
ibility in the year they begin and in fully or partially
decoupling within the limits for each sector. They
may also give up to 10 percent of the payments for
environmentally friendly farming and restrict enti-
tlement trading within a region. All payments are
to be reduced 3 percent in 2005, 4 percent in 2006,
and 5 percent in 2007. Support prices will also
decline. Payments will be conditional on compli-
ance with various measures, including environ-
mental and acreage set-asides.
Decoupling Efforts in Mexico 
About a quarter of Mexico’s population depends on
agriculture, which contributes 5 percent to gross
domestic product (GDP), down from 9 percent in
the early 1980s. According to the OECD, total
transfers to agriculture averaged $7 billion annually
during 1999–2001, $5.7 billion of which went to
producer support. This support corresponds to
$1,000 per full-time farmer equivalent and $53 per
hectare, both considerably lower than the OECD
averages of $11,000 per farmer and $192 per
hectare. About 29 percent of producer support
went to maize,21 percent to milk,and 13 percent to
sugar.
Traditionally, Mexico’s state agricultural enter-
prise, Conasupo (Compania Nacional de Subsis-
tencias Populares), has been heavily involved in the
marketing, transportation, storage, and processing
of most agricultural commodities. Maize, beans,
and wheat, by far the most important agricultural
commodities,have been heavily subsidized through
a system of guaranteed prices.The government also
set prices, which were usually announced before
planting decisions were made and were uniform
across the country and across seasons. Conasupo
bought unlimited quantities at the guaranteed
prices. Hence, producers knew in advance the price
they would receive and shifted production to crops
with the highest degree of relative protection rather
than with the highest profitability according to
world prices. The poorest peasants did not benefit
from guaranteed prices since they formally mar-
keted little or none of their production.
In 1994 Mexico introduced Procampo, a decou-
pled support program to provide income support
to grain and oilseed producers—about 90 percent
of all Mexican farmers. Procampo replaced the old
scheme of guaranteed prices. By supporting farm-
ers’ incomes rather than production of specific
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production and trade less distorted.It is also distri-
butionally more attractive than the earlier guaran-
teed price program because poor subsistence farm-
ers are eligible for payments and there is a ceiling of
100 hectares on the amount of land that a single
farmer can use to claim payments.
Government credibility became a major issue
for Procampo. Initially, some producers did not
believe that the government would actually imple-
ment the program. Fearing increased taxation, they
underreported land allocated to eligible commodi-
ties. The government’s turnaround, requiring that
land be allocated to eligible crops after initially
delinking payments from the current use of land,
likely further discredited the government. (In 1996
the government increased the number of eligible
crops.) The macroeconomic environment also
played an important role. When Procampo was in
the design phase, most commodities were highly
protected, but the 1994 devaluation of the peso
sharply reduced protection rates.
Despite these shortcomings the program has at
least two features that improve income distribution
(sometimes at the cost of more inefficiency). First,
decoupled area payments are given for a minimum
of one hectare, even if the actual size of a farm is
less than one hectare. Second, land reforms allow
small farms to rent approximately 10 percent of
their land to larger farmers.These features can have
a significant positive impact on income distribu-
tion compared with historical guaranteed prices.
Few small farmers benefited from that system
because they were often net buyers,sold products at
distress prices at harvest, or could not take advan-
tage of price supports because they were not inte-
grated with market price centers because of high
transaction costs.
Just as the United States did, however, Mexico
reintroduced its price support in 2002. New coun-
tercyclical payments, similar to those that the
United States introduced in its 2002 Farm Bill,took
effect with the 2002–03 marketing year. The pay-
ments were to equal the difference between the tar-
get price and the sum of the market price and
Procampo payments.The payments would apply to
eight commodities. In addition, a new common
subsidized price for electricity used for agricultural
production was introduced (estimated to cost $0.6
billion annually.)
The most visible change in Mexican agricul-
tural policies has been the move from support
based on input use to support based on historical
entitlements, under Procampo (table 5.4). Border
measures are still the dominant component of
support, accounting for 64 percent of producer
support during 1999–2001.
Mexico’s decoupled payment program encoun-
tered several problems. The program was
announced well in advance of the registration of
eligible producers.The lag allowed many farmers to
increase the amount of land in production of the
eligible commodities and thus to increase their
future payments. So rather than moving resources
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TABLE 5.4 Composition of Agricultural Support in Mexico, 1986–88 to 1999–2001
(US$ millions)
Category 1986–88 1989–92 1993–95 1996–98 1999–2001
Value of production 15,412 25,209 26,186 27,033 30,328
Total support estimate 1,287 8,121 7,558 4,858 6,999
Producer support estimate −266 5,718 5,060 3,190 5,694
Market price support −1,710 4,025 2,918 1,495 3,625
Budgetary support 1,444 1,692 2,142 1,695 2,068
Output 1 26 52 4 110
Input Use 1,442 1,663 1,308 676 721
Area 0 3 6 62 61
Historical entitlements 0 0 776 925 1,112
Input constraints 0000 0
Overall farm income 0 0 0 27 63
Source: OECD database.to more efficient uses, the scheme, initially at least,
moved more resources into production that was
already inefficient. Moreover, because land rights
among landowners, tenants, and sharecroppers
were unclear, it was difficult to determine who was
entitled to payment.
Decoupling Efforts in Turkey
The agricultural sector in Turkey employs 43 per-
cent of the labor force and contributes 16 percent
to GDP, down from 26 percent in 1980. Total agri-
cultural support in Turkey reached an annual aver-
age of $9.7 billion during 1999–2001,$6.5 billion of
it in direct producer support, according to the
OECD (table 5.5).Of that amount,$5.1 billion was
transferred through border measures, the domi-
nant component of agricultural support in Turkey.
At 5.1 percent of GDP, Turkey’s agricultural sup-
port rate is the highest of all OECD countries and
almost four times the OECD average of 1.3 percent.
This support corresponds to $162 per hectare,
compared with the $192 per hectare average for
OECD. Sugar accounts for 13 percent of estimated
producer support, milk for 11 percent, and wheat
for 10 percent. The main policy instruments for
agricultural support have been border measures,
administered prices,input subsidies,and budgetary
payments. With a per capita GDP of a little over
$3,000, this support imposes considerable budget-
ary strains on the economy.
Responding to the high cost of support and its
distortionary effects,Turkey embarked on a major
agricultural policy reform program in 2001 with
World Bank assistance (World Bank 2001). A
main component of the reform was to replace
administered prices and input subsidies with
annual direct income support payments. In addi-
tion, farmers were granted a one-time payment to
cover the cost of transition from overproduced
and highly subsidized commodities to other
commodities.
Income support payments were set at $100 per
hectare, but even this low level of transfer implied
an eventual annual expenditure of $1.9 billion. The
upper limit,initially set at 20 hectares,was raised to
50 hectares in 2002. As in Mexico, to allow small
subsistence farmers (who otherwise received no
support) to benefit from the program, a minimum
payment was set for farmers cultivating below a
certain threshold.
A number of hard choices had to be made fol-
lowing the decision to implement direct income
support payments.A key decision related to records
(as was the case in Mexico).A pilot program was set
up in several districts in four provinces to test two
methods of developing a registry for producers.
One method, applied in two provinces, used the
existing land registry records. A second method,
applied in the other two provinces, was based on
certifications by the chief of the village,the council,
and the local farmers associations. Payments were
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TABLE 5.5 Composition of Agricultural Support in Turkey, 1986–88 to 1999–2001
(US$ millions)
Category 1986–88 1989–92 1993–95 1996–98 1999–2001
Value of production 18,343 26,859 29,158 34,068 29,458
Total support estimate 3,092 7,212 6,027 10,705 9,649
Producer support estimate 2,779 6,127 4,675 7,791 6,522
Market price support 1,884 4,784 2,712 5,710 5,093
Budgetary support 895 1,344 1,962 2,081 1,429
Output 11 30 242 104 337
Input Use 885 1,314 1,720 1,978 957
A r e a 0000 0
Historical entitlements 0000 1 3 6
Input constraints 0000 0
Overall farm income 0000 0
Source: OECD database.made on a per hectare basis in two installments for
up to two hectares.
While the pilot benefited 9,681 farmers includ-
ing many small farmers, at a cost of $2.3 million,
numerous problems were encountered during
implementation. Land registries contained unclear
descriptions, shared titles did not specify the
amount of land that each person owned, and many
landowners who had inherited their land did not
possess deeds. Registration procedures were also
unclear, and various “producer certificates” were
issued without uniform standards. Many share-
croppers were declared ineligible for participation
because they lacked official documents. There were
also cases of false claims, for nonfarm land or land
not in agricultural use.
Other problems were related to the design and
implementation of the pilot. Farmers received
inadequate information about the program, and
consequently many failed to apply for benefits
(especially in remote villages). The agencies
involved in the pilot also received inadequate train-
ing and information. And farmers were not given
enough time to apply for the program.
Experience with One-Time Buyouts
In addition to broad decoupling attempts, coun-
tries have conducted numerous one-time buyouts
in the last two decades. These buyouts have been
much more successful than the broader decoupling
efforts.
The 2002 U.S.Peanut Quota Buyout
The U.S. peanut program goes back to 1934, when
peanut producers agreed to reduce their acreage in
return for payments. The program failed to reduce
output and was revised in 1941 by introducing
individual acreage allotments and penalties for
farmers who exceeded the allotments. The allot-
ments were not enforced, however. The Agricul-
tural Act of 1949 established support prices for
peanuts, and until 1978 all peanuts from approved
allotments were guaranteed the support price. The
program again ran into financial difficulties prima-
rily because of the introduction of high-yielding
varieties. Beginning in 1978 peanut quotas were set
annually and producers received support for quota
peanuts only. During 1979–82 farmers had to have
both quantity and acreage allotments to be eligible
for payments. The acreage allotment was aban-
doned in 1982.Quantity quotas were tradable,with
some exceptions. Imports were banned.
The program again ran into trouble as the costs
of the program grew enormously.Peanut manufac-
turers pressed for reforms because they wanted
access to lower-priced peanuts, while the introduc-
tion of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) allowed peanut products to enter duty
free from Mexico and Canada.
Some modifications were made in 1996, but the
biggest change came with the 2002 Farm Bill, with
the government deciding to buy out the marketing
quotas created in 1978.Eligible quota holders are to
be compensated for the lost value of the marketing
quota during fiscal years 2002–06. Quota holders
can elect to receive payment in five equal install-
ments of $0.11 a pound per year times the actual
quota allotment for the 2001 marketing year or to
receivetheundiscountedsumof allthepaymentsin
the first year, equal to $0.55 a pound. Given that an
average effective quota for 1998–2000 is 5.6 million
tons, the buyout is expected to cost $181 million a
year,or $1.4 billion for the five-year period.During
the same period, the annual value of U.S. peanut
production was $3.1 billion (8.79 million tons
times $355 per ton). In addition to the quota buy-
out, peanut producers will be compensated by
receiving support from the other provisions of the
2002 Farm Bill (decoupled and countercyclical pay-
ments). Several factors led to this change in the
existing peanut program: pressure from imports
under NAFTA, opposition by other industry
groups, and enormous increases in the fiscal costs
of the program (see chapter 12 in this volume).
Canada’s Buyout of the Railway Subsidy (“Crow
Rate”) for Grain Shippers
Canada’s Crow Rate program (named for
Crowsnest Pass in the Rocky Mountains) goes back
to 1897,when Canadian Pacific Railway was given a
subsidy of $3.4 million to build a line between
Alberta and British Columbia. In exchange for the
subsidy, Canadian Pacific agreed to charge grain
farmers 20 percent less than the (then) prevailing
rates. The 1925 Railway Act made the subsidized
rates statutory. Over the years the Crow subsidies
were extended to numerous commodities. Because
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ers created by the transportation subsidies, value-
added industries (especially livestock production),
moved to central and eastern Canada where grain
prices were lower (Klein and Kerr 1995).
In 1995 the Canadian government decided to
terminate the program, which was becoming
fiscally unsustainable. To ease the transition, a one-
time payment of C$1.6 billion was made to eligible
farmers. An additional C$300 million was invested
in a more efficient grain handling and transporta-
tion system. The one-time payment was spread
over two fiscal years and made to owners of prairie
farmland with eligible crops grown in 1994 and
summer fallow land in 1993,adjusted for a produc-
tivity factor, distance factor, and provincial alloca-
tion factor. Eligible crops were those that were
eligible for subsidies under the Western Grains
Transportation program. There were no restric-
tions on how the payments were used, and they
were treated as a capital gain rather than as current
income, a concession valued by the OECD at an
estimated $0.6 billion.
The outcome has been positive overall. The
lower grain prices lifted a constraint on value-
added industries, encouraging entrepreneurship
and innovation; led to diversification into specialty
crops; lowered land prices; and exposed the indus-
try to trade challenges. The change also brought
Canada into compliance with international trade
agreements.
The 1984 New Zealand Exit Grant
Before 1984 New Zealand’s farmers were receiving
generous support—in some years as high as 40 per-
cent of the value of production.In 1984 the govern-
ment abolished the subsidies. With the economy
almost on the brink of bankruptcy and facing dete-
riorating external markets, inflation, and histori-
cally high interest rates, the government eliminated
almost 30 different production subsidies.Although
the end of agricultural subsidies took place in con-
junction with overall deregulation of the economy
and reduced input costs,currency appreciation and
low commodity prices during 1985–87 made the
transition stressful.
To ease the transition, the government provided
one-time exit grants to farmers leaving the land,
equivalent to about 66 percent of their previous
annual income. Farmers with extremely low
incomes were temporarily entitled to social welfare
income support. Farmers were also offered limited
financial advice. There was no substantive effort to
soften the effects of the change. Despite early pre-
dictions that large numbers of farmers would leave
the land,only 1 percent of farms failed,with signif-
icant adjustments occurring in the form of off-
farm employment and changes in input use and
output mix.
Land prices, which had been kept artificially
high by the subsidies, plummeted with their
removal. Marginal land reverted to bush, and
subsidy-driven land management problems ended.
Now farmland values have more than recovered as
farm profitability has been restored. Farmers
reduced costs and focused on producing higher-
value products, where profitable. Many farmers
restructured their debts and continued farming,
adjusting farm practices to reduce input costs.With
investment decisions now subject to commercial
and good farming disciplines, agricultural input
suppliers were forced to become more competitive,
also improving the competitiveness of the agricul-
tural sector.
Since 1986–87 the value of economic activity in
New Zealand’s farm sector has grown by more than
40 percent in constant dollar terms, and agricul-
ture’s contribution to the economy has risen from
14.2 percent of GDP in 1986–87 to 16 percent in
1999–2000. With the removal of farm subsidies,
GDP growth went from 1 percent in 1986 to the
current annual average of 5.9 percent.New Zealand
has around 80,000 farm holdings. Sheep and beef
farms account for 20 percent of the number of
farms,and dairy farms for 18 percent.Horticulture,
forestry, cropping, and rural tourism also con-
tribute to the rural sector, which employs 11.4 per-
cent of the work force. About 80 percent of New
Zealand’s farm outputs are exported, accounting
for more than half of New Zealand’s merchandise
exports.
Assessing Decoupling
The movement toward decoupled agricultural poli-
cies is undeniably a step in the right direction,
reducing trade distortions and increasing world
prices for developing countries’ exports. But how
much movement has actually occurred? And what
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and trade distortions?
The rate of agricultural protection in OECD
countries has declined, while the share of domes-
tic support has increased. Total direct support
to agricultural producers as measured by esti-
mated producer support averaged $235 billion in
2000–02, 63 percent of it from border measures.
Most support is concentrated in a few sectors
(milk, meats, and sugar).
Although the absolute level of producer support
has remained fairly constant, taxpayer-financed
subsidies paid directly to farmers have increased
significantly. From 1986–88 to 2000–02, domestic
subsidies to farmers rose 60 percent, with large-
impact programs (output and input subsidies)
increasing moderately compared with the substan-
tial increases in so-called smaller-impact programs
(subsidies for land area and number of animals,
decoupled historical entitlements, and payments
based on input use restrictions and overall farm
income). Payments based on area planted and
number of animals have increased the most, fol-
lowed by historical entitlements. Several countries,
however,have made little progress in reforming the
composition of support away from border support
to domestic support (among them Japan and
Switzerland), while others have not needed sub-
stantial reforms (many members of the CAIRNS
Group).
As for reductions in trade distortions, experi-
ence in the decoupled programs described above
has been mixed. The few countries studied here
have moved away from border support to domestic
support and to less distorting domestic support.
Although there is evidence of a reallocation of
resources across agriculture as a result, the decline
in total output and increase in world prices have
been modest.
In addition to the uneven distribution of “cou-
pled” subsidies (less in major field crops, more in
sugar and livestock), other factors help to explain
the lack of significant reductions in output. Eligi-
bility rules have changed, and expectations about
future policies and dynamic considerations affect
current production decisions because producers
develop expectations about future assistance based
on past government actions. Experience shows that
imperfect decoupled programs still distort trade,
especially when decoupled payments are substan-
tial. Large payments can have risk reduction effects
that lead to increased output. Direct payments also
help cover fixed costs, allowing farmers to cross-
subsidize production at market prices. Direct
payments can affect farmers’ investment and exit
decisions if they are facing constraints in capital
and labor markets. Direct payments allow banks to
make loans that they otherwise would not and
allow farmers with specialized skills to stay in
agriculture.
The primary motivation for decoupling is to
compensate farmers for the move to free markets
by providing transitional adjustment assistance.
This also makes the programs politically more
palatable and transparent. Ideally, compensation
programs would be universal (open to all sectors in
the economy, not just agriculture) or at least non-
sector-specific within agriculture. A simple and
minimally distorting scheme would be a one-time
unconditional payment to everyone engaged in
farming or deemed in need of compensation that is
nontransferable, along the lines of the one-time
buyouts discussed earlier.
However, because a one-time buyout is an
unlikely outcome (unless it is well-targeted in one
sector), specific attention should be given to time
limits, harmonization with other support pro-
grams, government credibility, and constraints on
input use (Baffes and de Gorter 2003 provide a
detailed discussion of these conditions along with
WTO’s potential role on decoupling). Unless these
aspects are properly addressed, decoupled pro-
grams are likely to have the same detrimental
effects as other subsidy programs.
Most important, programs should be strictly
limited in duration. The European Union and
Turkey have no limit: the United States had (at least
implicitly) one in the 1996 Farm Bill but violated it
three years later. Mexico’s reform had a time limit,
which so far has not been extended. A time limit
helps to ensure that payments are made for adjust-
ment purposes only.
If there are other (coupled) support programs,
the decoupled program may not eliminate the
incentives to overproduce. All four decoupling
cases examined here either left other coupled sup-
port programs in place or added new ones.
To maintain government credibility and reduce
uncertainty, eligibility rules need to be clearly
defined and not allowed to change.The time period
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and the sectors covered should all remain fixed.
Updating bases and adding crops create a govern-
ment credibility problem, making the decoupling
policy inconsistent over time. If governments have
the discretion to change eligibility criteria and pay-
ments as market conditions change, these commit-
ments will not be viewed as binding. Farmers,
meanwhile, will change their production decisions
to reflect this,thus undermining decoupling.
Support to specific sectors within agriculture
should be in the form of taxpayer-funded pay-
ments. There should be no requirement of produc-
tion. Land, labor, and any other input should not
have to be in “agricultural use.”
Experience shows the difficulty of designing
effective decoupling schemes. But strict criteria are
required to minimize direct trade distortions
because sector-specific decoupled support can still
affect output indirectly, through wealth effects and
lessened constraints in credit and labor markets.
One way to improve the performance of decou-
pling schemes might be to have the WTO specify
the conditions; this approach would avoid counter-
vailing duties by other countries.
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Experience with Decoupling Agricultural Support 89Standards: Barrier or Catalyst?
The expansion of global trade in perishable agricul-
tural products and high-value foods has high-
lighted the great divergence in national standards
for food safety and animal and plant health and in
the capacities of public authorities and commercial
supply chains to manage the risks associated with
trade in these products. For many higher-value
foods, including fruits and vegetables, fish, beef,
poultry, and herbs and spices, the challenges of
international competitiveness have moved well
beyond price and basic quality to food safety and
agricultural health concerns.
1 There is increasing
attention to the risks associated with microbial
pathogens; residues from pesticides, veterinary
medicines, and other agricultural inputs; and envi-
ronmental or naturally occurring toxins.And there
is greater scrutiny of the production and processing
techniques employed along supply chains (Buzby
2003).
There are several reasons why food safety and
agricultural health standards,referred to as sanitary
and phytosanitary measures within the World
Trade Organization (WTO), differ across countries
Food safety and agricultural health standards can
impede trade, especially for developing countries,
through explicit bans on imports of particular
products or through the high cost of compliance
with stringent standards, which can diminish com-
petitiveness. In certain circumstances, however, the
new landscape of proliferating and increasingly
stringent food safety and agricultural health
standards can be a basis for the competitive reposi-
tioning and enhanced export performance of
developing countries. Key to this is the ability of
developing countries to upgrade capacity and make
necessary adjustments in the structure and opera-
tion of their supply chains. In an attempt to rebal-
ance much of the dialogue in this area, this chapter
explores the nature of the new standards landscape
and the related capacity requirements, before look-
ing at the impacts on trade.In addition to the tradi-
tional approach using quantitative measures of
changes in trade that are related to the evolution of
standards, the chapter presents a number of illus-
trative case studies that relate losses or gains in
trade to food safety and agricultural health require-
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(Unnevehr 2003; Henson 2004). Differences in
tastes, diets, income levels, and perceptions influ-
ence people’s tolerance of these risks.Differences in
climate and available technology (from refrigera-
tion to irradiation) affect the incidence of food
safety and agricultural health hazards. Standards
reflect the feasibility of implementation, itself
influenced by legal and industry structures as well
as technical, scientific, administrative, and finan-
cial resources. Some food safety risks tend to be
greater in developing countries because of weak-
nesses in physical infrastructure and the higher
incidence of certain infectious diseases. Tropical
and subtropical climates may be more conducive to
the spread of certain pests and diseases that pose
risks to health.
Thus the intrinsic risks associated with the pro-
duction, transformation, and sale of high-value
and perishable food products, combined with dif-
ferent standards and institutional capabilities, can
pose major challenges for international trade. And
food safety and agricultural health standards
are changing rapidly, along with increased public
awareness of food safety in high-income countries
following a series of highly publicized food scares
or scandals (bovine spongiform encephalopathy,or
BSE,in beef in the United Kingdom,E. coli in ham-
burgers in the United States, dioxins in animal feed
in Belgium). In response, there have been signifi-
cant institutional changes in food safety oversight
and reform of laws and regulations. For long-held
concerns such as pesticide residues, there has been
a tightening of standards in many countries. And
new standards are being applied to address previ-
ously unknown or unregulated hazards, such as
BSE, genetically modified organisms, and environ-
mental contaminants.
As official standards and public oversight have
changed, the private sector has moved rapidly to
address food safety risks and the concerns and pref-
erences of consumers,resulting in a proliferation of
private codes of practice and other forms of supply
chain governance. Private systems of food safety
governance are also being applied more widely in
middle-income and some low-income countries,in
part through investments by multinational super-
market and restaurant chains and competitive
responses by local firms (Reardon and Berdegue
2002). In addition, new food safety standards in
industrial countries are shaping the expectations of
developing-country consumers, especially those
with higher incomes and in urban areas.
The proliferation and enhanced stringency of
food safety and agricultural health standards are a
growing concern among many developing coun-
tries and those promoting their increased integra-
tion into the world trading system.Reflecting wider
changes in the trade regime for various agricultural
and food products, there is a presumption that
food safety and agricultural health measures will be
used as protectionist tools, providing “scientific”
justification for prohibiting certain imports or
applying higher standards to imports than to
domestic supplies. Even if standards are not inten-
tionally used to discriminate, their growing com-
plexity and lack of harmonization could still
impede the trading efforts of developing countries.
There is also a concern that many developing
countries lack the administrative, technical, and
scientific capacities to comply with emerging
requirements. The investment and recurrent costs
of compliance could undermine the competitive
position of developing countries or otherwise com-
press the profitability of high-value food exports.
The combined effects of institutional weaknesses
and rising compliance costs could contribute to the
further marginalization of weaker economic play-
ers, including poor countries, small businesses, and
smallholder farmers.
A less pessimistic view emphasizes the opportu-
nities provided by evolving standards, which some
developing countries can use to their competitive
advantage. Many of the emerging public and
private standards can serve as a bridge between
increasingly demanding consumers and distant
suppliers. The standards can provide a common
language within the supply chain and promote
consumer confidence in food product safety.
From this standards-as-catalyst perspective,
food safety and agricultural health standards may
provide a powerful incentive for modernizing
developing-country export supply chains and giv-
ing greater clarity to the management functions of
government. Further, there may be spillovers into
domestic food safety and agricultural health, to the
benefit of the local population and domestic pro-
ducers. Part of the costs of compliance could be
considered necessary investments,while an array of
foreseeable and unforeseeable benefits might arise
from the adoption of different technologies andmanagement systems. Rather than degrading the
comparative advantage of developing countries,
enhancement of capacity to meet stricter standards
could create new forms of competitive advantage,
providing the basis for more sustainable and prof-
itable trade over the long term.
This rather crude dichotomy between standards
as barriers and standards as catalysts suggests a
complex reality in which close attention is needed
to the specifics of particular markets,products,and
countries to understand how the changing food
safety and agricultural health standards environ-
ment is providing challenges and opportunities for
developing countries. This chapter draws on the
literature and work in progress to examine the
underlying evidence on the changing standards
environment and its implications for developing-
country exporters of high-value agricultural and
food products. Drawing on both systematic and
anecdotal evidence, the chapter presents a varied
picture,partially supporting both perspectives.
The Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Agreement: An End to Disguise
and Discrimination?
During the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade
negotiations, agricultural exporters voiced con-
cerns that sanitary and phytosanitary measures
were being used to restrict foreign competition and
that such protectionist measures would likely
increase as the use of more traditional trade barri-
ers declined. The Agreement on the Application of
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures provided a set
of multilateral rules recognizing the need of coun-
tries to adopt such measures and creating a frame-
work to reduce their trade distorting effects.
The agreement, built on the Standards Code of
the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
permitted measures “necessary to protect human,
animal, or plant life and health,” yet required that
regulators base measures on a scientific risk assess-
ment,recognize that different measures can achieve
equivalent safety outcomes, and allow imports
from particular regions in an exporting country
when presented with evidence of the absence or low
incidence of pests or diseases. The agreement
encouraged the adoption of international stan-
dards, making explicit reference to those of the
Codex Alimentarius Commission for food safety,
the International Office of Epizootics for animal
health,and the International Plant Protection Con-
vention for plant health. The agreement protects
the rights of countries to choose their own “appro-
priate level of protection,” yet guides members to
“take into account the objective of minimizing neg-
ative trade effects.”
Important underlying objectives are minimiza-
tion of protectionist and unjustified discriminatory
use of standards and promotion of greater trans-
parency and harmonization. In both regards, expe-
rience has been mixed.The difficulties encountered
are probably due less to specific shortcomings of
the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement itself
than to the intrinsic complexities of managing food
safety and agricultural health protection and the
rapidly evolving markets for agricultural and food
products. Further, it is evident that WTO members
vary widely in their understanding of the agree-
ment and their ability to take advantage of the
rights and responsibilities it defines.
The agreement has not brought an end to the
differentialapplicationof standards—norshouldit.
Differentiation is a necessary part of any risk-based
food safety and agricultural health control system.
The hazards to be monitored and the control meas-
urestobeimplementedneedtobeprioritizedatthe
country, industry, and enterprise levels. Political
factorsaswellasscientificevidenceinfluenceprior-
ities, focusing, for example, on issues of greatest
concern to consumers and other interest groups
(Henson 2001).As resources are limited and imple-
mentation may be costly, an effective risk manage-
ment system will go beyond prioritizing potential
hazards to differentiate explicitly among alternative
sources of supply based on conditions of produc-
tion, experience, and assessments of risk manage-
ment capabilities in the supply chain.
Separating Legitimate and Illegitimate Standards
Differentiation
When regulators and others have wide discretion
and differentiation is required for cost-effective
management of food safety and agricultural health,
there remains ample scope for mischief.Yet separat-
ing legitimate differentiation from illegitimate dis-
crimination is problematic. Even more difficult is
clearly attributing standards to protectionist inten-
tions,consideringthatinmostcircumstancesat least
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issuesareinvolved.Forexample,intwowidelyrefer-
enced cases of assumed protectionist motivation—
restrictions on exports of Mexican avocados and
Argentine citrus fruits to the United States—there
was scientific justification for measures to prevent
the spread of plant disease, though less-trade-
restricting measures were available (Roberts and
Orden 1997). In other cases, trade partners have
different perspectives on the state of scientific
knowledge and the need to make allowance for
uncertainty.Aprominentcaseisthedisputebetween
theEuropeanUnion(EU)andUnitedStatesoverthe
use of hormones in beef cattle (Pauwelyn 1999;
Bureau,Marette,and Schiavina 1998).
Thus, questions remain about whether there is
systematic discrimination against imports in the
application of food safety and agricultural health
controls. One question is whether foreign suppliers
must comply with higher standards than domestic
suppliers. No systematic research has been done on
this subject, although a great deal of anecdotal evi-
dence is presented by those who purport to have
been adversely affected by such discrimination.
And WTO members raised 241 complaints in the
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Committee from 1995
to 2002 (Roberts 2004).
General impressions suggest that many coun-
tries, both industrial and developing, have a lower
tolerance for certain animal and plant health risks
from imports than from domestic sources. There
have been cases when countries have restricted
imports from countries experiencing a plant pest
or animal disease that is also prevalent domesti-
cally. Similar observations can be made for some
food safety controls.For example,the United States
has long argued that, like itself, a broad array of
countries has a near-zero tolerance for salmonella
in imported poultry products yet this pathogen is
widely present in domestic supply chains. Coun-
tries can also apply discriminatory measures to
different importing countries. For example, the
Philippines complained that Australia prohibited
imports of Philippine sauces containing benzoic
acid while permitting imports from New Zealand
of similar products containing that additive.
Private and Public Oversight and Monitoring
High-value food exporters in developing countries
frequently claim that they face more rigorous
controls than do domestic suppliers in certain
industrial countries. But this intensive oversight
and monitoring often come from private entities,
especially supermarkets and their buying agents,
rather than from official systems.And the methods
of control that exporters face are more visible in
their effects, in that compliance for exporters is
assessed at the border, with entry possibly denied
on this basis, whereas domestic suppliers are regu-
lated through inspection of processing facilities,
with a focus on system-based controls and market
surveillance.
Yet, there is anecdotal evidence that regulatory
oversightissubstantiallymorestringentondomestic
supplies in certain products and markets.For exam-
ple, there is no official requirement in the United
States for border testing of cereals or nuts for the
presence of aflatoxin.Private-sector testing for afla-
toxinlevelsincerealsiscommonplaceinthedomes-
tic market, however, with frequent price discounts
being applied by buyers. Over a typical three-year
period the U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s
(FDA)CenterforFoodSafetyandAppliedNutrition
inspects all domestic firms that produce low-acid
canned foods,yet only 3 percent of foreign facilities





For relatively high-risk products (for example, fish
andmeatproducts),ahigherproportionofdomestic
than imported supplies is inspected. In both the
United States and the European Union compliance
monitoring for pesticide residues pays consider-
ably more attention (absolute and proportional) to
domesticsuppliersthantoimports.
3
There is also little research comparing the inten-
sity with which private buyers and distributors
enforce their own standards among domestic sup-
pliers and foreign suppliers, especially in develop-
ing countries. With less opportunity to observe
directly the food safety and agricultural health
control systems employed by developing-country
suppliers, private buyers would likely emphasize
end-product testing or third-party certification of
quality management systems. This is certainly a
clear trend among buyers in the United Kingdom
and the Netherlands, for example, yet it is doubtful
that such requirements are being imposed on
developing-country suppliers at the same rate as on
their industrial-country competitors.
4
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Environment
The overall picture for food safety and agricultural
health requirements in trade is becoming increas-
ingly complex and fast moving as standards are
promulgated in multiple spheres at both public and
private and national and international levels. The
complexity of this issue stems from the variability
of the standards themselves and from differences in
how and with what intensity standards are moni-
tored and enforced, which is also changing over
time.
The transparency of official regulatory measures
in the application of food safety and agricultural
health requirements has clearly improved since the
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement entered into
force. Some 85 percent of WTO members have
established an “enquiry point” for obtaining infor-
mation on proposed food safety and agricultural
health requirements. Between 1995 and 2002 WTO
members submitted some 3,220 notifications indi-
cating the nature and objectives of proposed meas-
ures, the products they applied to, whether they
were based on an international standard, and when
the measure was to come into force.These notifica-
tions provide advance warning of new or modified
measures and an opportunity for trading partners
to raise questions about the proposed measures,
both bilaterally and through the Sanitary and Phy-
tosanitary Committee.An increasing proportion of
WTO members, including developing countries,
has been taking advantage of this opportunity to
raise concerns (Roberts 2004).
While the transparency of many food safety and
agricultural health measures has increased, consid-
erable variation remains in standards across coun-
tries. And there is widespread uncertainty about
how certain countries are implementing their stan-
dards. Roberts, Josling, and Orden (1999) note the
paucity of international standards for many agro-
food products and indicate that the vast majority
of food safety and agricultural health measures
notified to the WTO during 1995–99 had no inter-
national standard.
5With specific reference to horti-
cultural products, Roberts and Krissoff (2003)
found that over the same period two-thirds of
notifications involved measures for which there was
no recognized international standard and that
many involved maximum pesticide residue levels.
Jaffee (2003) notes that despite EU efforts to har-
monize maximum pesticide residue levels in
imported fresh fruit and vegetables,wide variations
remain in operative standards due to countries’dif-
ferent approaches to surveillance and enforcement.
Variations in standards are also common in
other sectors.Henson and Mitullah (2004) note the
varied standards that developing countries must
meet to gain and maintain access to the U.S., EU,
and Japanese markets for fish products.While some
requirements overlap, differences remain in both
regulatory and technical requirements. Likewise,
Mathews, Bernstein, and Buzby (2003) highlight
the range of product and process standards coun-
tries require to minimize the risk of salmonella
contamination in poultry products. Dohlman
(2003) and Otsuki, Wilson, and Sewadeh (2001)
discuss the significant differences in the maximum
permitted level for aflatoxin in cereals and nuts and
in the sampling methods used. This lack of harmo-
nization of standards and conformity assessment
procedures raises production and transaction costs
for developing-country suppliers, necessitating
duplicative testing and reducing their ability to
achieve economies of scale in production and in
food safety and agricultural health management
functions.
Also contributing to the increased complexity of
the standards environment is the expansion of risk-
based process standards relating to production,
postharvest,and other procedures,and the prolifer-
ation of private standards. Roberts (2004) notes
that the major international standards organiza-
tions have devoted more of their attention and
resources over the past decade to the development
of common approaches to risk identification,
assessment, and management than to international
standards themselves. This reflects both the ineffi-
ciency and the inefficacy of end-product testing,
particularly in view of the levels of risk deemed
acceptable today and the emergence of new or
newly prominent food-borne pathogens.
With respect to private standards, there have
been attempts to harmonize standards formerly
applied by individual private companies, yet a
plethora of private standards are still simply com-
municated through individual supply chains and
can vary widely in their specific requirements.
Examples of private protocols that have been codi-
fied and are available to the public include food
safety and food hygiene protocols, such as the
British Retail Consortium Technical Food Standard
and the EUREPGAP Fruit and Vegetable Standard,
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social dimensions. Other standards focus on social
or environmental issues, such as Social Account-
ability 8000, the Ethical Trading Initiative, and the
Marine Stewardship Initiative.
Variations in food safety and agricultural health
requirements together with the progressive shift
toward process-based measures have enhanced the
importance of “equivalence” of national standards
and systems. Currently, there is no systematic
recording of equivalence agreements. Most appear
to be between industrial countries.Certain develop-
ing countries, including successful agricultural
exporters, have highlighted the difficulties in gain-
ing recognition for the equivalency of their food
safety and other controls to those of their major
trading partners (WTO 2001). A successful and
wide-ranging example of equivalence, however, is
the recognition by the European Union that many
developingandindustrialcountrieshaveestablished
systems of hygienic control for fish and fishery
productsthatofferalevelof protectionatleastcom-
parable to its own legislation (see discussion below).
A parallel trend, reflecting the proliferation of
private standards, is the heightened importance of
certification of compliance with defined standards,
which is typically undertaken by a third-party
agency that the buyer recognizes as “competent.”
A crucial issue for developing countries is the
establishment of certification capacity and parallel
institutions for accrediting certification bodies.
Exporters in countries that lack an accreditation
certification system may be forced to use the ser-
vices of an accredited body in another country, at
considerable cost (El-Tawil 2002).
What Capacity Is Needed?
Countries frequently require guarantees that
imports come from areas that are free of certain
pests or diseases; that minimum standards of
hygiene have been applied in manufacture, packag-
ing, and distribution; and that products are free of
excessive residues of pesticides, medicines, and
other contaminants. The exporting country must
have the capacity to comply with these require-
ments and to demonstrate compliance. Among the
required capacities are:
• Detecting the presence or demonstrating the
absence of biological, chemical, and physical
hazards and having an information system to
inform decision-making processes.
• Employing emergency procedures in the event
of emerging hazards or outbreaks.
• Certifying that traded products meet established
food safety risks.
• Undertaking scientific analysis of hazards in
agricultural inputs and food products.
• Establishing and maintaining the identity of
agricultural products through the supply chain.
• Establishing and maintaining systems for
hygienic practices in agro-food product han-
dling and transformation.
• Registering the production, distribution, and
use of agricultural inputs that may pose risks to
human, animal, or plant health.
Administrative and technical capacities for food
safety and agricultural health management are
embodied in institutional structures and proce-
dures, physical infrastructure, and human capital.
It is frequently assumed that managing food safety
and agricultural health is predominantly a public-
sector responsibility.While some crucial regulatory,
research, and management functions are normally
carried out by governments, and importing coun-
tries may require that certain functions be per-
formed by a designated public-sector “competent
authority,” the private sector also has important
roles:
• Because it is typically well informed about tech-
nical options and hazard management systems,
it should contribute to standard setting.
• Compliance with food safety and agricultural
health standards requires specific actions by
individual producers and processors.
• Capacity building in the private sector can com-
plement (or substitute for) public-sector capac-
ity, as through investment in accredited labora-
tory testing facilities.
Development of food safety and agricultural
health management systems is closely related to the
availability of wider technical, administrative, and
scientific capacities that reflect broader patterns
of economic development as much as specific
demands for food safety and agricultural health
controls. Unnevehr and Hirschhorn (2001) high-
light the capacity needs for food safety manage-
ment at different stages of economic development.
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of challenges because foreign food safety and agri-
cultural health requirements may differ sharply
from domestic requirements, especially in the case
of low-income countries (Dong and Jensen 2004).
Some regulatory, technical, and administrative
capacities represent a greater constraint on
developing-country exports of agricultural and
food products than do others.
6 In general, weak-
nesses in the management of plant and animal
health issues are more likely to be an absolute bar-
rier to trade than is lack of food safety controls.For
many food safety hazards there is an array of effec-
tive technologies or approaches, some of which do
not require sophisticated equipment or expertise.
Even where management of food safety hazards is
well within the capacities of producers and proces-
sors,systems of conformity assessment require test-
ing and certification of food safety management
systems and end products. Many developing coun-
tries lack the capability to undertake the rigorous
epidemiological surveillance and risk assessments
demanded by trading partners. They lack the
accredited laboratories and internationally recog-
nized systems for certification (El-Tawil 2002).
Thus, regardless of private-sector capacity to meet
the food safety and quality requirements of foreign
customers, the country as a whole will be unable to
gain market access.
While many developing countries have wide-
spread weaknesses in food safety and agricultural
health management capacity, there is evidence that
even low-income countries can establish the regu-
latory, technical, and administrative arrangements
to meet demanding standards in high-income
export markets. The European Commission has
recognized a relatively large—and growing—
number of low- and lower-middle-income coun-
tries as having standards of hygiene in the capture,
processing, transportation, and storage of fish and
fishery products that are at least equivalent to those
of the European Union. Their shipments benefit
from reduced physical inspection at the border.
How Significant Are Compliance
Costs?
Developing countries can incur significant “costs
of compliance” whenever changes are made in
international standards or those of their trading
partners. These costs can come in various forms,
including fixed investments in adjusting produc-
tion and processing facilities and practices,
recurrent personnel and management costs to
implement food and other control systems and the
public- and private-sector costs of conformity
assessment.
Typically there are a variety of technological and
administrative ways in which to achieve compli-
ance with a certain standard. For this and other
reasons the level and relative significance of com-
pliance costs can vary enormously from industry to
industry and between countries.
7 Important vari-
ables include the structure and conditions of the
supply chain, the extent of administrative and sci-
entific capacities, the degree of cooperation within
industries and between the public and private sec-
tors, and the strength of technical service indus-
tries. Where the export industry is mature and
reasonably well developed, changes in food safety
and agricultural health standards may require
only incremental adjustments by producers and
exporters and modest changes in public-sector
oversight arrangements. Where the supply chain is
makeshift, however, or uses multipurpose facilities
and when new requirements (or levels of enforce-
ment) necessitate major upgrades, some firms may
need to redirect their products to less-demanding
markets,while others will need to undertake signif-
icant fixed investments.
Consider the differences in adjustment costs
associated with investments in the upgrading of
hygiene controls in the shrimp industries in
Bangladesh and Nicaragua (table 6.1). In
Bangladesh major investments had to be made in
the mid-1990s to upgrade fish-processing facilities,
product-testing laboratories, and other areas in
response to repeated quality and safety detentions
of products entering the United States and a ban in
1997 on shrimp imports into the European Union.
These investments equaled 2.3 percent of the value
of the country’s shrimp exports in 1996–98.Annual
maintenance costs for hazard analysis and critical
control point (HACCP) and regulatory systems
equaled 1.1 percent of exports. The Nicaraguan
shrimp industry needed to make adjustments dur-
ing 1997–2002 to hygiene controls to ensure com-
pliance with modified U.S. fish safety regulations,
including requirements to implement a HACCP
program. But many Nicaraguan factories were
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mental investments were needed, equivalent to
0.6 percent of the value of exports.
Many technological and organizational changes
involve shifts in levels and structures of operating
costs. The costs associated with these changes are
often controversial. The changes are sometimes
perceived to be unjustified,because they lack scien-
tific basis or replace simpler, less costly procedures
that might provide similar outcomes. Another
complaint is that suppliers obtain little or no bene-
fit beyond continued market access, while the
opportunity cost of the required investments can
be considerable. This complaint is more difficult to
sustain,often reflecting a lack of appreciation of the
frequently intangible or indirect benefits that can
result from enhancement of food safety controls,
for example. Improved control systems can reduce
waste, improve product-cost accounting, and
enhance staff morale.Thus,changes in product and
process technologies can generate substantial
increases in efficiency, reducing production costs
and promoting competitiveness.
The expenditures related to standards compli-
ance can have other beneficial, multiplier effects.
Some of the needed investments may require labor,
especially skilled and supervisory workers, creating
additional job opportunities. Other expenditures
may go toward building materials, contractors, and
technical services, much of which could be sourced
locally. Only where upgrading relies primarily on
imported equipment or expertise would there be
few multiplier effects.
The enhancement of food safety capacity can
also have more dynamic and wide-ranging impacts
on private-sector suppliers. For example, imple-
menting an HACCP system and gaining third-
party certification can send positive signals to
existing and potential customers, enabling firms to
reposition themselves in the marketplace or access
new markets. Indian fish-processing plants that
have invested in sophisticated systems of hygiene
control are seeking to access higher-value markets
for processed and semi-processed products. Some-
times, when problems are experienced in comply-
ing with requirements in a particular market,
producers and exporters will shift to markets with
lower or different food safety requirements.Kenyan
fish exporters, which have been highly dependent
on European markets, have attempted to diversify
their exports to Australia, Japan, and the United
States.
But even where the administrative, technical,
and financial burdens of compliance are manage-
able at the country or industry level, the burdens
may be too great at the firm level.There is a general
concern that the challenge of rising standards is
marginalizing smaller players, especially producers,
traders,and processors,as well as smaller industries
as a whole. There is, however, little empirical evi-
dence to support this argument. In part, this is
because of the difficulties of disentangling the spe-
cific role of standards compliance in the consolida-
tion processes of agro-food systems.
In many cases,compliance requirements exacer-
bate other factors that threaten the status quo in
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TABLE 6.1 Costs of Compliance with Export Food Safety Requirements in the




Industry facility upgrading 17.55 0.33
Government 0.38 0.14
Training programs 0.07 0.09
Total 18.01 0.56
Annual maintenance of HACCP program 2.43 0.29
Shrimp exports during focal periods 775.00 92.60
Average annual shrimp exports 225.00 23.20
Ratio of upgrade costs to focal year export (%) 2.3 0.61
Ratio of maintenance costs to annual exports (%) 1.1 1.26
Source: Based on Cato and Lima dos Santos 2000, and Cato, Otwell, and Coze 2003.established supply chains. For example, both the
Indian and Kenyan fish-processing sectors were
facing longer-term challenges when forced to com-
ply with enhanced hygiene standards for exports.
Indian exporters were facing intense price competi-
tion from other suppliers such as Thailand and
Vietnam. The Kenyan fish-processing sector suf-
fered from chronic excess capacity because of raw
material shortages. In both cases the costs of com-
pliance with stricter food hygiene standards have
induced consolidation of the industry that likely
would have occurred anyway, albeit over a longer
period. In Nicaragua the decline in the production
share of small-scale shrimp producers had more to
do with Hurricane Mitch and its aftermath than
with the tightening of standards (Cato, Otwell, and
Coze 2003).
A particular concern is that smaller players can
be disadvantaged where there are economies of
scale or scope in the implementation of particular
technologies or administrative systems. Studies of
compliance with labor and environmental stan-
dards in the United States suggest that costs are
proportionately higher for smaller firms (Crain
and Johnson 2001). In some cases the necessary
investments have elements of lumpiness, for exam-
ple, in laboratory equipment and cold-storage
facilities, which are economically viable only for
large-scale operations or require collective action.
Likewise,smaller firms may find it more difficult to
hire certain types of skilled personnel. More gener-
ally,smaller firms can be overwhelmed by the sheer
number of changes needed to comply with new
food safety requirements, even when the cash
investments required are not substantial.
Sometimes certifying that the standards have
been met is more difficult for small producers than
complying with food safety and agricultural
health requirements. For example, Kenyan veg-
etable exporters face considerable oversight costs in
demonstrating compliance to their major European
buyers.
8In turn,this generates pressure for rational-
izing supply chains.Changes in the product compo-
sition of trade may also affect structural patterns.
9
Further, in a competitive environment, exporters
find it difficult to control the volume and continuity
of smallholder supplies due to side-selling by farm-
ers. Where export supply commitments are firm
and specific, exporters need more effective control,
and this can induce backward integration into
production.
A frequent presumption when discussing the
marginalization of suppliers is that standards com-
pliance is a do-or-die situation. In reality, however,
there is rarely just a single market for a particular
product. Suppliers need to seek out markets (and
market segments) where they have advantages
rather than disadvantages. For example, there may
be opportunities in domestic or regional markets
for the same or similar products, with lower prices
offset by the absence of compliance challenges and
costs. Directing attention to these markets may be
one way to avoid marginalization. Thus, the devel-
opment of high-value agricultural and food
products sectors in the future is likely to be
bimodal, with some firms upgrading and adapting
and others targeting other markets and raising their
capacity at a slower pace.
What Impact Are Standards
Having on Exports of High-Value
Agro-Food Products?
The application of food safety and agricultural
health standards by governments and the private
sector can significantly affect international trade.
While most standards are designed in pursuit of the
legitimate goals of maintaining human, plant, and
animal health, they can also serve as technical bar-
riers to trade. Roberts, Josling, and Orden (1999)
classify technical trade barriers associated with
agricultural and food products into three cate-
gories: full or partial import bans; technical specifi-
cations, including product and process standards;
and information remedies, including packaging
and labeling requirements and controls on volun-
tary (health and other) claims. Full or partial bans
are the most trade restricting. Total bans are typi-
cally used when great risks are associated with cer-
tain plant and animal health problems and where
cost-effective measures are not available. Partial
bans may permit trade only in certain seasons or
from certain countries or regions.Technical specifi-
cations and informational remedies will normally
apply to both imports and domestic supplies.Their
effects on trade will derive from the relative abilities
of different suppliers to comply with these meas-
ures, the incidence of compliance costs, and how
each affects the relative competitiveness of different
suppliers.
While there is general agreement that food
safety and agricultural health measures strongly
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consensus on the importance of individual meas-
ures, their impact compared with other trade-
distorting measures, or their aggregate net effect.
Testing the empirical impact of such standards on
trade is enormously difficult. First, it requires
assumptions about how the broad array of meas-
ures is actually enforced and how enforcement
deters or encourages potential export suppliers,
depending on whether suppliers need to make
major or modest adjustments. This variable cannot
be aggregated and differs across countries and
industries. Second, food safety and agricultural
health standards may have secondary effects, for
example, leading to shifts in sourcing, the produc-
tion of complementary and competitive goods,and
the spread of regulations and restrictions to other
countries. Third, a specific measure may not be a
dominant or even important determinant of
observed trade flows. There is a risk of ascribing
agro-food standards to shifts in trade that are
driven by other economic or technical factors.
Fourth,there are problems in defining the counter-
factual. Without the measure, would trade have
been unimpeded, or would distributors and con-
sumers have sought the product from other suppli-
ers instead? In the absence of a (trade-restricting)
measure, might overall demand have declined for a
product for which certain problems were identi-
fied? Finally, many food safety and agricultural
health measures will affect domestic suppliers as
well, with varied outcomes in terms of shifts in the
relative competitiveness and market share of the
different players.
These and other empirical problems have led
researchers to devote more attention to specific
cases and to attempt to highlight the role played by
(changing) food safety and agricultural health
requirements on bilateral or broader multicountry
patterns of trade. Some of the cases are discussed
below. Only one study, however, has attempted to
provide an aggregate measure of the level of agri-
cultural and food trade constrained or blocked by
technical barriers. In 1996 the U.S. Department of
Agriculture,drawing on the expert opinions of staff
and other regulatory personnel, found that “ques-
tionable” technical barriers (measures judged to
have no scientific basis) were inhibiting U.S.
exports of agricultural and food products to some
62 countries. More than 300 market restrictions
were identified as constraining exports valued at
$5 billion, equal to around 7 percent of U.S. agri-
cultural, food, and forestry trade in 1996. Two-
thirds of the identified measures, including nearly
all full or partial import bans, addressed risks for
animal or plant health (Roberts,Josling,and Orden
1999).
This type of broad estimate of trade effects has
not been made for any other country. Other
approaches have provided insights into the subject,
however. Most commonly, researchers have looked
to the only two available multicountry sources of
data on the subject, official listings of agricultural
and food product detentions and rejections by
industrial countries and the growing number of
complaints recorded by the Sanitary and Phytosan-
itary Committee. Though incomplete, both are
useful proxies for the trade-inhibiting effects of
food safety and agricultural health standards.
Border Detentions and Rejections of Agricultural
and Food Products
Information is available for a limited number of
countries (through periodic reports and web-based
databases) on the incidence of detention or rejec-
tion of imported agricultural and food products for
reasons associated with quality, safety, labeling, or
other technical issues. The most widely available
and cited data are for the European Union and the
United States.
10 The data provide a reasonable pic-
ture of the incidence of product rejections over
time by country of origin but do not specify the
volume or value of rejected consignments.
Several patterns emerge from product rejection
data for the European Union and United States:
• Rising incidence. In the European Union the
number of notifications or alerts increased more
than sixfold between 1998 (230 cases) and 2002
(1,520). This increased incidence of rejections
reflects a combination of factors, including the
tightening or harmonizing of standards, appli-
cation of standards for formerly unregulated
hazards, and substantially increased capacity
for inspection and enforcement. In the United
States there was a sixfold increase in the number
of product inspections by the FDA, in part
because of heightened concerns about bioter-
rorism.
11
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rejections occurred in a few product categories:
fish and crustaceans (35 percent of rejections in
2002), meat products, and fruits and vegetables.
For the European Union there was also a high
incidence of rejections for nuts, while for the
United States there were many rejections of low-
acid canned foods.Comparatively few rejections
were issued on quality or safety grounds for bev-
erage crops,cereal products,feedstuffs,or spices.
• Country of origin concentration.A few countries
accounted for the bulk of rejections. Among
developing countries most of the rejections
were from countries that have been dominant
suppliers of “sensitive”products for many years
(for example, Brazil, Mexico, Thailand, and
Turkey) or newly emerging large exporters of
such products (for example, China, India, and
Vietnam). In 2002 five countries (Brazil, China,
Thailand, Turkey, and Vietnam) accounted for
nearly 60 percent of EU rejections of agricul-
tural and food products from outside Europe.
Some of these countries, however, are simulta-
neously increasing their EU market share for
such products,suggesting that border rejections
are more of an irritant than a major problem
for larger exporters.
• Minimal interception of products from low-
income countries. Exports from low-income
countries account for a very small proportion of
product rejections. For example, in 2002 the
European Union rejected only 26 consignments
from low-income Sub-Saharan African coun-
tries,with most countries experiencing only one
or two rejections. Most of these countries are
exporting less sensitive products in terms of
food safety or agricultural health risks, or they
have been recognized as being fully harmonized
with EU requirements for more sensitive prod-
ucts such as fish and thus are subject to lower
levels of border inspection.
• Leading reasons for product rejections. For the
European Union the largest (and growing) pro-
portion of rejections concerns chemical and
other contaminants in food, especially veteri-
nary drug residues, pesticide residues, and
mycotoxins. Chemical contaminants accounted
for nearly two-thirds of rejections in 2002, up
from 55 percent in 2000. Microbial pathogens
were implicated in 30 percent of rejections,
down from 41 percent. This pattern reflects
the growing harmonization of EU standards
for an array of chemical contaminants and the
increased political and technical attention to
these issues within the European Union. For the
United States a large proportion of border rejec-
tions in the late 1990s was due to the presence of
filth or foreign bodies (32 percent), microbial
pathogens (17 percent), or problems associated
with the packaging or labeling of canned food
products for which botulism is a risk (13 per-
cent). A smaller proportion of rejections was
due to chemical contaminants (12 percent).
Neither the European Union nor the United
States systematically reports on the volume or value
of trade that is affected by border inspections and
rejections. To obtain a rough notion of the value of
trade interrupted by technical measures, data were
collected (from official sources and consultations
with private traders) on the proportion of trade in
particular products that was likely to have been
detained or rejected in 2000–01. These estimates
were then applied to overall trade in these prod-
ucts to estimate the value of interrupted trade
(table 6.2). For simplicity, the proportion of trade
for particular products that is subject to rejections
is assumed to be the same for products flowing
between low-,middle-,and high-income countries.
This is unlikely to be so in practice,but data are not
available to provide more refined estimates.
The value of world agro-food trade affected by
official product rejections at the import level is esti-
mated at $3.8 billion in 2000–01.
12 This is almost
certainly an overestimate since similar levels of
rejection are assumed for products entering devel-
oping countries as for those entering industrial
countries, even though levels of standards and
enforcement capacities are typically lower in devel-
oping countries. Reflecting the dominant share of
high-income countries in certain product groups
for which detention or rejection levels are high (for
example, meat and dairy products, other processed
foods, and processed fruit and vegetables), these
countries are estimated to account for 53 percent
of rejected exports, while they account for some
63 percent of world agricultural and food product
exports. The estimated value of developing-
country agro-food border rejections is $1.8 billion,
74 percent of it accounted for by middle-income
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$275 million in agricultural and food product trade
rejected at the importing-country border repre-
sents less than 1 percent of their agricultural and
food exports. The product composition of the
rejected exports is broadly consistent with the data
presented earlier on EU and U.S. rejections. For
middle-income countries, the dominant products
are fruits and vegetables and fish, followed by live-
stock products. For low-income countries, fish is
the dominant category, accounting for more than
half the estimated rejections.
Until recently, border rejections for food safety
or related technical reasons have had only a modest
impact on overall trade in agricultural and food
products, including that of developing countries.
An estimated 1 percent of this trade was directly
affected in 2000–01. Further, only a small propor-
tion of rejected consignments is actually destroyed
at the point of import. Some (perhaps significant)
proportion of the product is reshipped, recondi-
tioned, or otherwise managed for sale whether in
the domestic market of the exporter or in some
other international market. Indeed, for most food
categories the proportion of agro-food trade that
encounters official rejection is probably substan-
tially lower than the proportion of sales that are
subjected to price discounts by private buyers
because of quality defects, lack of timeliness, and
poor presentation. The products with the highest
estimated proportion of rejections are also those
with the highest rates of growth in international
agricultural trade.
Thus while undoubtedly an irritant to exporters,
border rejections are not a major impediment to
trade. Still, they are costly, both in the value of lost
product and in adverse reputation effects on the
supplier and the country of origin. Some import-
ing countries will list for automatic detention par-
ticular suppliers or the entire country following
repeated violations of food safety and other
standards. Subsequent shipments are detained,
inspected, and tested at the expense of the exporter
or importer until a record of compliance has been
(re)established. This can take a long time, and the
costs can be considerable (Lamb,Velez,and Barclay
2004). Further, during this period exporters may
lose customers who are unwilling to incur the costs
and delays associated with enhanced border for-
malities.
In addition, there are some indications for cer-
tain high-income countries that increased attention
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TABLE 6.2 Estimated Value of World Agricultural and Food Trade Directly Affected
by Import Border Rejections Based on Technical Standards, 2000–01
(millions of US$)
Estimated High- Middle- Low-
Proportion Income Income Income Total Trade
Product Group of Trade (%)
a Countries Countries
b Countries China Affected
Meat and dairy products 1.25 811 142 8 21 982
Fish and fishery products 1.00–2.00 232 417 145 90 884
Fruit and vegetables 0.75–1.50 367 439 44 61 911
Grains 0.50 160 40 6 8 214
Animal feed 0.50 65 39 4 2 110
Tropical beverages 0.25 25 18 16 0 59
Nuts and spices 0.75–1.50 16 33 30 1 80
Other processed food 1.00–2.00 122 53 3 6 184
All other categories
c 0.25 199 112 19 6 307
Total 1,997 1,332 275 195 3,799
Proportion of trade affected 0.70 1.10 0.93 1.25 0.84
a. Where there are two numbers the first relates to exports of high-income countries and the second to those
of middle- and low-income countries.
b. Excluding China.
c. Includes oilseeds, textile fibers, drinks, tobacco/cigarettes, and sugar/confectionery.
Source: Authors’ computation based on official data and consultations with private traders.is being given to border inspections of products
deemed “sensitive” in relation to new regulatory
concerns about food safety and agricultural health
risks. If the patterns described above are indicative,
an increasing level of border interceptions of prod-
ucts would be expected in coming years. This will
either increase the transaction costs for certain
developing-country suppliers or induce them to
make adjustments in production, postharvest, and
product monitoring and testing arrangements.
Border rejections attributable to food safety
concerns represent only a small part of the con-
straint on international trade in agricultural and
food products associated with food safety and agri-
cultural health measures. For example, although
meat and dairy products may be subject to the
highest level of rejections in global trade, these
are not significant for low-income countries and
are probably of secondary importance for most
middle-income countries. In terms of the impact
on aggregate trade, far more inhibiting are the
broad array of measures related to animal and plant
health that render large numbers of countries ineli-
gible to supply many livestock products and food
crops to other countries (Sumner 2003).
While this pattern undoubtedly reflects tradi-
tional trade protections and subsidies in industrial
countries that distort world trade, animal disease
controls exclude many developing countries from
world markets for these products altogether.
13
In part this reflects the prevalence of endemic
infectious diseases of animals in many low- and
middle-income countries. Indeed, the high costs of
establishing and maintaining disease-free areas can
be beyond the means of many of the poorest coun-
tries. Many developing countries lack the surveil-
lance and risk assessment capacity to demonstrate
that they have areas that are disease-free and to get
these areas recognized as such by the International
Office of Epizooties.
14 And even where developing
countries have established disease-free areas, they
face the risk that trade will be disrupted should
outbreaks of disease occur. A recent example is the
restrictions applied to exports of poultry from
Thailand and Vietnam because of an outbreak of
avian flu. The overall impact of animal disease
issues, therefore, is to enhance the risks associated
with trade in livestock products and put a great
onus on public authorities to invest in disease con-
trols and to ensure their continued efficacy.
Because of an inability to meet a broad array of
food safety and agricultural health requirements
pertaining to livestock disease and hygiene con-
trols, most low-income countries are restricted to
trade in live animals rather than livestock products.
This avoids the need for attention to hygienic
slaughter in an abattoir, meat inspection, and
refrigerated transport.
15 Even if animal disease and
hygiene capacity could be enhanced, however, low-
income countries would need to compete with
well-established livestock product exporters such as
Argentina and Australia, which are more reliable
producers with fewer animal health problems and
more standardized production. However, the bene-
fits from access to high-value markets could be
considerable for developing countries that invest in
animal disease controls, as a case study of foot and
mouth disease controls in Zimbabwe shows (Perry
and others 2003).
Disputes and Complaints through the WTO
Complaints and counter-notifications made
through the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Committee
within the WTO also provide an indication of
the nature and breadth of the standards challenge
for developing countries (table 6.3). While the
counter-notification database and the information
provided in most counter-notifications do not per-
mit quantifying the levels of developing-country
trade that has or might be affected by the contested
measures, it does provide some insights. A sum-
mary of complaints by regulatory goal and country
group suggests that (at least some) developing
countries have actively used this formal review and
complaint process to register their concerns about a
significant number of notified measures by both
industrial and developing countries. A more
detailed look at the individual complaints,indicates
that:
• Complaints by developing countries are domi-
nated by a handful of countries—Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, and Thailand. Each of these coun-
tries has issued or supported more than a dozen
complaints, with Argentina being involved in
more than a quarter of all developing-country
complaints. Only a handful of other countries,
including Ecuador, India, the Philippines, South
Africa, and Uruguay, have been involved in
Agro-Food Exports from Developing Countries: The Challenges Posed by Standards 103multiple cases. This pattern of participation
reflects the prominence of certain countries in
trade in a few product categories, especially beef
and horticultural products,rather than the over-
all structure of developing country agricultural
and food trade.
• These data alone provide little information
about the extent to which food safety and agri-
cultural health measures are inhibiting exports
of low-income countries.Low-income countries
are weakly represented in counter-notifications,
issuing or supporting complaints in only five
cases. This could reflect the structure of their
exports (concentrated in commodities for which
food safety and agricultural health measures are
of lesser importance) or their limited capacity to
participate in the formal review process. This
lack of formal complaints does not mean that
they have been able to resolve their concerns
bilaterally.
• Among the seemingly large number of
developing-country complaints are a limited
number of repeated concerns, with slight varia-
tions. Most complaints about animal health
issues relate to what are claimed to be overly
restrictive (and nonscientifically based) measures
dealing with foot and mouth disease and beef
products or bovine spongiform encephalopathy
and animal by-products for pet food, animal
feed, and cosmetics. Similarly, most complaints
about plant health issues relate to claims of
overly restrictive measures for plant diseases or
pests or for horticultural products. Complaints
related to food safety are a mixture of specific
concerns, with no large clustering around partic-
ular themes. Surprisingly, given the huge impor-
tance for developing-country trade, there are
few complaints about measures governing fish
products.
• The reasons for developing-country complaints
are varied, yet most involve concerns about the
lack of scientific evidence in relation to food
safety,the absence of risk assessments in relation
to plant health, and inconsistencies between
country and international standards in animal
health.
• Among industrial countries, the European
Union has been the subject of the largest num-
ber of complaints by developing countries.
There were more than three times as many com-
plaints against the European Union as against
the United States. Several factors might account
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TABLE 6.3 Number of Counter-Notifications to the Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Committee Relating to Reported Measures, 1995–2002
Regulatory Goal of Contested Measure
Plant Animal Human
Complaints Health Health Health Other
a Total
By industrial countries against:
Industrial countries 16 7 44 3 70
Developing countries 17 11 41 4 73
Multiple countries — 2 — — 2
Subtotal 33 20 85 7 145
By developing countries against:
Industrial countries 12 12 34 2 60
Developing countries 8 17 7 2 34
Multiple countries — 2 — — 2
Subtotal 20 31 41 4 96
Total 53 51 126 11 241
— Not available
a. Includes complaints about horizontal regulations (such as those regulating products of modern
biotechnology) that reference human, animal, and plant health as objectives.
Source: Roberts 2004. for this. Harmonization of food safety and agri-
cultural health measures within the European
Union has often resulted in the adoption of the
most stringent standards previously applied by
individual member states. The European Union
has more frequently and most visibly embraced
the precautionary principle when adopting cer-
tain standards, sometimes giving rise to contro-
versies over the scientific basis for the measures.
And because of the complex administrative
structure of the European Union, some coun-
tries find it difficult to resolve concerns through
bilateral discussions and therefore more readily
turn to the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Commit-
tee for concerns related to the European Union
than for other countries.
Thus, the growing number of recorded com-
plaints or counter-notifications by developing
countries provides only a crude indicator of the
extent to which food safety and agricultural health
measures impede their trade in high-value agricul-
tural and food products. These complaints proba-
bly represent only the tip of the iceberg as most
concerns and disputes are raised bilaterally,and the
majority of negotiations are handled by technical
organizationsratherthancountrytraderepresenta-
tives. Some of the complaints have occurred in the
context of expanding trade ties, which can increase
the seriousness of previously minor effects.
There is little basis for associating the growing
number of complaints with deliberate protection-
ism. Many of the concerns seem to be related more
to inadequate (scientific) information rather than
to discrimination. Further, the apparatus of formal
complaints relates only to mandatory standards set
by public agencies. A growing array of standards
are being set privately, either through consensus
within particular industries or by the gatekeepers of
the dominant supply chains. While many such
standards are ostensibly voluntary, they are becom-
ing the de facto standards to gain or maintain
access to particular buyers or market segments.
Some Illustrative Case Studies
Because the data on agricultural and food product
rejections and disputes related to food safety and
agricultural health measures provide an incomplete
picture of the effects on developing countries,
analysts are using case studies to examine the
effects of specific standards on the trade of particu-
lar countries and products. Earlier work empha-
sized the potential disruptive impact of food safety
and agricultural health measures on exports from
developing countries (Otsuki, Wilson, and
Sewadeh 2001; Wilson and Otsuki 2003). More
recent work by the U.S. Department of Agriculture
(Buzby 2003) and the International Food Policy
Research Institute (Unnevehr 2003) point to more
varied experiences. Other case study analyses have
been undertaken by the United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD),the United
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), and
the World Bank.
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This section draws on selected examples to illus-
trate the complex ways in which sanitary and
phytosanitary measures can affect developing-
country exports. Three of the most prominent
concerns raised in the literature are emphasized in
the selection of case studies: fish trade bans and
their wider supply chain effects, limits on myco-
toxins as trade barriers, and the strengthening of
horticultural product and process standards.
Fish Bans and Their Wide Supply-Chain Effects 
Since 1990 developing-country exports of fish and
fishery products have increased at an average
annual rate of 6 percent (Delgado and others 2003).
A major challenge faced by developing countries in
seeking to maintain and expand their share of
global markets is the progressively stricter food
safety requirements, particularly in major indus-
trial countries. Previous studies suggested that
some exporters experienced considerable problems
in complying with these requirements.
The European Union lays down harmonized
requirements governing hygiene throughout the
supply chain for fish and fishery products.Process-
ing plants are inspected and approved individually
by a specified “competent authority” in the coun-
try of origin, whether an EU member state or a
third country, to ensure compliance. Imports from
third countries are required to have controls that
are at least equivalent to those of the European
Union.
17 Exports from countries for which local
requirements have been recognized as equivalent
are subject to reduced physical inspection at the
border. Countries that have not yet met these
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that their controls are at least equivalent to those of
the European Union are permitted to export but
are subject to higher rates of border inspection.
The current deadline for all countries to be fully
harmonized with the EU’s hygiene standards is
December 31, 2005.
Kenya is an example of longer-term efforts to
comply with the European Union’s food safety
requirements, overlaid with the need to overcome
restrictions on trade relating to immediate food
safety concerns. Kenya’s major fish export is Nile
perch from Lake Victoria. Until the mid-1980s this
was a relatively minor species in the Lake Victoria
fishery,but with a shift in focus from local to export
markets, Nile perch came to account for more than
90 percent of Kenya’s exports of fish and fishery
products by the mid-1990s, with a value of around
$44 million in 1996.Most exports were destined for
the European Union. Through the 1980s there was
significant investment in industrialized fish-
processing facilities, and 15 facilities were in opera-
tion by the mid-1990s. At the landing beaches,
however, there was little or no change in fishing
methods or marketing facilities.
Initially,Nile perch exports were extremely prof-
itable. Processing capacity soon exceeded the sup-
ply of fish, however, a situation that sets the com-
petitive environment in which all levels of the chain
operate.Although food safety requirements in their
major export markets were evolving, most proces-
sors made little attempt to upgrade their facilities
and systems of procurement, processing, and mar-
keting. Likewise, the legislative framework of food
safety controls remained largely unchanged,despite
the fact that the structure and focus of the supply
chain had shifted to exports. The picture was of a
supply chain that had not been upgraded in line
with the growth in exports and was unable to
implement effective controls within the context of
rapidly evolving standards overseas. Thus, both the
public authorities and exporters were in the posi-
tion of continuous problem solving.
In recent years exporters of Nile perch have
faced a catalogue of restrictions on trade with the
European Union. In 1996 salmonella was detected
in a number of consignments of Nile perch from
Kenya (and Tanzania and Uganda) at the Spanish
border, and Spain immediately prohibited imports.
In April 1997 the European Commission intro-
duced a requirement for salmonella testing of all
consignments of Nile perch from the region.
Following an outbreak of cholera across East
Africa, testing was extended to all fish and to cover
Vibrio cholerae and Vibrio parahaemoliticus. These
requirements were lifted in June 1998. In March
1999 a suspected case of fish poisoning with pesti-
cide was identified in Uganda. The European
Union subsequently imposed a ban on exports of
Nile perch in April 1999 that was not lifted for
Kenya until December 2000. In each case, the
impact was immediate. Exports declined, although
over time declines were partially offset by increased
sales to other markets.Fish-processing plants,most
already operating at less then 50 percent capacity,
reduced their production,and some closed.In turn,
the landed price of Nile perch fell.
Both the Kenyan government and the private
sector tried to upgrade food safety controls.
Responsibility for regulatory controls was split
between the Ministry of Health and the Fisheries
Department of the Ministry of Agriculture and
Rural Development, creating significant coordina-
tion problems. To improve compliance, the Fish-
eries Department was made the sole “competent
authority,” and legislation was quickly revised in
line with the European Union’s requirements.
Fish-processing plants upgraded their facilities
and implemented an HACCP system, at an esti-
mated average cost per plant of about $40,000 and
a total cost of $557,000. These costs were prohibi-
tive for several processing facilities, which closed,
helping to reduce excess capacity. Simultaneously,
fish-processing companies began to cooperate to
present a united voice to the government and Euro-
pean Commission. The Kenya Fish Processors and
Exporters Association (AFIPEK), formed in 2000,
has developed a code of good manufacturing prac-
tice for the sector.
A remaining weakness in the Nile perch supply
chain is standards of hygiene at landing beaches.
Most attempts by the government to implement
effective management of the fishery resource and
marketing arrangements have failed. Only recently
have efforts been made to provide toilets, paved
and fenced landing areas, potable water, and cov-
ered markets. This is the biggest compliance issue
facing the sector in the short to medium term for
access to EU markets.
The efforts of the Kenyan government and pri-
vate sector eventually paid off, and in December
2003 the European Commission recognized the
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European Union. The European Union’s hygiene
requirements for fish and fishery products have had
profound effects on the Nile perch sector in Kenya.
Whereas the export supply chain had developed
with a sole focus on EU markets, today most
exporters have diversified their export base and
have major markets in Australia, Japan, and the
United States. Compliance with EU requirements
helped Kenyan exporters to access and maintain
these markets.
This case illustrates the significant impact that
stricter food safety requirements can have on a sup-
ply chain that is almost entirely export oriented and
dependent on a single market. It also demonstrates
how such requirements can exacerbate pressures
for restructuring and reform, while prevailing sup-
ply and capacity issues constrain how various levels
of the chain are able to respond.The case also illus-
trates the interdependencies between levels of the
supply chain and between the public and private
sectors in meeting food safety requirements in
export markets. And it demonstrates the impor-
tance of responding quickly to emerging food
safety and agricultural health standards. The peri-
ods of restrictions faced by Kenyan exporters of
Nile perch very much reflect the fact that little had
been done in response to the implementation of
stricter food safety requirements in the country’s
most important export market. Rather, most of the
concerted effort to comply with these requirements
was stimulated by the sudden loss of market access,
in very much a crisis management mode of
operation.
Limits on Mycotoxins as Trade Barriers
Mycotoxins are toxic by-products of mold infesta-
tions, affecting as much as a quarter of global food
and feed crop output (Dohlman 2003; Reddy and
others 2002).They commonly occur in the produc-
tion of corn, wheat, and peanuts, causing consider-
able crop losses (Bhat and Vasanthi 1999). Their
incidence is affected by weather and insect infesta-
tion, although proper production and postharvest
(especially storage) practices can strongly mitigate
occurrence.
18 Consuming foods with very high lev-
els of mycotoxins can be fatal, and long-term con-
sumption of foods with lower levels has been linked
to liver cancer.Since the discovery of mycotoxins in
the 1960s, regulatory limits have been established
in 77 countries to protect consumers (Egmond
1999). There are wide differences in national stan-
dards, however, linked to different susceptibilities
and different perceptions of acceptable health risks.
For example, acceptable tolerances for aflatoxin in
food range from zero to 50 parts per billion.
There are indications that mycotoxin problems
have disrupted developing-country trade. Thailand
was once a leading world exporter of corn. Because
of persistent aflatoxin problems, however, Thai
corn regularly sold at a discount, costing the coun-
try an estimated $50 million a year in reduced
export revenue.
19 Similarly, India was historically a
significant supplier of peanut meal to the European
Union, but this trade declined sharply in the early
1980s because of problems meeting stricter stan-
dards for aflatoxin. Otsuki, Wilson, and Sewadeh
(2001), in a widely cited study, examine the process
of harmonization of the European Union’s stan-
dards for aflatoxin and the potential impact on
exports of selected products, including cereals and
dried fruit and nuts, from African countries.
20 In
1997 the European Union proposed a set of harmo-
nized standards for aflatoxin for member states,
which had developed their own standards, and
a uniform sampling procedure for testing. In
response to the European Union’s notification to
the WTO, developing countries raised a series of
objections to the proposed standards and sampling
methods. The proposed standards were to be far
more stringent than the proposed Codex standard,
without proper scientific justification.
21
Otsuki, Wilson, and Sewadeh (2001) argue that
these standards are unnecessarily stringent given
the estimated risk reduction that would be
achieved. Their work is widely cited for its econo-
metric estimation of the potential loss of African
trade that could be attributed to the change in the
European Union’s standard. Using a gravity model,
which incorporates a number of variables assumed
to affect bilateral trade flows,they compare existing
levels of African exports to the European Union
with likely levels following implementation of the
new standards and likely levels had the European
Union adopted the Codex standard (15 parts per
billion) across all product categories.They estimate
that annual African exports to the European Union
of cereals and nuts and dried fruit would decline
from $770 million to $372 million following adop-
tion of the EU standard but would rise to slightly
more than $1 billion under the Codex standard.
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adopt the more stringent standards was estimated
to have cost Africa some $667 million.
The conclusions of this work were headline
grabbing but widely misinterpreted. Many subse-
quent commentators have mistakenly referred to
the estimates as if they were actual losses rather
than the results of an econometric simulation. Sev-
eral shortcomings of this method need to be taken
into account when interpreting the results.
22 The
major focus here relates to the value of exports
before and after the adoption of the standard
and the lessons that stakeholders take from the
example.
The trade data used to establish the baseline put
African exports to the European Union (in 1998) at
$472 million for dried fruit and nuts and $298 mil-
lion for cereals,with the bulk of this trade occurring
with France. These figures seem implausible, espe-
cially for cereals, given Africa’s lack of competitive-
ness in this sector relative to Europe. Statistics from
the United Nations COMTRADE database show
much lower European imports from Africa in 1998
of $104 million for dried fruit, $45 million for
groundnuts, $27 million for other edible nuts, and
less than $14 million for cereals and cereal prod-
ucts.
23 This suggests that the baseline against which
the impact of the standards should have been
assessed was $190 million (c.i.f.—cost, insurance,
and freight—value) rather than $770 million.
What about the evidence on impact? Most of the
region’s dried fruit trade is accounted for by two
North African countries—Tunisia and Algeria—
whose exceptionally dry climate contributes to a
very low incidence of aflatoxin. The only other
African country with any history and recent
strength in exports of dried fruit is South Africa.
The new EU standards came into full force in April
2002. Both in the year proceeding and the year fol-
lowing that date there were no cases of dried fruit
consignments from Africa being detained on entry
to the European Union. In fact, while total EU
imports of dried fruit declined somewhat in 2002,
imports from Africa increased, boosting Africa’s
share from 9.8 percent in 2001 to 10.3 percent in
2002. Competing countries with more humid con-
ditions (especially Turkey) incurred higher levels of
product rejections during 2003. For dried fruit, the
more stringent EU standards and enforcement at
the border worked to the competitive advantage of
Africa’s leading suppliers.
What about groundnuts? Africa’s groundnut
exports are dominated by South Africa, although
Egypt,The Gambia,Sudan,and Senegal have main-
tained small exports of confectionery nuts.Various
supply-side constraints have inhibited the competi-
tiveness of many African countries in the interna-
tional market for groundnuts (see chapter 12).
24 In
2002 South Africa had 12 consignments of ground-
nuts rejected by EU member states because of afla-
toxin. Only 3 of the 12 would have met the less
stringent Codex standard or the standards applied
previously by the individual member states. The
rejected consignments were returned to South
Africa, presumably for sale elsewhere, rather than
destroyed. Probably a few hundred thousand dol-
lars of business was affected, although the probable
sale of these nuts in other markets would have sub-
stantially mitigated these losses. No evidence was
found that Africa’s limited exports to the European
Union of either cereals or tree nuts have been
adversely affected since the adoption of the new
standards. Thus the near-term loss of African trade
because of the more stringent EU standards has
likely been in the hundreds of thousands of dollars
rather than in the hundreds of millions.
While the case for significant African trade losses
is weak,compliance with the EU aflatoxin standards
remains a challenge for some developing countries.
Between 2000 and 2002 the number of border rejec-
tions of nuts, nut products, and other snacks
increased threefold (from 92 to 251). In 2002 some
235 consignments of nuts and dried fruit were
rejected on grounds of excessive levels of aflatoxin.
Most of the rejected shipments were from Turkey
(77 cases involving hazelnuts and dried fruit),Brazil
(51 cases, mainly Brazil nuts), and Iran (50 cases,
mainly pistachios). Other countries with more than
a few rejections were China (18), South Africa (12),
the United States (7),and Argentina (5).
Although the data are incomplete,the EU notifi-
cations and alerts database reports the actual test
results for levels of aflatoxin for many months. In
most cases of rejection, the measured levels of afla-
toxin are substantially higher (sometimes many
times higher) than the Codex standard and also sig-
nificantly above the domestic standards of the
exporting countries.For example,of the 15 nut and
dried fruit consignments rejected in January 2002,
only 3 were above the EU standard but below the
Codex standard. In October 2002, one country
source of nuts had 38 individual consignments
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per billion or more.
25 This suggests that suppliers,
especially those producing in humid conditions,
are having considerable difficulty controlling afla-
toxin contamination.
It is still unclear, however, how much EU
standards on aflatoxin have affected developing-
country trade. For example, Iran has been experi-
encing problems with aflatoxin for several years. Its
exports of edible nuts declined from $452 million
in 1996 to less than $210 million in 2002. Further
analysis is needed to determine how much of this
decline can be attributed to problems with afla-
toxin contamination and of that, how much to reg-
ulatory measures rather than to a more general loss
of buyer confidence.Exports from Turkey,however,
seem to have been little affected by the increased
stringency of EU standards and enforcement. In
2002 the volume of products rejected by the
European Union constituted less than 1 percent of
Turkish exports of nuts and dried fruit to that mar-
ket.Any rejected product is reexported to countries
with less strict standards (or enforcement) or sold
domestically, reducing losses.
Proliferation of Horticultural Product Standards
The regulatory and private governance systems for
international fresh produce markets are becoming
increasingly complex. This changing regulatory
environment appears to be raising the bar for new
entrants and throwing new challenges in the path of
existing developing-country suppliers. Concern is
mountingabouttheabilityof smallandlow-income
countries to meet rising public and private stan-
dards and thus their ability to remain competitive
in international fresh produce markets (Dolan and
Humphrey 2000; Chan and King 2000; Buurma and
others 2001). High-profile food scares and highly
publicized instances of pesticide residue violations
have created an impression of extreme vulnerability
of developing-country suppliers.Yet experiences are
mixed, and most countries and industries that have
run into standards-related barriers have also been
struggling with other supply-chain problems that
have inhibited their profitability and competitive-
ness. Consider the contrasting experiences of two
low-income countries,Guatemala and Kenya.
Guatemalan raspberries: a cautionary tale? In
the late 1980s several firms began exporting
raspberries from Guatemala to the United States
during months when U.S. domestic supplies were
limited (Calvin 2003; Calvin, Flores, and Foster
2003). By 1996 these exports had reached $3 mil-
lion, with some 85 growers participating. In that
year, however, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention and Health Canada received
reports of some 1,465 cases of food-borne illness
associated with the parasite Cyclospora.Raspberries
from Guatemala were identified as the most likely
source of the contamination.
The FDA sent a team to Guatemala to investi-
gate, amid considerable scientific uncertainty and
great difficulty identifying the likely source of the
contamination. The association of Guatemalan
growers (GBC) remained unconvinced that its
raspberries were the source of the problem. It
attempted to put in place a limited program to
screen out potentially high-risk farms, but the pro-
gram had no effective enforcement mechanism.
After another large outbreak of Cyclospora-related
illnesses in the spring of 1997, the GBC voluntarily
agreed to stop exports of raspberries to the United
States. Despite the fact that the Guatemalan gov-
ernment created a food safety commission with
enforcement powers in late 1997, the FDA was
unconvinced and essentially imposed an import
ban on Guatemalan raspberries.
During the next two years many organizations
in the United States and Canada worked with the
Guatemalans to solve the problem.A Model Plan of
Excellence was put in place in 1999, involving the
application of food safety practices by growers,
mandatory inspection by government, and a sys-
tem of product traceability back to individual
growers. The United States lifted the ban on
imports of Guatemalan raspberries. In 2000, how-
ever, there were two further Cyclospora outbreaks,
which were traced back to a single Guatemalan
farm. The grower was removed from the program,
and there have been no further outbreaks.
While the Model Plan of Excellence was techni-
cally successful,it came too late to save the industry.
Facing consumer concerns,several supermarkets in
the United States sought alternative sources of
raspberries.Recognizing the enormous challenge of
rehabilitating the reputation of Guatemalan rasp-
berries in the eyes of both consumers and distribu-
tors, several leading firms (both Guatemalan and
international firms) shifted their operations to
Mexico. By 2001 only four growers of raspberries
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less than $200,000. Meanwhile, Mexico’s exports of
raspberries grew from $2.9 million in 1998 to $8.9
million in 2002 and now account for the largest
share of an expanding U.S. import market.
Although the Guatemalan raspberry industry
never recovered, other parts of the fresh produce
industry built on the institutional capacity building
that had taken place. For example, the inspection
agency, the Integrated Program for Agricultural
and Environmental Protection (PIPAA), has been
working closely with local blackberry growers, a
leading local supermarket chain, and others to
enhance food safety management systems. PIPAA
is also collaborating with the Animal and Plant
Health Inspection Service and the FDA in the
United States on a program for Guatemalan
exports of mangoes and papayas.
Calvin, Flores, and Foster (2003) draw several
lessons from Guatemala’s experience. Delays in
addressing food safety and agricultural health
problems may hurt an industry’s exports and repu-
tation.An effective traceability system allows focus-
ing on particular growers or exporters rather than
needing to enhance standards in an entire industry.
Finally, strong grower organizations can improve
an industry’s ability to respond to food safety
challenges. There is also a wider lesson from
Guatemala’s experience. Small countries and niche
products are probably far more vulnerable to loss
of markets and collapse of reputation in the face of
food safety problems than are larger countries and
more mainstream or generic products. Both inter-
national buyers and consumers would likely be
more tolerant and patient with core, long-standing
suppliers that have established a “brand” in which
they have confidence.
Kenyan fresh produce exports: some success.
Kenya’s fresh produce trade dates to the mid-1950s,
when small quantities of temperate-climate vegeta-
bles and tropical fruits were supplied in the Euro-
pean winter off-season to up-market stores in
London.
26 This off-season trade was later joined by
year-round supplies of high-quality green beans
and a broad array of vegetables that are part of the
traditional diets of UK immigrant populations
from South Asia. Most of the products were air-
freighted in two-kilogram boxes for sale through
wholesale markets or to distributors and caterers.
For years the industry functioned with simple
supply chains, involving little investment in infra-
structure, product development, or management
systems. Around a dozen medium-size firms plus
large numbers of small, part-time operators han-
dled the exports, frequently trading with relatives
or similar small-scale companies in Europe. Fresh
produce was purchased from large numbers of
growers. Produce was generally collected in card-
board boxes from farms or along roadsides and
brought to a central warehouse, sifted through and
regraded if necessary, cooled a little, and trucked to
the airport for evening shipment. Ministry of Agri-
culture officials at the airport conducted limited
inspections. This was the model from the 1960s to
the mid-1980s. The industry remained competitive
in some markets and for some products,but not for
others. The Kenyan fresh produce export trade
grew slightly in the 1970s but stagnated in the
1980s.
Since the early 1990s the industry has been
reshaped and transformed in response to—and in
anticipation of—commercial, regulatory, and pri-
vate governance changes within its core external
markets. Commercial pressures came from satu-
rated markets for certain products and increased
competition from suppliers that had improved
their supply capabilities and had less expensive sea
or air-freight costs than did Kenya. Commercial
changes within Europe also required a shift in the
Kenyan approach. In many countries large super-
market chains were in ascendancy while wholesale
markets were declining. Consolidation was also
occurring among importers, packers, and distribu-
tors. The growing segments of the fresh produce
market were being managed by fewer players. On
the regulatory front a steady wave of activity was
geared toward strengthening and harmonizing EU
and member state regulations and monitoring sys-
tems for food safety, quality conformity, and plant
health. Also emerging were progressively refined
private-sector standards or codes of practice gov-
erning food safety, plant health, and other issues.
Several leading Kenyan exporters caught an
early glimpse of this new fresh produce environ-
ment and began to reorient their operations. With
the encouragement of several UK supermarkets,
they began to experiment with new crops,new con-
sumer packaging,and new combinations of vegeta-
bles. An increasing proportion of products was
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began to send “audit” teams to Kenya to check
hygiene and other conditions on farms and pack-
houses. Improvements and investments were rec-
ommended and in some cases required. With
renewed confidence in the future of the industry,
several exporters invested heavily in new or
upgraded pack-houses and related food safety
management systems for packing ready-to-eat and
semi-prepared products. Mixed salads, stir-fry
mixes, vegetable kebabs, and other value-added
products now account for more than 40 percent of
what has been a burgeoning trade over the past
decade. Between 1991 and 2003 Kenya’s fresh
vegetable exports increased from $23 million to
$140 million.
27
Rising public- and private-sector standards have
posed challenges to the Kenyan fresh produce
industry, yet they have also thrown a lifeline to the
industry. Because of Kenya’s location and relatively
high air-freight costs, its fresh produce sector
cannot compete with many other players on a unit-
cost basis. Margins have been squeezed in the mar-
ket for mainstream, commodity-type vegetables.
With rising labor costs in Europe, however, the
Kenyan industry has positioned itself as a slicer,
dicer, and salad-maker, all labor-intensive func-
tions. Thus far, this market segment has grown
fastest in the United Kingdom, although there is
increased buyer interest and consumer demand on
the European continent as well. This suggests that
well-organized industries in low-income countries
can use stricter standards as a catalyst for change—
and profit in the process.
Conclusions
There are now a number of documented cases in
which developing countries have faced restrictions
because of their inability to meet food safety or
agricultural health requirements. In some of these,
well-established export-dependent sectors have
been compromised by the implementation of new,
stricter standards, with negative repercussions for
the livelihoods of those involved.At the same time,
other countries have managed to gain access to
high-value markets in industrial countries despite
the exacting standards. Clearly, the situation is not
as black and white as some commentators suggest.
What cannot be disputed, however, is that stan-
dards have become an increasingly important
influence on the international competitiveness of
developing countries, especially for high-value
agricultural and food products.
The evidence presented in this chapter, while
admittedly incomplete,suggests that the picture for
developing countries as a whole is much less
pessimistic than that widely presented by the
standards-as-barriers perspective. Indeed, rising
standards accentuate underlying supply-chain
strengths and weaknesses and thus affect the com-
petitive positions of countries and distinct market
participants, making it important to view the
effects of food safety and agricultural health meas-
ures in the context of wider capacity constraints.
The key question for developing countries is how to
exploit their strengths and overcome their weak-
nesses to emerge as gainers rather than losers.
Still, by raising the bar for new entrants and
placing a premium on effective safety management
and logistical coordination, higher official and pri-
vate standards can weaken the competitive position
of small and poorer countries and the ability of
small enterprises and farmers to remain active and
profitable in export supply chains. But food safety
and agricultural health standards are here to stay,
and there is no slowing down their rate of change
or applying for special and differential treatment.
Much of the impetus for standards comes from
consumer and commercial interests, magnified
by advances in technology and added security
concerns.
The answer for developing countries is to
develop and improve food safety and agricultural
health management systems.This requires simulta-
neousattentiontolegalsystems,humancapital,and
physical infrastructure, among other things. Man-
agement capacity is required not only to comply
with different requirements in different markets,
butalsotodemonstratecompliancewithstandards.
Although many countries have struggled to meet
ever stricter standards, even some very poor coun-
tries have managed to implement the necessary
capacity. This has most commonly occurred where
the private sector is well organized and the public
sector is well focused and supports the efforts of
exporters. To meet the challenges posed by stan-
dards in international markets for high-value agri-
cultural and food products, developing countries
need institutional frameworks to help them
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orsmall.Thesecanincludeoutgrowerprogramsfor
smallholder farmers, systems of training and over-
sight for smaller enterprises organized through
associations and other groups, and twinning and
regional networking for small countries.
An overarching message is the need for develop-
ing countries (and their exporters) to be proactive
on food safety and agricultural health issues. It is
important not to be pushed into action by a major
crisis. By thinking strategically, countries, produc-
ers, and exporters can program capacity enhance-
ment into wider and longer term efforts to enhance
domestic food safety and agricultural health man-
agement systems and export competitiveness. The
alternative is that large investments will be required
over a long period just to “put out fires.” In all of
this, there is a need for the public and private sec-
tors to work together to identify the most efficient
and effective ways to develop capacity,viewing food
safety and agricultural health controls as a collabo-
rative effort.
Notes
1. For the more traditional food exports of developing coun-
tries, such as beverage crops, fiber crops, tobacco, and sugar,
international trade is still largely governed by price and quality
and by traditional forms of trade protection and preferences (see
chapters 3 and 4).
2. According to a source at the Food and Drug Administra-
tion, while 99 percent of domestic facilities are found to be in
compliance, some 30 percent of inspected foreign facilities have
significant system defects.
3. See www.cfsan.fda.gov and europa.eu.int/comm/food/fs/
inspections/fnaoi/reports/annual_eu/index_en.html.
4. For example, as of August 2003, two countries—the
Netherlands and the United Kingdom—accounted for more
than two-thirds of the area certified as being EUREPGAP-
compliant. EUREPGAP is a set of good agricultural practices
(GAP) based on accepted standards and promoted by the Euro-
pean retailer produce group (EUREP). Only a small proportion
of the area in developing countries on which fresh produce is
grown for the European market was so certified,the bulk of it in
South Africa. Recognizing these constraints, extended deadlines
have been given to many developing-country exporters and pro-
ducers to adopt and gain certification against the EUREPGAP
protocol.
5. Only 20 percent of the notifications by low-income coun-
tries and 22 percent of those of high-income countries involved
applications of international standards.
6. An array of capacity assessment instruments are used to
gauge strengths and weaknesses of food safety and agricultural
health management capacity. Some instruments focus on spe-
cific dimensions of capacity, while others provide a broader
overview.
7. In practice, it is rather difficult to measure “costs of com-
pliance.”Food safety is very often achieved in combination with
other business functions and is thus a joint product with those
functions. Thus, there are questions over what investments and
which management systems are put in place strictly to ensure
compliance with particular standards and which service a multi-
plicity of functions. In practice, it is often difficult to make this
separation. For example, cold-store facilities may be needed to
prevent the multiplication of bacteria in fresh produce, yet such
facilities are also critical for achieving a quality characteristic or
extended shelf-life.
8. One leading Kenyan firm estimated that the costs of its
small farmer oversight arrangements represented about 12 per-
cent of its costs of raw materials. These transaction costs repre-
sent 6 percent of the f.o.b.(free on board) value of French beans,
which is equivalent to the exporter’s profit on the product and
about 60 percent of the grower’s profit.
9. Some new products may not require as much farm
labor as previously traded products or may require more capital
investment. In either scenario the comparative advantage of
smallholders may be reduced.
10. Data for the United States can be found at www.fda.gov/
ora/oasis/ora_oasis_ref.html, and for the European Union at
www.europa.eu.int/comm/food/fs/sfp/ras_index_en.html. The
data exclude certain agricultural and food products for which
the FDA has no jurisdiction, most notably meat and poultry.
Until 2002 these data referred to border detentions regardless of
whether the product was eventually permitted to enter. Since
then they have recorded border rejections. The European Union
has made disaggregated data on import alerts available only
since 2002,although annual reports with broad summary statis-
tics were published previously.
11. Between 2002 and 2003 the number of ports at which the
FDA has assigned inspection staff increased from 40 to 90. Dur-
ing this period, a $96 million increase in the FDA’s budget for
food security work enabled it to hire 655 new field personnel.In
the Bush administration’s proposed 2005 budget, the FDA
would receive a 9 percent increase in funding to expand its “food
defense”program.The fiscal 2005 budget calls for 97,000 import
inspections, seven times the number undertaken in 2001. Simi-
larly large increases were proposed for the Department of
Agriculture’s work on food safety.
12. To put this number into perspective, the estimated total
costs to the United Kingdom alone from BSE-related market
losses and for the various cull and disposal schemes was more
than $5 billion (Mathews,Bernstein,and Buzby 2003).This does
not take any account of the adverse impact on the country’s
tourism industry.
13. For example,the United States currently permits imports
of beef from only 33 countries and imports of chicken from only
4 countries.
14. Currently, the International Office of Epizooties recog-
nizes only 57 countries as being totally free of foot and mouth
disease without vaccination, of which 26 are developing coun-
tries—only 3 of them low-income countries. For further infor-
mation, see www.oie.int.
15. Indeed, more widespread cases of both new and well-
established animal diseases have led to heightened concerns
about the role of international trade in the spread of such dis-
eases. In the case of BSE, widespread restrictions have been
applied to trade in live animals, meat, animal feed, and an array
of by-products used in the cosmetics,pharmaceutical,and other
industries.
16. For the case studies produced by UNCTAD, see
r0.unctad.org/trade_env/test1/openF1.htm. For the case studies
produced by UNEP, see www.unep.ch/etu/publications/
Ctry_studies.htm.
112 Global Agricultural Trade and Developing Countries17. The European Commission has presented its controls on
hygiene for imports of fish and fishery products as a practical
example of the application of equivalence (WTO 2001). Thus,
rather than laying down specific requirements, the European
Commission focuses on the conditions under which products
will be equivalent to those produced in the European Union.
18. Although the growth of mycotoxin-producing molds is
an endemic problem in humid areas, management of this prob-
lem need not involve very sophisticated or costly measures. See
Boutrif (1997), Park, Njapau, and Boutrif (1999), and
Dimanche and Kane (2002) for examples of practical and low-
cost measures.
19. There, most of the problem occurred during postharvest
as the harvested maize was typically stored in moist if not wet
conditions for one to two months before sale and processing
(Tangthirasunan, T. n.d.).
20. Thisisprobablythemostwidelycitedstudyonthepoten-
tial or actual impact of rising food safety standards on exports of
agricultural and food products from developing countries.
21. In response to objections, the European Union revised
some of its proposed measures. In its 1998 Directive, it estab-
lished a limit for total aflatoxin in groundnuts subject to further
processing at 15 parts per billion,and a limit for aflatoxin B1 at 8
parts per billion,which was consistent with the proposed Codex
standard. For other nuts and dried fruit subject to further pro-
cessing, more stringent limits were set at 10 parts per billion for
total aflatoxin and 5 parts per billion for aflatoxin B1. There was
no equivalent Codex standard. The strictest standard was set for
cereals, dried fruits and nuts intended directly for human con-
sumption with maximum levels of 4 parts per billion for total
aflatoxin and 2 parts per billion for aflatoxin B1. Again, there
was no equivalent Codex standard.
22. See, for example the discussions about gravity models
and other approaches to estimating the trade impacts of stan-
dards in Beghin and Bureau (2001), OECD (2003), and Wilson
(2003).
23. In that year, African exports of cereals totaled $105 mil-
lion,with Egypt accounting for $70 million.The vast majority of
this trade was conducted with countries of the Near East and
Middle East.
24. In the 1960s and 1970s Africa was a major world supplier
of groundnuts, with large exporters in Malawi, Nigeria, Senegal,
and other countries. For reasons unrelated to aflatoxin, these
exports lost their international competitiveness, and most pro-
duction went to serve domestic markets or for use in oil crush-
ing.Over the years,research activity and the commercial trade in
Africa moved away from confectionery-type varieties preferred
in world markets, and recent attempts to revive confectionery
nut exports have encountered major problems attributable to
inadequate seed, basic quality control and price incentives for
farmers.
25. Moonen (2004) reports on testing results from the
Dutch import control authority. It is common that groundnut
shipments from developing countries have levels of aflatoxin
contamination of between 50 and 800 parts per billion. Also
cited by Moonen are toxicological surveys in Senegal for
groundnuts sold in the domestic market. Some 90 percent of
sampled groundnuts were contaminated with aflatoxin with the
average level being 230 parts per billion.
26. The discussion in this section draws on Jaffee (2003).
27. Systems for crop procurement have also been trans-
formed, with many leading companies investing in their own
farms or inducing changes in the practices of outgrowers. There
has been an array of joint public-private initiatives to train
growers in all aspects of good agricultural practice.But not all of
the industry has transformed itself. Some 25 smaller exporters
lack the financial resources to invest in modern pack-houses and
continue to supply loose produce to commission agents and
others in European wholesale markets and the Middle East.
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114 Global Agricultural Trade and Developing Countriesdecomposes the aggregate results by looking at the
impacts of partial reforms—both regionally and
across instruments—to identify what share of the
globalgainsderivesfromreforminindustrialcoun-
tries and what from reform in developing countries
and what share is driven by border protection and
what by domestic support. The second set of simu-
lations addresses issues raised by critics of trade
reform—notably that the predicted gains for devel-
opingcountriesaretoooptimisticandthatthetran-
sition costs for industrial-country farmers are high
and too often ignored. Concerns have also been
raised about the ability of developing countries to
respond to reforms and to achieve consistently high
productivity gains. To answer the questions about
theimpactsondevelopingcountries,threeassump-
tions are explored: the consequences of assuming
differential and lower agricultural productivity in
some developing countries, the impacts of con-
straining output supply response in selected
low-income countries, and estimates of trade elas-
ticities. The chapter also assesses the impacts of
This chapter uses a global,dynamic applied general
equilibrium model (LINKAGE) to assess how the
multifarious trade and support policies in agricul-
ture affect income,trade,and output patterns at the
global level.
1 Such models have become a standard
tool for assessing policy reforms because they cap-
ture linkages across sectors and regions (through
trade) and because, by their nature, they have
adding-up constraints so that supply and demand
are in equilibrium in all markets. The analysis pro-
vides order-of-magnitude estimates of the poten-
tial consequences of policy changes, rather than
a single point or “best” estimate. It also looks at
the induced structural changes, including cross-
regional patterns of output and trade, which tend
to be much larger than the more familiar gains
to real income. Whereas income gains typically
amount to 1 percent of base income or less, struc-
tural changes—for example, in sectoral output or
trade—can be greater than 50 percent.
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slower exit by industrial-country farmers and how
this would affect transition adjustments.
Some of the main findings:
• Reform of agricultural and food trade policy
provides 70 percent of the global gains from
merchandise trade reform—$265 billion of a
total of $385 billion.
• The global gains are shared roughly equally
between industrial and developing countries,
but developing countries gain significantly more
as a share of initial income. Significant income
gains occur in developing-country agriculture,
where poverty tends to be concentrated.
• Developing countries gain more from reforming
their own support policies than from improved
market access in industrial countries. Likewise,
industrial countries also gain relatively more
from their own reform.
• Notwithstanding the overall benefits from
greater openness, structural changes are impor-
tant and transition adjustments need to be
addressed.
• Productivity and supply assumptions affect
impact assessment, but their influence is small,
and they do not alter the main aggregate
findings. Trade elasticities, however, are key in
determining the overall level of the income
gains.Higher elasticities dampen terms-of-trade
effects and increase trade and real income gains
more than proportionally, while the opposite is
true for lower elasticities. These effects can be
very large for individual countries.
The Modeling Framework
The LINKAGE model is based on a standard neo-
classical general equilibrium model with firms
maximizing profit in competitive markets and con-
sumers maximizing well-being under a budget con-
straint. The model has added features related to its
dynamic nature.It is global,with the world decom-
posed into 23 regions, and multisectoral, with
economic activity aggregated into 22 sectors (see
annex A in the report on the CD-ROM). Seven of
the 23 regions are classified as high-income (or
industrial) including Canada, Western Europe
(European Union-15 plus the European Free Trade
Association countries), Japan, and the United
States—the so-called Quad countries.The develop-
ing countries include some of the large countries
that are important in agricultural markets as pro-
ducers or as consumers (Argentina, Brazil, China,
India, and Indonesia). The remaining developing
countries are grouped into regional aggregations.
2
The sectoral decomposition is concentrated in the
agricultural and food sectors (15 of the 22 sectors).
The LINKAGE model is dynamic, with scenarios
spanning 1997 to 2015. The dynamics include
exogenously given labor and land growth rates,
savings-driven investment and capital accumula-
tion, and exogenous productivity growth. Struc-
tural changes over time are driven by differential
growth rates and supply and demand parameters.
Trade is modeled using the Armington assumption.
Goods are differentiated by region of origin using a
two-nested structure (domestic absorption first
allocated across domestic and aggregate import
goods, then aggregate imports allocated across
different regions of origin).
Overview of Baseline Simulation
Assessing the impacts of policy reforms requires
two steps in the dynamic framework of the
LINKAGE model, a baseline (or reference) simula-
tion and a reform simulation.The baseline involves
running the model forward from its 1997 base year
to 2015, with exogenous assumptions about labor
and population growth rates, productivity, and
demand behavior parameters including savings,
which determines the rate of capital accumulation
(adjusted exogenously for depreciation).
The baseline simulation can also incorporate
changes in base year policies—to take into account
known changes in policies (between 1997 and the
present) or anticipated changes. The baseline
described below assumes no changes in base year
policies, however; they are held at their 1997 levels.
Thus the reform simulations reflect changes from
their 1997 levels, not changes that would be antici-
pated from 2004 levels.
3 It is unclear in which
direction some past and anticipated changes would
affect the global trade reform results.Some changes
clearly reflect further opening—for example,
China’s accession to the World Trade Organization
(WTO) and some bilateral free trade agreements.
Others would go in the opposite direction—for
example, the changes to the U.S. farm support
programs.Agriculture and Food Trends in the Baseline
Scenario
Trends in agriculture and food supply and demand
across the globe as determined in the baseline sce-
nario are driven in part by the macroeconomic
environment (as described in annex B on the
CD-ROM). But they are also driven by microeco-
nomic assumptions about the mobility of factors,
production technologies,income and price elastici-
ties, and trade elasticities, among others.
For agriculture and food between 2000 and
2015, both demand and production grow at
1.0–1.2 percent a year in industrial countries and at
a much higher 2.9–3.4 percent in developing coun-
tries (tables 7.1 and 7.2 summarize the results;
tables on the CD-ROM provide details for individ-
ual countries). On a per capita basis there is more
demand growth in developing countries, largely
because of higher income elasticities for food.Thus
the baseline assumes that demand growth will be
lower than output growth in industrial countries
and higher than output growth in developing
countries.
With higher output growth than demand,
industrial countries will see an increase in their
exportable surplus. On aggregate their net
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TABLE 7.2 Trends in Processed Foods, 2000–15
Average Annual Growth  Net Trade
(percent) (billions of 1997 US$)
Country Grouping Output Demand Imports Exports 2000 2015
High-income countries 1.2 1.0 1.3 2.4 7.7 53.5
Low-income countries 3.3 3.4 3.9 2.2 3.6 1.8
Middle-income countries 2.9 3.1 4.5 2.0 −11.3 −55.3
Low-income countries, 3.1 3.3 3.8 2.2 1.8 −0.2
excluding India
Middle-income countries, 2.9 3.1 4.5 2.0 −9.5 −53.4
including India
Developing countries 2.9 3.2 4.5 2.1 −7.7 −53.5
World total 1.8 1.8 2.4 2.3 0.0 0.0
Note: Net trade is measured at f.o.b. prices (imports exclude international trade and transport margins).
Source: World Bank simulations with LINKAGE model, based on release 5.4 of the GTAP data.
TABLE 7.1 Trends in Agriculture, 2000–15
Average Annual Growth Net Trade
(percent) (billions of 1997 US$)
Country Grouping Output Demand Imports Exports 2000 2015
High-income countries 1.2 1.1 1.9 3.0 −24.3 −3.1
Low-income countries 3.6 3.5 4.4 5.5 9.9 21.6
Middle-income countries 3.2 3.3 8.3 5.4 14.4 −18.5
Low-income countries, 3.7 3.4 3.6 6.6 7.2 22.4
excluding India
Middle-income countries, 3.2 3.4 8.3 5.1 17.1 −19.3
including India
Developing countries 3.3 3.4 7.8 5.4 24.3 3.1
World total 2.6 2.6 4.4 4.2 0.0 0.0
Note: Net trade is measured at f.o.b. prices (imports exclude international trade and transport margins).
Source: World Bank simulations with LINKAGE model, based on release 5.4 of the GTAP data.agricultural and food trade will improve dramati-
cally from a deficit of $17 billion in 2000 to a sur-
plus of $50 billion in 2015 (at 1997 prices). The
opposite occurs in developing countries,where a net
positive balance in agriculture and food turns into a
large deficit of $50 billion, due mostly to a balloon-
ing deficit in processed food. Agriculture and food
balances are positive for low-income countries in
2000 and 2015.
Developing a baseline of the future world econ-
omy requires nuanced analysis. The country and
regional growth rates used here are in line with
consensus views, given stronger demographic
trends and income elasticities for agriculture and
food in developing economies. World and regional
totals may be skewed by several factors.The weights
are biased toward industrial countries because of
the use of base year (1997) value shares. Volume
shares would yield different figures. Demand
growth in developing countries may be overstated
because income elasticities are held constant at
their base year levels. It is plausible to argue that
income elasticities would converge toward those of
high-income countries as developing countries
grow. The growth numbers are also broadly consis-
tent with Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO) historical trends. The discrepancy between
agricultural growth and food processing originates
in the growth in intermediate demand for agricul-
tural products as food processing grows. A more
meat-intensive future world would also exhibit a
slight acceleration in agricultural growth relative to
food because of the feed input in the livestock
sector. So, while the baseline scenario is plausible,
aggregate growth rates should be used with caution
for all these reasons.
The biggest mover among developing countries
is China,where the food deficit of $8 billion in 1997
would swell to somewhere around $120 billion by
2015. Demand is expected to outpace output by
about 1 percentage point a year.
4 In agriculture this
provides new opportunities for Sub-Saharan Africa
and Latin America, with both seeing a large rise in
agricultural surplus (on an aggregate basis). Sub-
Saharan Africa will nonetheless see a slight deterio-
ration in its processed-food balance. The aggregate
net trade balances may mask more detailed sectoral
shifts. For example, Sub-Saharan Africa will con-
tinue to be a net importer of grains through the
baseline scenario time horizon, and therefore a rise
in world prices induced by trade reform could lead
to a negative terms-of-trade shock since the agri-
cultural commodities they tend to export—for
example, coffee and cocoa—already have relatively
free access.
With relatively low demand growth in industrial
countries and relatively high output growth, the
exportable agricultural surplus will increase sub-
stantially, particularly from North America and
Oceania.Europe and Japan are the exceptions,with
output growth expected to be anemic.
The Impacts of Agricultural
Reform
The impacts of agricultural trade reform are exam-
ined first in the context of global merchandise trade
reform, and then the results are decomposed by
type of reform and region, to assess the relative
importance for developing countries of reforms in
industrial countries and in developing countries.
Results of Global Merchandise Trade Reform
Global reform involves removing protection in all
(nonservice) sectors, in all regions, and for all
instruments of protection (leaving other taxes
unchanged, although lump-sum taxes (or trans-
fers) on households adjust to maintain a fixed gov-
ernment fiscal balance). The model contains six
instruments of protection:
• Import tariffs, eliminated only if they are
positive 
• Export subsidies, eliminated only if they are
negative
5
• Capital subsidies, with direct payments con-
verted into subsidies on capital
• Land subsidies, with some payments also con-
verted to subsidies on land
• Input subsidies
• Output subsidies
The overall measure of reform, referred to as
real income, measures the extent to which house-
holds are better off in the post-reform scenario
than in the baseline scenario in the year 2015.
6 The
world gain (measured in 1997 U.S. dollars) is
$385 billion, an increase from baseline income of
some 0.9 percent (table 7.3).The gains are relatively
118 Global Agricultural Trade and Developing Countriesevenly divided between industrial countries
($188 billion) and developing countries ($197 bil-
lion), but developing countries are considerably
better off as a share of reference income,with a gain
of 1.7 percent compared with 0.6 percent for indus-
trial countries.
Caveats. A few caveats about the basic global
reform scenario. First, there are known deficiencies
inthebaseyearpolicies,whicharetakenfromrelease
5.4 of the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP)
database. Most preferential arrangements—
including the Generalized System of Preferences
and some regional trading agreements—are not
incorporated.
7Alternativescenarioscouldbeunder-
taken to test their overall importance especially
regarding the utilization rates of the preferences.
Second, the reference scenario assumes no changes
inthebaseyearpoliciesbetweenthebaseandtermi-
nal years. Thus changes in trading regimes since
1997,suchasChina’saccessiontotheWTO,orantic-
ipatedchanges,suchastheeliminationof theMulti-
fiberArrangement,are not taken into account.
8
Third, changes to some key assumptions or
specifications could generate higher benefits. For
example, raising the trade elasticities—as some
have argued—dampens the negative terms-of-
trade effects. Increasing returns to scale can gener-
ate greater efficiency improvements, depending
on the structure of product markets and scale
economies to be achieved.Reform of services could
have economywide impacts to the extent that
cheaper and more efficient services can lower pro-
duction costs as well as improve real incomes.
Changes in investment flows—not modeled here—
have proven to be as important (sometimes more)
as lowering trade barriers in many regional agree-
ments. In a global model, the net change would be
zero. Therefore, any reallocation of capital would
lead some countries to be better off,all else remain-
ing the same, and others worse off (abstracting
from the benefits of future repatriated profits).
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TABLE 7.3 Real Income Gains and Losses from Global Merchandise Trade Reform:
Change from 2015 Baseline
Export Capital Land Input Output
All Tariffs Subsidies Subsidies Subsidies Subsidies Subsidies
Country Grouping Instruments Only Only Only Only Only Only
Change in value
(billions of 1997 US$)
High-income countries 188.3 160.4 1.4 1.1 −4.8 −0.3 9.0
Low-income countries 31.9 34.6 −1.1 −0.1 −0.7 −0.3 0.2
Middle-income countries 164.7 187.7 −7.0 −1.2 −7.3 −3.8 −6.4
Low-income countries, 19.9 21.5 −0.9 −0.1 −0.6 −0.2 0.9
excluding India
Middle-income countries, 176.7 200.8 −7.3 −1.2 −7.4 −3.9 −7.0
including India
Developing countries 196.5 222.3 −8.2 −1.3 −8.1 −4.1 −6.2
World total 384.8 382.7 −6.8 −0.2 −12.8 −4.4 2.8
Percentage change
High-income countries 0.6 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Low-income countries 1.6 1.7 −0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Middle-income countries 1.8 2.0 −0.1 0.0 −0.1 0.0 −0.1
Low-income countries 1.9 2.1 −0.1 0.0 −0.1 0.0 0.1
excluding India
Middle-income countries 1.7 1.9 −0.1 0.0 −0.1 0.0 −0.1
including India
Developing countries 1.7 1.9 −0.1 0.0 −0.1 0.0 −0.1
World total 0.9 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Source: World Bank simulations with LINKAGE model, based on release 5.4 of the GTAP data.Gross flows could have a greater impact than net
capital flows to the extent that they raise productiv-
ity if they are associated with technology-laden
capital goods. Finally, dynamic effects can also lead
to a boost in the overall gains from reform.
The global scenario captures some of the inher-
ent dynamic gains, notably changes from savings
and investment behavior. These can sometimes
have a substantial impact, to the extent that
imported capital goods are taxed. Assuming that
savings rates are unchanged,a sharp fall in the price
of capital goods can lead to a significant rise in
investment (more bang per dollar invested). The
scenario does not incorporate changes to produc-
tivity, however. The channels and magnitudes of
trade-related changes to productivity are as yet
poorly validated by solid empirical evidence, and
attempts to incorporate these effects are by and
large simply illustrative of potential magnitudes.
Recent World Bank reports suggest that these
effects could be large, but the reports are really an
appeal for more empirical research.
9
Decomposition by instrument. The key finding
on instruments of protection is the predominant
role of tariffs.Removal of tariffs accounts for virtu-
ally all of the gains. The other instruments have
much smaller impacts on real income—slightly
positive on average for industrial countries and
negative in aggregate for developing countries. For
example, elimination of export subsidies negatively
affects Africa—both North and Sub-Saharan—and
the Middle East, although it provides a positive
benefit for Europe.Elimination of domestic protec-
tion also tends to be negative for developing
countries, and at times for industrial countries as
well. The rest of Sub-Saharan Africa is a notable
exception, with an income gain of 0.6 percent. This
could reflect the removal of significant output sub-
sidies on cotton in some of the major producing
countries (China and the United States).
The ambiguity of the welfare impact is in part
driven by the nature of partial reforms. Removal of
one form of protection may exacerbate the negative
effects of other forms of protection. For example,
removal of output subsidies may worsen the impact
of tariffs if removal of the subsidies leads to a
reduction in output and an increase in imports.
There are no robust theoretical arguments to deter-
mine which is more harmful. There are also other
general equilibrium effects inherent in multisec-
toral global models.
While the aggregate measure of gain often gar-
ners the most attention—at least from policy mak-
ers and the media—more relevant for most players
are the detailed structural results. By and large, it is
the structural results that influence the political
economy of reforms, particularly since the losers
from reforms tend to be concentrated and a well-
identified pressure group, whereas the gainers are
typically diffuse and harder to identify. For exam-
ple,a 10 percent decline in the price of wheat could
have a major impact on a farmer’s income, but
an almost imperceptible effect on the average
consumer.
With reform, aggregate agricultural output of
industrial countries declines—by more than
11 percent when all forms of protection are elimi-
nated (table 7.4). Removal of tariff protection gen-
erates the greatest change to production in indus-
trial countries, but unlike the case with the welfare
impacts, the other forms of protection have meas-
urable, if smaller, impacts on output. Removal of
output subsidies results in the next greatest change
in agricultural output, driven largely by the nearly
5 percent output decline in the United States—
although land and export subsidies have nearly the
same aggregate impact. The detailed results for the
Quad countries confirm several points of common
wisdom regarding the patterns of protection. First,
the United States makes more use of output subsi-
dies than do Europe and Japan. Europe makes
greater use of export subsidies and direct payments
(capital and land subsidies). Japanese protection is
mostly in the form of import barriers.
Results of Agricultural Reform
Full merchandise trade reform provides a bench-
mark from which to judge the maximal effects from
reform.This section focuses on the agricultural and
food sectors.
Real income gains. If all regions remove all pro-
tection in agriculture and food, the global gains in
2015 amount to $265 billion—nearly 70 percent of
the gains from full merchandise trade reform
(table 7.5). This is remarkable considering the
small size of agriculture and food in global output
(figure 7.1).
10 Agriculture represents less than
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TABLE 7.4 Agricultural Output Gains and Losses from Global Merchandise Trade Reform:
Change from 2015 Baseline
Export Capital Land Input Output
All Tariffs Subsidies Subsidies Subsidies Subsidies Subsidies
Country Grouping Instruments Only Only Only Only Only Only
Change in value
(billions of 1997 US$)
High-income countries −109.7 −56.2 −9.5 −1.6 −10.4 −7.4 −12.0
Low-income countries 14.8 11.5 1.1 0.0 0.7 0.4 2.0
Middle-income countries 41.8 18.1 8.2 −0.2 8.5 0.5 9.3
Low-income countries, 13.7 10.5 0.9 0.0 0.5 0.3 2.8
excluding India
Middle-income countries, 42.9 19.2 8.4 −0.2 8.7 0.6 8.6
including India
Developing countries 56.6 29.7 9.3 −0.1 9.2 0.9 11.3
World total −53.1 −26.6 −0.2 −1.7 −1.2 −6.5 −0.7
Percentage change
High-income countries −11.1 −5.7 −1.0 −0.2 −1.1 −0.7 −1.2
Low-income countries 2.4 1.8 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3
Middle-income countries 2.4 1.0 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.5
Low-income countries, 4.1 3.1 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.8
excluding India
Middle-income countries, 2.1 0.9 0.4 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.4
including India
Developing countries 2.4 1.2 0.4 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.5
World total −1.6 −0.8 0.0 −0.1 0.0 −0.2 0.0
Source: World Bank simulations with LINKAGE model, based on release 5.4 of the GTAP data.
TABLE 7.5 Real Income Gains from Agricultural and Food Trade Reform: Change
from 2015 Baseline
(billions of 1997 US$)
Agricultural and
Global Food Trade Agricultural
Merchandise Reform Trade Reform
Trade Reform High-Income Only
Country Grouping Global Global Countries High-Income
High-income countries 188.3 136.6 92.0 29.3
Low-income countries 31.9 10.3 3.0 1.1
Middle-income countries 164.7 118.2 6.9 −4.9
Low-income countries, 19.9 8.4 3.6 1.6
excluding India
Middle-income countries, 176.7 120.1 6.4 −5.3
including India
Developing countries 196.5 128.6 10.0 −3.8
World total 384.8 265.2 102.0 25.5
Source: World Bank simulations with LINKAGE model, based on release 5.4 of the GTAP data.2 percent of output for industrial countries and
10.5 percent for developing countries, while
processed foods represent 4.5 percent for industrial
countries and 7.5 percent for developing countries.
Agriculture is still a relatively high 19 percent of
output in the low-income developing countries.
Clearly,protection tends to be higher in agriculture
and food than in other sectors, particularly in
industrial countries, but in middle-income coun-
tries as well. Protection is more uniform in low-
income countries.
For low-income countries the gains from global
free trade in agriculture and food amount to
around one-third of the gains from global free
trade in all merchandise. This is a consequence of
their dependence on imports of the most protected
food items—such as grains—while they are net
exporters of commodities with little or no protec-
tion. The middle-income countries gain 71 percent
from global free trade in agriculture and food,
nearly as much as industrial countries, which gain
72 percent as compared with full merchandise
trade reform.
If reforms are limited to high-income
countries—a super-version of special and differen-
tial treatment—with perhaps an agreement by
middle-income countries to bind at existing levels
of protection, global gains drop to $102 billion,
indicating that a significant portion of the global
gains is generated by removal of agricultural barri-
ers in developing countries (see table 7.5).
11 The
drop in gains is particularly striking for middle-
income countries, where the gains from their own
agricultural and food reform would be quite sub-
stantial. On a percentage basis, this is less so for
low-income countries. The industrial countries
reap gains of $92 billion, implying that agricultural
reform in developing countries could generate
gains of about $45 billion for the industrial
countries.
The final decomposition scenario is to assess the
impacts of reform in agriculture alone in industrial
countries—leaving protection unchanged for
processed foods. This lowers the gains substantially
for industrial countries—from $92 billion to $29
billion (see table 7.5). Protection is high in both
sectors,and the processed foods sector is more than
twice as large as the agricultural sector. Further-
more, in a partial reform scenario, the efficiency
gains in agriculture could be offset to some extent
by further losses in processed foods. Output will
expand in the processed food sector as resources
are moved around—and the lower costs of inputs
will also provide incentives to increase output.
Middle-income countries could lose from an
agriculture-only reform in industrial countries.
They would benefit little from improved market
access in agriculture, and in a partial reform sce-
nario, expansion of their protected domestic agri-
culture and food production leads to efficiency
losses that are not compensated elsewhere.
To conclude—global agricultural trade reform
generates a huge share of the gains to be made from
merchandise trade reform. Market access into
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Source: GTAP release 5.4.industrial countries provides significant gains, but
a greater share of the gains for developing countries
comes from agricultural trade reform among
developing countries. Finally, reform in agriculture
alone provides few benefits. It needs to be linked to
reform in the processed food sectors.
Structural implications. Accelerating integration
is one of the key goals of trade reform. Beyond the
efficiency gains that come from allocating resources
to their best uses, integration is expected to bring
productivity increases—scale economies, greater
competitiveness, ability to import technology-
laden intermediate goods and capital, greater mar-
ket awareness, and access to networks.
The potential changes in trade from global
reform of agriculture and food are large. World
trade in these two sectors could jump by more than
half a trillion dollars in 2015 (compared with the
baseline), an increase of 74 percent (table 7.6).
Exports in agriculture and food from developing
countries would jump $300 billion, an increase of
more than 115 percent, with industrial-country
exports increasing $220 billion, or 50 percent. On
the flip side, imports from both industrial and
developing countries would rise substantially. The
net trade position of industrial countries would
deteriorate marginally—from $50 billion in the
baseline in 2015 to $48 billion after global reform
of agriculture and food. The marginal improve-
ment for developing countries decomposes into a
boost of nearly $12 billion for low-income coun-
tries and deterioration for middle-income coun-
tries of nearly $10 billion.
If the reform is limited to industrial countries,
the picture is modified significantly. First, the
change in imports for industrial countries is almost
identical under the two scenarios—$223 billion
with full reform and $205 billion with industrial-
country reform only (see table 7.6). Developing
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TABLE 7.6 Impact of Global Agricultural and Food Reform on Agricultural and
Food Trade: Change from 2015 Baseline
Exports Imports Net Trade
Country Grouping Global Industrial Global Industrial Global Industrial 2015 Baseline
Change in value
(billions of 1997 US$)
High-income countries 221.2 63.4 223.3 205.3 −2.1 −141.9 50.4
Low-income countries 41.0 20.9 29.2 −0.3 11.8 21.2 23.4
Middle-income countries 260.1 120.5 269.8 −0.2 −9.7 120.7 −73.8
Low-income countries, 33.8 17.5 21.9 0.1 11.8 17.5 22.2
excluding India
Middle-income countries, 267.3 123.9 277.1 −0.5 −9.8 124.4 −72.7
including India
Developing countries 301.1 141.4 299.0 −0.4 2.1 141.9 −50.4
World total 522.3 204.9 522.3 204.9 0.0 0.0 0
Percentage change
High-income countries 50 14 57 52
Low-income countries 74 38 92 −1
Middle-income countries 125 58 96 0
Low-income countries, 70 36 84 0
excluding India
Middle-income countries, 125 58 96 0
including India
Developing countries 115 54 95 0
World total 74 29 74 29
Note: The columns labeled Global refer to the impacts from global agriculture and food reform.
The columns labeled Industrial refer to industrial-country only reform of agriculture and food.
Source: World Bank simulations with Linkage model, based on release 5.4 of the GTAP data.countries see a significant rise in exports, but to
industrial countries only,with little or no change in
their own imports.Thus industrial countries would
witness a much sharper deterioration in their net
food bill, with net imports registering a change of
$142 billion instead of $2 billion, as under the
global reform scenario. The United States and
Europe bear the brunt of the adjustment, with
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand seeing little
difference between the global and partial reform
scenarios. In other words, these three countries
reap much of the trade benefits from greater mar-
ket access within industrial countries. Opening up
of markets in developing countries significantly
dampens the adjustment process for the United
States and Europe, and the United States would
reinforce its net exporting status significantly
under a global reform scenario.
Most developing countries see a greater im-
provement in their net food trade with industrial-
country-only reform than with global reform—
but not all countries.Argentina, Brazil, and the rest
of East Asia improve their net food trade more
with global reform than with partial reform. They
would gain additional market access from develop-
ing countries and reinforce their comparative
advantage over more highly protected countries in
East Asia. The biggest beneficiary in net terms
would be China. While its (small) exports would
not change much, removal of its own protection
induces a huge shift in imports. The lack of reform
under the partial reform scenario means that
instead of its net food position deteriorating by
$74 billion in the global reform, it sees a small
improvement of $6 billion. On aggregate for devel-
oping countries the partial reform would gener-
ate an improvement in net trade of food of
$142 billion.
The structural impacts described above are asso-
ciated with global changes in the distribution of
farm income. With global agriculture and food
reform, farm incomes barely change at the global
level (a loss of perhaps $10 billion,
12 or 0.6 percent
of baseline 2015 farm income). Changes are much
more significant at the regional level (figures 7.2
and 7.3). The largest absolute gains in farm income
are in the Americas, Australia and New Zealand,
and developing East Asia excluding China. Latin
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FIGURE 7.2 Change in Rural Value Added from Baseline in 2015
(billions of 1997 $US)
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Source: World Bank simulations with Linkage model, based on release 5.4 of the GTAP data.America would receive 40 percent of the total posi-
tive gains; Australia, Canada, and New Zealand
18 percent, and the United States 15 percent.
The relative position of regional gainers is some-
what different, however (see figure 7.3). Farmers in
Australia, Canada, and New Zealand gain the most
from global free trade in agriculture and food, with
income gains of 50–65 percent. Farmers in a num-
ber of developing regions have gains of more than
25 percent—Vietnam, Argentina, countries of the
Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU), the rest
of East Asia (which includes Thailand, Malaysia,
and the Philippines),and the rest of Latin America.
The farmers who lose most are in China, with
potential losses of $75 billion in 2015 compared
with the baseline scenario.
13 The next biggest losers
are farmers in Western Europe and the developed
East Asian economies—Japan, the Republic of
Korea,and Taiwan (China).In percentage terms the
biggest losses occur in Japan (30 percent) and West-
ern Europe (24 percent), with China’s losses down
to about 15 percent because of its huge rural
economy.
Most of the impact on rural incomes is gener-
ated by volume changes, not factor returns. Both
labor and capital returns are determined essentially
on national markets.
14 Thus wage changes are
modest overall, with generally greater impacts
in developing countries, where more labor is
employed in agriculture (table 7.7). For example,
wages for unskilled labor increase 8 percent in
Argentina and Vietnam,and 5–6 percent in the rest
of Latin America and the rest of Sub-Saharan
Africa. Unskilled workers in Australia and New
Zealand also benefit from these reforms. Unskilled
workers in developing countries generally do better
in relative terms than skilled workers, largely as a
result of their concentration in agricultural sectors.
China is a significant exception. Removal of its
agricultural protection lowers demand for
unskilled workers, and their wages decline. The
impact on wages in the European Union and Japan
is negligible, as agriculture employs a very small
share of the national labor force.
As in the labor markets, the returns in capital
market are determined mainly at the national level
(table 7.8). Thus changes to income will largely be
reflected in volume changes, not price changes.
Direct payments to farmers, however, are imple-
mented as an ad valorem subsidy on capital (and
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FIGURE 7.3 Percentage Change in Rural Value Added from Baseline in 2015
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Source: World Bank simulations with Linkage model, based on release 5.4 of the GTAP data.land), thus creating a wedge between the cost to
farmers and the returns to owners. Removal of the
capital subsidy has little effect on owners since the
return is determined at the economywide level, but
it raises the costs to farmers. For example, the cost
of capital net of subsidies increases by almost 1 per-
cent in the European Union,but the average cost to
farmers increases by 22 percent—and even more
for livestock producers (43 percent). Note that
these capital subsidies are used mainly in industrial
countries, so for most developing countries there is
no difference between the owner return and the
cost to farmers.
The changes in the contribution of land to agri-
cultural incomes are driven largely by price
movements—contrary to the case for labor and
capital income (table 7.9). Land is essentially a
fixed factor in agriculture,with some allowance for
movements up and down the supply curve and for
cross-sectoral shifts in land usage.
15 In Europe the
average return to land drops 66 percent, with the
supply of land falling 9 percent following global
reform. Farmers gain some benefit in lower unit
costs because of falling land prices. But removal of
the direct subsidy does not allow farmers to reap
the full cost gains from falling land prices. The
average cost for farmers drops 57 percent, lower
than the drop in the rental price of land (66 per-
cent). And the change in the cost structure is
highly sector specific. Thus cereal and grain farm-
ers see a small drop in their net cost of land (5 per-
cent); however, the drop in the price of land does
not compensate for removal of the subsidies since
the returns to owners falls by 74 percent. This is
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TABLE 7.7 Impact of Global Agriculture and Food Reform on Agricultural Employment
and Wages: Change from 2015 Baseline
(percent)
Total Agriculture Cereals and Sugar Livestock and Dairy
Wages Wages Wages
Employ- Employ- Employ-
Country or Region ment Unskilled Skilled ment Unskilled Skilled ment Unskilled Skilled
Canada 8.5 1.0 0.8 30.4 1.0 0.8 −15.5 1.0 0.8
United States 0.4 0.6 0.6 −12.4 0.6 0.6 3.3 0.6 0.6
European Union −23.7 −0.6 0.4 −57.7 −0.6 0.4 −28.0 −0.6 0.4
with EFTA*
Australia and 18.2 3.4 2.3 25.6 3.4 2.3 31.1 3.4 2.3
New Zealand
Japan −26.8 −0.9 −0.1 −28.9 −0.9 −0.1 −46.2 −0.9 −0.1
Korea, Rep. of and −13.8 −0.2 0.7 −3.9 −0.2 0.7 8.2 −0.2 0.7
Taiwan (China)
Argentina 13.3 7.9 5.5 25.8 7.9 5.5 14.3 7.9 5.5
Brazil 12.5 3.4 3.0 25.8 3.4 3.0 11.7 3.4 3.0
China −6.6 −3.1 0.0 −26.6 −3.1 0.0 8.6 −3.1 0.0
India −0.3 0.0 0.2 0.7 0.0 0.2 1.1 0.0 0.2
Indonesia 4.3 1.4 −0.3 6.1 1.4 −0.3 −2.0 1.4 −0.3
Mexico 5.0 1.3 −0.2 1.3 1.3 −0.2 −4.8 1.3 −0.2
Southern African 13.8 1.3 1.1 31.7 1.3 1.1 8.8 1.3 1.1
Customs Union
Turkey 5.2 3.0 0.5 −15.3 3.0 0.5 −18.7 3.0 0.5
Vietnam 17.0 7.8 3.0 63.1 7.8 3.0 −15.4 7.8 3.0
Rest of East Asia 11.6 2.7 0.9 72.0 2.7 0.9 −9.1 2.7 0.9
Rest of South Asia −1.3 −0.2 0.0 1.1 −0.2 0.0 0.7 −0.2 0.0
EU accession countries 6.9 1.6 0.9 12.8 1.6 0.9 13.3 1.6 0.9
Rest of Europe and −0.4 −1.0 −0.3 0.3 −1.0 −0.3 −2.4 −1.0 −0.3
Central Asia
Rest of Sub-Saharan 6.2 6.0 1.9 17.9 6.0 1.9 1.2 6.0 1.9
Africa
Rest of Latin America 6.2 5.4 3.4 17.9 5.4 3.4 42.6 5.4 3.4
Rest of the World  −0.1 −0.3 0.9 2.6 −0.3 0.9 −4.2 −0.3 0.9
including Middle 
East and North Africa
*European Free Trade Association, (Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland).
Source: World Bank simulations with LINKAGE model, based on release 5.4 of the GTAP data. not the case in the livestock sector, where subsidy
payments are linked to capital (the herds) and not
to land. The impacts in the United States are
muted, with the overall return to landowners
changing slightly—a decline of 5 percent—but
costs to farmers increasing substantially—22 per-
cent on average and more than 42 percent for
cereal and sugar producers.
In most developing countries land prices
increase substantially, except in China and in a few
other regions. This may reduce to some extent
the positive distributional impacts from relatively
higher wages for unskilled labor since land owner-
ship may not necessarily be congruent with the
unskilled labor working the land. There are some
interesting sectoral shifts. For example, China
would see more land devoted to livestock and dairy
and less to cereals, which would be imported from
lower-cost sources.
Sensitivity Analysis
This section uses sensitivity analysis to explore how
results change when some of the basic assumptions
of the model change. It focuses on four areas:
• The agricultural productivity assumptions of
the standard baseline scenario. Agricultural
productivity is cut by 1 percentage point in
developing countries and the results from global
agriculture and food reform are compared with
the results using the default productivity
assumptions.In a separate analysis,productivity
is increased for middle-income developing
countries.
• The impacts of the mobility of agricultural capi-
tal. Agricultural capital is more closely tied to
the sector, making it more difficult to shed and
leading to a different transition when reform is
undertaken.
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TABLE 7.8 Impact of Global Agricultural and Food Trade Reform on Agricultural
Capital: Change from 2015 Baseline
(percent)
Total Agriculture Grains and Sugar Livestock and Dairy
Owners’ Farmers’ Owners’ Farmers’ Owners’ Farmers’
Country or Region Volume Return Cost Volume Return Cost Volume Return Cost
Canada −4.9 −0.5 4.1 7.2 −0.5 3.1 −17.0 −0.5 7.1
United States 0.8 0.7 2.6 −19.2 0.7 2.6 4.5 0.7 6.5
European Union with EFTA −32.9 0.7 21.8 −67.1 0.7 21.7 −29.2 0.8 43.1
Australia and New Zealand 40.2 0.6 1.2 3.0 0.7 1.3 123.5 0.6 1.7
Japan −22.9 1.7 4.9 −25.0 1.7 7.6 −47.0 1.7 12.2
Korea, Rep. of and  −4.3 0.7 12.0 8.9 0.8 15.4 17.5 0.8 103.8
Taiwan (China)
Hong Kong (China)  9.8 0.7 0.7 75.4 0.7 0.7 −4.3 0.7 0.7
and Singapore
Argentina 6.0 4.2 4.2 9.0 4.2 4.2 17.9 4.2 4.2
Brazil 10.1 3.1 3.1 21.9 3.1 3.1 9.8 3.1 3.1
China −2.7 3.2 3.2 −17.5 3.2 3.2 5.8 3.2 3.2
India 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.8 0.1 0.1 1.2 0.1 0.1
Indonesia 0.7 −0.2 −0.2 1.0 −0.2 −0.2 −0.9 −0.2 −0.2
Mexico 4.3 −0.1 3.7 2.3 −0.1 4.4 −7.5 −0.1 9.1
Southern African 19.5 −0.6 −0.6 39.4 −0.6 −0.6 25.4 −0.6 −0.6
Customs Union
Turkey 0.2 −0.4 −0.2 −15.8 −0.4 0.5 −15.1 −0.4 −0.4
Vietnam 2.4 1.8 1.8 28.7 1.8 1.8 −13.3 1.8 1.8
Rest of East Asia 20.9 0.2 0.2 36.5 0.2 0.2 −8.6 0.2 0.2
Rest of South Asia 0.1 1.3 1.3 2.3 1.3 1.3 0.7 1.2 1.2
EU accession countries −0.2 0.5 21.6 7.7 0.5 18.9 −6.3 0.5 67.6
Rest of Europe and  −2.5 1.6 7.7 −1.9 1.6 8.3 −5.8 1.6 9.3
Central Asia
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa 0.5 −1.1 −1.1 5.6 −1.1 −1.1 4.0 −1.1 −1.1
Rest of Latin America 6.2 1.8 1.8 15.9 1.8 1.8 41.1 1.8 1.8
Rest of the World  0.3 −0.2 −0.2 2.9 −0.2 −0.2 −3.7 −0.2 −0.2
including Middle 
East and North Africa
Source: World Bank simulations with LINKAGE model, based on release 5.4 of the GTAP data. • Sensitivity of the results to supply rigidities in
developing countries.
• Sensitivity of the results to the key trade
elasticities.
Agricultural Productivity
Agricultural productivity is assumed to grow
2.5 percent a year globally in the standard baseline
scenario based on existing evidence (Martin and
Mitra 1996, 1999). This may be too optimistic for
developing countries, particularly for low-income
countries. This assumption may have an impact on
long-term self-sufficiency rates, particularly of sen-
sitive commodities. The more trade reform raises
the world price of food, the more net food
importers will be adversely affected by negative
terms-of-trade shocks. To test the sensitivity of the
trade results to agricultural productivity,a different
baseline was constructed with agricultural produc-
tivity improving at a slower 1.5 percent for devel-
oping countries, but remaining at 2.5 percent for
industrial countries.
Trade impact. Under the standard baseline,high-
income countries go from a position of net food
importers in 1997 to net food exporters in 2015
(table 7.10). Low-income countries improve their
position significantly, going from a positive food
balance of $12.5 billion in 1997 to $23 billion in
2015. The position of middle-income countries
deteriorates, however. Under the low-productivity
baseline, the net food trade position of industrial
countries increases substantially—jumping to $151
billion in 2015 compared with only $50 billion in
the standard baseline. Low-income countries still
maintain a positive balance, but the balance is
much closer to zero than it was in the previous
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TABLE 7.9 Impact of Global Agriculture and Food Reform on Agricultural Land:
Change from 2015 Baseline
(percent)
Total Agriculture Cereals and Sugar Livestock and Dairy
Price Price Price
Country or Region Land Owner Farmer Land Owner Farmer Land Owner Farmer
Canada −6.4 69.5 133.8 6.6 76.9 192.8 −25.2 56.8 83.5
United States 2.4 −5.1 22.1 −19.0 −12.5 42.1 12.3 −0.2 9.1
European Union with EFTA −9.4 −66.3 −57.0 −58.9 −74.1 −4.7 −3.5 −65.0 −59.7
Australia and New Zealand 6.2 197.8 219.1 1.9 197.0 224.0 34.8 219.6 252.4
Japan −21.0 −44.9 −41.5 −24.0 −45.5 −34.6 −34.1 −48.9 −48.9
Korea, Rep. of and  −11.4 −27.6 −27.1 −0.2 −25.3 −24.6 4.1 −23.0 −20.9
Taiwan (China)
Argentina 4.5 56.2 56.2 11.4 59.5 59.5 12.0 60.0 60.0
Brazil 9.9 18.0 18.0 23.8 22.9 22.9 8.6 17.6 17.6
China −0.9 −25.7 −25.7 −21.1 −31.1 −31.1 7.6 −23.6 −23.6
India 0.0 −1.8 −1.8 0.8 −1.5 −1.5 1.4 −1.3 −1.3
Indonesia 0.7 10.9 10.9 2.1 11.4 11.4 −1.8 10.0 10.0
Mexico 2.7 0.6 13.1 −8.9 −3.6 52.1 −1.6 −0.6 0.8
Southern African 8.0 86.4 86.4 26.4 95.2 95.2 4.5 84.9 84.9
Customs Union
Turkey 0.8 47.3 47.3 −14.9 39.0 39.0 −20.2 36.1 36.1
Vietnam −0.3 44.6 44.6 33.2 60.3 60.3 −16.0 38.1 38.1
Rest of East Asia −1.5 34.1 34.1 43.7 53.8 53.8 −9.6 32.7 32.7
Rest of South Asia −0.1 −6.0 −6.0 3.2 −5.0 −5.0 1.3 −5.4 −5.4
EU accession countries 2.6 2.0 6.1 4.6 2.8 10.8 7.5 3.5 8.8
Rest of Europe and −1.5 −2.4 −2.4 −1.1 −2.3 −2.3 −1.2 −2.2 −2.2
Central Asia
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa −0.3 62.8 62.8 9.0 67.9 67.9 −2.4 61.7 61.7
Rest of Latin America 1.0 55.4 55.4 5.0 58.6 58.6 40.3 74.9 74.9
Rest of the World  0.0 0.1 0.1 2.7 0.8 0.8 −4.3 −1.2 −1.2
including Middle East 
and North Africa
Source: World Bank simulations with LINKAGE model, based on release 5.4 of the GTAP data.baseline. And the net food trade situation of
middle-income countries shows a greater depend-
ence on world markets.
Whereas reform in the standard baseline posi-
tions low-income countries as net food exporters
and has only a mild negative effect on the food bal-
ance of high- and middle-income countries, under
the low-productivity assumption, the food trade
balance of the high-income countries improves
substantially—by $30 billion—largely because of
an increased dependence on food imports by
middle-income countries. The low-income coun-
tries still see an improvement in their trade balance,
but by a more modest $3.6 billion rather than the
nearly $12 billion using the standard productivity
assumptions.
Output impact. Average annual agricultural out-
put growth in developing countries slows from
3.3 percent in the standard baseline to 2.6 percent
in the low-productivity baseline (table 7.11). In
industrial countries higher productivity provides
an opportunity to gain market share, and higher
world prices relative to the original baseline pro-
vide greater incentives to produce. World output
under the alternative scenario declines 3.4 percent
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TABLE 7.10 Net Trade Impacts Assuming Lower Agricultural Productivity 
in Developing Countries
(billions of 1997 US$)
Standard Productivity Low Productivity
Baseline Reform Baseline Reform
Country Grouping 1997 2015 2015 2015 2015
High-income countries −23.1 50.4 48.4 151.2 181.6
Low-income countries 12.5 23.4 35.2 0.9 4.5
Middle-income countries 10.5 −73.8 −83.6 −152.0 −186.1
Low-income countries,  7.4 22.2 34.1 8.5 17.2
excluding India
Middle-income countries,  15.6 −72.7 −82.4 −159.7 −198.9
including India
Developing countries 23.1 −50.4 −48.4 −151.2 −181.6
Source: World Bank simulations with LINKAGE model, based on release 5.4 of the GTAP data.
TABLE 7.11 Impacts on Output Assuming Lower Agricultural Productivity for
Developing Countries
Growth in 2000– Baseline Difference Difference between Baseline
15 (percent) in 2015  and Reform Scenario in 2015
Low Standard Value Percentage Low Standard Low Standard
Country Grouping Baseline Baseline ($ billions) Change ($ billions) ($ billions) (percent) (percent)
High-income countries 1.9 1.2 122.6 12.4 −100.0 −107.7 −9.0 −10.9
Low-income countries 2.8 3.6 −71.6 −11.4 8.7 12.1 1.6 1.9
Middle-income 2.6 3.2 −166.2 −9.4 27.0 37.2 1.7 2.1
countries
Low-income countries, 3.0 3.7 −39.4 −11.6 10.3 12.3 3.4 3.6
excluding India
Middle-income 2.6 3.2 −198.4 −9.7 25.4 37.0 1.4 1.8
countries, including 
India
Developing countries 2.6 3.3 −237.8 −10.0 35.7 49.4 1.7 2.1
World total 2.4 2.6 −115.2 −3.4 −64.3 −58.3 −2.0 −1.7
Source: World Bank simulations with LINKAGE model, based on release 5.4 of the GTAP data.(higher prices lead to reduced demand), with a
reallocation between industrial and developing
countries. Industrial countries benefit from a
12 percent increase in output in 2015 compared
with the standard baseline, whereas developing
country output is reduced by some 10 percent.
With respect to output impacts following the
trade reform scenario, the qualitative results of the
different baseline assumptions of agricultural pro-
ductivity are identical—trade reform of agriculture
and food lead to a shift in agricultural production
from industrial to developing countries. In the
standard baseline, developing-country agricultural
output increases more than 2 percent, whereas in
the low-productivity baseline the increase is only
1.7 percent. The decline in industrial countries
drops to 9 percent, from 11 percent in the standard
baseline. The changes in output patterns across
regions are identical, although the magnitudes
differ.
Aggregate welfare. The change in the agricul-
tural productivity assumption translates into mod-
est changes in aggregate welfare (figure 7.4).Indus-
trial countries see an improvement of $18 billion in
2015, a jump in gains of some 0.05 percentage
point.Developing countries see a reduction in their
welfare gains, with low-income countries seeing a
drop of $1.4 billion (0.08 percentage point) and
middle-income countries a drop of $17.8 billion
(0.19 percentage point).
A high-productivity assumption. Many middle-
income countries such as Argentina, Brazil, and
Thailand have experienced rapid growth in agricul-
ture, suggesting the potential for higher productiv-
ity growth than assumed in the standard baseline.
To explore this, agricultural productivity growth
was raised from 2.5 percent to 4.0 percent for
middle-income countries (China, India, Indonesia,
rest of East Asia,Vietnam,Argentina,Brazil,Mexico,
rest of Latin America, the EU accession countries,
rest of Europe and Central Asia,and Turkey).
Changes are as expected. Agricultural supply
and exports expand for natural exporters such as
Argentina and Brazil. China, the largest middle-
income importer, reduces its deficit by about
$18 billion (table 7.12). The middle-income group
includingIndiaexperiencesanetsurplusof $30bil-
lion in 2015,whereas under the standard baseline it
has a deficit of $19 billion. High-income countries
experience a deterioration of their net agricultural
tradeof about$50billion,comparedwith$3billion
in the standard baseline, and Europe’s deficit
increases to nearly $60 billion. Results for the food
sector are qualitatively similar, but smaller in size,
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Source: World Bank simulations with Linkage model, based on release 5.4 of the GTAP data.with an increase in competitiveness of food pro-
cessing in middle-income countries and a decrease
in net trade by high-income countries relative to
the standard baseline (table 7.13). These large
changes show how sensitive baseline trajectories
are to changes in assumptions about the future.
They do not, however, affect the impact of the
reform scenario measured in deviations from
the baseline.
In conclusion, the baseline assumptions regard-
ing productivity are important,although changes in
the assumption would not yield substantially differ-
ent results from agriculture and food trade reform
for developing countries in terms of net benefits
and agricultural output.
16 However, lower produc-
tivity will reduce the level of food self-sufficiency
among developing countries—particularly middle-
income countries—and could lead to a different
assessment of the direction of food self-sufficiency
in the aftermath of reform.
Mobility of Agricultural Capital and the Transition
in Industrial Countries
The focus so far has been mainly on the long-term
impact of the removal of protection, with little
attention to the transitional impacts. A key mecha-
nism of the model is the vintage structure of capi-
tal. Sectors in decline have excess capital that will
not readily be used in other sectors.This is certainly
the case with agricultural capital, although some
could be used for nonagricultural purposes, and
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TABLE 7.12 Baseline Trends in Agriculture with Higher Agricultural Productivity in
Middle-Income Countries
Average Annual Growth, 2000–15 (percent) Net Trade (billions of 1997 US$)
Country Grouping Output Demand Imports Exports 2000 2015
High-income countries 0.6 1.0 2.7 0.9 −24.3 −50.2
Low-income countries 3.9 3.8 4.0 6.2 9.9 25.2
Middle-income countries 3.7 3.6 7.5 7.2 14.4 24.9
Low-income countries,  3.8 3.5 4.0 6.2 7.2 19.1
excluding India
Middle-income countries,  3.7 3.7 7.4 7.1 17.1 31.1
including India
Developing countries 3.7 3.7 7.0 7.0 24.3 50.2
Note: Net trade is measured at f.o.b. prices (imports exclude international trade and transport margins).
Source: World Bank simulations with LINKAGE model, based on release 5.4 of the GTAP data.
TABLE 7.13 Baseline Trends in Food Processing with Higher Agricultural
Productivity in Middle-Income Countries
Average Annual Growth, 2000–15 (percent) Net Trade (billions of 1997 US$)
Country Grouping Output Demand Imports Exports 2000 2015
High-income countries 1.1 1.0 1.4 2.0 7.7 36.2
Low-income countries 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.2 3.6 4.4
Middle-income countries 3.1 3.3 4.1 2.6 −11.3 −40.6
Low-income countries, 3.2 3.3 3.7 2.2 1.8 −0.1
excluding India
Middle-income countries, 3.1 3.3 4.1 2.8 −9.5 −36.2
including India
Developing countries 3.2 3.3 4.1 2.7 −7.7 −36.2
Note: Net trade is measured at f.o.b. prices (imports exclude international trade and transport margins).
Source: World Bank simulations with LINKAGE model, based on release 5.4 of the GTAP data.other equipment could be used in nonprotected
agricultural sectors.
Excess capital is released to other sectors follow-
ing an upward-sloping supply curve. The value for
the supply elasticity in the standard model is 4. To
test the importance of this elasticity,the reform sce-
nario is simulated again,but with a supply elasticity
of 0.5. This makes excess supply much less mobile
and, all else equal, will tend to increase supply rela-
tive to the same simulation with a higher supply
elasticity.
Consider the case for the sugar sector in Europe.
The starting point is 2004, since the trade reform
starts in 2005. Under the baseline, sugar output in
Europe increases modestly between 2004 and 2015
(figure 7.5). With the start of reform, output drops
rapidly, and by 2015 output has fallen from about
$42 billion to about $11 billion. The supply elastic-
ity has an impact on the rate of decline of sugar
output, but the final level is more or less identical.
Thus with a low supply elasticity, the transition is
drawn out over a longer period. The rate of decline
between 2004 and 2010 is 18.4 percent using the
standard elasticity and 16.5 percent with the lower
elasticity.
There are only a handful of sectors in industrial
countries where the supply elasticity has any
noticeable impact: wheat and sugar in the United
States; rice,wheat,other grains,oil seeds,and sugar
in the European Union; and wheat and oil seeds in
Japan. The aggregate impacts on agricultural
production are negligible, at less than 1 percent
over all industrial countries in any given year, and
at most 0.3 percent for developing countries,but in
the opposite direction. There are no discernible
impacts on welfare.
In conclusion, lowering the supply elasticity will
draw out the supply response during the transition
phase but will have no discernible long-term
impact on the results.
Supply Response in the Low-Income Countries
This section evaluates the impact of lowering the
land supply response in three regions—rest of
South Asia, the Southern Africa Customs Union
region, and the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa—to
examine whether low-income countries, with their
potentially low supply response, will benefit from
greater market access. This involves three param-
eters. First, the base year land supply elasticity was
reduced from 1 to 0.25. Second, the land supply
asymptote was reduced from 20 percent of the ini-
tial land supply to 10 percent.
17 These two param-
eters determine aggregate land supply. A third
parameter moderates the degree of land mobility
across sectors. The allocation of land across sectors
is governed by a constant elasticity of transforma-
tion function.
18 The standard transformation elas-
ticity is 3, a relatively elastic value. In the sensitivity
simulation, the transformation elasticity for the
three regions is set to 0.5.
The lower land supply elasticities affect the base-
line scenario. For the three regions where changes
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Source: World Bank simulations with Linkage model, based on release 5.4 of the GTAP data.were made to supply elasticities, the overall rate of
growth of agricultural output between 2000 and
2015 declines from 3.4 to 3.1 percent in rest of
South Asia, from 4.0 to 3.8 percent in rest of Sub-
Saharan Africa, and remains the same for SACU at
2.1 percent (table 7.14). In all three regions, the
most affected crop is plant-based fibers. These
three regions have a sizable market share at the
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TABLE 7.14 Impact of Lower Land Supply Elasticities in Rest of South Asia
and Sub-Saharan Africa
(percent)
Impact of Trade 
Baseline Growth Rates 2000–15 Reform Standard
Standard Baseline Standard
Supply Low Supply Difference Supply Low Supply
Commodity Elasticity Elasticity in 2015 Elasticity Elasticity
Rest of South Asia
Rice 2.8 2.7 −2.1 3.4 2.4
Wheat 2.7 2.6 −3.8 34.4 19.6
Other grains 3.8 3.6 −3.6 −2.4 −1.5
Oil seeds 4.1 3.5 −9.1 −10.0 −6.8
Sugar 3.8 3.3 −8.9 −17.2 −12.4
Plant-based fibers 4.5 3.7 −13.2 19.2 6.2
Other crops 3.6 3.2 −7.3 −8.0 −5.4
Cattle 4.0 3.7 −4.9 1.7 1.5
Other meats 4.1 3.6 −8.3 −1.0 −1.8
Raw milk 3.9 3.5 −6.1 1.3 1.3
Total 3.4 3.1  5.6  0.2  0.6
Southern African 
Customs Union
Rice 2.3 2.4 −1.7 8.8 8.4
Wheat 1.9 1.9 −0.5 0.0 0.5
Other grains 1.1 1.3 0.8 29.5 19.9
Oil seeds 1.6 1.8 −1.8 9.2 8.6
Sugar 1.3 1.4 −0.2 87.7 50.6
Plant-based fibers 6.0 3.8 −35.9 3.4 3.6
Other crops 2.4 2.4 −8.7 7.2 4.3
Cattle 2.2 2.2 0.0 24.2 23.0
Other meats 2.2 2.2 0.1 5.0 5.1
Raw milk 2.2 2.2 0.0 −2.7 −2.6
Total 2.1 2.1  2.9 18.4 14.0
Rest of Sub-Saharan 
Africa
Rice 3.2 3.2 −0.1 −1.2 −0.9
Wheat 3.4 3.5 0.4 0.3 3.0
Other grains 3.2 3.2 0.4 −0.1 3.0
Oil seeds 3.9 3.8 −0.8 51.0 37.7
Sugar 3.2 3.2 1.5 48.1 40.3
Plant-based fibers 8.1 6.5 −23.2 42.8 24.9
Other crops 4.5 4.2 −5.8 −3.6 0.0
Cattle 3.5 3.4 −1.4 4.6 3.5
Other meats 3.7 3.6 −1.9 −0.7 0.3
Raw milk 3.3 3.3 −1.1 1.7 1.2
Total 4.0 3.8  4.1 5.6 4.9
Source: World Bank simulations with LINKAGE model, based on release 5.4 of the GTAP data.global level in 1997 of 11.4 percent for plant-based
fibers and 15 percent for rice. The demand for rice,
however, is much less elastic than for plant-based
fibers. The lower supply elasticity would make land
relatively more costly, all else equal, and given the
higher demand elasticities, the higher land prices
will be reflected in lower demand from these three
regions.
The impact of trade reform on agricultural out-
put using both the standard and the lower land
elasticities is broadly the same qualitatively,
although lower in magnitude in general. Consider
sugar again. Output increases 88 percent in SACU
and 48 percent in the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa
using the standard supply elasticity. Sugar output
expansion drops to 51 percent in SACU and 40 per-
cent in the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa when lower
land supply elasticity is assumed.
The welfare impacts are modest, but measura-
ble,and the results reflect only some of the possible
supply constraints in low-income countries. For
the three regions under question, aggregate welfare
would decline $1.1 billion compared with the stan-
dard assumption and would drop from 1.2 percent
to 1.1 percent of baseline income.
Trade Elasticities
The most critical parameter in trade reform scenar-
ios is trade elasticities. There is ongoing debate
about their size. Most econometric evidence sug-
gests that the Armington elasticities (measuring the
degree of substitutability between domestic and
imported goods) are low, in the range of 1 to 2.
19
The studies are riddled with data problems—
particularly the evaluation of unit values—and
many trade economists downplay the empirical
evidence, for two main reasons. First, low Arming-
ton elasticities lead to implausible terms-of-trade
effects. And second, low elasticities would suggest
high optimal tariffs. Trade studies fall into three
groups—those with relatively low elasticities (1–3),
those with middling elasticities (3–6), and those
with very high elasticities (20–40). Examples of the
first are the MONASH model (Dixon and Rimmer
2002) and the standard GTAP model (Hertel 1996).
Recent World Bank work has been using the mid-
dling elasticities.High elasticities are mainly associ-
ated with the work of Harrison, Rutherford, and
Tarr (for example, see Harrison, Rutherford, and
Tarr 2003).
The impacts of the agriculture and food trade
reformwerereassessedusingtwoalternativeelastic-
ities.Alowscenariousestradeelasticities50percent
lower than the standard, and a high scenario uses
trade elasticities 50 percent higher than the stan-
dard (the standard values used in this study are
shown in table A3 on the CD-ROM). Each set of
assumptions requires two simulation runs. A new
baselineisconstructedeachtime—withall assump-
tions identical except for the trade elasticities—and
the reform scenario is simulated.Thus the compar-
isons are between each individual baseline and each
associated reform scenario.
Within this range of trade elasticities the model
exhibits some modest nonlinearity, particularly on
the upside (figure 7.6). For all three regions the
50 percent higher elasticities lead to a greater than
50 percent rise in real income gains—particularly
for developing regions, where the rise is almost
75 percent. On the downside, both high- and low-
income regions see an equiproportionate fall in the
real income gains relative to the elasticities, with a
fall to 40 percent of the standard gains in the case of
the middle-income countries. The higher elastici-
ties dampen the adverse terms-of-trade shocks
from reforms, leading to the higher income gains.
The global gains vary from a low of $126 billion to
a high of $438 billion,with the gains at $265 billion
using the standard elasticities.
For some countries and regions the range of
results is much broader than at the aggregate level.
For example, Mexico would lose some $1.2 billion
with the low elasticities and gain $3 billion with the
high elasticities compared with a gain of 0.9 with
the standard elasticities. Several other regions show
similar variation. The standard deviation of the
index across all developing countries is 130 in the
case of the high elasticities, whereas the weighted
average is 170.
The impacts on trade are similar to the impacts on
income but exhibit more nonlinearity (figure 7.7).
At the global level, exports increase 80 percent
using the high elasticities and decline 60 percent
using the low elasticities (with export increases
ranging from a low of $216 billion to nearly $1 tril-
lion). There is also less variability across regions of
the model than with the income results.In isolation
the trade elasticities appear to have the greatest
impact in determining the overall outcomes of
trade reform,although other model changes—both
in specification and in elasticities—combined may
134 Global Agricultural Trade and Developing Countriesbe at least as important in determining overall out-
comes. This is an area of active research to better
determine the bounds on the possible ranges for
these elasticities. Better data would help, but there
are still issues relating to model specification and
aggregation that need to be thought through.
Conclusions
This quantitative assessment of the impact of agri-
cultural and food market distortions on incomes,
welfare,trade,and output shows that the changes in
cross-regional patterns of output and trade tend to
be much larger than the more familiar gains to real
income. A decomposition of the aggregate results
across policy instruments and regions shows that
reforms in agriculture and food account for a large
share of the global gains of reforms of total mer-
chandise trade.This result is driven by the relatively
low protection levels in manufacturing sectors.
Another major finding is that developing countries
have more to gain from reforming their own sup-
port policies than from reforms in high-income
countries. Symmetrically, high-income countries
would experience larger welfare gains from their
own reforms than from developing countries’
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FIGURE 7.6 Real Income and Trade Elasticities












Source: World Bank simulations with Linkage model, based on release 5.4 of the GTAP data.
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Source: World Bank simulations with Linkage model, based on release 5.4 of the GTAP data.reforms. These dimensions of the debate are often
overlooked but are crucial. Global reform leads to
additive results with aggregate gains close to the
gains from reforms in each group.A third key find-
ing is that agricultural reform alone in high-
income countries would create moderate gains,
about 10 times smaller than those of a combined
reform of food and agricultural markets. Develop-
ing countries would be negatively affected as a
group, because their own distortions would be
exacerbated by the agricultural reforms in high-
income countries.
The results are broadly robust to changing
assumptions on future agricultural productivity in
developing countries, supply constraints, and level
of the trade elasticities, but the levels of the trade
elasticities remain of foremost importance. The
trade effects of reforms are also sensitive to
assumptions about agricultural productivity gains
in developing countries. Assuming low productiv-
ity gains leads to a reversal in the estimated impact
of global liberalization for industrial countries,
increasing their net food trade surplus as middle-
income countries become much larger importers
of food and agricultural products. Low-income
countries experience an increase in net food trade
surplus that is much smaller than under the higher
productivity assumption. Hence, variations in pro-
ductivity could lead to a different assessment of the
direction of food self-sufficiency after reform.
Supply constraints do not qualitatively affect the
estimated impact of trade reform on agricultural
output, although estimated changes tend to be
smaller. Higher trade elasticities dampen the
adverse terms-of-trade shocks from reforms, lead-
ing to higher income gains. The global gains vary
from a low of $126 billion with low elasticities to a
high of $438 billion with high elasticities, with the
gains at $265 billion using the standard elasticities.
There is also higher variation at the individual
country level.
The changes in agricultural value added and fac-
tor prices are considerable in several cases.The esti-
mated loss of rural value-added is large in Japan
and the European Union, the Republic of Korea,
Taiwan (China), and China. Thus, considerable
adjustment and displacement of resources would
take place to reflect these changes. Cairns Group
countries and the United States experience sizable
gains in rural value-added as do SACU and the rest
of Sub-Saharan Africa.Wages for unskilled labor in
developing countries are moderately influenced by
major policy reforms such as in China, where they
decrease, but more significantly in Argentina,
where they increase.
Notes
1. The model is based at the World Bank and uses the GTAP
release 5.4 dataset (see van der Mensbrugghe 2003 for details).
The details of the modeling and the results are given in the
attached CD-ROM.
2. East Asia is divided into four economies—China,
Indonesia, Vietnam, and the rest. South Asia has two compo-
nents—India and the rest. Latin America has four economies—
Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and the rest. Europe and Central Asia
is split into three components—the European Union accession
countries, Turkey, and the rest. Sub-Saharan Africa has two
components—the Southern African Customs Union countries
and the rest,and the Rest of the World region has all other coun-
tries including those in the Middle East and North Africa.
3. Agricultural policies derived from the Agricultural Market
Access Database (AMAD) reflect 1998–99 levels of support,
except for cotton, for which International Cotton Advisory
Committee data were used (see chapter 14 in this volume).
4. Income elasticities are held more or less constant over the
time horizon.With China’s rapid growth,one might anticipate a
convergence of income elasticities toward levels in higher-
income countries and thus a dampening of food growth over
time relative to incomes.
5. Textile and apparel quotas that generate quota rents for
exporters are converted to export taxes (for the country of ori-
gin).In the current simulations,these have not been eliminated.
6. Technically, it is a measure of the Hicksian equivalent
variation. When comparing aggregate welfare measures across
studies, it is important to convert them to similar scales. Thus
$350 billion in 2015 is more or less equivalent to $250 billion in
2004 and $200 billion in 1997—assuming an average annual
global growth rate of 3 percent in gross domestic product (all in
1997 US$, the base year of release 5 of the GTAP data set).
Assuming a world inflation rate of 2.5 percent over the entire
period, the measured $250 billion in 2004 in 1997 dollars
becomes $300 billion in 2004 dollars.
7. The Mercosur preferential agreement is not incorporated
in the standard GTAP dataset but is included in the dataset used
for these simulations.Efforts were made to minimize distortions
to the original social accounting matrix (SAM) while adjusting
the original dataset.
8. There is also an issue regarding whether bound or applied
tariffs are liberalized. Most developing countries have bound
their tariffs at rates much higher than applied rates.Negotiations
concern the bound tariffs;the reforms described here are relative
to the applied tariffs.For a full reform scenario,it is not much of
an issue,but for analyzing potential outcomes of a negotiation,it
could be.
9. See Global Economic Prospects 2002 and 2004 (World Bank
2001, 2003). The 2002 report notes dynamic gains of $830
billion compared with static gains of $350 billion, with a range
of up to $1,340 billion depending on some key parameters
(table 6.2, page 100).
136 Global Agricultural Trade and Developing Countries10. Figure 7.1 shows output shares in the base year. One
would assume that the agricultural and food shares are declining
over time as income elasticities for food tend to be lower than
for other goods and services.
11.While the model is highly nonlinear,the results to a close
approximation are relatively additive.
12.Nominal values are measured with respect to the model’s
numéraire—the average export price of manufactured exports
from industrial countries.
13. This should be considered an upper bound on China’s
potential loss since the baseline scenario does not include the
impacts of China’s accession to the WTO. Thus the reform sce-
nario is capturing the combined gains from global reform and
China’s WTO accession, which include the gains to be had from
reforming from 1998–99 base agricultural policies.
14.Sector-specific capital returns may be possible during the
transition phase, as sectors in decline shed unwanted capital.
The most mobile equipment will be shed first, and the return to
the remaining capital may be priced lower than the national rate
of return to capital.
15. In the default version of the model, cross-sectoral trans-
formation elasticities are set to 3. Thus a 10 percent rise in the
return in one sector (relative to the others) will lead to a 30 per-
cent shift of land into that sector. Because of the finite transfor-
mation elasticity, land prices are sector specific.
16. Given the aggregate nature of the model, the impacts on
vulnerable countries or sectors are harder to assess.In particular,
Sub-Saharan Africa is a heterogeneous subcontinent that is not
reflected in the level of aggregation of this study.
17. The land supply function is governed by a logistic curve.
It is calibrated in the base year to an exogenously given elasticity
and the value of the asymptote relative to the base supply level.
Thus if the asymptote is set to 1.2,land supply can increase by at
most 20 percent above its base level.
18.The elasticity measures the ease of shifting land from one
activity to another when the relative price of these two activities
changes.
19.More recent econometric work is resulting in higher esti-
mates for the trade elasticities,and these are now being reflected
in the forthcoming release of the GTAP dataset.
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The Commodity
Studiesfallen from 2.5 million tons to 1.5 million tons over
the past two decades. Thus, the three largest
markets for sugar imports in the 1970s have been
closing to competition after becoming largely self-
sufficient, at least compared with the early 1970s,
when their combined net imports accounted for
half of the world’s exports (figure 8.1).
Background
Sugar occurs naturally in most foods, but it is eco-
nomically extracted from only a few crops such as
sugar beets,sugar cane,and corn.Sugar beets are an
annual root crop grown in temperate climates,
while sugar cane is a tall perennial grass grown in
tropical and semitropical climates. About 55 coun-
tries grow sugar beets, and 105 grow sugar cane.
The process of producing sugar (sucrose) from
sugar beets or sugar cane requires that the juice be
extracted and processed in a factory near where the
beet or cane is grown. The by-products of sugar
cane are bagasse and molasses. Bagasse is the
residue of cane, after the juice is extracted. It has
some industrial uses and is often used to fuel the
Sugar protection dates back to at least the 1800s. It
hasbeengreatestincountriesofthenorthern hemi-
sphere that produce sugar beets. That is because
sugar from beets is nearly twice as expensive to pro-
duce as sugar from cane, and most beet producers
cannot survive without high protection. Over the
years, high protection has led to lower consump-
tion, reduced imports, and surplus production,
which is disposed of in the world market at
subsidized prices. Many other countries have been
pressured by their producers for protection from
heavily subsidized exports and depressed world
market prices. The cycle of protection, subsidies,
and more protection has run for decades.
The European Union (EU), Japan, and the
United States are among the areas with the highest
level of protection and therefore the most distorted
import patterns. Since the early 1970s, U.S. sugar
imports have declined from more than 5 million
tons per year to slightly more than 1 million tons
per year. The European Union was a net importer
of about 2.5 million tons of sugar in the early
1970s, compared with net exports of about 5 mil-
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boilers in the sugar factory (also called a sugar mill).
Molasses is an edible by-product as well as an ani-
mal feed. The by-products of sugar beets are beet
tops, the leafy portion of the beet used for animal
feed, and molasses, which is also used primarily as
an animal feed. Once harvested, sugar cane is
highly perishable and must be processed quickly.
Sugar beets are less perishable than sugar cane but
still must be processed soon after harvest. The high
cost of transporting sugar beets or cane makes it
impractical to locate the factory far from the pro-
ducing areas.
Sugar growers and processors are economically
interdependent and normally share in the value of
total sugar and molasses sales according to a con-
tractual agreement. Both can influence the value of
total output since the volume and sugar content of
sugar beets or cane is affected by input use and pro-
duction practices, and the recovery of sugar from
beets or cane is dependent on the technology and
operation of the sugar factory. Various ownership
arrangements exist in the industry—ranging from
ownership by a single company of the factory and
producing lands to independent growers who con-
t r a c tp r o d u c t i o nw i t haf a c t o r y .S o m eg r o w e r sa r e
members of cooperatives,which own and operate a
sugarfactory.Stateownershipof factoriesandlands
is still common in developing countries, but sub-
stantialprivatizationhastakenplaceinrecentyears.
Common sugar is sucrose. It is extracted in
nearly pure, chemically identical form from sugar
cane and sugar beets. Dextrose is a sugar derived
synthetically from starch (most commonly corn
starch). Fructose is a very sweet sugar derived from
dextrose. High-fructose corn syrup (HFCS) is pro-
duced by the enzymatic conversion to fructose of a
portion of the dextrose in corn syrup. It is chemi-
cally similar to sugar used in soft drinks, which is a
mixture of equal parts of dextrose and fructose.
The fact that identical or nearly identical sugars can
be produced from different crops provides produc-
ers and consumers with a wide range of substitu-
tion possibilities. It also means, however, that sugar
policies are often complex, as the different indus-
tries vie for support. For example, sugar producers
in the European Union have been able to get legis-
lated quotas on HFCS production.Japan also limits
HFCS production to prevent it from further erod-
ing sugar’s market share. In the United States,
HFCS producers benefit from high sugar prices and
support current sugar policies.
High protection has led to the emergence of
HFCS as a substitute for sugar in the United States
and Japan. Because it is a nearly perfect substitute
for sugar in uses such as soft drinks, HFCS and
other corn syrups now account for 40 percent of
caloric-sweetener use in Japan and more than half
of U.S. caloric sweetener consumption (figure 8.2).
The technique for commercial production of high-
fructose corn syrup was discovered in the late 1960s
and made profitable by high sugar prices in the
protected Japanese and U.S. markets. But now,
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Source: FAOSTAT.economies of scale, improvements in production
techniques, and large installed production capacity
(financed under high prices), have made corn
syrups competitive with sugar from cane and less
costly than sugar from beets.
Another product that can be produced from
sugar beets, sugar cane, and corn (and some other
crops) is ethanol—a clear colorless, flammable,
oxygenated hydrocarbon that can be used for a
number of purposes, including as a vehicle fuel, a
use that accounts for about two-thirds of world
ethanol consumption. It is normally more costly
than petroleum-based fuels, however, and is used
only when special incentives, such as environmen-
tal regulations or government subsidies encourage
its production and use. Ethanol can be produced
from crude oil, ethylene, and coal, or from agricul-
tural products. Roughly 60 percent of global
ethanol production comes from sugar cane and
sugar beets.In Brazil,half of sugar cane production
isusedforethanolproduction;governmentethanol
policies mandate the share of ethanol to be blended
with gasoline.
The United States is a major producer and con-
sumer of ethanol from corn. Ethanol has environ-
mental advantages when used as a fuel, because it
burns cleaner than gasoline and does not produce
greenhouse gases. In 1990 amendments to the U.S.
Clean Air Act required certain U.S. regions to use
oxygenated, reformulated gasoline during certain
high-smog months and stipulated that a certain
percentage of oxygenates must be derived from
renewable sources such as corn. The legislation
provided tax incentives for ethanol, amounting to
$0.54 cents a gallon when blended with gasoline at
a 10 percent rate. Some Midwestern states provide
additional tax incentives.
The cost of ethanol production from corn is
about$1.10pergallon,butbecauseethanolcontains
less energy than gasoline, the comparable energy-
equivalent cost is $1.65 per gallon (Oregon Office of
Energy 2002). Thus, with the $0.54 tax incentive,
ethanol is competitive with regular gasoline. In
response to the incentive, U.S. ethanol production
has been growing by about 6 percent per year (Berg
2001). Both HFCS and ethanol can be produced in
the same facility by adding an ethanol unit to an
HFCS facility, so the tax incentive on ethanol partly
financesthefacilitiesthatproduceHFCS.Aseasonal
complementarity between ethanol and HFCS pro-
duction is also possible because ethanol is used for
fuels primarily during the winter months, whereas
the demand for HFCS in soft drinks increases dur-
ing summer months. The U.S. ethanol policy con-
tributes to production capacity, which also can be
used for HFCS production, thereby reducing HFCS
production costs and making HFCS more competi-
tive with sugar.
Estimates of Production Costs
Although the costs of producing sugar vary among
countries for a variety of reasons, it is cheaper
to produce it from cane than from beets in all
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for cane sugar, beet sugar, and HFCS. The firm’s
most recent estimates cover 41 beet-producing
countries, 63 cane-producing countries, and
19 HFCS-producing countries (table 8.1). LMC
bases its estimates on an engineering cost approach
that accounts for the physical inputs of labor,
machinery, fuel, chemicals, and fertilizers used in
fieldandfactory.Theestimatesareof actualaverage
costs and include the impact of policies that protect
producers in certain countries. Such cost estimates
do not represent the supply curve normally esti-
matedbyeconomists,sincetheyarenotestimatesof
marginal costs. Nevertheless, they are useful for
comparing the average costs of production of dif-
ferent products. Actual raw cane sugar prices are
provided for comparison. The prices are f.o.b. (free
on board),while costs are exfactory; thus the prices
shouldbehigher.
The average cost of producing raw cane sugar by
major exporters was 10.39 U.S. cents per pound in
1994–99, while the average cost of refined cane
sugar was 14.25 cents per pound. Thus the raw-to-
white spread averaged 3.86 cents per pound.
Refined sugar from beets cost an average of
25.31 cents per pound—78 percent more than
refined cane sugar. Among low-cost producers, the
difference between refined cane and beet sugar was
even wider. The average production cost for low-
costproducersof refinedcanesugarwas11.44cents
per pound, compared with 22.29 cents per pound
for refined beet sugar—a difference of 95 percent.
Basedonthiscomparison,sugarfrombeetswasnot
competitive with sugar from cane by either major
exporters or low-cost producers.However,the wide
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TABLE 8.1 Average Costs of Producing Cane Sugar, Beet Sugar, and High-Fructose
Corn Syrup by Categories of Producers, and Actual Sugar Prices,
1994–1999 
(nominal U.S. cents per pound
a)
Category 1994–95 1995–96 1996–97 1997–98 1998–99
Raw cane sugar 
Low cost producers
b 7.43 8.10 8.18 7.78 7.58
Major exporters
c 10.37 10.60 10.72 10.52 9.73
Cane sugar, white equiv.
Low cost producers
b 11.02 11.75 11.84 11.41 11.19
Major exporters
c 14.23 14.48 14.61 14.38 13.53
Beet sugar, refined
Low cost producers
d 21.31 23.16 23.09 21.21 22.67
Major exporters




g 13.45 16.78 13.57 12.86 11.76
Actual market prices
Raw cane sugar
h 13.53 12.23 11.21 10.71 7.05
a. Exfactory basis. 
b. Average of 5 producing regions (Australia, Brazil–Center/South, Guatemala, Zambia, and Zimbabwe). 
c. Average of 7 countries (Australia, Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, Guatemala, South Africa, and Thailand). 
d. Average of 7 countries (Belgium, Canada, Chile, France, Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States). 
e. Average of 4 countries (Belgium, France, Germany, and Turkey). 
f. HFCS-55, dry weight. 
g. Average of 19 countries (Argentina, Belgium, Canada, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy,
Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, the Slovak Republic, the Republic of Korea, Spain, Taiwan (China), Turkey,
United Kingdom, and United States). 
h. Raw cane sugar price is U.S. cents per pound, July-June average of monthly prices, f.o.b. Caribbean
ports. 
Source: LMC International (1999). Actual market prices are from World Bank databases.margin between refined sugar from beets and cane
ispartlyareflectionof protectiontosugarbeetpro-
ducers in the European Union and United States,
which encourages production in marginal areas
and contributes to higher average costs.
Production costs for HFCS-55 (55 percent fruc-
tose) averaged 13.68 cents per pound and were
lower than white sugar from cane produced by
major exporters in four of the five years. They
exceeded the cost of cane sugar only when corn
prices rose sharply in 1995–96. Thus, HFCS-55 can
compete with refined cane sugar in the current pol-
icy environment, and perhaps even in a fully liber-
alized market environment, since many studies
have suggested that raw sugar prices would rise
more than corn prices under liberalization.
Employment
Data on employment in developing countries’
sugar industries are not readily available but can be
estimated from reports,surveys,and industry state-
ments. Such estimates (table 8.2) show consider-
able cross-country consistency among high- and
low-cost producers. For example, Brazil, Guyana,
and South Africa are known to be among the
lowest-cost producers; raw-sugar production per
industry employee for those countries is estimated
to range from 16.3 tons to 19.9 tons. In contrast,
countries known to be high-cost producers such as
Fiji,Kenya,and Mauritius have production of 7.0 to
8.3 tons of raw sugar per industry employee. Thus,
one can reasonably conclude that an additional
million tons of sugar production from a low-cost
sugar-producing country would generate about
55,500 direct employment jobs.If the exports came
from a high-cost producer,the same million tons of
production would generate about 128,000 direct
employment jobs. Additional indirect employment
jobs would also be generated in transportation and
related industries,but no attempt was made to esti-
mate these jobs.
The World Sugar Market
Brazil, the European Union, and India are the
largest sugar producers, each accounting for
roughly 14 percent of world production during
1999–2001 (table 8.3). They are followed by China
and the United States, which each produce about
6 percent of the world’s sugar. Sugar trade is domi-
nated by Brazil and Russia, with Brazil accounting
for about one-quarter of world net exports and
Russia accounting for about 14 percent of world
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TABLE 8.2 Raw Sugar Produced Annually per Sugar Industry Employee, Selected
Developing Countries
Tons of Raw Tons of Raw
Direct Employment Sugar Produced, Sugar Produced
Country (Growers and Factory) Average 1999–2001 Per Employee
Low-cost producers
Brazil 1,100,000 19,485,000 17.7
Guyana 18,000 293,072 16.3
South Africa 130,000 2,589,667 19.9
High-cost producers
Fiji 40,500 336,333 8.3
Kenya 69,000 485,333 7.0
Mauritius 65,000 529,299 8.1
Other producers
Malawi 17,000 200,667 11.8
Mexico 300,000 5,069,233 16.9
Note: Production is the three-year average of raw sugar production during 1999–2001 from FAOSTAT. 
Source: Employment figures are derived from various sources and include total direct employment in
sugar factories and plantations. Employment data for Brazil, Mexico, and South Africa are from OECD
(2002a); Fiji, Guyana, and Mauritius data are from F. O. Licht (2002); Kenya data are from the Kenya
Sugar Board; Malawi data are from the Malawi Ministry of Commerce and Industry.net imports during 1999–2001. The European
Union is the second largest net exporter, followed
by Australia, Cuba, and Thailand, which each
export about 8–10 percent of the world total. Net
imports are widely dispersed after Russia, with the
next largest net importer accounting for less than
5 percent of world imports. India is the largest
sugar consumer, with about 15 percent of world
consumption, followed by the European Union
with 10 percent, and Brazil with 7 percent.
World HFCS production averaged 11.7 million
tons (dry weight basis) during 1999–2001. Produc-
tion in the United States alone averaged 9.2 million
tons—79 percent of the world total. Japan was the
second-largest producer,with an average of .78 mil-
lion tons,followed by Argentina,Canada,European
Union, Mexico, and Republic of Korea with be-
tween .3 and .4 tons each. HFCS is considered
equivalent to sugar on a dry weight basis when used
to produce products such as soft drinks.
World sugar prices have historically been char-
acterized by periodic sharp increases followed by
long periods of low or declining prices.This pattern
has been caused, in large part, by policies in both
developed and developing countries that isolated
consumers and producers from international prices
and diminished their price responsiveness. Since
the early 1980s, however, some developing coun-
tries have reformed their policies. As the share of
those countries in global consumption and imports
has increased with population and income growth,
the reformed policies have led to greater price
responsiveness by sugar producers and consumers,
likely reducing the severity of future price spikes.
The collapse of the former Soviet Union also led to
the abandonment of dedicated sugar imports from
Cuba and increased trade at world market prices.
Many developed countries still maintain highly
protected sugar sectors and thus contribute to the
likelihood of price spikes,but they now account for
only one-third of consumption and one-half of
imports—compared with slightly more than half of
consumption and 60 percent of imports when the
last sugar price spike occurred in 1980.
Despite some liberalization of sugar policies,
roughly 80 percent of world sugar production and
60 percent of world sugar trade is at subsidized or
protected prices. Only three major producers
(Australia,Brazil,and Cuba) have sugar sectors that
produce and operate at world market price levels.
1
These three producers account for a combined
20 percent of world production and 40 percent of
world trade. The remaining 80 percent of world
production and 60 percent of world trade relies on
production subsidies,export subsidies,or preferen-
tial access to protected markets. The European
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TABLE 8.3 Major Sugar Producers, Net Exporters, and Net Importers,
1999–2001 Average
Producers Net Exporters Net Importers
Millions Millions Millions
Country/Region of Tons Country/Region of Tons Country/Region of Tons
India 19.4 Brazil 9.3 Russia 5.2
European Union 18.6 European Union 4.2 Indonesia 1.7
Brazil 18.5 Australia 3.8 Japan 1.6
United States 7.9 Thailand 3.6 United States 1.4
China 7.8 Cuba 3.2 Korea, Rep. of 1.2
Thailand 5.4 South Africa 1.3 Canada 1.2
Mexico 5.1 Guatemala 1.1 Iran 1.0
Australia 4.9 Colombia 1.0 Malaysia 1.0
Cuba 3.8 Turkey 0.6 Algeria 0.9
Pakistan 3.0 Mauritius 0.5 Nigeria 0.7
All other 38.9 All other 10.3 All other 20.7
World 133.3 World 38.9 World 36.6
Note: Data are in raw sugar equivalents.
Source: USDA Production Supply and Distribution (PS&D) 2002.Union, Japan, and the United States account for
20 percent of world production; their average
producer prices are more than double the world
market. China and India account for another
20 percent of world production and protect pro-
ducers with prices that are higher than world mar-
ket prices. The remaining 40 percent of production
is in countries that either produce for preferential
markets (as is the case with Fiji, Mauritius, the
Philippines, and many African and Caribbean
countries) and thus receive prices higher than those
of the world market, or they protect their domestic
producers with policies that restrict imports to
provide above-market prices.
The value of world sugar exports has remained
relatively constant in nominal dollars ($11.8 billion
during 1980–85; $11.6 billion during 1995–2000),
and sugar has remained an important source of
export earnings for some developing countries.
However, the share of developing countries in total
sugar exports declined from 71 percent during
1980–85 to 54 percent in 1995–2000, as developed-
country exports increased and the share of higher-
valuedrefined-sugarexportsbydevelopedcountries
increased. Twelve countries received 10 percent or
more of their total export earnings from sugar
during 1995–2000, and an additional five received
5–10 percent. In contrast, during 1980–85, ten
countries received 20 percent or more of total
exports from sugar, and nine additional countries
received from 5–20 percent.
Sugar Policies in Selected
Developing Countries
Although this chapter focuses on prospects for pol-
icy reform in the European Union, Japan, and the
United States, it is useful to examine policies in
other major sugar-producing and -trading coun-
tries to see how they would be affected by such
reforms.
Brazil—the world’s largest sugar exporter
and generally considered to be its lowest-cost
producer—would be a major beneficiary of
increased world sugar trade and higher prices
because it has the capacity to increase sugar pro-
duction and exports substantially. The devaluation
of the Brazilian real by 65 percent relative to the
dollar since 1998 has contributed to the country’s
competitiveness. Despite its dominance, however,
exports are viewed as the third alternative for
Brazilian sugar cane after production of fuel
ethanol and sugar for the large domestic market.
Only half of Brazil’s sugar cane is used to produce
sugar; the other half goes into ethanol for automo-
tive fuel. Sugar cane can easily be divided between
sugar and ethanol production depending on mar-
ket conditions and government policies. If all of
Brazil’s sugar cane were used to produce sugar,pro-
duction could roughly double (an increase of
roughly 18.5 million tons per year). Most of the
increase could be exported, subject to port and
milling capacity.
The Brazilian government has pursued a biofuel
policy since the 1970s, when concerns about the
adequacy of petroleum supplies were high. These
policies included tax incentives and direct subsidies
for ethanol production and use, sugar price con-
trols, and restrictions on sugar exports. Lower
petroleum prices during the 1980s led to reduced
ethanol subsidies and the removal of export and
price controls on sugar beginning in 1990. Other
controls on sugar were eased during the 1990s, and
sugar exports increased from 1.5 million tons in
1990–91 to 11.3 million tons in 2000–01. Some
subsidies remain on ethanol production and use,
and the future of such subsidies can strongly influ-
ence the use of sugar cane for ethanol versus sugar
production. Government mandates on the share
of ethanol to be included in gasoline (currently
20–24 percent) can strongly influence demand for
ethanol as automotive fuel and the supplies of
sugar cane directed to sugar production.The future
of the biofuel program depends on international
petroleum prices as well as Brazilian policy.
Recently marketed flex-fuel automobile engines
that run equally well on gasoline or pure hydrous
alcohol are expected to boost ethanol demand and
direct some sugar cane production away from sugar
production and exports.
Sugar cane production has increased rapidly in
the center-south region of Brazil,where the climate
is favorable, land is available, and sugar cane yields
good returns relative to other crops.Further expan-
sion of sugar cane production in the center-south
region is possible and expected by most industry
experts, but milling capacity will need to be ex-
panded to allow significantly more sugar produc-
tion. Sugar is also produced in the northeast
region, where high-cost growers receive a small
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total annual quota of premium-priced U.S.imports
to this region.
China was an occasional large sugar importer
and exporter in the 1990s, but average net imports
were about 400,000 tons during 1990–2000. Most
of these imports came from Cuba under a long-
term trade agreement. The government has fol-
lowed a policy aimed at self-sufficiency by provid-
ing strong price incentives to producers,controlling
imports, and accumulating and releasing govern-
ment stocks to maintain high internal market
prices. About 90 percent of China’s sugar produc-
tion comes from sugar cane and the remainder
from sugar beets. A “guidance price” is provided to
sugar refiners for sugar cane and beet, but market
forces largely determine prices (Sheales and others
1999). The policy and strong demand growth kept
sugar prices high during most of the 1990s, but
prices fell sharply after the record 1998–99 crop,
remaining low through 2000. Prices increased in
2001, with white wholesale sugar prices averaging
about $0.22 per pound during the first half of 2001
(F. O. Licht 2002), more than double the world
market price and similar to U.S. domestic prices. A
record 2002–03 harvest caused prices to fall again.
Artificial sweeteners, mainly saccharin, are an
importantcompetitortosugarinChinaandsubsti-
tute for as much as 2.4 million tons. When China
entered the World Trade Organization (WTO) in
2001, it agreed to a tariff rate quota of 1.6 million
tons of sugar at a tariff rate of 20 percent, with an
over-quota tariff of 76 percent. The quota is sched-
uled to increase to 1.945 million tons,and the over-
quota rate to fall to 65 percent, by 2004. If China
were to import the full amount specified by the tar-
iff rate quota, imports would increase substantially
over the levels of recent years. China’s WTO tariff
quota does not commit the country to import all of
the quota tonnage, however, and China can choose
among a number of different methods of adminis-
teringthequotatoinfluenceitsfillrate(Jolly2001).
For example, actual imports during 2001–02 were
1.15 million tons, according to the International
Sugar Organization (2002), despite the tariff rate
quota of 1.6 million tons.The Chinese sugar indus-
try would undergo substantial adjustment if it were
opened to international competition.A large num-
ber of small, high-cost sugar mills would become
unprofitable,and production would likely decline.
India’s sugar industry, heavily regulated under
the Essential Commodities Act of 1955, is very
politicized because of the large number of sugar
cane growers (reportedly as many as 5 million) and
the importance of sugar in Indian diets.The indus-
try is largely self-sufficient,with occasional imports
to offset domestic shortfalls. An import duty (cur-
rently 60 percent) is varied to maintain domestic
prices above those of the world market. Large
stocks of sugar currently burden the industry and
can only be exported with substantial subsidies or
at substantial losses. India provides an internal
freight reimbursement and ocean freight subsidy to
help export surplus production.State controls limit
internal sugar movements,and licensing and stock-
holding requirements for mills and shops con-
tribute to industry inefficiencies. Sugar mills are
small and inefficient, and high internal transport
costs would limit export potential even if world
prices were to rise above internal prices. Sugar
millers and importers are required to sell a portion
of their supplies to the Public Distribution System
at below-market prices for resale to low-income
consumers. Sugar-cane production is more prof-
itable than most other crops, with prices that are
about 50 percent higher than world market prices
due to minimums established by the central gov-
ernment and higher prices advised by the states.
India has a small ethanol program, and there are
government proposals to require ethanol to be
blended with gasoline to reduce pollution.The gov-
ernment has announced plans to liberalize the sec-
tor, but past efforts at liberalization have been
unsuccessful. Decades of regulation have also cre-
ated complicated political interdependencies that
will be difficult to disentangle. It is unlikely that
India would emerge as a significant exporter even if
policies in the European Union, Japan, and the
UnitedStateswerechangedtoallowgreaterimports.
Mexico privatized its sugar mills and partially
deregulated its sugar industry in reforms that con-
cluded in 1992 (Escandon 2002). It has maintained
strong government regulation of the sector, how-
ever, by setting sugar-cane prices for its 150,000
growers.Mexico liberalized pricing and production
of sugar in 1995 but simultaneously increased pro-
tection by increasing tariffs from 65 percent to
136 percent on raw sugar and from 73 percent to
127 percent on refined sugar. This led to a 60 per-
cent increase in domestic sugar prices, a 50 percent
148 Global Agricultural Trade and Developing Countriesincrease in production, and a doubling of exports
from 1992 to 2002.
The North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) came into force on January 1, 1994. A
15-yearadjustmentperiodendingin2008wastobe
followed by free trade in sugar between Mexico and
the United States. The implementation of NAFTA
has been contentious because of a last-minute side-
letter agreement on sugar added to ensure approval
bytheU.S.Congress.Althoughtheside-letteragree-
mentwasneverratifiedbyMexico’sCongressandis
not recognized as valid by Mexico, the U.S. govern-
ment administers NAFTA in accordance with its
terms.UnderNAFTA,theamountof Mexico’sduty-
free access to the U.S. sugar market depends on
w h e t h e rM e x i c oi sas u r p l u ss u g a rp r o d u c e r( s u g a r
production minus sugar consumption). The side-
letter agreement changed the definition of surplus
producer to include HFCS consumption as well as
sugar consumption. Using this definition, Mexico
could export up to 25,000 tons per year of surplus
sugar duty-free during the first 6 years of NAFTA.
Beginning in year 7 (the 2000–01 marketing year),
and until the end of the 15-year adjustment period,
Mexico could export up to 250,000 tons of surplus
sugar duty-free.
High prices for sugar in Mexico led to large
imports and increased production of HFCS, which
quickly displaced sugar in the soft-drinks industry
and left Mexico with large sugar stocks that could
not be exported duty-free to the United States
because of the 25,000 ton limit. After the United
States rejected a request to allow increased duty-
free exports, Mexico charged that the United States
was dumping HFCS in Mexico and initiated
antidumping duties.Negotiations are continuing to
resolve the trade and duties on HFCS.
Caught between the high prices that the govern-
ment had established for sugar cane and the weak
domestic and world market prices for sugar, many
of Mexico’s 60 sugar mills became insolvent. The
government expropriated 27 mills with large and
unpayable debts in September 2001. Public invest-
ments are being made to prepare these mills for
resale to private investors.
Among the measures in Mexico’s national sugar
policy for 2002–2006,which is designed to make the
sector profitable, is the formation of an export
cooperative of all private and government-owned
sugar mills. Mexico’s sugar exports in the 2001–02
marketing year are estimated to total 650,000 tons,
of which 148,000 tons were exported to the United
States duty-free. Beginning in 2009, Mexico will
have unlimited duty-free access to the U.S. sugar
market and will likely increase exports substantially.
The Russian Federation is by far the world’s
largest sugar importer,with average annual imports
of 5.2 million tons during 1999–2001, three times
the amount of the next largest importer. Following
the breakup of the Soviet Union, the Russian sugar
sector faced an uncertain future, an unstable and
confused policy structure, and a technically weak
industry.Sugar production,all from beets,declined
by about 45 percent from 1992 to 2000, while con-
sumption declined by 17 percent and sugar imports
increased by 35 percent. Low beet yields, poor
factory recovery rates, outdated technology, and
shortages of fuel and replacement parts hampered
the adjustment of the Russian sugar industry to
privatization. With trade policy changing fre-
quently, high perceived risks discouraged foreign
direct investment and slowed the modernization of
the industry.
The government uses high tariffs to protect the
domestic industry.To protect domestic sugar refin-
ers, tariffs on white sugar are higher than on raw
sugar. Seasonal tariffs are added during periods of
peak domestic production to protect local produc-
ers and support prices. The import duty on raw
cane sugar for 2003 has been set at $95 per ton
($.043 per pound). Russia is expected to remain a
large importer as long as the investment climate
remains uncertain and foreign companies are
reluctant to invest. Even with foreign investment,
Russia will likely remain a high-cost producer
because its industry is based on beets.
Thailand is the world’s fourth-largest sugar
exporter, with net exports of 3.6 million tons dur-
ing 1999–2001 (annual average). Thailand’s sugar
policy is patterned after that of the European
Union, with high internal sugar prices maintained
by quotas and import tariffs. The government uses
production quotas, tax incentives, and subsidized
credit to encourage exports. The tariff rate quota
agreed under the WTO Agreement on Agriculture
was 65 percent for in-quota imports in 1999 and
99 percent for outside-quota imports (Sheales and
others 1999). Despite high protection, Thailand’s
costs of production are among the lowest in the
world, roughly comparable to those of Australia
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costs have led to rapid growth of production and a
more than tripling of exports over the past two
decades.
This selective review of policies in major sugar-
producing and -trading countries illustrates the
significance of policy distortions in the world sugar
market. India, the largest sugar producer, has a
heavily regulated domestic sugar market and high
import tariffs to protect local producers. China’s
import restrictions keep domestic sugar prices
nearly as high as those in the United States. Russia,
the largest net importer, has high tariffs to protect
sugar-beet producers and additional tariffs on
white sugar to protect local refiners. Brazil, the
largest sugar exporter, has a sugar policy that is
partly driven by its biofuel policies; until recently it
restricted sugar exports. Thailand, the fourth-
largest net exporter and a low-cost producer, has
used high domestic prices, tax incentives, and sub-
sidized credit to increase exports. Mexico’s high
domestic prices have stimulated production in
anticipation of unlimited duty-free access to the
U.S. sugar market beginning in 2009.
Sugar Policies in Selected OECD
Countries
More than half of the value of sugar production in
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development) countries during 1999–2001
came from government support or transfers from
consumers. Such high support typically limits con-
sumption through high prices and encourages pro-
duction even when a country does not have a com-
parative advantage in sugar production. Support to
OECD sugar producers during 1999–2001 totaled
$6.35 billion, more than half the value of world
sugar trade (about $11.6 billion) and nearly equal
to developing-country exports of about $6.5 bil-
lion. The European Union provided the largest
annual support, with $2.71 billion, while the
United States provided $1.30 billion, and Japan
provided $0.44 billion. Several developing coun-
tries also provided high levels of support to sugar
producers, including Mexico, Poland, and Turkey
(table 8.4). Much of that support is provided
through border protection.
The benefits of more liberalized trade in sugar
and reduced domestic support, especially in OECD
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TABLE 8.4 Government Support to Sugar Producers, 1999–2001
Producer Support Producer Nominal Support from Border
Country/Region (million US$) Assistance Coefficient Protection (percent)
OECD 6,351 2.11 n.a.
Australia 51 1.11 0.0
Czech Republic 16 1.25 47.6
European Union 2,713 2.11 91.7
Hungary 12 1.20 41.5
Japan 437 2.17 88.7
Mexico 713 2.10 83.9
Poland 176 2.28 92.9
Slovak Republic 16 1.94 54.7
Switzerland 86 4.36 73.0
Turkey 749 3.02 95.8
United States 1,302 2.37 84.3
n.a. Not applicable.
Note: Producer support was converted from local currency to U.S. dollars using period average annual
exchange rates from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics, May 2002. Producer nominal assistance
coefficient is an indicator of the nominal rate of assistance to producers measuring the ratio between the
value of gross farm receipts including support and gross farm receipts valued at world market prices
without support. No calculations were made for Canada, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway, or the Republic
of Korea.
Source: OECD 2002b.countries,are substantial,according to several stud-
ies (Borrell and Pearce 1999; Devadoss and Kropf
1996; Elbehri and others 2000; El-Obeid and
Beghin 2004; USGAO 1993 and 2000; Sheales and
others 1999; USITC 2002; van der Mensbrugghe,
Beghin, Mitchell 2003; Wohlgenant 1999). Study
results differ because of different assumptions,
methodologies, and scenarios, but the general con-
clusion is that reduced support to OECD sugar
producers would result in lower production in
those countries, lower domestic prices, increased
consumption, and increased net imports. World
sugar prices would increase and exports from
developing countries,and some developed-country
exporters, would rise. According to Sheales and
others (1999), full liberalization of the world sugar
market would result in a 41 percent increase in
world sugar prices. Sugar imports would increase
by 44 percent in the United States. Exports would
decline by 34 percent in the European Union. Low-
cost sugar-producing countries would increase
exports, with Australia’s exports rising 16 percent,
Brazil’s 23 percent, and Thailand’s 22 percent.
Removal of government support from domestic
producers in the European Union, Japan, and the
United States would save consumers $4.8 billion
per year. A study by the U.S. General Accounting
Office(USGAO2000)concludedthattheU.S.sugar
program resulted in a net loss to the U.S. economy
of $1 billion in 1998. Elbehri and others (2000)
used the global trade analysis project (GTAP)
multisectoral, multiregional general-equilibrium
model to examine the impacts of partially liberaliz-
ing sugar tariff-rate-quota regimes,concluding that
cutting the European Union’s over-quota tariff by
one-third would yield a global welfare gain of $568
million. Coordinated global reforms would result
in the greatest benefits. Wohlgenant (1999) esti-
mated that global sugar-trade liberalization would
result in a 43 percent increase in world price.
Borrell and Pearce (1999) used a 24-region
model of the global sweetener market to examine
consumption, production, trade, price, and welfare
effects for seven classes of sweeteners. A baseline
projection that continued current protection was
compared with a fully liberalized market with no
trade protection or domestic support in any coun-
try or region. Under the fully liberalized scenario,
sugar prices were projected to fall from the baseline
by 65 percent in Japan; 40 percent in Western
Europe; 25 percent in Eastern Europe, Indonesia,
Mexico, and the United States; and 10 percent in
China, the Philippines, and Ukraine. Lower prices
would lead to higher consumption, lower produc-
tion,and increased imports of sugar in those coun-
tries that had trade protection. World prices would
increase by 38 percent, and lower-cost producers
would increase production and exports—however
consumption decreased from the higher prices. In
countries with the highest protection (Europe,
Indonesia, Japan, the United States), net imports
would increase by 15 million tons per year. Japan’s
production would drop by 44 percent, that of the
United States by 32 percent, and Western Europe’s
by 21 percent. Among low-cost producers and
exporters, Australia and Thailand would increase
production by 25 percent, and Brazil, Cuba, and
other Latin American countries (excluding Brazil,
Mexico, and Cuba) would increase production by
about 15 percent.
Global welfare gains from full liberalization are
estimated by Borrell and Pearce (1999) to total
$4.7 billion per year based on historical supply
responses; gain could go as high as $6.3 billion per
year if higher supply responses occur. Brazilian
producers would gain the most from liberalization,
at around $2.6 billion per year, but this would be
offset by a loss of $1 billion to Brazilian consumers
who would pay higher prices after liberalization—
leaving a net gain of $1.6 billion for Brazil. Japan
would enjoy a net gain of about $0.4 billion from
lower consumer prices that would more than offset
lower producer prices on the 40 percent of sugar
that is domestically produced. The United States
would have a small net gain of about $0.5 billion
from full liberalization, with consumer gains
slightly larger than producer losses. Western
Europe would gain about $1.5 billion as consumer
gains of about $4.8 billion exceeded producer losses
of about $3.3 billion.
The exporting countries that now enjoy prefer-
ential access to European and U.S. sugar markets
gain about $0.8 billion per year from prices that are
more than twice world market prices on sales to the
European Union, and 80 percent more than the
world market price for sales to the United States.
The value of the preferential access is less than it
appears, however, because many of these producers
have high production costs and would not produce
as much at world market prices. Further, world
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cent after full liberalization, partially offsetting the
loss of high prices in preferential markets for pro-
ducers. Borrell and Pearce (1999) estimate the net
loss to these exporting countries from full liberal-
ization at $0.45 billion. The cost to taxpayers in the
European Union and United States of providing
each $1 of preferential access is estimated to be
more than $5. In a recent study of the Fijian econ-
omy (Levantis,Jotzo,and Tulpule 2003),alternative
forms of aid were found to deliver much greater
economic benefits and growth prospects.
Caribbean sugar producers are among the
largest group of countries having preferential
access to the European and U.S. sugar markets. A
recent study (Mitchell 2004) found that most of the
Caribbean producers cannot export profitably even
to the European Union, which pays prices that are
more than triple those of the world market. Many
of these countries have abandoned their U.S. quo-
tas because they do not produce enough to satisfy
both their EU and U.S. quotas, and EU quotas have
higher prices.
While the benefits to reform are not widely dis-
puted, the opposition to reform within certain
countries has been strong. The remainder of this
section examines the sugar policies of the European
Union, Japan, and the United States with an eye to
the prospects for reform.
The European Union’s Sugar Policy
The European Union’s sugar policy uses produc-
tion quotas, import controls, and export refunds
(subsidies) to support producer prices at levels well
above international prices.The program is financed
primarily by the European Union’s consumers,who
pay high prices for sugar.The sugar policy began in
1965 as part of the Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP). Under the CAP, intervention sugar prices
have been constant in nominal terms since
1984–85; however, they vary with exchange rates
when expressed in U.S. dollars (figure 8.3). They
have been more than double world market prices
during most of the past 20 years. Import duties are
used to prevent lower-priced imports from the
world market, and export refunds are paid to
exporters to cover the gap between the EU price
and the generally lower world market prices when
commodities are sold from intervention stocks.
Production quotas limit the amount of sugar
eligible for price support. Quotas are divided into
categories A and B, with different levels of price
support. Sugar production in excess of quota is
classed as C sugar and is not supported, but it can
be carried over for use as quota sugar in the next
year or exported at world market prices. The total
of A and B quota sugar was 14.592 million tons in
2000–01, of which 11.983 million tons was for A
quota and 2.611 million tons was for B quota
(USDA 2003). The quotas have been declining to
meet WTO commitments. The surplus of A and B
quota sugar above domestic consumption is about
1.5 million tons; it is exported with subsidy. Excess
quota (C sugar) averaged 1.59 million tons (white
equivalent) between 1995–96 and 2000–01. Thus,
the EU sugar program results in about 3.1 million
tons of sugar exports per year (about 10 percent of
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2 Crit-
ics of EU policy charge that A and B quota sugar is
subsidizing the production and export of C sugar.
Australia, Brazil, and Thailand have filed a com-
plaint with the WTO to that effect.
Production levies are applied to all quota sugar
production to cover the costs of export refunds.
The levy on A quota sugar is 2 percent, whereas the
levy on B quota varies from 30 percent to 37 per-
cent depending on world market prices. An addi-
tional levy can be collected in the next marketing
year to recover any shortfall in export refunds.
Quotas are also set for some alternative sweeteners
such as HFCS (known as isoglucose within the
European Union) and inulin (produced from
chicory and Jerusalem artichoke). The quota for
production of HFCS is 303,000 tons; that for inulin
is 323,000 tons.
The Uruguay Round commitments had little ini-
tial impact on the European Union’s sugar regime.
The variable import levy was replaced by a fixed
duty plus a safeguard clause allowing for a variable
additional duty with minimal impact on protection
to sugar beet producers. The European Union
agreed to reduce both the amount spent on export
refunds and the volume of sugar exported with sub-
sidy. Export refunds are also payable on sugar
exported in the form of processed goods such as
sugar confectionery, chocolate, biscuits, cakes, ice
cream, soft drinks, and so on. The European Union
amended legislation to allow changes in sugar-
production quotas on an annual basis (rather than
the previous five-year basis) to ensure that the limits
on exports were met.The WTO commitment was to
reduce only the subsidized exports net of preferen-
tial imports. This is a small proportion of total
exports, and amounted to just 34 million tons from
the 1986–90 base of 1.612 million tons per year.
Preferential access to the European Union’s sugar
market and its high prices are granted to the
46 countries from Africa, the Caribbean, and the
Pacific(ACP)thatsignedthefirstLoméConvention
in 1975. The Lomé sugar protocol provided for
imports of specified quantities of raw or white cane
sugar originating in the ACP states at guaranteed
prices.Unlikemostarticlesof theLoméConvention,
the sugar protocol does not expire and cannot be
changed unilaterally. The original quantities speci-
fied were 1,294,700 tons of white-sugar equivalent,
with an additional amount allotted to India. The
total import commitment was for 1,304,700 tons;
this amount has remained constant, with realloca-
tion of quotas among existing members when a
country did not fulfill its quota.The sugar imported
undertheLoméConventionisknownas“preference
sugar.”An additional import allocation of between
200,000 and 350,000 tons of sugar was made toACP
countries (primarily) in 1995. This allocation of
“special preference sugar”is not permanent,and the
quantity can vary based on import needs. The price
specified for special preference sugar was 85 percent
of the guaranteed price for the permanent prefer-
ence sugar. In addition, the European Union took
over the WTO import commitments of the new
members joining the European Union in 1995.
These included a tariff quota of 85,500 tons, mainly
from Brazil, with an in-quota tariff rate of 98 ECU
(European currency unit) per ton. The European
Union has also granted several countries in the
Balkans temporary access to its sugar market.
Imports under this program totaled about 100,000
tons in 2001–02.In total,the EU permanent import
commitment is 1.39 million tons (white sugar
equivalent) plus additional quantities of up to
450,000 tons of temporary imports.
The European Union’s Everything But Arms
initiative (EBA), approved in 2001, allows duty-
free access to the EU sugar market by the 48 least-
developed countries (39 are ACP countries). It
could become the largest of the European Union’s
commitments.Initially EBA imports will be limited
by quotas, and the sugar imported will be counted
against the quota of special preference sugar. The
EBA quota will increase annually until full duty-
free access for white and raw sugar is allowed in
2009. Safeguard clauses in the EBA initiative could
be used to limit imports, but these would be diffi-
cult for the European Union to invoke because
doing so would be seen in the least-developed
countries as a policy reversal.
Imported sugar will eventually displace domes-
tic EU production and could severely strain the EU
sugar regime. The European Commission esti-
mated the possible impact of the EBA on the EU
sugar regime in 2000, concluding that sugar
imports could increase by an additional 2.4 million
tons and cost the EU budget about 1.05 billion
euros. These imports would have to be offset by
reduced domestic production quotas or used for
ethanol (European Commission 2003).
A longer-term threat to the EU sugar program
is the Commission’s plan to offer, all 77 ACP
Sugar Policies: An Opportunity for Change 153countries the same conditions as the EBA countries
under the Economic Partnership Agreements
(EPAs).Negotiations,begun in September 2002,are
expected to take five years.Under the EPAs,all ACP
countries would have duty-free access to the EU
market for all goods except arms. These countries
currently produce 6.2 million tons of sugar. They
could provide all of it to the European Union on
short notice while covering their own demand from
the world market. Taken together, EBA and ACP
supplies could total 8.6 million tons.This is 60 per-
cent of current EU production and would force
major changes to the EU sugar program.
Enlargement of the European Union may also
create new problems for its sugar regime. The
10 countries that joined in mid-2004 were Cyprus,
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and
Slovenia. Bulgaria and Romania will likely join in
the next several years; the last of the current round
of accession countries, Turkey, may join several
years later. Poland is the largest sugar producer of
the 10 countries that joined in 2004, with nearly
60 percent of the group’s total production.The first
10 accession countries produce about one-fifth as
muchsugarastheEuropeanUnion,havehigherper
capita consumption, lower yields, and lower recov-
ery rates than the European Union. They agreed to
an A and B quota of 2.958 million tons, with
2.829 million tons of A quota and 0.129 million
tons of B quota (European Commission 2003).
AccedingproducerswilllikelyalsoproduceCsugar,
as is done by current EU producers,and export it at
world market prices.A 1998 EU Commission study
of the 10 accession countries concluded that the
group would add at least 200,000 tons to the
European Union’s export surplus.
The current EU sugar regime runs until June
2006, and the European Commission opened
discussions on reform on September 23, 2003.
However, unlike the other commodities sched-
uled for reform discussions—cotton, olive oil,
and tobacco—specific reform proposals were not
offered for sugar. Instead, three scenarios for
reform were offered, ranging from an extension of
the current sugar regime beyond 2006 to complete
liberalization of the current regime. Complicating
the reform discussions is an investigation launched
by the WTO in August 2003 in response to the
complaint by Australia, Brazil, and Thailand that
the EU sugar regime illegally subsidizes the indus-
try and depresses world prices. A negative finding
against the EU by the WTO dispute-settlement
body could force changes to the EU sugar regime.
Japan’s Sugar Policy
Japan is the third-largest net sugar importer, after
Russia and Indonesia, with average annual net
imports of about 1.6 million tons of raw sugar dur-
ing 1999–2001 (figure 8.4). Imports supply about
two-thirds of domestic consumption; the remain-
ing one-third is supplied by highly subsidized beet
and cane production. Domestically produced
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Source: FAOSTAT.HFCS accounts for about 40 percent of total caloric
sweeteners.The government intervenes in the sugar
market by establishing guaranteed minimum prices
for sugar beets and cane, controls on raw sugar
imports, prohibitive duties on refined sugar
imports, high tariffs on imported products con-
taining sugar,and quotas,tariffs,and other controls
on sugar substitutes. The system results in retail
sugar prices that are among the highest in the world
($.89 per pound in Tokyo in 2000) and producer
prices for sugar beets and sugar cane that are
roughly 10 times world market levels. Sugar con-
sumption is gradually declining due to competition
from HFCS, high sugar prices, slow economic
growth, and dietary changes away from sweeteners.
Consumption may actually be higher than re-
ported, however, because sugar contained in im-
ported products is not reported and is estimated to
account for as much as an additional 10 percent of
sugar consumption.
Japan’s Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and
Fisheries (MAFF) sets guaranteed minimum prices
for sugar cane and sugar beets according to the
Sugar Price Stabilization Law of 1965 and the
Revised Sugar Price Adjustment Law of 2000
(Fukuda, Dyck, and Stout 2002). The minimum
producer prices are set based on a formula com-
paring current agricultural input prices and consu-
mer goods relative to prices that prevailed in 1950
and 1951. The minimum producer price for sugar
beets during 1990–95 averaged $149 per ton, while
the minimum producer price for sugar cane was
$174 per ton. By comparison, U.S. sugar beet and
cane producers received an average of $29 and $40
per ton, respectively, during the same period. Thus
Japanese beet and cane producers received at least
10 times the world market prices.
3 For the 2001
marketing year, the minimum price was 17,040 yen
per ton ($131 per ton) for sugar beets and
20,370 yen per ton for sugar cane ($157 per ton).
Australian sugar cane producers, which receive no
government price supports, received $16 per ton in
the 2001 marketing year (Sheales 2002).The MAFF
also sets the raw sugar price for domestic refiners,
known as the “domestic sugar rationalization target
price,” at a level intended to allow restructured
sugar refining firms to pay the guaranteed mini-
mum price to sugar cane and beet producers and
still recover costs. A subsidy is provided to sugar
refiners to cover the difference between the domes-
tic market price and the “target price.”In marketing
year 2001, the target price for raw sugar was
151,800 yen per ton ($1,168 per ton or $0.53 per
pound), while the resale price on imported raw
cane sugar was about $0.22 per pound (Fukuda,
Dyck,and Stout 2002).The difference was made up
by a subsidy financed by a surcharge on imported
sugar, other surcharges, and funds from Japan’s
national budget. The current subsidy to refiners is
90 billion yen ($692 million) (Fukuda, Dyck, and
Stout 2002).The government regulates the produc-
tion and price of HFCS to limit competition with
sugar and obtain funds to partially pay for the high
support to sugar beet and cane producers.
Full liberalization of Japan’s sugar and sweetener
market would likely reduce domestic sugar produc-
tion drastically—perhaps completely eliminat-
ing domestic production. Consumption would
increase as consumers faced lower sugar prices.
Imports would increase to meet consumer
demand. HFCS consumption would likely increase
without current controls but would not necessarily
increase under full liberalization of the sugar and
sweetener markets because of competition from
imported sugar. The Australian Bureau of Agricul-
ture and Resource Economics (see Sheales and oth-
ers 1999) estimated that sugar imports would rise
by 500,000 tons if Japan eliminated its tariffs, sur-
charges, and levies on sugar imports. The study
assumed that domestic production would decline
by just 22 percent because of other means of gov-
ernment support—this is probably an underesti-
mate. The Economic Research Service of the U.S.
Department of Agriculture (USDA) estimated that
production would decline by 40 percent if Japan
were to eliminate all border protection and trade-
distorting domestic support. Consumer and pro-
ducer prices in Japan would fall by 70 percent
under the scenario, and imports would rise by as
much as 735,000 tons (Fukuda, Dyck, and Stout
2002). Borrell and Pearce (1999) estimated that
sugar prices would decline by 65 percent, produc-
tion would decline by 44 percent, and net imports
would increase by about 1.5 million tons.
The United States’Sugar Policy
U.S. sugar policy provides for a loan program for
sugar beets and cane.
4 The nonrecourse loan pro-
gram is reauthorized through fiscal 2007 at 18 cents
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poundforrefinedbeetsugar.ARefinedSugarReex-
port Program allows sugar cane refiners to pur-
chase raw sugar at world prices, without duty, and
export a like amount within 90 days.A similar pro-
gram exists for manufacturers of sugar-containing
products.A no-cost provision of the policy requires
the secretary of agriculture to make every effort to
operate the sugar program in a way that avoids for-
feiture under the loan program. To avoid forfei-
tures, it is necessary to keep the domestic sugar
price above the world market price. This is done by
restrictingsugarimports,firstbyquotasintroduced
in May 1982, and then by tariff rate quotas begin-
ning in 1990 following a successful GATT (General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) challenge.
Minimum import levels were approved in 1990
to allay concerns of quota-holding countries and
cane processors. It provided for marketing allot-
ments on domestically produced sugar if estimated
imports were less than 1.25 million tons,raw value.
The secretary of agriculture has the authority to
impose marketing allotments in order to balance
markets, avoid forfeitures, and comply with the
U.S. sugar-import commitments under WTO and
NAFTA. The allotments can be used only when
sugar imports, excluding imports under the reex-
port program,are less than 1.532 million tons.
5 The
USDA announced flexible marketing allotments for
sugar for the 2002–03 marketing year (Haley and
Suarez 2002).
In the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agricul-
ture (URAA), the United States agreed to maintain
minimum imports of 1.139 million metric tons of
raw-value sugar imports (1.256 short tons).Of this,
22,000 metric tons were reserved for refined sugar.
The tariff rate quota on raw cane sugar was allo-
cated to 40 quota-holding countries based on their
export shares during 1975–81,when trade was rela-
tively unrestricted. The duty of 0.625 cents per
pound, raw value, continues on quota imports.
Most countries continue to avoid the duty because
of programs under the Generalized System of Pref-
erences and the Caribbean Basin Initiative. The
duty on raw sugar above the tariff rate quota was
17.62 cents per pound beginning in January 1995
and declined by 0.45 cents per pound each year
until it reached 15.36 cents per pound in 2000. The
over-quota rate for refined sugar was 18.62 cents
per pound in 1995 and declined by 0.48 per year
through 2000 to 16.21 cents per pound. The over-
quota tariff will remain prohibitive at a world price
of about 5 cents per pound (assuming a U.S. raw
sugar market price of 22 cents per pound and a
transportation cost of 1.5 cents per pound).
Under NAFTA most trade barriers between
Canada, Mexico, and the United States were to be
eliminated by 2009. As described previously, the
treaty’s sugar provisions were altered by a side-
letter agreement prior to the start of NAFTA. But
the side-letter agreement did not change other
NAFTA provisions—such as the phased reduction
in the United States over-quota tariff of 16 cents
per pound by a total of 15 percent during the first
six years,and then in a straight line to zero in calen-
dar year 2008. The over-quota tariff on raw sugar,
7.6 cents per pound in 2003, drops about 1.5 cents
per pound each year. If the world raw sugar prices
are in the range of 7 cents per pound, and U.S. raw
sugar prices are about 18 cents per pound,Mexican
producers would benefit from exporting to the
United States instead of to the world market
(USDA 2002). Currently, Mexico does not have a
large surplus of sugar to export, but increased pro-
duction or reduced consumption could change
that. In future years, the over-quota tariff will con-
tinue to decrease and could lead to large imports.A
provision of the U.S.sugar legislation removes pro-
duction quotas if imports exceed 1.5 million
tons—a free-for-all if imports increase beyond
certain limits. Under this alternative, the U.S. gov-
ernment could end up holding large stocks
defaulted under the sugar loan program, and the
sugar system would become more difficult to man-
age because of the no-net-cost provision. Mexico
has increased sugar production from about 3.5 mil-
lion tons during 1989–91 to 5.2 million during
2000–02, while consumption has increased from
4.0 to 4.5 million tons. Following the end of the
NAFTA phase-in period, Mexico can ship unlim-
ited quantities of sugar to the United States duty-
free without the condition of being a net surplus
producer. This will likely force changes to the U.S.
sugar program.For example,Mexico could increase
imports of HFCS for use in the soft drink industry,
freeing sugar for export to the United States.
The effectiveness of the U.S. sugar program at
keeping domestic prices above world prices since
1980 can be seen in figure 8.5. During this period,
world prices have fallen sharply, but U.S. producers
156 Global Agricultural Trade and Developing Countrieswere protected. The sugar program, however, faces
new challenges in the near future that could bring
into conflict the no-cost provision of the sugar pro-
gram, the minimum import commitment under
the WTO, and the duty-free access provision to
Mexican imports in 2009. The rapid growth of
sweetener production compared with consumption
could also destabilize the program.The growth rate
of sweetener production during 1985–2000 was
3.2percent,compared with consumption growth of
2.1 percent over the same period. If these growth
rates are extended into the future, marketing allot-
ments would be needed to prevent stock building.
The problem is further exacerbated by the agree-
ment under the URAA to import 1.139 million tons
of sugar per year.
The U.S. sugar program, like that of the
European Union, almost certainly will have to
change. But although it benefits just 9,000 sugar
beet producers and 1,000 sugar cane producers
(Orden 2003), opposition to policy reform is
strong, especially from sugar-cane producers, who
average nearly 3,000 acres per producer (compared
with 200 acres per beet producer).Florida accounts
for one-quarter of U.S. sugar production, and two
large corporations account for nearly 80 percent of
the cane acreage in Florida. Such concentration of
production suggests that reforming the U.S. sugar
program will likely require compensation to exist-
ing producers.
A model to consider is the recent reform of the
U.S. edible peanut program (Orden 2003). Under
that program domestic prices were supported at
about double world prices, with quotas to limit
production and tariff rate quotas to limit imports
(see Diop, Beghin, and Sewadeh in this volume).
And, like sugar, the edible peanut program faced
the threat of increased imports due under WTO
agreements and NAFTA.In the 2002 U.S.Farm Bill,
the loan rate for edible peanuts was cut by half,
compared with the mid-1990s, production quotas
were eliminated, and direct cash payments were
made to producers. The payments consisted of
deficiency payments if prices fell below the new
lower loan rates, decoupled direct payments, and
countercyclical payments. In addition, quota hold-
ers were compensated with direct payments for
their loss of quota rights. A similar program for
sugar would be complicated by the loss of benefits
by HFCS producers, who benefit from high sugar
prices. Reform of the sugar program may also
require compensating the industries that now
depend on distorted sugar policies.
Conclusions
Sugar cane is an almost ideal commodity for some
developing countries to grow for domestic con-
sumption and export.It can be produced efficiently
in tropical climates under a wide range of technolo-
gies, from low-input labor-intensive to high-input
fully mechanized. Sugar is locally consumed in all
producing countries and provides a substantial
part of total calories in many countries. Processing
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Source: USDA.can be varied to meet the needs of low-income
domestic or high-income foreign consumers. Raw
cane sugar stores well after initial processing. There
are few problems in meeting sanitary and health
standards because sugar cane juice is boiled during
initial processing and raw cane sugar is boiled again
when refined to produce white sugar. The biggest
problems for producers are limited export oppor-
tunities and low world prices—caused partly by
policies in OECD countries.
Support for current OECD sugar policies
among beneficiaries is obviously strong, but prob-
lems are emerging that make change inevitable.The
benefits of sugar policy reform are substantial, and
the gains are greatest under multilateral reform.
According to recent studies of the global sugar and
sweetener markets, the global welfare gains of
removing all trade distortions and domestic sup-
port are estimated to total as much as $4.7 billion
per year. In countries with the highest protection
(Europe, Indonesia, Japan, and the United States),
net imports would increase by 15 million tons per
year. World sugar prices would increase about
40 percent, while sugar prices in countries that
heavily protect their markets would decline. The
greatest price decline would occur in Japan, where
sugar prices would fall 65 percent, followed by a
40 percent decline in Western Europe and a 25 per-
cent decline in the United States. Brazilian produc-
ers would gain the most from liberalization,around
$2.6 billion per year, offset by a loss of $1 billion to
Brazilian consumers who would pay higher prices
under liberalization. Employment in developing
countries would increase by approximately 1 mil-
lion workers if the 15 million ton increase in net
imports that accompanied the removal of all trade
distortions and domestic support were supplied by
developing countries.
The exporting countries that currently have
preferential access to European and U.S.sugar mar-
kets gain about $0.8 billion per year through prices
that are more than double world market price. The
value of the preference is less than it appears, how-
ever, because many of these protected producers
have high production costs and would not produce
at world market prices. Further, world market
prices would rise by about 40 percent after full mul-
tilateral liberalization,partially offsetting the loss to
producers of high prices in preferential markets.
The net loss to these exporting countries from full
liberalization is estimated to total $0.45 billion
per year.
The nature of reforms can have very different
consequences for developing countries. If existing
EU and U.S. polices are adjusted to accommodate
higher imports from countries in the EBA and
NAFTA systems, low-cost producers such as Brazil
will lose. Full multilateral liberalization of the
world sugar market would allow efficient producers
to expand production and exports,thereby benefit-
ing consumers in protected markets. Coordinated
multilateral liberalization also offers the advantage
of somewhat higher world prices to soften the
adjustment for producers in protected markets
such as the European Union, Japan, and the United
States.
Notes
1. Brazil’s policies on ethanol indirectly affect sugar, but the
government provides no direct subsidies to sugar producers.
Other small sugar producers that produce at world market
prices include Canada and Malaysia.
2.An additional 1.8 million tons of sugar is imported under
the sugar protocol between the EU and the member countries of
ACP (Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific) and reexported
with subsidy after processing.
3.There appears to be an anomaly between the OECD’s esti-
mate of producer support in table 8.4 and the prices received by
sugar beet and sugar cane producers in Japan. If sugar beet and
cane producers in Japan receive five times the prices in the
United States, then it appears the Producer Support Estimate
(PSE) in percentage form should be higher rather than lower as
reported in table 8.4.
4. Nonrecourse commodity loans are used by the govern-
ment to support prices of many crops. Under the program,
farmers who comply with the provisions of each commodity
program are allowed to pledge their commodity as collateral and
obtain a loan from the USDA’s Commodity Credit Corporation
at the specified loan rate per unit for the commodity. The bor-
rower may elect to repay the loan with interest within a specified
period and regain control of the commodity, or default on the
loan as payment of the loan and interest. The farmer will nor-
mally default on the loan if the market price is below the level
necessary to repay the loan and interest. Thus, the loan rate
becomes the effective floor price.
5. This seems the opposite of what is required, but the logic
is apparently that if imports exceed this amount then the sugar
program has lost its ability to control imports and U.S. produc-
ers should be given unrestricted freedom to produce.
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Sugar Policies: An Opportunity for Change 159tion in industrialized countries are also important
sources of economies in procurement, processing
and logistics, and foreign direct investment.
Policy reforms leading to free markets would
pitch consumers against producers in most coun-
tries because of the large transfers implied by cur-
rent policies and their removal.In importing coun-
tries with high barriers (Asia),consumers’gains are
larger than producers’ losses because the dairy sec-
tor is small. In competitively producing countries,
consumers currently benefit from depressed world
dairy prices and low trade barriers and have much
to lose in undistorted markets, whereas producers
have much to gain. The largest net welfare gains
would accrue in the Quad, however, because large
consumer gains and reduced budgetary costs for
support policies would be much larger than pro-
ducers’ losses. In most other countries, net effi-
ciency gains would remain small because the gains
to one group would be offset by losses to the other.
Our simulations also show the production gains
from trade liberalization are captured by dynamic
reformers attracting foreign direct investment and
overcoming supply constraints and technology
transfers.
1
World dairy markets exhibit an extreme case of dis-
tortions traceable to a complex system of domestic
and international trade barriers—including sur-
plus disposal in the Quad countries (Canada,
European Union,Japan,and the United States) and
the Republic of Korea. Oceania (Australia and New
Zealand)—which, with the Quad, dominates the
export market—is a competitive exporter with few
distortions. However, dairy interest groups in the
Quad are entrenched, and prospects for policy
reforms appear dim. Domestic price discrimina-
tion schemes in the Quad (minus Japan) rely heav-
ily on the ability to close borders, suggesting that
the emphasis in the Doha negotiations should be
on commitments to lower border protection to
force domestic reforms.
Despite the quagmire of distortions, dairy is a
dynamic sector with much growth potential, espe-
cially in Asia, where dairy consumption has been
propelled upward by income growth,urbanization,
and westernization of diets.Dairy is also experienc-
ing innovations in food processing, with value-
added opportunities in traditional products and
new dairy-based protein ingredients facing few
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Background on the World 
Dairy Sector
Milk Production and Dairy Product
Manufacturing
Milk and dairy products are expensive to produce.
Production of animal feed uses three to nine times
more land than production of food plants that
produce the same amount of protein (Bender
1992). When food sufficiency is a problem in a
country, dairy is probably not an appropriate way
to produce food, because the nutritional conver-
sion rate from grains to animals is low. In most
developed countries, milk is produced by feeding
animals concentrates made from grains—these can
be used directly as human foods. Livestock feed
requires on average 7 kilocalories input for each
kilocalorie generated. The range extends from 16
for beef production to 3 for broiler chickens, with
milk somewhere in between (Bender 1992).
Animal food production does not always com-
pete with other food production, however. Some
animals, including sheep and cows, can be fed on
inedible agricultural and industrial by-products
(with limited alternative uses) to produce highly
nutritional foods, or they can be grazed on mar-
ginal land. Marginal land suitable for grazing is
often on small parcels in remote areas with low
population density. Shipping perishable dairy
products to urban consumers is expensive,as many
developing countries face production and distribu-
tion challenges that constrain milk production,
such as poor infrastructure and limited refrigera-
tion facilities.
In Argentina, Australia, Ireland, and New
Zealand, milk production occurs generally on large
pastures within reach of relatively efficient trans-
portation systems and with the support of better
human capital and technology. These factors pro-
vide considerable advantage to these countries in
producing milk and dairy products in free-trade
environments. However, pasture-based milk farm-
ing is seasonal and vulnerable to weather and natu-
ral disasters.
Although raw animal milk is nutritious, only 5
to 10 percent of milk is consumed in raw form in
most developed countries. Most raw milk is
processed into derivative products in these coun-
tries (FAO various years). These processing sectors
can be significant sources of income and employ-
ment to local economies.Derivative dairy products,
or manufactured products, can be either in liquid
form (standardized milk, pasteurized milk, cream,
partly or totally skimmed milk, buttermilk), or
products no longer liquid (cheese, butter, cream,
condensed and evaporated milk, milk powder,
casein).
Development of the dairy industry requires good
infrastructure. A good transportation system, avail-
ability of low-cost refrigeration technology, and
good packing technologies are all prerequisites for
an advanced dairy manufacturing sector. Most
developing countries have poor conditions for dairy
manufacturing. In those that lack an adequate milk
supply and infrastructure to process and distribute
milk,peoplereconstitutemilkpowderandbutteroil
back to fluid form to meet daily consumption
needs. In many countries, commercial milk combi-
nation, which reestablishes the product’s specified
fat-to-nonfat solids ratio and solids-to-water ratio,
is widely used.
Overall, approximately one-third of world milk
is consumed in fluid form. About one-fourth is
used in cheese making. The joint production of
butter, milk powder, and casein uses roughly one-
fifth of all milk. The remainder is processed into
soft or frozen products, condensed and evaporated
milk, or other dairy products.
Derivative products satisfy specific consumption
needs. Simple technologies for separating and
recombining nutritional components of milk have
lowered the cost of processing and made it possible
to adjust fat content to different dietary needs.
Cheese and butter do not require advanced technol-
ogy. The production of milk protein concentrates
and whey and lactose milk fractionations, however,
is relatively new technology. Milk protein concen-
trates and whey and lactose products are important
in the world dairy markets, where most buyers are
developing countries, countries with low self-
sufficiency in dairy production, and developed
economies with relatively low trade barriers on
these products.
Skim milk powder, whole milk powder, butter
oil, and even butter are important inputs in a
special dairy processing practice called milk recon-
stitution, a technology that converts milk powder,
milk fat products,and other dairy products back to
fluid milk for consumption or for making other
dairy products. With the rapid development ofdairy processing technology, milk reconstitution
becomes commercially practical and desirable,even
in more advanced dairy-producing countries where
fresh milk is readily available.
Fluid milk is a major product of milk reconstitu-
tion in developing countries.In developed countries
and countries with dairy foods in the traditional
diet,“hard” dairy products, such as cheese, are pro-
duced through milk reconstitution. The recent
growth of trade in milk powder and butter oil is
partially attributable to the improvement in milk
reconstitution technology in many dairy-importing
countries. Milk reconstitution overcomes high
transportation and storage costs. Trade distortions
and investment decisions in the dairy manufactur-
ing sector also make reconstitution desirable. Many
developing countries reconstitute fluid milk based
on cheap milk powder available in world markets.
For example, Mexico makes cheese by reconstitut-
ing imported skim milk powder and adding veg-
etable oil (filled milk).
Besides technical difficulties and additional
costs involved in milk reconstitution, other prob-
lems limit the practice of this technology. The
reconstituted dairy products are often considered
to be inferior substitutes for fresh-milk-based
products. In addition, milk reconstitution from
dried dairy ingredients often induces a loss of
nutrients due to the heat required to condense and
dry milk.
World Milk Production Trends
In the last decade, world milk production was
between 445 million and 470 million metric tons.
The Quad and Oceania’s share of this production
was around 42 percent, while the share from East-
ern Europe and the Former Soviet Union (FSU)
fell steadily from 27 percent to 16.8 percent.There
is some reason to expect that the decline in the
share of Eastern Europe and the FSU in world
milk production may be reversed as several key
milk-producing countries (Poland, Hungary, and
Baltic countries join the European Union (EU) in
2004.
South Asia (India and other South Asian Coun-
tries) and Sub-Saharan Africa increased their share
of world milk production slightly from just under
20 percent in 1990 to more than 20 percent by
2000. Similarly, other developing countries and
regions (China, Korea, other Southeast Asia,
Middle East and North Africa, and Central and
South America) increased their combined share
from just over 10 percent in 1990 to almost 20 per-
cent in 2000. These trends indicate significant
changes in the production of milk in the develop-
ing regions. For example, growth in South Asia and
the Middle East and North Africa was 3.8 percent
annually, in sharp contrast to the negative growth
of –3.5 percent recorded in Eastern Europe and
the FSU.
About 25 percent of world milk was produced in
Western Europe before the 1994 Uruguay Round
Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) (FAO various
years). After 1994 Western Europe’s share of world
milk production began to dip slowly, falling to
23 percent in 2000. Nevertheless, Western Europe
remains a key factor in world dairy markets. The
share of world milk production of the United States
and Canada remained relatively constant at around
14 percent before (1989–1994) and after (1995–
2000) the URAA. The share of Oceania in world
milk production increased slightly, reaching 4 per-
cent in 2000. Japan’s share of world milk produc-
tion remained relatively constant at around 1.5 per-
cent over the same periods.
In China, Korea, and the rest of Southeast Asia,
a steady increase in share occurred both before
and after the URAA, reaching 2.8 percent in 2000.
Much of the growth occurred in China and Korea.
India, as well, showed a steady growth in share of
world milk production before and after the URAA
periods. That share stood at 13.8 percent in 2000.
India appears to be expanding its activity in world
export markets, particularly for butter fat products
(butter, ghee/anhydrous milk fat). The share of
other countries in South Asia reached 5.1 percent
in 2000.
Central and South America showed strong
growth in share of world milk production both
before and after the URAA.Its share is now 10.5 per-
cent. Expansion in this region is dominated by
Argentina and, to a lesser extent, Uruguay, Brazil,
and Mexico. Sub-Saharan Africa, including South
Africa, has held relatively steady at around 3 per-
cent of world milk production,suggesting that milk
production and dairy processing are not expanding
as rapidly in southern Africa as in other developing
economies. Disparity in regional income growth
likely plays a key role in this trend.
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Dairy products exhibit two-way trade because they
are differentiated products.
2 Over the 1989–2000
period, world dairy exports increased more or less
steadily from 25.6 million to 39.1 million metric
tons, with no difference between the pre- and post-
URAA periods.World dairy exports are dominated
by the developed economies (Quad and Oceania),
but their share of the markets shrank from 87 per-
cent in 1989 to 78 percent in 2000. Developed
countries’ share of world dairy exports grew an
average 2.9 percent annually in 1989–2000.Exports
represented 9.7 percent of the developed countries’
total milk production in 1989; that share had
grown to 12.4 percent by 2000. World dairy
imports increased more or less steadily, from
26 million to 36 million metric tons (FAO, various
years). World dairy imports in the pre-URAA
period (1989–94) averaged 27 million metric tons,
increasing to 33 million metric tons in 1995–2000
period.
Comparison of dairy exports as a share of total
milk production before and after the URAA pro-
vides some informal evidence that the dairy trade
liberalization during the Uruguay Round increased
the importance of exports in the world’s dairy
economies. Developed countries’ (Quad and Ocea-
nia) import market shares—16 percent (4 million
metric tons) in 1989 and 20 percent (7 million met-
ric tons) in 2000—grew an average 4.8 percent
annually, but average annual growth was much
faster after the URAA (7.3 percent). Japan is a large
importer of high value-added dairy products, such
as cheese and casein. Its demand for dairy products
is driven by high incomes, more Westernized diets,
and the inability of domestic supply to satisfy the
demand growth despite protectionist policies.
Despite their decreased share of world milk
production, Eastern Europe and the FSU increased
their share in world dairy exports from 7.6 per-
cent to 11.6 percent during the period under study.
Those exports represented 1.3 percent of total milk
production in the region in 1989 and increased
more than three-fold, to 4.8 percent, by 2000.
Eastern Europe and the FSU are relatively small
importers, with imports fluctuating in the 3 million–
4millionmetrictonrange.Importgrowthslowedin
the years after the URAA (–5.9 percent). Low
growth rates in gross domestic product (GDP),
rather than URAA-induced trade liberalization, are
likely responsible for most of these changes.
Other developing economies (China, Korea,
other Southeast Asia, Middle East and North
Africa, and Central and South America almost
doubled their share of world dairy exports from
5.3 percent in 1989 to 9.6 percent by 2000; much
of the increase came from the Southern Cone
(Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay), where exports
represented 1.9 percent of total milk production in
1989 and 3.6 percent by 2000.
In South Asia (India and other South Asian
countries) and Sub-Saharan Africa (including
South Africa), which are primarily importers,
exports represented less than 1 percent of total
milk production in 1989–2000. The share of world
dairy imports for these two regions was 9–10 per-
cent (3 million metric tons) over the same period.
The dominant countries in these regions (India
and South Africa) are either self-sufficient or net
exporters. Overall, the participation of South
Asian countries in world dairy trade has been lim-
ited,because most countries in the region strive for
self-sufficiency in food; both imports and exports
of dairy products are restricted by the government.
Imports consist of intermediate products such as
butter oil, milk powder, and condensed milk,
mostly obtained from food aid programs from
Western countries.
The Middle East and North Africa are signifi-
cant importers of dairy products, accounting for
21 percent of total world imports of dairy products.
Lacking natural resources to expand their milk pro-
duction, the countries of this region will continue
to rely on imports to meet their increasing con-
sumption needs.
Import substitution policies and economic
hardship in Central and South America have pre-
vented these countries from fully exploiting their
significant comparative advantage in agriculture,
though some South American countries increas-
ingly participate in world and regional dairy trade.
Under more stable macroeconomic environments
and regional trade agreements, Latin American
countries, have increased trade volume consider-
ably. Latin America imports about 18 percent of
world dairy trade while exporting 2 percent.Mexico
is the world’s largest importer of milk powder,
accounting for some 10 percent of total world trade.
Brazil is a significant importer of dairy products,
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ners, Argentina and Uruguay. The European Union
is also a big player in the Brazilian market, but
Brazil’s dependence on imports will likely change
with the rapid adoption of new technology in
domestic milk production and dairy processing.
Other African countries are net importers
(mostly through food aid programs), accounting
for about 6 percent of total world trade. Reduced
government intervention in agriculture, propelled
by the URAA and other factors, will result in
reducing food aid to traditional recipients, includ-
ing the Sub-Saharan countries. A significant pro-
portion of food aid has been redirected to transi-
tional economies. The affordability of commercial
imports of dairy products (without current export
subsidies) is questionable for many African
countries.
Trade and Domestic Policy
Regimes in Key Producing and
Consuming Countries
Developed Economies: Quad and Oceania
Most developed countries intervene in their
domestic dairy sectors with a wide variety of policy
instruments. Intervention prices (price support
programs) establish minimum domestic prices that
are generally well above world market levels.This is
true for butter and skim milk powder (SMP) in
Canada and the European Union; for butter,
cheese, and SMP in the United States, although
SMP is priced near world-market levels.
Canada and the European Union use a system of
milk production and marketing quotas to limit the
production of milk and reduce the cost of protect-
ing the domestic milk- and dairy-processing sec-
tors. These policies have generated substantive
“quota rents”to the holders of the quotas.
Canada and the United States use classified pric-
ing schemes to enhance market returns for dairy
farmers based on how their milk is used. Generally
these are price-discrimination schemes that admin-
ister higher prices to less elastic, higher-value-
added, and more perishable product markets (bev-
erage milks, soft and frozen products). To the
extent that these premium markets are nontrad-
able,such schemes can help insulate domestic mar-
kets from world market forces.In addition,because
they increase milk prices above the competitive
equilibrium price, more milk is generated, less pre-
mium milk is consumed (due to the higher admin-
istered prices), and the prices for manufactured
milk are depressed relative to a competitive, non-
distorted equilibrium. In a sense, these classified
pricing schemes generate consumption cross-
subsidies to manufactured products (and the
consumers and processors who purchase these
products) at the expense of the consumers of
premium products. To the extent that these cross-
subsidized manufactured products are exported,
there is an open question as to whether the implicit,
consumption cross-subsidies are in fact export
subsidies.
Inthecaseof Canada,severalof thedairyclassifi-
cations targeted to compete on export markets (the
world or the U.S.market) have been deemed export
subsidies generated by government intervention—
hence countable against URAA export-subsidy
commitments.
Canada, the European Union, and the United
States also use a variety of other subsidies in pro-
duction, marketing, and export financing. Among
these are the European Union’s consumption subsi-
dies on butter (60 percent of EU butter is subsi-
dized for use by the bakery sector) and skim milk
powder (45 percent is subsidized for animal feed).
Market access under the URAA is controlled pri-
marily by tariff rate quotas, a system of in-quota
tariffs up to a negotiated limit, and a series of out-
of-quota tariffs that are generally quite prohibitive.
In addition,a variety of sanitary,phytosanitary,and
technical trade restrictions (such as country-level
standards of identity) act as nontariff barriers and
impede global trade in dairy products.
Developed countries agreed in the URAA to
increase their import quotas to 5 percent of con-
sumption by 2000. Similarly, in- and out-of-quota
tariffs were to be reduced 16 percent over six years,
by 2000. Table 9.1 summarizes the URAA increases
in dairy import quotas for the developed countries.
Table 9.2 summarizes the URAA dairy product
tariff reductions.
Under the URAA, the European Union and
United States were obliged to make the greatest
increases in access to their domestic markets, par-
ticularly for cheese,butter,butter oil,and skim milk
powder. Australia, Canada, and Japan endured less
market access change under the URAA since many
of their dairy product imports were already in
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consumption (by 2000). The level of most out-of-
quota tariffs is prohibitive,with the result that tariff
rate quotas act as pure import quotas for many
products in developed countries.
The heavy intervention in domestic dairy mar-
kets by the developed countries often generates sur-
plus production relative to domestic consumption
requirements. Because the domestic policies usu-
ally keep domestic prices above world market
levels, many developed countries—particularly
Canada, the European Union, and the United
States—are forced to export these surpluses with
considerable subsidy. Those export subsidies
depress world market prices, making cost-effective
dairy production more difficult in many develop-
ing countries.While frustrating potential milk pro-
ducers, consumers in these developing countries
gain substantively from the transfer of wealth,
which comes in the form of cheaper dairy imports.
3
Since Australia substantially deregulated its
domestic market in 2000–01, domestic market
protection has been radically reduced. Currently,
Australian dairy exports are without explicit export
subsidies.
Eastern Europe and Baltics
AmongWorldTradeOrganization(WTO)members
in Eastern Europe, only the Czech Republic and
Estonia use Green Box policies to support their
domestic dairy industry. These policies are limited.
Under its Domestic Food Aid Plan, the Czech
Republic donates milk to schools. The program’s
monetaryvaluereached$0.74millionin2000.Atthe
same time, the Czech government paid $4.7 million
in support to dairy cow herds through structural
adjustment assistance provided through an invest-
ment aids plan. The monetary value of Estonia’s
school milk program value was small ($0.6 million
in2001)(Megli,Peng,andSoufi2002).
The dairy industry is important in Eastern
Europe. Many countries in the region use Amber
Box policies to support its development.Some even
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TABLE 9.1 Dairy Import Quotas for the Developed Countries under the URAA
(1000 tons)
Butter, Skim Milk Whole Milk
Country/Region Policy Regime Cheese Butter Oil Powder Powder
Western Europe BASE 37.0 79.5 41.2 0.7
GATT 2000 123.1 91.3 69.2 1.1
GATT 2005 194.7 101.0 92.6 1.5
Eastern Europe BASE 6.9 12.6 10.5 3.0
GATT 2000 8.8 20.9 19.0 5.0
GATT 2005 10.4 27.8 26.1 6.7
Japan BASE na 3.5 99.8 0.0
GATT 2000 na 3.5 99.8 0.0
GATT 2005 na 3.5 99.8 0.0
Australia BASE 11.5 na na na
GATT 2000 11.5 na na na
GATT 2005 11.5 na na na
Canada BASE 20.4 2.0 0.9 0.0
GATT 2000 20.4 3.3 0.9 0.0
GATT 2005 20.4 4.4 0.9 0.0
United States BASE 116.4 7.5 1.3 0.5
GATT 2000 136.4 13.1 5.3 3.4
GATT 2005 153.1 17.7 8.6 5.9
na — Not available
Data source: International Dairy Arrangement, Fifteenth Annual Report. November 1994.
BASE and GATT 2000 follow the URAA of the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), assume linear
changes.
GATT 2005 projects the Uruguay Round Agreement linearly to 2005.increased their support to the dairy industry dur-
ing the WTO implementation period. Hungary
increased its support for cow milk from $17.7 mil-
lion in 1996 to $58.5 million in 1998 (nonspecific
component of the aggregate measure of support).
In 1995 and 1996 Slovenia spent $5.5 million on
milk (increasing to $6.6 million in 1997 and 1998)
and $9 million on ice cream in 1997 (decreasing to
$0.8 million in 1998). Compared with negligible
support before 1998, Poland increased its market
support for butter to $6.5 million and $1.9 million
in 1999 and 2000,respectively.
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TABLE 9.2 Tariff Reductions for Dairy Products under the URAA, by Region
(US$/ton for specific duties, percent for ad valorem tariffs)
Butter, Skim Milk Whole Milk
Country/ Policy Policy
Cheese Butter Oil Powder Powder
Region Regime Instrument In-Q Over-Q In-Q Over-Q In-Q Over-Q In-Q Over-Q
Western BASE Specific duties 547 3,643 1,189 3,971 639 1,956 1,773 4,102
Europe GATT 2000 768 2,362 1,225 2,572 632 1,561 1,760 3,486
GATT 2005 952 1,295 1,255 1,406 626 1,232 1,750 2,972
Eastern BASE Ad valorem 53% 181% 39% 187% 67% 200% 40% 160%
Europe GATT 2000 59% 133% 39% 142% 66% 164% 40% 102%
GATT 2005 65% 92% 39% 105% 65% 134% 40% 54%
Japan BASE plus Ad valorem 50% 50% 35% 35% 1.3% 15% 30% 30%
Specific duties 0 0 0 13,406 0 4,954 0 10,228
GATT 2000 Ad valorem 32% 32% 35% 30% 13% 13% 30% 26%
plus Specific duties 0 0 0 11,397 0 4,210 0 8,691
GATT 2005 Ad valorem 17% 17% 35% 25% 13% 11% 30% 22%
plus Specific duties 0% 0% 0% 9,723 0 3,500 0 7,411
Australia BASE Specific duties 71 1,068 74 1% 37 1% 37 1%
GATT 2000 or ad valorem 71 905 0 1% 0 1% 0 1%
GATT 2005 71 769 0 1% 0 1% 0 1%
Canada BASE Specific duties 56 3,794 193 3,483 48 1,720 48 3,315
GATT 2000 24 3,231 83 2,915 21 1,462 21 2,820
GATT 2005 0 2,761 0 2,442 0 1,247 0 2,408
United BASE  plus Ad  valorem 10.5% 0.0% 5.0% 5.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
States Specific duties 0 1,924 62 2,004 33 1,018 68 1,320
GATT 2000 Ad valorem 10.5% 0.0% 4.3% 4.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
plus Specific duties 0 1,636 62 1,703 33 865 68 1,122
GATT 2005 Ad valorem 10.5% 0.0% 3.6% 3.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
plus Specific duties 0 1,395 62 1,453 33 738 68 957
Mexico BASE Ad valorem 50% 95% 35% 35% 0% 139% 0% 139%
GATT 2000 49% 89% 31% 31% 0% 131% 0% 131%
GATT 2005 47% 84% 27% 27% 0% 124% 0% 124%
South BASE Ad valorem 56% 66% 59% 60% 65% 68% 49% 82%
America, GATT 2000 49% 58% 56% 57% 59% 31% 46% 75%
North GATT 2005 44% 51% 53% 54% 54% 56% 43% 69%
South BASE Ad valorem 37% 37% 37% 37% 36% 36% 36% 36%
America, GATT 2000 36% 36% 35% 35% 35% 35% 34% 34%
South GATT 2005 36% 36% 34% 34% 33% 33% 32% 32%
Data source: International Dairy Arrangement, Fifteenth Annual Report, November 1994
BASE and GATT 2000 follow the URAA of the GATT (General Agreement on Tariff and Trade) and assume linear
annual changes.
GATT 2005 projects the Uruguay Round Agreement linearly to 2005. “In q” and “over q” are in quota and above
quota tariff rates respectively.Some countries apply tariff rate quotas (TRQ)
on dairy imports to protect their domestic markets.
The Czech Republic applies TRQs to milk, cream,
yogurt, butter, and ice cream. While the fill rate for
ice cream and yogurt is relatively high, it is low for
butter and even less for milk and cream (less than
1 percent). Similarly, the fill rates for butter in
Slovenia and the Slovak Republic are quite low as
they are for milk and cream in Hungary and
Poland. The resulting reduction in market access
contributes to distortions in world dairy markets,
but the levels are small, reflecting the modest levels
of both trade and support.
The countries of Eastern Europe use different
methods to administer TRQs. The Czech Republic
uses a first-come-first-served method to allocate
them. Hungary uses licenses on demand. For milk
and cream Poland applies licenses on demand; for
other dairy products it uses the applied-tariff
method. Slovenia and the Slovak Republic apply a
license-on-demand method to allocate TRQs. No
matter which method is used, additional import
costs are incurred, and imports are restricted.
Milk powder, butter, cheese, casein, yogurt,
creams, and some other dairy products receive
export subsidy from the Czech Republic, Poland,
and the Slovak Republic. The actual level of export
subsidies is much lower than the commitment lev-
els, however, and these levels have been decreasing
over time.
Latin America
A major question regarding the future of dairy pol-
icy and trade agreements in South America is
whether the Mercosur countries will join with the
NAFTA countries in creating a Free Trade  Area of
the Americas,or FTAA.Initiated in 1994 with nego-
tiations to be finished by 2005, the FTAA project is
considered a single undertaking: nothing is agreed
until all is agreed. If implemented, major changes
can be expected for trade policies in South America,
especially for the Mercosur countries (Megli 2002).
Current trade policies in South America revolve
mainly around the Mercosur policies for the four
main economies of Argentina,Brazil,Paraguay,and
Uruguay.Negotiations are under way to bring Chile
and Bolivia into full member status, and future
negotiations are expected to take place for Colombia,
Peru, and Venezuela.
The implementation of a set of common exter-
nal tariffs and a substantive (if not total) elimina-
tion of internal tariffs and nontariff barriers in
Mercosur countries began in 1995. Certain prod-
ucts or regions are exempted from these regulations
until 2006. Mercosur has 11 different tariff levels
bounded by 20 percent; exceptions can be greater
than 20 percent but no more than 35 percent. As a
result of this common market, trade among the
member countries increased from $4.7 billion in
1991 to $18 billion in 1998.
Other trade agreements exist between countries
in South America. The Andean Group consists of
Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru, while
the Group of Three is made up of Colombia,
Mexico, and Venezuela. Bilateral agreements are
also common (Bolivia-Mexico; Brazil-Argentina).
Chile’s tariff rates are around 8 percent for most
dairy products. Peru has rates of 20 percent on
most dairy products, with a surcharge of 5 percent.
Both countries are members of the Asia Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC). Argentina’s agri-
cultural sector enjoys export rebates that range
from 1.4 to 10 percent.Brazil has a system of export
credits and cash advances for exported products.
East Asia and South Asia
Income, price, tastes, age, and geography are main
factorsaffectingdairyconsumptioninAsia.
4China,
India, Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea,
Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, and Singapore—
all WTO members—are the main dairy producers
and consumers in the region. Because dairy prod-
ucts are not necessary products in Asia, income is
themajorfactoraffectingtheirconsumption.When
incomegoesup,dairyconsumptionwillincrease,as
can be seen from the experience of China, Japan,
and the Republic of Korea. Although the three
countries show similar patterns of food consump-
tion behavior, Japan’s per capita GDP is much
higher than those of Korea and China, and its per
capita consumption of dairy products is 66 and
23 kilograms more,respectively.
In developed countries and cities of developing
countries, dairy products represent a small portion
of total expenditure. Thus, consumers’ reaction to
price change is not highly sensitive.In rural areas of
developing countries, however, where dairy prod-
ucts are a luxury,consumption is highly sensitive to
price changes.
168 Global Agricultural Trade and Developing CountriesMost of the dairy products consumed in Asia are
fluid milk, yogurt, and milk powder. In 1999, for
example, Asia’s consumption of fluid milk and
milk powder accounted for 97 percent of dairy
consumption.
People in dairy-producing areas tend to con-
sume more dairy products than in other regions,
due to easy and convenient access.This may explain
why per capita dairy consumption in South Asia is
higher than in East Asia, even though its per capita
GDP is much lower.
From countries’ notifications to the WTO Agri-
culture Committee, we find that only Japan uses
Green Box policies to support domestic dairy mar-
ket in school-lunch programs. Another potential
user of this policy may be China,which has begun a
program to provide subsidized milk for school chil-
dren in some cities and expects to expand it to the
rest of the country.
With the exception of Japan and Korea, most
countries in East Asia show a negative or de mini-
mus aggregate level of support for agriculture
(Amber Box policy). Japan uses price support pro-
grams for certain dairy products (mainly butter
and skimmed milk powder), and also makes defi-
ciency payments for calves and milk manufactur-
ing. In 2000 Japan’s milk-producer support esti-
mate (PSE) reached $4.7 billion; the nominal
protection coefficient for milk in 1999 was 364 per-
cent (OECD 2001). Korea’s milk producers receive
more than three times the world price for milk.The
PSE for Korean milk reached $0.8 billion in 2000;
the nominal protection coefficient in 1999 was
225 percent. No Asian country uses blue-box poli-
cies to support their dairy sectors.
East Asia protects its dairy markets,and entry of
many imports is governed by tariff rate quotas and
high tariffs. The scale and scope of tariffs differ
widely, however. China, India, Japan, and Korea
impose relatively higher tariffs on dairy products
than do Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, and
Singapore.Ten dairy exports to Japan,five to South
Korea, two to Malaysia, and just one to Indonesia
are subject to tariff rate quotas. Japan’s and Korea’s
tariff rate quotas are allocated on a global basis.For
whey and skim milk powder,Japan’s tariff rate quo-
tas are allocated to producers and producer organi-
zations or sellers of mixed feed.For skim milk pow-
der, whole milk powder, and other milk and cream,
Korea’s tariff rate quotas are allocated according to
the highest-price bidders at quota auctions held by
the livestock products marketing organization. In
Japan, the tariff rate quota fill rates for skimmed
milk powder, whey, and butter are around 50 per-
cent. South Korea and Malaysia have higher fill
rates, but real imports are still lower than tariff rate
quotas. Indonesia has out-of-quota imports, and
the tariff rate quota fill rate is 100 percent.
World dairy trade liberalization would increase
the region’s imports.
The Middle East and North Africa
Dairy tariff levels in the Middle East and North
Africa vary greatly among countries and products.
They appear to be relatively high for nonconcen-
trated milk, cream, and yogurt, for example, and
lower for milk powder and butter.
5 In addition to
tariffs, countries implement regulations aimed at
protecting dairy consumers from fraud. Such regu-
lations impose technical requirements related to
product composition and associated customs pro-
cedures such as sanitary certifications. There are
various bilateral trade arrangements between the
European Union and the countries of the region.
Import tariffs directly affect the supply of dairy
products in the Middle East and North Africa. For
instance,relatively high tariffs on milk powder tend
to increase raw milk supply,while low tariffs on raw
milk handicap local production. Also, low import
tariffs on raw materials and equipment stimulate
the production of processed dairy products and the
derived demand for raw milk. Subsidies are not the
main incentive tool used to encourage raw milk
supply in the Middle East and North Africa.Where
subsidies exist, they support production or trans-
portation, but their level is not always effective.
The Impact of World Dairy 
Policy Reforms
Considerable scope remains for further removal of
trade and domestic support policy distortions in
the Doha Round. Even after full implementation of
the URAA provisions by developed countries,
almost 60 percent of world dairy trade will still be
exported with subsidies (U.S.Dairy Export Council
1999). Market access provisions allow for tariff rate
quotas with prohibitively high rates of out-of-
quota duty (Griffin 1999). Also, special safeguards,
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reduction requirements for individual commodi-
ties undermine the market access provisions of the
URAA (Coleman 1998). Thus, even after full
implementation,world dairy markets will continue
to be characterized by highly subsidized exports,
limited market access, and heavy government
intervention.
As part of the URAA, countries agreed to begin
new agricultural negotiations by the beginning of
2000, and dairy groups in several countries have
detailed their policy objectives and positions for the
Doha Round. U.S. dairy industry representatives
outlined their negotiating priorities early on (U.S.
Dairy Export Council 1999). Those priorities
include gradual elimination of export subsidies,
reduction and harmonization of high tariffs, and
tightening disciplines on domestic supports. By
eliminating export subsidies and reducing import
barriers, it is assumed that world prices will rise
sufficiently for the United States to be competitive
in world markets (Kirkpatrick 1998). Countries of
the Cairns Group (with the exception of Canada),
which represents small- and medium-sized agricul-
tural exporters, are pushing for measures that go
even further toward freer markets and liberalized
trade (Cairns Group Farm Ministers 1998). While
the negotiating goals of the European Union are
not yet articulated, their priorities will likely
involve minimizing increases in import access and
reductions in export subsidies, as well as maintain-
ing the Blue Box and the Peace Clause (Oxford
Analytica 1998).
The implications of alternative proposals on
developed versus developing countries are not well
researched. This chapter addresses these questions
by simulating various dairy policy liberalization
scenarios using the University of Wisconsin-
Madison World Dairy Model (UW-WDM).
6 The
results of the simulations provide insights into the
tradeoffs between the heavily protected developed
economies and the developing economies, provid-
ing quantitative measures of the impact of those
tradeoffs on economic welfare and world trade.
World Dairy Deregulation Scenarios
A first scenario, discussed here in detail, contem-
plates full dairy sector liberalization: all trade and
domestic support policies are removed between
2001 and 2005. Full world dairy sector liberaliza-
tion combines two other scenarios: free dairy trade,
and no domestic support.The free-dairy-trade sce-
nario considers the elimination of all trade distor-
tions for 2001 through 2005. All export subsidies
and import tariff rate quotas (quotas, in- and out-
of-quota tariffs) are eliminated. Domestic support
policies are maintained as in the base scenario.This
should increase world trade, increase world market
prices, and put considerable strain on several
domestic support policies (intervention price pro-
grams, in particular) in the protected dairy sectors.
The no-domestic-support scenario eliminates all
domestic supports from 2001 to 2005. These meas-
ures include intervention prices for the European
Union (SMP), Canada (butter and SMP), the
United States (butter, SMP, cheese), and other
countries; the elimination of classified pricing in
the United States and Canada (modeled as a price
premium for residual—fluid, soft, and frozen—
products over manufactured products); and elimi-
nation of production and marketing quotas in the
European Union and Canada.
Because the United States incurred large costs in
the base year (2000) through its intervention/price
support program (about $500 million in SMP pur-
chases), domestic deregulation would have strong
impacts on U.S. milk prices. Similarly, given the
large levels of rents from milk-production quotas
in the European Union and Canada (35 percent
and 40 percent of the domestic milk prices, respec-
tively), elimination of these policies would sharply
increase these countries’competitiveness (no quota
constraints and sharply reduced production costs).
Hence milk production would increase sharply
even as milk prices and revenues drop.
Domestic deregulation would lower prices in the
protected dairy economies and thus lower world
dairy prices, but it would not necessarily widen
access to competitive exports—unless out-of-quota
tariffs became less prohibitive at the lower market
prices.Moreover,the increased milk production for
the European Union and Canada would need to
find a market, potentially beyond domestic con-
sumption, and so would likely displace base-level
imports by these dairy sectors and reduce other
countries’potential for export-market growth.
We focus our presentation of the simulation
results on the main scenario (full liberalization)
and refer readers to the annex tables for the sepa-
rate second and third scenarios.
170 Global Agricultural Trade and Developing CountriesFull world dairy sector liberalization. Devel-
oped economies with dairy sectors characterized by
strong protection from domestic and trade policies
would experience large changes from full liberaliza-
tion, with large transfers from producers to con-
sumers. In the absence of rents from milk produc-
tion quotas,EU milk prices would fall 23 percent by
2005,generating a moderately competitive EU milk
sector and expanded production (approximately
8 percent at prices roughly 20 percent less than base
levels by 2005).The expansion implies a potentially
radical restructuring of the EU milk sector toward
more efficient farms. Dairy exports would increase
16 percent, while imports would fall 50 percent by
2005, suggesting that lower domestic prices (inter-
vention price floors having been eliminated) and
larger domestic milk availability at sharply lower
prices (due to quota elimination) would cut
imports. Currently competitive exporters, there-
fore, would suffer. The current producer surplus
would take a massive hit of $8.1 billion by 2005,
and the social and political costs of the implied rad-
ical restructuring of the milk production sector
would be nontrivial. Consumers would be the big
gainers from deregulation (due to falling prices),
with large welfare gains of $8.1 billion. Total gov-
ernment costs would fall slightly (lost tariff rev-
enues offset by reduced costs of domestic support
and export subsidies). Consumer and treasury
gains would offset producer losses, yielding net
welfare gains of $1.1 billion.
The scenario would work similarly in Japan. By
2005 Japanese milk production would fall by
23 percent, milk prices by 54 percent, and the pro-
ducer surplus by 61 percent (or $3.2 billion). The
concurrent removal of domestic regulations would
have little effect because trade barriers sustain most
of the domestic programs. Imports would increase
by 134 percent, bringing consumers a surplus of
$4 billion. Net government revenues would fall by
$21 million (lost tariff revenues net of smaller
domestic policy savings). Consumer gains would
offset producer and treasury losses to generate net
welfare gains of $1.1 billion.
While the dairy sectors in Canada and the
United States use both trade policies and domestic
support programs, they derive more protection
from the former (subsidized exports and limited
market access due to import quotas and higher out-
of-quota tariffs). Under the full liberalization sce-
nario, Canada’s milk prices would drop by 44 per-
cent and production by 4 percent, significantly
more than under the no-domestic-support sce-
nario. Dairy exports would fall by 6 percent, while
imports would increase 215 percent (versus 80 per-
cent export expansion and 5 percent contraction of
imports,under the no-domestic-support scenario).
Producer surpluses would be cut in half (to
$1.4 billion) by 2005, but consumer welfare gains
would be even greater at $1.6 billion (up 14 per-
cent).Total government revenues would fall slightly
(lost tariff revenues being not quite offset by gains
from elimination of export subsidies, the interven-
tion price program, and production and marketing
subsidies). Consumer welfare gains would offset
producer and treasury losses, yielding a net welfare
gain of 2.7 percent ($385 million).
In the United States, milk production (–7 per-
cent), prices (–12 percent), and producer surplus
(–17 percent, –$2.7 billion) would fall sharply by
2005 under full liberalization, about three times
more than under the no-domestic-support sce-
nario. These relative impacts indicate that U.S pro-
ducers enjoy substantive protection from current
trade-policy distortions. U.S. exports would fall
61 percent (down 331,000 metric tons), while
imports would more than double (130 percent,
510,000 metric tons) by 2005. U.S. consumers
would gain $3.4 billion (4 percent); government
costs would be reduced by $147 million (lost tariff
revenues net of gains from eliminating intervention
price and export subsidy costs). These gains would
exceed producer losses by $2.7 billion to generate
net welfare gains of $729 million (0.7 percent) by
2005.
As expected, Oceania’s dairy producers and
processors would gain under full liberalization,
despite giving up large quota rents (especially New
Zealand) associated with current preferential
(quota) access to the protected developed-economy
markets. As low-cost exporters, Australia and New
Zealand would be able to fully exploit their com-
parative advantage in undistorted world dairy mar-
kets, increasing milk production by 6 percent, pro-
ducer prices by 22 percent, and the producer
surplus by 42 percent, or $1.1 billion, by 2005.
Their exports would rise by 21 percent, or 429,000
metric tons, by 2005. The production and trade
gains would be less than under the free-trade-alone
scenario, because that scenario would not increase




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































172production in Canada and the European Union.
Consumer losses would pale in comparison to the
substantive producer gains, generating net total
welfare gains of 8.8 percent, or $1 billion, by 2005.
Developing-country exporters would enjoy the
same benefits from full dairy sector liberalization
as Oceania, but at slightly lower levels of gain and
with larger transfers from consumers to producers
(table 9.3). Wider access to developed-economy
markets and elimination of export subsidies would
generate aggregate increases in milk production
(2.6 percent), prices (1–24 percent), and producer
surpluses ($2.5 billion, or 9.3 percent), suggesting
substantialimport-substitutionandexport opportu-
nities available in some of these countries. However,
the aggregate consumer surplus in the developing
countries would fall by $2.6 billion (1.9 percent)
because of the loss of subsidized imports and higher
domestic prices (except in Eastern European coun-
tries). Together with the loss of tariff revenues
($114 million), aggregate consumer and taxpayer
losses would slightly dominate producer gains,
generating modest welfare losses ($173 million, or
0.1 percent) by 2005.The political economy of dairy
reform is complex even in developing countries,
because consumer and producer interests are dia-
metrically opposed. The poverty implications are
also stark, pitching poor consumers (who benefit
from the current regime) against the rural dairy
sector,which would gain under free markets.
Consumers in net-importing regions would
gain or lose depending on the tradeoffs between
increased world import prices (a negative impact)
and increased dairy trade (a positive impact). The
loss of previously subsidized imports can be offset
by gains from broadly expanding trade depending
on the size, composition, and direction of import
price increases. Many governments currently tax
their consumers—removing those taxes could off-
set price increases. Although there may be some
opportunity to expand domestic production to
substitute for previously subsidized imports, the
cost-competitiveness of scale-efficient exporters
makes this less viable for many of these countries
that would experience negative impacts on milk
production, prices, and producer surpluses under
full liberalization. These producer surplus losses
could be offset by consumer gains,notably in South
America (dominated by Brazil), where dismantling
Mercosur common external import tariffs would
generate lower prices and large consumer gains
($1.7 billion, or 3.3 percent). Several regions would
show substantive increases in production, price,
and producer surplus,notably the FSU (with a pro-
ducer surplus gain of $2.6 billion). Treasuries in all
countries would suffer from lost tariff revenues.
Aggregate treasury losses would amount to $1.7 bil-
lion exceeding modest aggregate producer gains of
$298 million and consumer gains of $521 million.
Net welfare losses would be $861 million by 2005.
Under full liberalization aggregate world milk
production would rise by 1.1 percent by 2005.
Average milk prices would decrease by 7.8 percent
overall, falling 20.7 percent in the developed coun-
tries, while rising 2.7 percent in the developing
countries,reflectingthemodestlosstoconsumersin
the latter countries on average. World dairy trade
wouldexpandbymorethan2millionmetrictonsby
2005 as the impacts of domestic deregulation
(chiefly quota removal) reinforced the impacts from
the elimination of trade barriers. World producer
surpluses would fall sharply in the developed coun-
tries(–$14.5billion,–25percent)whileincreasingin
the developing countries ($2.8 million,4.1 percent).
Developed-countrylosseswouldbedueprimarilyto
the loss of quota value in the European Union and
Canada,and to the removal of substantive domestic
supports (in Japan and the United States).
Savings from elimination of domestic and
export subsidies would exceed lost tariff revenues
in the developed countries, generating a net treas-
ury savings of $1.2 billion by 2005. In developing
countries, where domestic supports are generally
much smaller, their elimination would not offset
the loss of tariff revenues, generating net increases
in treasury costs of $1.8 billion, which could be an
issue in some developing countries with few alter-
native fiscal sources. Aggregate world treasury rev-
enues would fall nearly $611 million by 2005. Con-
sumer welfare would increase by $17.5 billion in
the developed countries, while falling $2 billion in
the developing regions. In the developed countries,
gains by consumers and taxpayers would exceed
producer losses, generating $4.2 billion in net wel-
fare gains by 2005.Just the opposite would occur in
the developing regions, where producer gains
would fail to offset consumer and treasury losses on
average, yielding net welfare losses of $1 billion.
Because the markets of the developed countries
are so much larger than those of the developing
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(at $15.4 billion) than aggregate producer losses of
$11.7 billion and treasury losses of $611 million,
yielding net welfare gains for the world of $3.1 bil-
lion by 2005. These aggregate patterns hide the
variability in individual country impacts and the
large transfers at work between consumers and
producers within many countries.
Other scenarios. The free-trade scenario models
the elimination in 2001 of export subsidies and all
tariff rate quota barriers, while keeping substantive
domestic supports in place. In the absence of
changes in domestic support programs, free trade
would decrease welfare overall, pointing to the fis-
cally unsustainable nature of domestic programs
under conditions of free trade. Free trade would
have the effect of stimulating domestic supports,
possibly leading to violations of WTO ceilings on
aggregate measure of support.
Under the scenario of free trade alone, trade-
protected producers in developed economies
would suffer substantive losses as their domestic
consumers enjoyed world prices. In the protected
developed countries, milk prices, exports, and pro-
ducer surpluses would fall, while imports would
climb. Elimination of export subsidies would not
offset the loss of tariff revenues in Canada or the
European Union, yielding net treasury and welfare
losses in these countries. Exporting developing
countries and Oceania’s dairy producers and
processors would realize strong gains due to free
access to higher-priced, protected markets. Con-
sumers in these countries would lose, but not as
much as producers gain, resulting in net welfare
gains. Consumers in net-importing dairy regions
would gain or lose depending on the tradeoffs
between increased import prices (a negative
impact) and increased trade (a positive impact)
from elimination of tariffs on imports into these
regions.
In the last scenario, that in which domestic sup-
ports are eliminated but trade barriers remain,
dairy producers in developed countries with strong
domestic support and production controls would
suffer as production quotas and associated rents
were eliminated. Lower prices would lead ineffi-
cient producers to exit the market and nearly elim-
inate imports to these markets. In the European
Union, producers would take a massive hit, offset
by strong consumer welfare gains. Total govern-
ment costs would fall, yielding substantive net wel-
fare gains of $4 billion,much larger than under full
liberalization results ($1.1 billion). Similar forces
would apply in Canada. Dairy sectors that were
more protected by trade barriers than domestic
subsidies (such as Japan) would not experience
such losses. The United States would bear the full
brunt of domestic policy deregulation, as U.S. milk
prices, production, and producer surpluses all
would fall sharply. Reduced government costs and
massive consumer gains would offset producer
losses, however, leading to a net welfare gain. In
Oceania, New Zealand would gain and Australia
would lose under the no-domestic-support sce-
nario. Milk production, prices, and producer sur-
plus would rise across most of the developing
world, but consumers in unprotected markets
would face higher prices. Impacts on net importers
in the developing world would be quite similar to
those for potential developing-country exporters,
with the notable exception of the FSU, where con-
sumer gains would barely exceed producer losses to
generate a breakeven net welfare impact.
Conclusions
The world dairy sector is complex and character-
ized by multifaceted domestic and trade policy dis-
tortions. The results of our simulation model
(detailed by commodity, policy, and region) pro-
vide a quantitative measure of the economic and
welfare impacts of those distortions across regions,
producers,consumers,and governments.While the
usual limitations of sectoral simulation studies
should be kept in mind, the simulations confirm
what most standard economic policy analyses
suggest—that the numerous and sizeable distor-
tions induced by most developed economies to
protect their domestic dairy sectors have large and
generally negative spillover effects on competitive
exporters and developing countries. Liberalization
would lessen those spillovers, creating opportuni-
ties for growth in the domestic and potentially
export-oriented portions of the dairy sectors in
developing countries, but several caveats must be
noted.
Liberalization would also cut into the large
benefits that now accrue to consumers who enjoy
access to subsidized dairy products on world
174 Global Agricultural Trade and Developing Countriesmarkets thanks to the current protection regimes
of the developed countries. Millions of these con-
sumers live in poorer countries with low border
protection and limited capacity to develop a dairy
sector. The interests of these developing countries
diverge starkly from those of others having an
actual or potential dairy industry.
World Dairy Sector Growth: A Component
Perspective
World product markets are increasingly driven by
milk components (milk fat and fat fractionations;
casein, whey, and other protein fractionations; and
lactose). Current world growth trends are domi-
nated by “industrial” demand for dairy-based
ingredients—intermediate products, not consumer
products. This growth in demand is driven by
advances in food processing,both on the input side
(fractionations of milk components) and the pro-
duction side (processes that optimize cost and
functionality using the evolving dairy-based ingre-
dients), and by consumer demand for the final
processed products. Shaping a competitive dairy
sector in a world context will require producers to
have component-based marketing plans, to organ-
ize incentive structures rewarding such plans, and
to meet quality standards regimes. Making use of
new dairy-based ingredients demands a moderately
sophisticated food-processing sector and technol-
ogy. Size and scale economies are important in
many of these processes, suggesting differential
advantages to larger firms and to firms with foreign
direct investment backed by knowledge, expertise,
and ready capital.
Prospects for World Dairy Policy Liberalization
Trends in dairy product development and markets
occur in the context of current and evolving
WTO agricultural trade negotiations. Short-term
prospects for further dairy trade liberalization in
developed markets may be somewhat limited,how-
ever.The heavily protected dairy sectors of Canada,
the European Union, Japan, and the United States
are not likely to open their markets before reducing
subsidy levels. While the United States and Canada
would likely support liberalization in grains,
oilseeds, and livestock products, dairy remains
an especially sensitive industry. Meanwhile, the
European Union is absorbed in its expansion to the
East and the new 2003 CAP reforms, which leave
dairy relatively unchanged.
U.S. dairy policy as articulated in the 2002 Farm
Bill increases domestic subsidies through the Milk
Income Loss Contract program. Meanwhile, low-
cost dairy exporters (Australia, Argentina, and
Eastern Europe) will likely continue pushing hard
for additional market access through lower tariffs,
lower export subsidies, and increased import
quotas.
The fundamental question is,“Who has the bar-
gaining power in dairy issues?” The WTO meeting
in Cancún in 2003 changed this calculus by creating
strong opportunities for expansion of regional
trade agreements (as opposed to a difficult global
agreement) that will limit access by nonmembers.
Expansion of the European Union will provide
protected access to new members, benefiting the
dairy sectors in several Eastern European countries.
However, managing the EU’s structural milk sur-
plus will remain challenging in the face of existing
WTO commitments, the integration of Eastern
Europe, and the relatively strong entrenchment of
protectionist farm lobbies. The interests and influ-
ence of EU dairy processors and consumers, both
of whom would benefit in a liberalized market,
compete directly with the established interests of
the milk producers.
Prospects for Developing Economies
The potential for domestic market growth is driven
by population and GDP. Population growth stimu-
lates consumption of traditional dairy products;
whereas increased incomes favor growth in new
value-added products. Slow GDP growth will stall
consumption of both types of products.
What firms will supply the demand of growing
populations of more affluent consumers in the
developing world? Will they be local or multina-
tional firms? Will they use local milk supplies,
imported dairy ingredients, or some combination
of the two? Industry structure and infrastructure
are crucial to answering these questions. Scale effi-
cient (low-cost) and innovative processing firms
are likely to have competitive advantages in meet-
ing these potential growth markets. Local versus
multinational ownership will be influenced by
access to and the cost of capital and by the firms’
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direct investment is often used to overcome market
access limitations allowed by the current WTO
agreement and regulations by countries that permit
only domestically owned firms to import dairy
products.
Export potential into the developed economies
will be closely linked to further dairy trade liberal-
ization characterized by increased market access
and lower domestic subsidies. In this context, opti-
mal world supply and demand will remain a crucial
determinant of export prices and hence will define
the competitive context of world trade. If recent
trends continue,export markets should remain rel-
atively competitive, with lower production costs
and prices, but also with some structural weakness
in demand due to macroeconomic factors.Discern-
ing the differential potential for market growth in
value-added products (which are sensitive to con-
sumer income) versus bulk commodities (which
are more responsive to price) will require careful
consideration.
Overall, countries that are actual or potential
dairy producers and exporters stand to gain from
an unfettered market, but as liberalization occurs,
special consideration should be given to poor con-
sumers who are likely to suffer from higher con-
sumer prices. Poor consumers in such countries
will be hurt, at least in the short run, by a move to
global free trade in dairy products unless special
measures are taken.
Notes
1. The CD-ROM included with this volume contains
an annex for this chapter presenting detailed market data
and policy information by country, a description of the model
used here, and additional tables of results of policy-reform
simulations.
2. In this section all dairy products are expressed as total
solids, milk equivalent, to facilitate comparisons.
3. The European Union and, to a lesser extent, Canada, and
the United States have had substantive export subsidy
allowances under the URAA and used them—a major impedi-
ment to the expansion of dairy production in many developing
countries.
4. This discussion draws on Peng (2002).
5. See Soufi (2002) for further details.
6. The model is described on the CD-ROM that accompa-
nies this volume.See also Zhu,Cox,and Chavaz (1999) and Cox
and others (1999).
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176 Global Agricultural Trade and Developing Countriesmarkets. Clearly, however, domestic price stabiliza-
tion policies have been pursued by restricting im-
ports, in turn contributing substantially to interna-
tional market thinness. Therefore, it is difficult to
ignore the effect of domestic stabilization policies
achieved through import and export restrictions
as a significant cause of international rice price
instability.
In addition to the thinness of rice trade,another
important structural characteristic is the geo-
graphic concentration of production and con-
sumption in Asia.More than 90 percent of produc-
tion and consumption occur in Asia—nearly
two-thirds of it in just three countries (China,
India, and Indonesia). With as much as 40 percent
of Asian rice cultivated under rain-fed systems,
the monsoon weather effects are magnified on
rice trade.
Finally,there is substantial market segmentation
by rice type and quality.A key structural dimension
is the degree of end-use differentiation. Substitu-
tion among rice types and qualities is limited by
differences in taste preferences.Low substitutability
Rice is one of the most important food grains in the
world, accounting for more than 20 percent of
global calories consumed and 29 percent in low-
income countries (table 10.1). Thus, policies that
affect rice prices,production,and trade have a large
impact on the poor.
Despite the importance of rice as a basic staple,
global trade accounts for only 6.5 percent of con-
sumption. That means that most countries are self-
sufficient in rice and face increased price volatility
in times of production shortfalls. By contrast,
wheat trade accounts for 18 percent of consump-
tion, corn for 12 percent, and soybeans for 35 per-
cent (USDA PS&D 2003). The thinness of trade for
rice stems primarily from the use of protectionist
mechanisms to achieve national policy objectives
of domestic food security and support for producer
prices and incomes in major rice-producing and 
-consuming countries (box 10.1).
Jayne (1993) argues that the link between
domestic stabilization policies and instability in
world rice prices has been exaggerated, empha-
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for rice exists on both demand (mill and end-use)
and supply sides. On the demand side, the closest
substitute is wheat,particularly important in South
Asia (India and Pakistan). In many Asian nations
rice has become an inferior good, so that as
incomes rise it is replaced by meats, fruits, and
vegetables.
On the supply side, different rice varieties
require different climatic conditions and produc-
tion and milling technologies.This limits the ability
of producers to respond to price incentives by
switching the type of rice produced. Production
benefits greatly from access to plentiful supplies of
surface or ground water and soils with poor
drainage that can maintain a flood condition.
While these characteristics limit the potential rice
production area, they also limit the production of
other crops that cannot withstand flood condi-
tions. Development of rice varieties that will be
much less dependent on water will have the poten-
tial to greatly expand production areas suitable for
cultivation, changing costs of production and geo-
graphic areas of comparative advantage and disad-
vantage. As the first major food crop to have its
genomic structure fully described, rice genomics
and biotechnology are progressing rapidly (Khush
and Brar 2002).
Thus, the combination of high levels of domestic
protection, geographic concentration, erratic
weather, inelastic price responses in production and
end-use markets,and relatively thinly traded volumes
results in volatile prices and trade (Wailes 2002).
TABLE 10.1 Share of Calories from Rice by Region and Income Level, 2000
Total Calories Rice Calories Share of Calories
Region Per Capita Per Capita from Rice (%)
World 2,805 576 20.5
Developed countries 3,260 118 3.6
Developing countries 2,679 703 26.2
Low-income countries 2,405 702 29.2
Low-income food-deficit countries 2,625 732 27.9
Africa 2,434 178 7.3
Asia 2,713 856 31.6
Sub-Saharan Africa 2,226 174 7.8
South America 2,838 315 11.1
North and Central America 3,411 117 3.4
Europe 3,250 45 1.4
Source: FAOSTAT.
BOX 10.1 Definitions of Rice Trade Flows in This Study
The international rice trade is differentiated by
type, quality, degree of processing, and degree
of milling. Long-grain varieties are typically
longer than 6.2 millimeters , while medium- and
short-grain varieties are 6.2 millimeters or less.
Many factors enter into the designation of qual-
ity for long-grain rice, including share of broken
kernels, seeds, chalkiness, and color. In this study
high quality refers to grain that contains 10 per-
cent or less of broken kernels and low quality to
rice that contains more than 10 percent broken
kernels. Paddy rice refers to rice as it is harvested
in the field before the husk and bran layer are
removed. Brown rice, also referred to as cargo or
husked rice, has had the husk removed but
retains the bran layer. Milled rice, also referred to
as white rice, has had both the husk and bran
layers removed. The fragrant rice varieties, bas-
mati and jasmine, are generally considered long-
grain types but are marketed and priced in
global markets differently from unscented long-
grain varieties.Rice Trade and Policies in the
Major Producing and Consuming
Nations
Because rice has been so highly protected in both
industrial and developing nations, trade liberaliza-
tion under the Uruguay Round Agreement on
Agriculture is having a profound impact on the
international rice market (Wailes 2002). Trade has
essentially doubled in volume and as a share of con-
sumption since the 1970s and 1980s (figure 10.1).
The changes in protection have been modest,
however,and rice remains one of the most protected
food commodities in world trade.
As a result of the more limited and longer mar-
ket access reforms required for developing coun-
tries under the Uruguay Round, rice policies in
developing countries have not changed signifi-
cantly since the early 1990s. This lack of rice policy
reforms has intensified price volatility, placing a
heavy burden on poor consumers and on govern-
ments to provide food distribution programs for
the poor. The coefficient of variation of domestic
prices in real terms over the past 20 years was 0.43
in India and 0.26 in Indonesia; it was 0.37 in China
over the past 16 years.However,some price stability
was achieved in these Asian countries in the 1990s
because real world prices had fallen dramatically
during this period as well as variability.
The major rice-producing countries are also the
major rice-consuming countries and leading rice
exporters and importers (tables 10.2 and 10.3 and
annex table 1 on the CD-ROM).
China
China, the largest rice-producing and -consuming
country, accounts for nearly a third of the global
rice economy. Rice has been an important compo-
nent of China’s food grain security objectives and
has been managed through procurement support
prices to ensure stable supplies. Government rice
stocks increased in the late 1990s to about 100 mil-
lion metric tons, 73 percent of domestic use. In
1999 the government eliminated purchases of low-
quality early season rice and lowered the procure-
ment prices for its rice purchases. The area planted
with rice has declined (USDA PS&D 2003),and rice
stocks were reduced by more than 30 percent by the
end of 2002, to 67.6 million metric tons. In some
coastal provinces the government has since elimi-
nated its procurement policy entirely, leaving pro-
ducers to sell their rice in the open market (Wade
and Junyang 2003). The government policy now
emphasizes quality over quantity, and rice produc-
ers are quickly adopting improved quality varieties.
The rice tariff rate quota negotiated by China
was initially 2.66 million metric tons in 2002,
Rice: Global Trade, Protectionist Policies, and the Impact of Trade Liberalization 179
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Source: USDA PS&D 2003.equally divided between long-grain and medium-
and short-grain or other rice (WTO 2001). Only
10 percent of the long-grain tariff rate quota and
50 percent of the medium-short grain quota are
designated for private firms. The tariff rate quota
rose to 3.78 million metric tons in 2003 and will
increase to 5.32 million metric tons by 2004 (Sun
and Branson 2002; Zhang, Matthews, and Branson
2002). Nearly all rice imports are fragrant jasmine
rice, primarily from Thailand. Domestic produc-
tion of fragrant rice is increasing, however, and
displacing imports. Unless there is a significant
adverse weather event, China is not expected to fill
its rice tariff rate quota. In-quota tariffs are 1 per-
cent for grains (including milled rice) and no more
than 10 percent for partially processed grain prod-
ucts. Over-quota tariffs will be 76 percent initially,
reduced to 65 percent in 2004 (WTO 2001).
China is a significant exporter of low-quality
long-grain rice, with principal markets in Côte
d’Ivoire, Cuba, and Indonesia. Medium-grain rice
is exported competitively into Russia, Japan, the
Republic of Korea, and the Democratic Republic of
Korea (Hansen and others 2002). While the state
trading agency handles most rice exports, export
subsidies are not considered necessary for China’s
rice export shipments (except for out-of-condition
stock liquidation).
India
As the second-largest rice producer, consumer, and
exporter,India plays an important role in the global
rice economy. India is a major supplier of low-
quality long-grain rice and fragrant basmati rice.
Like China,India views rice as a strategic commod-
ity for food security based on grains (rice and
wheat). Consequently, the government intervenes
in the market through grain procurement, price
supports, and export subsidies. In recent years the
government has procured some 25 percent of the
annual harvested crop to replenish government
stocks. Since April 2001 the government has
actively subsidized rice exports at 50 percent
of procurement prices, underselling Pakistan,
Thailand, and Vietnam in low-quality long-grain
markets by $15–$20 a metric ton. Major markets
for India’s low-quality parboiled and regular
long-grain rice include Bangladesh, Côte d’Ivoire,
Indonesia, Nigeria, Philippines, and South Africa.
Major markets for basmati rice include the
European Union (EU), Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia,
and United Arab Emirates.
India bound its rice tariffs under the Uruguay
Round at zero percent. Until May 1997 all rice was
imported through the Food Corporation of India.
Under an agreement to privatize the rice trade, the
government negotiated higher import tariffs that
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TABLE 10.2 Leading Rice-Producing, -Consuming, -Exporting, and -Importing
Countries
Rank Producing Consuming Exporting Importing
1 China China Thailand Indonesia
2 India India India Nigeria
3 Indonesia Indonesia Vietnam Bangladesh
4 Bangladesh Bangladesh United States Iran
5 Vietnam Vietnam China Philippines
6 Thailand Japan Pakistan Brazil
7 Japan Thailand Uruguay Iraq
8 Myanmar Myanmar Argentina Saudi Arabia
9 Philippines Philippines Egypt European Union
10 Brazil Brazil Myanmar Senegal
11 United States Korea, Rep. of Australia China
12 Korea, Rep. of United States Japan South Africa
13 Pakistan Nigeria European Union Côte d’Ivoire
14 Egypt Egypt Guyana Malaysia
15 Cambodia Iran Ecuador Cuba
Source: USDA PS&D 2003.become effective April 2000. Current tariffs are
80 percent on paddy, brown rice, and broken rice
and 70 percent on milled rice.
Indonesia
The third-largest rice-producing and -consuming
country, Indonesia is also the largest rice importer.
Rice policy, particularly price stabilization policy,
was historically implemented through quantitative
management of imports by the state monopoly,the
National Logistics Agency (BULOG). In late 1998,
Indonesia agreed to liberalize the rice trade to pri-
vate traders, but unable to sustain the domestic
floor price,the government restored market powers
to BULOG.
Following Indonesia’s financial collapse and po-
litical instability in the late 1990s, the government
sought to stabilize and support producer rice prices
through a specific rice tariff of 430 rupiahs (Rp)
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TABLE 10.3 Net Rice Trade, 1982–2002
(thousands of metric tons)
Countries by Trade Status 1982–83 1990–91 1995–96 2001–02
Net exporters 9,167 12,041 17,415 24,522
Thailand 4,111 4,432 5,249 7,468
India −255 643 2,900 5,275
Vietnam −65 1,481 3,183 3,685
United States 2,222 2,070 2,302 2,699
China 631 731 15 1,738
Pakistan 1,159 1,347 1,733 1,225
Myanmar 739 181 140 1,000
Uruguay 191 302 619 550
Egypt 43 184 269 350
Australia 286 534 567 310
Argentina 106 140 440 222.5
Net importers 4,735 5,460 9,789 15,129
Indonesia 744 366 960 3375
Nigeria 774 260 325 1803
Iran 715 938 1431 1,250
Iraq 364 408 489 1175
Philippines −16 175 829 1,050
Saudi Arabia 507 553 716 919
Brazil 187 708 801 650
South Africa 152 339 466 650
Côte d'Ivoire 329 216 402 637.5
Malaysia 386 333 483 616.5
Japan −135 18 461 525
European Union 321 33 492 525
Mexico 53 280 290 472
Bangladesh 249 25 593 387.5
Eastern Europe 10 0 163 311 367.5
Hong Kong (China) 369 398 345 320
Turkey 44 227 301 272.5
Canada 102 182 233 242.5
Taiwan (China) −452 −150 −193 −54
Korea, Rep. of 44 −85 8 −55
Rest of the World 4,432 6,581 7,626 9,380
Source: USDA PS&D 2003.per kilogram (equivalent to a 30 percent ad val-
orem tariff).Nontariff barriers and trader response
to risks and regulation (including a 2002 require-
ment for an import license and redlining) have
raised the effective rate of protection to 100 percent
(Timmer 2002). Average border prices of milled
rice were $200 per metric ton in 2002, while
monthly retail prices in Jakarta averaged $377 per
metric ton (Katial-Zemany and Alam 2003). It is
believed that a significant share of imports in 2002
was smuggled into the country, thanks to a porous
border and this large difference between world and
domestic prices.
The tariff policy is currently under review, and
producers are pressuring for an increase to Rp 510
per kilogram, equivalent to a 36 percent tariff but
well below the WTO (World Trade Organization)
bound rate of 160 percent until 2004 (Katial-
Zemany and Alam 2003). Floor prices for paddy
and milled rice were increased by 13 percent in
2003. In early 2003 BULOG’s status was changed
from a state agency to a state trading enterprise. It
continues to distribute subsidized rice to low-
income consumers. Current import and domestic
price support policies clearly have negative conse-
quences for Indonesia’s consumers, especially poor
consumers, and negative consequences on real
wages and therefore economic growth.
Bangladesh
Bangladesh is the fourth-largest rice-producing
and -consuming nation and an important but
highly variable rice import market. Since much of
the rice production in Bangladesh is dependent on
monsoon weather,production can fluctuate greatly.
In 1998 Bangladesh was the world’s second largest
importer at 2.5 million metric tons, but since 1998
it has imported an average of only 500,000 metric
tons annually.
In 2000 Bangladesh imposed an import tariff of
5 percent on rice. The rate was raised to 25 percent
in 2001, and a 10 percent regulatory duty was
added mid-year, along with an advance income tax
of 3 percent and a development surcharge of 2.5 per-
cent. These import protections along with a crop
shortfall in 2001 and a policy shift to distributing
money instead of food grains in the national food
distribution program resulted in a higher domestic
price and a rise in smuggled imports from India.As
a result, the government withdrew the 10 percent
regulatory duty in 2002 and more recently reduced
letter-of-credit margins from 100 percent to 25 per-
cent. Import restrictions that remained in 2003
include a tariff of 22.5 percent, an advance income
tax of 3 percent, and a development surcharge of
3.5 percent. Bangladesh imposes no quantitative
restrictions.
Vietnam
Vietnam produces the fifth-largest rice crop and is
also the fifth-largest rice-consuming country. Fol-
lowing the adoption of the Doi Moi reform pro-
gram in late 1986, Vietnam’s rice economy recov-
ered, and by the mid-1990s Vietnam had become
the world’s second-largest rice exporter. Vietnam
exports both high- and low-quality long-grain rice.
Important export destinations include Cuba,
Indonesia, Iraq, Malaysia, and several African
countries. Rice exports and prices are under the
control of the Ministry of Trade and Vietnam’s
Food Association (Vinafood) (Young, Wailes,
Cramer, and Tri Khiem 2002).
Vietnam has no significant production support
policies or export subsidy programs. Vietnam and
the other major Asian rice exporters (China, India,
Pakistan, and Thailand) have discussed the forma-
tion of a rice export cartel in response to the low
world prices for rice since 1999. India rejected the
idea, but the others are developing the concept.
Thailand
Thailand has been the world’s leading rice exporter
for the past several decades. Private export compa-
nies supply world markets with a wide range of
long-grain rice, including the fragrant jasmine rice.
The primary government rice policy is the paddy
mortgage scheme, a loan program operated under
the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Coopera-
tives (BAAC). Participating farmers can obtain
loans from BAAC using their crop as collateral.The
loan price is set at 95 percent of a government-
determined target price. In 2002 loan rice prices
were $8 to $10 per metric ton higher than market
prices (a 10 percent price support). Nearly a third
of the Thai crop was pledged to the loan price sup-
port program. Government stocks increased as
farmers defaulted on their loans. The government
182 Global Agricultural Trade and Developing Countriesprocured rice is milled and then exported through
government-to-government arrangements.
Japan
Japan’s rice economy is supported by the high
prices paid by consumers. Japan controls rice
imports through a tariff rate quota with a prohibi-
tive over-quota tariff.As the traditional staple food,
rice dominates the government’s agricultural policy
(Fukuda, Dyck, and Stout 2003).
In 1996 the government ended regulation of rice
marketing, freeing up wholesale and retail markets
from government supervision and licensing
requirements. With market liberalization, farm-
gate prices have declined. In 1998 the government
adopted the Rice Farming Income Stabilization
Program. When prices fall below a seven-year,
moving-average standard rice price, producers are
paid 80 percent of the difference between the cur-
rent year price and the standard price.Payments are
made from the Rice Farming Income Stabilization
Fund, with 25 percent of contributions from rice
producers and 75 percent from the government.
Participation is voluntary, but participants must
also enroll in the Production Adjustment Promo-
tion Program,which diverts land from rice to other
crops (wheat, barley, soybeans, forages, vegetables,
and fruits). Since stabilization fund payments are
tied to a diversion program, Japan claims Blue Box
treatment (see chapter 3).Income stabilization pay-
ments to rice producers in 1999, the most recently
reported year, were $815 million. Payments under
the diversion program were $1.03 billion.
Before the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agri-
culture,Japan had banned rice imports for 30 years,
except following the devastating production short-
fall in 1993.Japan now imports 682,000 metric tons
annually under a tariff rate quota, 7.2 percent of
domestic consumption in the base period 1986–88.
In-quota purchases are controlled exclusively by
the Food Agency,for which a markup of up to ¥292
($2.41 in 2001) per kilogram is allowed.
Imports are purchased through either ordinary
market access or the simultaneous-buy-sell system.
Under ordinary market access, which accounted for
85 percent of imports in 2001, the Food Agency
imports rice and resells it into Japan’s domestic mar-
ket or donates it to food assistance programs. Under
the simultaneous-buy-sell system, purchases are
made through an auction at which importers sell
rice to the Food Agency and simultaneously buy it
back. The Food Agency selects bids that maximize
the markup.They have averaged ¥100–¥200 per kilo-
gram ($1,000 to $2,000 per metric ton). Over-quota
tariffs are ¥341 per kilogram, ($2,842 per metric ton
in 2003).The average successful bid price in Decem-
ber 2002 was $318 per metric ton. Summary meas-
ures of protection from the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD
2003) indicate that the average producer support
estimate in Japan for 2000–02 was 86 percent and the
nominal protection coefficient was 6.89.
Republic of Korea
The Republic of Korea also protected its rice sector
with an import ban until 1995, when it agreed to a
minimum market access import commitment in
the Uruguay Round. In 2004, the final year of com-
mitment, Korea will import 205,000 metric tons,
4 percent of domestic consumption in the 1986–88
base period. Consumption has been declining and,
coupled with rising minimum market access
imports, this has resulted in excessive stocks.
In April 2002 the government released “A Com-
prehensive Plan on the Rice Industry”to cope with
the structural problem of oversupply and to pre-
pare for future restructuring. The government had
relied on a procurement program to support farm
prices. In 2002 it procured 789,000 metric tons of a
total production of 4.9 million metric tons at 2,097
won per kilogram ($1,667 per metric ton). Under
the proposed comprehensive plan the government
intends to decouple payments, moving from price
supports to income support. In 2002 the govern-
ment made a direct payment of 500,000 won
($398) per hectare in agricultural promotion areas
and 400,000 won ($319) per hectare in nonpromo-
tion areas. The program is similar to Japan’s
income stabilization program in that it will be
linked to a production adjustment system to shift
rice areas to other crops (soybeans,forages,and fal-
low) and therefore will claim Blue Box WTO status.
In 2003 the government announced plans to keep
rice land fallow by paying producers 3 million won
($2,531) per hectare on 27,500 hectares—2.6 per-
cent of total rice area. OECD (2003) estimates an
average producer subsidy equivalent to 82 percent
and a nominal protection coefficient of 5.35 per-
cent for Korean rice producers in 2000–02.
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imum market access agreement and are assessed a
5 percent tariff under this tariff rate quota agree-
ment. Imports, strictly controlled by the Ministry
of Agriculture, have generally been of low-quality
rice and are made available to end-users through
controlled channels.
European Union
The European Union maintained an intervention
price on paddy rice of €298.35 per metric ton.
Since 1996 the European Union has accumulated
intervention stocks as a result of increased produc-
tion and imports.Direct payments were introduced
in 1997, with payments up to a maximum guaran-
teed area of 433,123 hectares. The current direct
payment rate is €325.70 per hectare.Based on aver-
age yields, the direct payment is equivalent to
€52.65 per metric ton. Total support to rice pro-
ducers, taking into account the intervention price
and direct payment, is €351 per metric ton (Com-
mission of the European Communities 2002).
Under the Uruguay Round agreement,the Euro-
pean Union agreed to convert variable levies to
fixed tariffs and to reduce them by 26 percent by
2000. Current tariff levels are €211 per metric ton
for paddy, €264 per metric ton for brown rice, and
€416 per metric ton for milled rice. Import prices
of brown rice were approximately €250 per metric
ton in 2003,so the €264 tariff provides a protection
rate of 105 percent. Tariff escalation makes the tar-
iff rate on milled rice prohibitive.
A variety of tariff concessions and preferences
for EU rice imports exist. Brown basmati imports
fromIndiaandPakistanaregivena€250permetric
ton reduction,resulting in a tariff of €14 per metric
ton. With the accession to the European Union of
Austria, Finland, and Sweden in 1995, a tariff rate
quota was negotiated with zero tariff per metric ton
on imports of 63,000 metric tons of milled rice,
€88 per metric ton on imports of 20,000 metric
tons of brown rice, and €2 8p e rm e t r i ct o no n
imports of 80,000 metric tons of broken rice.Egypt
has an import concession for 39,000 metric tons at
a 25 percent tariff reduction, and Bangladesh has a
4,000 metric ton concession for brown rice at a
50 percent tariff reduction. Preferences are given
through a 110,000 metric ton quota to the African,
Caribbean, and Pacific countries at a 35 percent
tariff reduction and overseas countries and
territories at zero percent duty. Beginning in 2007,
tariffs on imports from the 48 least-developed
countries will be progressively reduced to zero by
2009 under the Everything but Arms agreement
negotiated in 2001.
The export regime for rice is based on Uruguay
Round agreement commitments, which limit
refunds to 133,400 metric tons of milled rice equiv-
alent and a subsidy expenditure of no more than
€36.8 million ($39.4 million). Export refunds are
set by type of rice and destination. In 2003 export
subsidies ranged from €111 to €165 ($119 to $177)
per metric ton. The OECD (2003) estimates the
producer subsidy equivalent at 31 percent and
nominal protection coefficient at 1.24 for 2000–02.
United States
The United States is the world’s fourth-largest rice
exporter,exporting nearly 45 percent of its produc-
tion. Under the 2002 Farm Bill, the U.S. govern-
ment provides price supports through a market
loan rate of $143 per metric ton of paddy rice. A
market loan deficiency payment is made if the
world reference price falls below the market loan
rate. The 2002 crop received an average payment of
$73 per metric ton.
Producers also receive income support through
two payment programs, a fixed decoupled direct
payment of $51.80 per metric ton and a decoupled
countercyclical payment when the direct payment
plus the market price or market loan rate (whichever
is higher) are below a target price of $231.48 per
metric ton.
1 When the market price is below the
market loan rate,the maximum countercyclical pay-
ment is $36.68 per metric ton. Both direct payment
and countercyclical payment are made on 85 percent
of a fixed historical production level.
Rice imports are subject to tariffs of $14 per met-
ric ton for milled rice, 11.2 percent ad valorem for
parboiled, $21 per metric ton for brown, $8.30 per
metric ton for basmati brown, and $18 per metric
ton for paddy rice. In 2002, 10 percent of exports
(380,000 metric tons) were funded by government
programs, all food aid shipments. Export subsidies
under the Export Enhancement Program have not
been used for U.S. rice exports since 1996. The
OECD (2003) estimates a producer subsidy equiva-
lent of 50 percent and a nominal protection coeffi-
cient of 1.77 for 2000–02.
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Key Rice Markets
The major distortions in world rice markets are
caused by import tariffs and tariff rate quotas in
key importing countries and price supports in key
exporting countries. The global trade-weighted
average tariff on all rice was 43.3 percent in 2000:
217 percent for medium- and short-grain rice and
21 percent for long-grain rice. Medium-grain rice
markets are far more distorted than long-grain rice
markets because of tariff rate quotas and quotas
in the major medium-grain rice importing coun-
tries of Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan
(China).OECD countries are a major source of dis-
tortions, with average annual producer support
reaching $25 billion in 2000–02.
Trade protection is also provided for domestic
milling industries. This protection is expressed in
tariff escalation and is especially prevalent in Cen-
tral and South America and the European Union.
EU tariffs are 46 percent for brown rice but 80 per-
cent for milled rice (table 10.4). In Mexico, paddy
rice imports pay a 10 percent tariff while brown
and milled rice pay a 20 percent tariff.
The effect of tariff escalation is seen in trade
flows. Most of the trade in milled high-quality
long-grain rice goes to countries with low tariffs,
while most of the trade in brown and paddy rice
goes to countries with high tariff escalation. Trade-
weighted average tariffs for high-quality long-grain
rice are estimated at 4.3 percent for milled rice,
31.4 percent for brown rice, and 16.9 percent for
paddy rice. Simple non-trade-weighted averages
are 13.7 percent for milled rice, 18.7 percent for
brown rice, and 25.4 percent for paddy.
The greatest degree of protection in world rice
trade is in medium- and short-grain rice. Protec-
tion by Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan
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Country or Milled Medium–Short Quota (1,000
Region Nonfragrant Fragrant Brown Paddy Milled Brown MetricTons)
Bangladesh 22.5 22.5 22.5 22.5 22.5 22.5
Brazil 15.0 15.0 13.0 13.0 15.0 13.0
Canada 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
China 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 5,320
Costa Rica  35.0 35.0 35.0 20.0 35.0 35.0
Côte d’Ivoire 32.0 32.0 12.0 7.0 32.0 12.0
European Union 80.0 71.0 46.0 146.0 75.0 64.3
India 70.0 70.0 80.0 80.0 70.0 80.0
Indonesia 21.0 16.1 25.0 35.0 14.3 15.6
Japan (yen/kg) 341 341 341 341 341 341 682
Korea, Rep. of 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 204*
Malaysia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Mexico 20.0 20.0 20.0 10.0 20.0 20.0
Nigeria 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0
Philippines 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0
Russia 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
Senegal 12.7 12.7 12.7 12.7 12.7 12.7
Taiwan (China)  0.0 210.0 0.0 0.0 210.0 229.4
Turkey 35.0 27.0 35.0 27.0 35.0 35.0
United States 14 14 21 18 14 21
($/metric ton)
* The Republic of Korea uses a quota rather than a Tariff Rate Quota (TRQ).
Sources: AMAD (Agricultural Market Access Database), USDA, FAS GAIN reports.(China)lowersworldexportpricesbysome100per-
cent. Currently, very few rice exporting countries
produce medium- and short-grain rice. The clear
beneficiaries of trade liberalization in medium- and
short-grain rice will be countries, especially China,
with a competitive advantage in production costs
and logistics relative to such other export competi-
tors asAustralia,Egypt,and the United States.
Trade liberalization would be expected to stimu-
late production of medium- and short-grain rice in
other countries, but current varieties are suitable
only for temperate climates. Thus South American
exporters such as Argentina and Uruguay could
develop adapted varieties more quickly.Many other
developing countries have tropical or subtropical
climates and would require a decade or more to
develop varieties that would be competitive in lib-
eralized medium- and short-grain rice markets.
Production capacity in Australia and the United
States and to some degree in China is increasingly
constrained by lack of water.
Long-grain rice markets are far less protected.
Tariffs in major low-quality rice-importing nations
such as Indonesia and Bangladesh are estimated to
reduce world prices by as much as 30 percent com-
pared with full liberalization. The major impact is
on consumers in these low-income developing
countries and on producers of low-quality long-
grain rice in exporting countries such as India,
Pakistan, Thailand, and Vietnam. While tariffs
are lower than on medium- and short-grain rice,
tariff escalation is substantial, particularly in the
European Union and several Central and South
American countries. This pattern of protection
depresses world prices for milled high-quality long-
grain rice relative to brown and paddy rice,creating
economic hardship for the milling industry in
high-quality long-grain exporting countries such as
Thailand, Vietnam, and the United States. Protec-
tion in high-quality long-grain milled rice markets
is estimated to reduce prices by 10–20 percent.
Trade Flow and Price Impact of
Rice Trade Liberalization
Estimates of the impact of the elimination of
import tariffs and export subsidies using a spatial
equilibrium model, RICEFLOW (Durand-Morat
and Wailes 2003), show a significant expansion of
rice trade and large price adjustments. An earlier
version of the model was used to assess trade
liberalization prior to the Uruguay Round (Cramer,
Wailes, and Shui 1993; Cramer and others 1991).
For the current study RICEFLOW was more
completely disaggregated by rice type and degree of
milling, and the baseline trade flows and elasticity
estimates were updated through 2000. The results
reflect the effects of trade liberalization applied to
year 2000 trade flows and prices. Detailed analysis
by quantities traded and prices are presented in
table 10.5.
Complete liberalization in 2000 would have
resulted in a significant expansion in global rice
trade of nearly 3.5 million metric tons, a 15 percent
increase in trade. Trade-weighted average export
prices would be 32.8 percent higher and trade-
weighted import prices would be 13.5 percent lower.
Trade in medium- and short-grain rice, where
initial protection was highest, would increase by
73percent.Producerexportpriceswouldrise91per-
cent and import prices would decline 27 percent.
2
In the most protected medium- and short-grain
brown rice markets, trade would increase 141 per-
cent, export prices would increase 200 percent, and
import prices would decrease 41 percent. Trade
would expand 59 percent in milled medium- and
short-grain rice markets, with export prices 71 per-
cent higher and import prices 25 percent lower.
Because trade in high-quality, long-grain mar-
kets is subject to much less protection,trade liberal-
ization results in only slight increases in volume
traded—4 percent more for paddy rice, 7 percent
for brown rice,and 3 percent for milled rice.Export
prices increase only 2 percent but import prices fall
18 percent (10 percent for paddy, 31 percent for
brown rice, and 4 percent for milled rice), improv-
ing consumer welfare in rice-importing countries.
Most of the expansion in trade occurs in the low-
quality markets,such as Bangladesh,Indonesia,and
the Philippines. Traded volumes increase 13 per-
cent and import prices fall 14 percent, improving
consumer welfare in many low-income developing
countries. Removing protection in these markets
also improves producer welfare in developing coun-
tries as export prices rise 7 percent. In the fragrant
rice market liberalization results in a 41.5 percent
lower import price but only slight increases in the
volume traded and the export price.
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TABLE 10.5 Simulation Results for Rice Trade Liberalization Using RICEFLOW, 2000




Quantity (metric tons) 1,035,320 1,081,254 4.4
Export price ($/metric ton) 149.21 154.67 3.7
Import price ($/metric ton) 185.51 166.89 −10.0
Brown
Quantity (metric tons) 856,798 916,721 7.0
Export price ($/metric ton) 223.75 219.25 −2.0
Import price ($/metric ton) 363.32 250.64 −31.0
Milled
Quantity (metric tons) 7,495,594 7,704,482 2.8
Export price ($/metric ton) 225.97 225.58 −0.2
Import price ($/metric ton) 262.06 252.16 −3.8
Low-quality
Milled
Quantity (metric tons) 8,084,093 9,149,728 13.2
Export price ($/metric ton) 177.05 188.70 6.6
Import price ($/metric ton) 248.19 213.09 −14.1
Fragrant
Milled
Quantity (metric tons) 2,449,711 2,467,502 0.7
Export price ($/metric ton) 265.24 267.07 0.7
Import price ($/metric ton) 511.20 299.07 −41.5
All long grain
Quantity (metric tons) 19,921,516 21,319,687 7.0
Export price ($/metric ton) 206.87 210.68 1.8
Import price ($/metric ton) 287.45 236.43 −17.7
Medium and short grain
Brown
Quantity (metric tons) 483,063 1,162,478 140.6
Export price ($/metric ton) 271.80 814.47 199.7
Import price ($/metric ton) 1438.54 842.75 −41.4
Milled
Quantity (metric tons) 2,487,760 3,946,170 58.6
Export price ($/metric ton) 367.71 628.92 71.0
Import price ($/metric ton) 855.89 645.69 −24.6
All medium and short grain
Quantity (metric tons) 2,970,823 5,108,648 72.0
Export Price ($/metric ton) 352.11 671.14 90.6
Import Price ($/metric ton) 950.63 690.53 −27.4
All rice
Quantity (metric tons) 22,892,339 26,428,335 15.4
Export Price ($/metric ton) 225.71 299.69 32.8
Import Price ($/metric ton) 373.51 322.97 −13.5
Source: Durand-Morat and Wailes 2003.Welfare Impact of Rice Trade
Liberalization
Global rice trade liberalization results in a total eco-
nomic surplus gain of $7.4 billion annually.
3
Importing countries have a net gain of $5.4 billion
and exporting countries a net gain of $2 billion.
Gains vary considerably by country, rice type, and
degree of milling.
Impact on Price Importers and Exporters
In most rice-importing countries, consumers gain
($32.8 billion for all importers), but producers lose
($27.2 billion). In some countries with large but
not prohibitive tariffs, significant tax revenues
evaporate under free trade ($2.9 billion in aggre-
gate), while significant public savings occur with
the removal of domestic support ($2.7 billion in
aggregate).
In rice-exporting countries producers gain from
higher prices and expanded output ($70.3 billion),
while consumers lose ($68.8 billion). Among
exporters, China accounts for the bulk of the pro-
ducer gains and consumer losses. Behind the net
gains are much larger transfers between producers
and consumers. When these transfers are normal-
ized by population to account for the large number
of producers and consumers in China and some
other countries, the transfers are much smaller and
less daunting than they appear. Many households
are involved in both production and consumption.
The net buyers detached from production activities
are the largest losers.
Impact by Type of Rice
This logic of large transfers between consumers
and producers holds on examination of the impact
of reforms by rice type. Reform of trade in
medium-grain milled rice accounts for more than
60 percent of the total global welfare improvement,
at $4.3 billion,with importers benefiting by $3.4 bil-
lion and exporters by $905 million.A breakdown by
milling stage reveals that importers of medium-
grain brown rice benefit by $1 billion and exporters
by $449 million. Liberalization of long-grain rice
trade generates improvements of $1.14 billion,with
importers gaining $1.06 billion and exporters just
$80 million. High-quality rice trade yields welfare
gains of $218 million—$195 million to importers
and $23 million to exporters. Most of these gains
are for high-quality milled rice ($69 million) and
brown rice ($124 million). Liberalization of paddy
rice trade improves the welfare of exporters by
$2.4 million and of importers by $22.4 million.
Liberalization of low-quality rice trade improves
the welfare of importing countries by $315 million
and exporters by $52 million.
Again these small net figures hide the large
transfers at work between sellers and buyers of rice.
Nearly all of the net gains are captured by develop-
ing countries. Reform of fragrant rice trade is
estimated to improve the welfare of importers by
$547 million, a result due primarily to Japan.
Exporting countries (India,Pakistan,and Thailand)
gain marginally in the net,although their producers
do gain substantially.
Impact by Country
Results by country or region depend on the type of
rice and degree of protection. The results discussed
here are for some key countries that are highly pro-
tectionist or large traders of rice.
Asian importers. Among Asian importers, Japan,
the most protectionist country in rice trade, would
gain the most from liberalization. Medium-grain
white rice prices would decline from $3,098 per
metric ton to $656 per metric ton,while the volume
of trade would increase from 392,000 metric tons
to 2.18 million metric tons.This results in a welfare
gain of $3.6 billion per year, with producers losing
$19.2 billion and consumers gaining $24.2 billion.
Savings from removing farm programs more than
offset the loss in tariff revenue.
The patterns for the Republic of Korea and
Taiwan (China) are similar. Border reform would
triple Korean imports of medium-grain rice to
306,000 metric tons. Prices would decline from
$1,952 per metric ton to $840 per metric ton.Korea
also imports fragrant rice. With liberalization, the
fragrantricepricewouldfallfrom$2,003permetric
tonto$288permetricton.Consumerswouldexpe-
rience a net gain of $6.2 billion, while producers
wouldlose$5.9billion.Taiwan(China)showstrade
and welfare patterns similar to those of Korea, but
the welfare gains are of magnitude smaller.
The Philippines is a major low-quality, long-
grain rice importer. Elimination of import tariffs
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787,000 metric tons to 1.02 million metric tons,
induced by price declines to $215 per metric tons.
Consumers would gain $701 million annually, and
producers lose from lower prices by $629 million.
The largest rice importer,Indonesia,would ben-
efit from tariff reform of its low-quality long-grain
rice imports. The volume of imports would in-
crease from 1.3 million metric tons to 1.7 million
metric tons. Prices would decline from $228 per
metric ton to $196 per metric ton.Producers would
lose $1.02 billion annually while consumers would
gain $1.07 billion.
Asian exporters. China is the world’s largest pro-
ducer of medium-grain rice and would therefore be
the largest export beneficiary of medium-grain rice
trade liberalization.Exports would more than dou-
ble,from614,000metrictonsto1.47millionmetric
tons. Export prices would increase from $270 per
metric ton to $647 per metric ton.Brown medium-
grainricetradewouldincreasefrom113,000metric
tons to 403,000 metric tons,with prices rising from
$233 per metric ton to $834 per metric ton. China
is also a significant exporter of low-quality long-
grain rice. With trade liberalization, exports would
increase from 1.9 million metric tons to 2.3 million
metric tons, and prices would increase from $178
per metric ton to $190 per ton. Producers would
gain $64.2 billion in aggregate, and consumers
would lose $63.6 billion, a large aggregate loss but
less so when normalized by population.
Vietnam is the major low-quality long-grain rice
exporter. Therefore tariff reform by importers of
this type of rice would mostly benefit Vietnam.
Exports would be expected to increase from 2.7 mil-
lion metric tons to 3.1 million metric tons, and
prices would rise moderately to $185 per metric
ton. Vietnam has steadily increased its volume of
high-quality milled long-grain rice. Trade reform
would increase this volume moderately as well as its
price. In aggregate, Vietnamese consumers would
lose from higher prices by $210 million annually,
but producers would gain $229 million.
Thailand is the world’s dominant rice-exporting
nation.All Thai exports are long grain,which is the
least protected rice type in world trade. As a result,
the benefits of rice trade liberalization are small for
Thailand. Milled high-quality long-grain rice
exports would increase from 3.3 million metric
tons to 3.4 million metric tons, milled low-quality
long-grain exports from 1.6 million metric tons to
1.8 million metric tons, and fragrant rice exports
from 1.21 million metric tons to 1.23 million met-
ric tons. Price increases would be modest and lead
to small gains to producers of $123 million annu-
ally, while consumers would lose $101 million.
In India producers of long-grain rice would gain
substantially ($973 million) but the gains would be
almost offset by losses to consumers ($967 mil-
lion). These figures are the results of moderate
price changes applied to large volumes and repre-
sent moderate impacts per producer or consumer.
Other exporters. Among other exporters, the
United States would be the next most important
beneficiary of rice trade liberalization after China.
Milled medium-grain rice exports would increase
from 226,000 metric tons to 383,000 metric tons,
with prices rising from $270 per metric ton to
$617 per metric ton. Brown medium-grain exports
would increase from 292,000 metric tons to
594,000 metric tons, and prices would rise from
$296 per metric ton to $803 per metric ton. The
United States is also a major exporter of high-
quality long-grain rice. Summing across all rice
imports and exports, the net gain to the United
States would be $326 million annually, a result of
higher total gains to producers of $2.2 billion and
losses to consumers of $1.9 billion annually.
Australia is the third largest medium-grain rice
producer and exporter and would also benefit
greatly from rice trade liberalization. Exports of
milled medium-grain rice would increase from
475,000 metric tons to 756,000 metric tons, with
prices rising from $271 per metric ton to $615 per
metric ton.The net welfare gain for milled medium-
grain rice is $211 million.Brown medium-grain rice
export prices would increase from $235 per metric
ton to $805 per metric ton. Producers would gain
$1.03 billion from higher prices, while consumers
lose $745 million.
The fourth major medium-grain exporter is
Egypt. Trade reform would result in an increase in
exports of milled medium-grain rice from 326,000
metric tons to 448,000 metric tons and an increase
in prices from $298 per metric ton to $629 per met-
ric ton. Producers would gain $1.39 billion and
consumers lose $1.26 billion, with a moderate
aggregate net gain of $128 million.
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Asia, the European Union would have an overall
net welfare gain from rice trade liberalization of
$145 million annually. As an importer of high-
quality long-grain brown rice, the European Union
would increase imports from 451,000 metric tons
to 588,000 metric tons, and prices would fall from
$496 per metric ton to $260 per metric ton. The
aggregate welfare gain for high-quality long-grain
brown rice imports would be $138 million annu-
ally. This gain is offset by the higher prices that the
European Union would pay for medium-grain
imports, up from $372 per metric ton to $624 per
metric ton. The volume of medium-grain imports
would decline from 645,000 metric tons to 595,000
metric tons.The aggregate welfare change would be
a gain to consumers of $254 million annually and a
loss to producers of $109 million.
Africa. Nigeria became a major rice importer
when it relaxed quantitative restrictions to rely pri-
marily on tariffs. Nigeria imports milled high- and
low-quality parboiled rice. High-quality imports
would increase from 36,000 metric tons to 144,000
metric tons, and low-quality imports would in-
crease from 682,000 metric tons to 877,000 met-
ric tons. Prices would fall substantially for both.
Rice producers would lose $186 million annually
while consumers would gain $271 million. Several
smaller African developing nations would gain
similarly, with large gains to consumers partially
offset by losses to producers.
North and Central America. Central American
paddy rice importers would capture most of the
gains associated with liberalization of paddy rice.
On the export side the analysis does not change
current rules in most countries, which ban paddy
export. Only Argentina and the United States cur-
rently export paddy. The net gain to these two
countries would be $2.4 million. Paddy rice
importers—Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Mexico, and Nicaragua—would have a
net gain of $22.4 million from lower import prices
and increased imports. The expanded trade would
benefit the domestic milling industries in the
importing countries and rice consumers at the
expense of rice producers.
Other countries. Several developing countries
andregionswouldlosefromricetradeliberalization.
These are countries that have been importing rice
withouttradebarriers.Inasensetheyhavebenefited
from protection by other importers since this pro-
tection has depressed export prices.Removing trade
barriers would boost export prices for all rice types
bydegreeof milling.Thishasnegativeconsequences
for countries that have had little or no import pro-
tection in rice. Most seriously affected would be
Turkey, a major importer of medium-grain rice,
which faces much higher export supply prices after
global trade reform. The estimated net welfare loss
forTurkeyis$137million.Allimportersofmedium-
grain rice, except Japan, the Republic of Korea, and
Taiwan(China)loseasaresultofsignificantlyhigher
import prices after global reform. The same situa-
tion holds for long-grain rice importers that have
little or no import protection. This includes Middle
Eastern countries such as Iran, Iraq, and Saudi
Arabia. Brazil, Canada, Hong Kong (China),
Malaysia,Singapore,andSouthAfricawouldalsonot
beexpectedtobenefitfromricetradeliberalization.
Dynamic Analysis of Rice Trade
and Domestic Policy Reforms
The RICEFLOW model used for the trade and wel-
fare analysis presented above is a static spatial equi-
librium framework of excess supply and demand
equations.It does not allow for analysis of domestic
farm policies. For that, the Arkansas Global Rice
Model (AGRM) was used. The AGRM is a partial
equilibrium nonspatial dynamic econometric
model of the global rice economy (Fuller, Wailes,
and Djunaidi 2003; Wailes, Cramer, Chavez, and
Hansen 2000). The AGRM structure is based on
equations for supply (expressed for estimated area
harvested and yields) and demand (domestic con-
sumption, exports, imports, and ending stocks).
Rice prices are endogenized, with world reference
equilibrium prices for long-grain and medium-
grain rice. The AGRM is used to generate baseline
estimates for domestic and international rice for
the FAPRI outlook (FAPRI 2004).
For this analysis, policy interventions in rice
supply that are trade distorting (Amber Box in
WTO parlance) were removed. The model was also
simulated for the removal of import tariffs and
export subsidies, to provide perspective. Finally
AGRM was used to examine the net effect of com-
plete policy reform including domestic support,
import protection, and export subsidies.
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exports) projections are 27.9 million metric tons in
2005 increasing to 33.6 million metric tons by
2012.
4 Long-grain rice prices in the baseline begin
at $232 per metric ton in 2005 and increase to $277
per metric ton by 2012. Medium-grain prices rise
from $332 per metric ton in 2005 to $406 per met-
ric ton by 2012.
The removal of tariffs dominates all policy
reform scenarios. Global rice trade increases by
3.5 million metric tons in 2005 and continues to
expand to 5.3 million metric tons above the base-
line. The removal of export subsidies reduces
global rice trade in the short term by 720,000 met-
ric tons, but the long-term effect is negligible.
Taken together, the tariff effects swamp the export
subsidy effects, and global trade is higher by
2.7 million metric tons in 2005 and by 5.2 million
metric tons in 2012. Elimination of domestic
supports in the United States,the European Union,
and Japan reduces trade very slightly in the short
term and not at all over the longer term. The com-
bined effect of the removal of tariff barriers,export
subsidies, and domestic supports increases trade
by 2.4 million metric tons in 2005 and by 4.9 mil-
lion metric tons in 2012.The 15 percent expansion
of global rice trade given by the more aggregated
but dynamic AGRM model is remarkably similar
to the static results generated by the RICEFLOW
model.
The impact on global export prices follows the
impact on trade, with the dominant impact on
prices resulting from removal of import tariffs.The
long-grain export price is higher by $23 per metric
ton in the short term and by $43 per metric ton in
the longer term relative to the baseline level. In the
more highly protected medium-grain rice market,
tariff removal boosts prices by $291 per metric ton
in 2005 and by $340 per metric ton in 2012. The
impact of removal of export subsidies is important
only in the short term, with long-grain rice export
prices 6 percent higher and medium-grain prices
5 percent higher. The effect of removal of domestic
support is negligible throughout the projection
period. The aggregate effects of policy reforms,
including tariffs, export subsidies, and domestic
supports, is significant for both long-grain rice and
medium-grain rice prices. Long-grain rice export
prices are 18–22 percent higher. This result differs
from the RICEFLOW model result. Medium-grain
rice prices are higher than baseline projections by
70–80 percent, a result similar to the findings using
the RICEFLOW model.
Policy Implications and Conclusions
Despite the importance of rice as a basic food sta-
ple, especially in developing countries, rice trade
accounts for only 6.5 percent of consumption.Such
limited trade is due partly to preferences for spe-
cific types and grades of rice,but also to protection-
ist policies based on food security objectives or
price and income support for producers.The trade-
weighted average import tariff on rice was 43 per-
cent in 2000, and tariff escalation is common, to
protect rice milling industries.
Several market and production characteris-
tics make rice prices more volatile than the prices
of most other commodities. Much of Asian rice
production is subject to monsoon climates, re-
sulting in uncertain yields. Global rice trade is
highly segmented by rice type (long and medium),
degree of processing (milled, brown, and paddy),
and quality (generally pertaining to the percent of
broken kernels). As a staple food, the demand for
rice is not very responsive to price and income
changes.
The combination of a high degree of protection,
geographic concentration, market segmentation,
inelastic supply response to price, and inelastic
demand response to price and income results in
volatile prices and volumes traded. Distortions in
rice trade occur throughout the world. State trad-
ing enterprises are pervasive in rice trade, most
notably in China, Indonesia, India, Japan, Republic
of Korea, Vietnam, and Australia. State trading
tends to result in a lack of transparency in pricing
and trade competitiveness. Thailand is a clear
exception, as rice trade is managed by a very com-
petitive group of export companies.
Domestic policy distortions exist in a number of
major rice trading nations, including Japan, the
European Union, and the United States. In the
United States and the European Union, domestic
support results in implicit or direct export subsi-
dies. In Japan the government’s commitment to
support rice prices is based on an aggressive rice
land diversion program and a tightly managed tar-
iff rate quota.
Policy reforms to eliminate protection in the
global rice economy are estimated to boost
economic welfare by more than $7.4 billion per
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consumers and producers that lead to these net
gains. Most of the gains can be achieved by elimi-
nating tariffs on imports. In importing countries
consumers gain $32.8 billion, while producers lose
$27.2 billion. Governments lose $2.9 billion in tar-
iff revenue but gain $2.7 billion by eliminating
domestic supports. The net welfare gain to rice-
importing countries is estimated at $5.4 billion. In
exporting countries producers gain $70.2 billion,
while consumers lose $68.8 billion. Imports by the
exporting countries result in a loss of tariff revenue
of $5.3 million while elimination of domestic sup-
ports saves $598 million. The net welfare gain in
exporting countries is $2 billion.
With global policy reform,rice trade is estimated
to increase by 10–15 percent. Prices received by
exporters would be 25–35 percent higher. Prices
paid by importers would be 10–40 percent lower,
depending on the type of rice.Rice trade,despite the
expansion, would remain relatively thin. Complete
policy reform would result in an increase in rice
trade from the current level of 6.5 percent of con-
sumption to 8.4 percent by 2012. Thus, one of the
major sources of world rice price instability is likely
to remain after liberalization. Global rice stocks
have declined by 30 percent between 2000 and 2003.
Thus,the ability of stocks to buffer supply shocks has
been markedly reduced. Global rice trade liberaliza-
tion would make low-income, net-rice-importing
countries more reliant on world rice trade, likely
reducing political and food security.
Medium-grain rice is the most protected rice
type. Consequently, policy reform would have its
biggest impact on countries that export and import
medium-grain rice. Japan is estimated to capture
nearly 70 percent of the global economic welfare
gains. Other industrial countries, such as Australia,
the European Union, and the United States, that
export medium-grain rice would also be significant
beneficiaries of trade policy reform.
Countries that had little or no protection before
reform are likely to be harmed by global policy
reforms. This result is due to the large country
impacts that increased imports in countries like
Japan would have, increasing the demand for
medium-grain rice and thereby boosting world
prices. Countries like Turkey and Russia that have
imported medium-grain rice with moderate or no
protection would experience higher prices as a
result. The benefits of removing moderate levels of
tariff protection, as in the case of Turkey, are
swamped by the price effect of free and expanded
trade in medium-grain rice.
Domestic policy reforms in the United States
and the European Union are estimated to reduce
rice exports by less than 5 percent in the initial
years and to have little or no impact on trade in the
longer term.Prices are estimated to be 5–10 percent
higher initially, but the effect diminishes to zero
over the longer term.
The multilateral and regional trade policy
reforms adopted since the early 1990s have con-
tributed to an expansion in rice trade and more sta-
ble prices. The achievements of the Uruguay Round
Agreement on Agriculture include the opening of
the previously closed Japanese and Korean markets.
But the limits on domestic support and export sub-
sidies have yet to have a significant impact.Regional
agreements such as NAFTA (North American Free
Trade Agreement) and Mercosur have increased rice
trade in the Western Hemisphere. The prospects for
the success of the Doha Round of the WTO hinge to
a great extent on continuing the expansion of mar-
ket access,reductions of tariffs,and limits on export
subsidies required to achieve the benefits estimated
here from global trade liberalization.
Notes
1. The direct payment is paid on a historical base produc-
tion,decoupled from both current production and current mar-
ket conditions. The countercyclical payment is also paid on a
historical base production, and although payment is decoupled
from current production, it is triggered by current market price
conditions.The government claims both payments as Green Box
in the WTO.
2. The large increase in the export prices for short- and
medium-grain rice does not consider the likely supply responses
by less-competitive producers that could enter the market and
survive at that high price. Hence, this is an upper-bound esti-
mate of the likely price increase.
3. Consumer and surplus gains and losses are estimated
using the results of the baseline and free trade results of the
RICEFLOW model. The welfare estimates for producers and
consumers are detailed in annex table 3 on the CD-ROM. The
results are reported for the major importing and exporting
countries or regions by rice type and degree of milling. Annex
table 4 on the CD-ROM includes the producer and consumer
welfare estimates with the impact on government revenues lost
due to tariff elimination and government expenditures elimi-
nated because of the elimination of domestic support programs.
4.Results are presented in annex table 5 and annex figures 1–3
on the CD-ROM.
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Argentina,Kazakhstan,the Russian Federation,and
Ukraine are also harmed because they receive lower
prices for their wheat. The surplus disposal pro-
grams are reduced during periods of low stocks and
relative wheat shortages, thus contributing to
global price volatility. In addition, many exporting
countries have resorted to export restrictions to
protect domestic consumers when prices are high,a
practice that further adds to global price volatility.
Such policies make it very difficult for importing
countries to rely on the world wheat market to ful-
fill a significant portion of their needs because of
the uncertainty of world supply. Consequently,
many countries follow policies aimed at self-
sufficiency and thus are deprived of the benefits of
trade. Policy reforms that reduced global volatility
in wheat prices, cut production subsidies, and
improved access to exports during periods of high
prices would reduce food security concerns.
This chapter discusses major trends and devel-
opments in the world wheat market and their
impact on trade and food security. We begin by
looking at the characteristics of wheat and trends in
wheat production,use,trade,stocks,and prices.We
then examine the policy environment, focusing
especially on trade policy and domestic support.
Wheatisoneof themostimportantfoodcrops,pro-
viding nearly one-fifth of the world’s calorie sup-
plies.About 19 percent of the world’s production is
tradedinternationally,primarilyasexportsfromthe
countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD)—including
Australia, Canada, the European Union (EU), and
theUnitedStates—todevelopingcountriestosupply
basic food needs and the growing demand for prod-
uctsmadefromwheatflour,suchasbread,pasta,and
noodles.
1 Wheat is also the food crop most com-
monly stored as a buffer against production short-
falls, with an average of 30 percent of the world’s
wheatproductioncarriedoverfromonecropyearto
the next.The global wheat situation and wheat poli-
ciesof majoractorsarethuscentraltothefoodsecu-
rityanddietarypreferencesof manycountries.
Major OECD wheat exporters,such as the Euro-
pean Union and the United States, support domes-
tic production. The support policies often lead to
surpluses, which are then exported with subsidies
or donated as food aid that is not emergency
related. Developing countries sometimes benefit
from such surplus disposal programs because they
pay lower import prices or receive food aid. How-
ever, countries are also harmed by such programs
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Wheat Characteristics and Trends
Wheat is produced in 120 countries and  accounts
for about 19 percent of the world’s calorie supplies.
It is used primarily as flour for making bread, pas-
try,pasta,or noodles.It is also used to feed livestock,
with feed use accounting for about 17 percent of
global wheat consumption. In addition, the by-
products from milling wheat into flour are used as
feed.Wheat stores for several years without deterio-
ration under proper conditions, making it well
suited for use as a buffer against food shortages.
The many varieties of wheat have different pro-
tein levels and varying milling and baking charac-
teristics. The protein levels range from about 8 to
18 percent. High-protein wheat is better suited to
bread and pasta making, while lower protein wheat
is better suited for pastry and noodles.There is sub-
stitution between wheat varieties and blending of
different varieties to produce flour with specific
characteristics. The demand for high-quality wheat
and wheat with specific characteristics is increas-
ing, as buyers become more sophisticated. Protein
premiums have steadily increased since the early
1980s, as responsibility for import decisions has
shifted to the private sector, which is better able
to evaluate quality and more willing to pay
premiums (Wilson and Dahl 1999). There has also
been greater specificity in purchasing contracts.
For example, the Australian Wheat Board offered
34 different segregations of wheat in the mid-
1990s, compared to just 2 in 1980 (Carter and
Wilson 1999).
Production and Yields
Wheat is produced under a variety of climatic con-
ditions using technologies ranging from fully
mechanized production and harvesting on large
tracts to manual planting and harvesting on small
plots. About 61 percent of wheat is produced in
non-OECD countries (table 11.1); this share has
been increasing over time as production has grown
more rapidly in developing countries than in
OECD countries. The European Union, China, and
India are the largest producers, with 18, 16, and
13 percent of global production, respectively.
Wheat yields have increased significantly since
the middle of the 20th century. From 1961 (when
data on many countries first became available) to
2000,world wheat yields increased by an average of
2.4 percent each year. The increase in yields in
developing countries came from using more inputs
(such as fertilizer) and high-yielding semi-dwarf
seed varieties developed at the International Maize
and Wheat Improvement Center (CIMMYT) in
Mexico and released to developing countries in the
mid-1960s in what is now known as the Green Rev-
olution. These varieties, adapted to local condi-
tions, were quickly adopted (Dalrymple 1974). As
shown in figure 11.1, average yields in India are
now very similar to those in the United States, at
TABLE 11.1 Wheat Production, Trade, and Growth Rates 1989–91 to 1999–2001,
by Region
Millions of Tons Growth Rates (percent)
Region Production Imports Exports Production Imports Exports
World 583 107 108 0.5 0.4 0.4
OECD 227 19 80 0.6 6.2 −1.1
Non-OECD 356 88 28 0.4 −0.5 5.4
Africa 17 26 0 1.3 3.3 9.7
Americas 111 25 58 −0.4 6.8 −0.3
Asia 199 27 4 1.7 −2.1 15.1
Europe 130 8 17 −1.0 −4.3 −2.2
FSU 75 6 9 −1.5 −12.2 4.8
Middle East 29 12 4 0.5 3.2 −6.3
Oceania 24 1 17 6.6 5.4 5.4
Note: Production, imports, and exports are the average for 1999–2001 crop years, which begin with
harvest and vary by country. Growth rates are for the average of 1999–2001 compared with 1989–91.
Source: USDA PSD online database and USDA 2003.about 2.8 tons per hectare, thanks largely to the
Green Revolution. The annual increase in yields
from 1950 to 2000 was 1.89 percent in the United
States and 2.95 percent in India.
2
While improvements in wheat yields have con-
tinued along historical trends, the growth of global
wheat production has slowed to just 0.5 percent per
year over the last decade (see table 11.1), largely
because of slower consumption growth and the
corresponding adjustment in production. Area
planted with wheat declined by 5.5 percent from
1989–91 to 1999–2001, mostly as a result of land-
diversion policies of major exporters such as the
United States. Certain regions, such as Oceania,
increased production and exports during this
period because of favorable exchange rates and low
production costs, while others, such as the former
Soviet Union (FSU), reduced production because
of reduced input use and lower domestic demand.
Trade
Trade of wheat is primarily from OECD to non-
OECD countries, with about three-quarters of
global wheat exports coming from OECD countries
and 82 percent of imports absorbed by non-OECD
countries (see table 11.1).Trade of wheat grew only
0.4 percent per year during the 1990s, while trade
in processed products made from wheat (bakery
products, flour, pasta, and other products) ex-
panded more rapidly (table 11.2). This increase in
wheat product trade has occurred despite tariff
escalation with higher levels of processing. Most of
the trade in processed products has been between
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TABLE 11.2 Global Wheat and Wheat Products Exports, Selected Periods
(millions of US$)
Average Value Annual Percentage Increase
Product 1970* 1980* 1990* 2000* 1970–80 1980–90 1990–2000
Wheat 3,146 15,502 15,572 14,399 17.3 0.0 −0.8
Bakery 227 1,362 3,913 8,108 19.6 11.1 7.6
Flour 408 1,889 1,748 1,763 16.6 −0.8 0.1
Pasta 39 285 841 1,508 21.9 11.4 6.0
Other 113 894 1,237 972 23.0 3.3 −2.4
Total wheat products 787 4,430 7,738 12,352 18.9 5.7 4.8
*Data is three-year average centered on year shown. 
Note: Values are in nominal U.S. dollars. Bakery products include bread and pastry. Other products
include gluten feed and meal, bran, germ, and whole meal bulgur.
Source: FAOSTAT.developed countries. During 1999–2001 about
85 percent of global exports and 77 percent of
global imports of processed wheat products were
by developed countries. Developing countries pri-
marily import wheat rather than products, with
about 80 percent of total expenditures on wheat
going for grain imports during 1999–2001. At the
same time, developing countries have increased
their wheat product exports from one-third of the
average value of total wheat and product exports
during 1979–81 to one-half the average value in
1999–2001.
Use
Wheat use has grown faster than population—at
2.5 percent per year since 1961, compared with
population growth of 1.7 percent. More recently,
however, use has slowed, and per capita food con-
sumption has remained nearly constant for more
than a decade in both developed and developing
countries (figure 11.2). Feed use has shown strong
growth among both developed and developing
countries, but this growth has been offset by the
dramatic drop in feed use in the countries of the
FSU following the breakup of the Soviet Union.
Global use of wheat for feed rose hardly at all dur-
ing 1981–2001, compared with average annual
growth of 7 percent during 1961–81.Among devel-
oping countries, feed use grew by 2.4 percent per
year in 1981–2001, compared to 6 percent per year
during the previous two decades.Developing coun-
tries tended to substitute wheat for other grains
when prices were advantageous; this was particu-
larly true for those Asian countries that are sensitive
to prices of grain imports for feed rations. The
demand for other uses of wheat, such as industrial
uses and as a food additive (gluten, starches, and so
on), also has been steady during the past four




Wheat carryover, or ending-stocks, provide a buffer
against wheat shortages during years of low produc-
tion or rapid increases in demand. When stocks are
high, prices tend to be low, and vice-versa. The level
of global ending-stocks as a percentage of con-
sumption and real wheat prices are shown in fig-
ure 11.3.The inverse relationship is readily apparent.
The share of global wheat stocks held by the five
major exporters (Argentina,Australia, Canada, the
European Union, and the United States), which
together account for three-quarters of net exports,
declinedfrom80percentin1960toabout20percent
in 2002. This dramatic shift occurred for two main
reasons. First, the share of global production of the
five major exporters declined from a high of 46 per-
cent in 1963 to 33 percent in 2002 as production in
developing countries increased more rapidly than
among major exporters. Second, policy changes in
the major exporters reduced government-held
stocks.Theconsequencehasbeenashrinking supply
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FIGURE 11.2 Per Capita Food Consumption of Wheat
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volatile prices in the future.
Prices
During most of the 20th century, real wheat prices
fell (by about 75 percent since 1900 and by about
half since 1970), while the policies of the major
exporters (with the exception of Argentina) were
aimed primarily at supporting prices, expanding
exports, and restricting production through vari-
ous schemes. A surge in wheat exports during the
1970s, combined with the oil-price shock, led to
sharp real price increases, but these were quickly
reversed as production increased to meet the rising
imports. By the end of the 20th century, real U.S.
producer prices had declined by about 75 percent
from the highs of the early 1900s (figure 11.4).
Overall Trends
The overall trends in wheat show that production
has grown more rapidly than population since
1961, and that, in recent years, production and
trade growth have slowed significantly because of
slower consumption growth. Part of the recent
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Farm season average fob calendar yearslowdown in consumption has been due to the col-
lapse of the FSU, but, in addition, per capita con-
sumption of wheat as food has stopped increasing
in both developed and developing countries. Trade
in wheat products has grown more rapidly than
grain trade, especially among developed countries.
The steady decline in real wheat prices and the
decline in stocks held by the major exporting coun-
tries as a share of world stocks could lead to greater
price volatility.
Policy Environment
Under the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agricul-
ture (URAA), member countries of the World
Trade Organization (WTO) had to convert quanti-
tative restrictions on imports into bound tariffs,
reduce those tariffs over an implementation period,
open their markets to imports under minimum
access provisions, limit and reduce the most trade-
distorting forms of domestic support, and cap and
reduce subsidized wheat exports. Despite these sig-
nificant achievements, the amount of trade liberal-
ization achieved in wheat was modest because of
the way the reforms were implemented. Many
countries applied the Uruguay Round provisions so
that they could protect producers in key sectors
from foreign competition. Applied tariffs were
often set high, and bound tariffs even higher, leav-
ing open the possibility of future increases in ap-
plied tariffs. Wheat export subsidies were reduced
by the European Union and the United States—the
countries with the largest export subsidies—but
that was attributable more to budget constraints
than to the URAA. Implementation of minimum
access and tariff reductions have stalled as coun-
tries have introduced new measures to offset agreed
commitments or to prevent them from taking
effect.
Market Access
Most countries met the minimum market access
requirements of the URAA by establishing tariff
rate quotas (TRQs), which provided for reduced
tariff rates on a specified volume of imports
(table 11.3). Imports above these quotas faced
higher tariffs. However, regional trading agree-
ments often have provided even lower tariffs or
duty-free access to regional trading partners. For
example, Mexico established a TRQ for wheat of
605,000 tons at an in-quota tariff of 67 percent.
Meanwhile, Canada and the United States receive a
preferential tariff of 4.5 percent under the North
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TABLE 11.3 Tariffs and Tariff Rate Quotas, by Country
(percent and millions of metric tons)
Year of Bound Tariffs Applied Tariffs Regional Trade
Country Report Final TRQ In-Quota Above-Quota Average Preferential Agreements
Brazil 2001 750 0.0 55.0 12.5 0.0 Mercosur
Canada 2001 227 0.7 62.8 1.3 0.0 NAFTA
China 2001 7,884 1.0 74.0 — — —
Colombia 2001 692 124.0 130.0 12.5 — Andean
Ecuador 1999 480 19.0 23.6 9.2 — —
European 2001 350 0.0 58.9 12.8 0.0 Central
Union Europe
Israel 2000 450 92.0 137.8 — 0.0 EU, U.S.
Japan 2001 5,740 249.2 414.3 — — —
Mexico 2001 605 50.0 67.0 67.0 4.5 NAFTA
Morocco 2001 1,555 144.0 198.4 30.1 2.5 EU
Poland 2000 280 25.0 64.0 20.0 0.0 EU
South Africa 2001 108 20.0 93.0 — — —
Tunisia 2000 900 17.0 86.7 20.0 — EU
Venezuela 2000 1,317 24.0 117.0 11.0 — —
— Not available.
Source: WTO, FAO, USDA, and ABARE 2002.American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Conse-
quently, virtually all of Mexico’s wheat imports
come from Canada and the United States. Brazil’s
wheat imports are mostly supplied by Argentina,
which has a comparative advantage in geographic
proximity and in preferential treatment under the
Mercosur regional trade agreement (Diaz-Bonilla
1999).
Turkey did not establish a TRQ for wheat, but
instead relied on tariff-only protection with a
bound tariff of 188 percent and an applied tariff of
55 percent. Because imports from the European
Union receive a zero tariff under a regional trade
agreement, however, most of Turkey’s imports
come from the European Union. The Russian Fed-
eration, which is not a member of the WTO, pro-
vides preferential access to several FSU countries.
The European Union has protected its producers
through variable import levies for many years as
part of the Common Agricultural Policy, but it
more recently resorted to TRQs on low- to
medium-grade wheat to slow wheat imports from
Ukraine and the Russian Federation.
Tariff escalation is a common practice that
encourages trade in wheat grain rather than in
wheat products (table 11.4). Tariffs generally esca-
late with the degree of processing of wheat prod-
ucts. Brazil, the largest wheat importer during the
1990s, imposed an average tariff on wheat imports
of 6.3 percent, but the tariff on wheat flour was
13.5 percent, and those for pasta and bakery prod-
ucts were 18.5 and 20.5 percent, respectively.
Because of the high tariffs on value-added prod-
ucts, most imports were in the form of grain or
flour. Bangladesh, Costa Rica, Egypt, Guatemala,
Jordan, the Philippines, and Uganda showed simi-
lar patterns, with most tariffs escalating with
greater processing and larger imports of the prod-
ucts with the lower tariffs. Kenya, the Republic of
Korea, Japan, and Mexico had different patterns
that may reflect stronger protection to producers or
specific processors. For example, Kenya had a
35 percent tariff on wheat imports,but a 25 percent
tariff on flour, pasta, and bakery products. Korea
had prohibitive tariffs on wheat flour imports, but
much lower tariffs on wheat grain, pasta, and
bakery products. Consequently, there have been
almost no flour imports, while wheat, pasta, and
bakery products have had large imports. The very
low tariffs on wheat probably reflect the fact that
Korea produced less than 1 percent of its consump-
tion but used high tariffs to protect flour millers.
Japan has specific duties on wheat, flour, and pasta;
Mexico had specific duties on bakery products.The
relatively large imports of bakery products despite
high tariffs suggest high demand or lack of compet-
itiveness of local bakers.
Indonesia and Malaysia, which had low tariffs
for wheat and all wheat products, provide an inter-
esting case of imports without much distortion.
There is still some tariff escalation, but the maxi-
mum tariff was a relatively low 6.3 percent on pasta
imports in Malaysia and 5.0 percent on bakery
products in Indonesia. Imports reflect these low
tariffs, with wheat products accounting for almost
half of the value of imports in Malaysia and for
one-third in Indonesia. This suggests that without
tariff escalation, wheat product trade would have
increased significantly,benefiting consumers.Trade
in processed wheat products is concentrated within
free trade areas such as within the European Union
and NAFTA. The shares of global trade occurring
within these two regions alone during 2000–01
were 23, 36, 50, and 66 percent, respectively, for
wheat, flour, pasta, and bakery products.
Some countries have used nontariff barriers
(NTBs) to protect their domestic wheat markets.
For example, the United States resorted to phy-
tosanitary standards during the 1980s to block
wheat imports from Mexico. At that time, durum
wheat producers in the southwestern United States
used the existence of Karnal bunt as a reason to
block wheat imports from Mexico (Beattie and
Biggerstaff 1999).
4In an ironic twist,wheat imports
from four southwestern states of the United States
are currently banned by Mexico because of con-
cerns about Karnal bunt (USDA 2004). U.S. wheat
was also barred from three major wheat markets
during the second half of the 1990s because of
phytosanitary concerns. Brazil, China, and India
banned the import of U.S. wheat, in particular
from the Pacific Northwest, based on the possible
presence of tilletia controversa kuhn (TCK) fungus
and mycotoxins.While all three cases were resolved
by the end of the decade, U.S. wheat exports to
these markets have not recovered due to changing
market conditions.
Several kinds of NTBs have also been adminis-
tered by governments to control wheat imports—
in many cases these have been lessened or
Wheat: The Global Market, Policies, and Priorities 201eliminated following liberalization of domestic
markets and international trade. Government
import controls include the issuing of import
licenses, quantity and quality restrictions, state
trading,and bureaucratic red tape in general.
5 State
trading is still practiced by many governments, but
the private sector is responsible for a growing share
of global wheat imports. Among large wheat
importers, examples of greater private sector
involvement can be found in Indonesia, Pakistan,
the Philippines, and Turkey in Asia; Algeria, the
Arab Republic of Egypt, and Morocco in Africa;
and Brazil and Mexico in Latin America. However,
many governments—among them those of China,
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TABLE 11.4 Average Tariff Rates and Imports for Wheat and Wheat Products
Tariffs (percent) Imports (million dollars)
Country Year Wheat Flour Pasta Bakery Wheat Flour Pasta Bakery
Australia 2001 0.0 0.0 4.0 7.0 0 0 — —
Bangladesh 1999 5.0 8.3 37.5 37.5 361 19 0 1
Brazil 2001 6.3 13.5 18.5 20.5 872 36 11 21
Bulgaria 2001 23.1 25.0 39.1 54.4 3 1 — —
China 2001 74.0 98.8 24.1 24.0 319 20 — —
Costa Rica 2001 0.0 6.0 14.0 14.0 36 3 1 8
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1998 1.0 8.3 40.0 40.0 816 25 1 3
European Union 2001 65.7 45.1 20.8 22.7 844 9 — —
Guatemala 1999 0.0 10.0 15.0 15.0 56 1 3 19
Hungary 2001 25.0 38.4 38.4 34.7 0 0 — —
India 2000 41.7 38.5 38.5 38.5 1 1 — —
Indonesia 1999 0.8 2.5 5.0 5.0 404 68 3 8
Jordan 2000 0.0 12.5 26.7 25.6 68 2 1 5
Kenya 2001 35.0 25.0 25.0 25.4 46 2 3 2
Korea, Rep. of 2001 2.7 151.4 8.0 8.0 530 1 34 34
Malawi 2000 0.0 16.7 25.0 22.9 3 4 0 1
Malaysia 2001 0.0 0.0 6.3 3.3 206 4 19 24
Mexico 2001 67.0 11.7 12.0 10.0 423 8 11 56
Morocco 1997 33.6 71.3 59.5 50.0 366 0 3 3
Pakistan 2001 5 25 70 27 0 — —
Philippines 2001 4.8 8.0 15.0 15.0 427 6 14 24
Romania 1999 232.9 206.3 261.5 225.0 1 5 — —
Russia 2001 5.0 10.0 102 19 — —
South Africa 2001 0.0 20.0 25.0 27.6 32 0 — —
Togo 2001 5.0 13.3 20.0 20.0 23 0 3 1
Uganda 2001 0.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 11 1 0 0
United States 2001 1.1 0.7 4.6 0.8 300 56 — —
Zimbabwe 2001 5.0 30.0 40.0 40.0 5 0 0 0
SITC Code — 410 460 483 484 410 460 483 484
— Not available.
Note: Unless otherwise noted, the duties applied to 100 percent of the tariff lines. The exceptions are as
follows: Mexico 83 percent of pasta tariff lines covered; South Africa 50, 67, 75, and 88 percent of tariff
lines covered for wheat, flour, pasta, and bakery, respectively; Turkey had only 25 percent of pasta and
14 percent of bakery tariff lines covered; the European Union had 25, 0, 9, and 0 percent of tariff lines
covered for wheat, flour, pasta, and bakery, respectively; the United States had only 33 percent of wheat
and flour tariff lines covered. 
Source: For Egypt’s tariff data, TRAINS database. For Pakistan, all data from WTO tables. For all others:
tariffs from WTO Integrated Database, MFN (most-favored-nation) Applied Duties; imports from FAOSTAT
and COMTRADE.the Islamic Republic of Iran,India,and Japan—still
control wheat imports through various schemes.
Export promotion
The two largest providers of wheat export subsi-
dies, the European Union and the United States,
had largely eliminated export subsidies by 2001 as
global prices rose and the European Union reduced
intervention prices under its 1992 and Agenda 2000
policy reforms. The European Union agreed to
reduce subsidized exports to 14.4 million tons by
2000 and thereafter under the URAA and has not
reported export subsidies since the 2001–02 sea-
son.
6 The United States agreed to reduce subsidized
wheat exports to 14.5 million tons by 2000 and
thereafter under the URAA, although the U.S. pri-
mary export subsidy facility, the Export Enhance-
ment Program, has not been used for wheat since
1995. Under URAA, however, both countries could
revive their export subsidy programs and together
could subsidize nearly one-quarter of global wheat
exports. Export credits were still used by Australia,
Canada,the European Union,and the United States
as recently as 1998, the most recent period for
which complete data were available (OECD 2000).
Food aid has been provided by many countries
to respond to emergencies or persistent food short-
ages. It has often been charged, however, that food
aid is partly used as a way to dispose of surplus pro-
duction. This charge is supported by the fact that
85 percent of global wheat food aid during
1990–2000 was provided by four of the world’s
major wheat exporters. The United States provided
54 percent of world wheat food aid, the European
Union 20 percent, Canada 8 percent, and Australia
3 percent (FAOSTAT). In total, wheat food aid
accounted for about 6 percent of wheat trade dur-
ing 1990–2000. Over a longer period, the United
States provided an average of 3.3 million tons of
wheat food aid from 1970 to 2000, averaging
10 percent of U.S. wheat exports. The level of food
aid varied with price (figure 11.5), which suggests
that it was partly surplus disposal.
7
Food Security and Global Wheat Trade
Since wheat is the food grain most often used as a
buffer against food shortages, any disruption of
trade flows or sharp increases in prices causes food
security concerns for importing countries. When
realwheatexportpricesdoubledfrom1970to1974,
for example, policymakers in wheat-importing
countries were quick to raise concerns. These were
furtherheightenedwhentheUnitedStatesimposed
grainexportembargoesin1974and1975toprotect
its own consumers from high prices.
8 Such actions
likely contributed to the strong desire for food self-
sufficiency in many food-importing countries. The
United States again embargoed grain sales to the
Soviet Union in 1980 as a foreign policy action
motivated by the USSR’s invasion of Afghanistan.
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export tax of $35 per ton on wheat during 1995–96
to protect its consumers from high prices.
9 The
Russian Federation recently took similar action by
imposing an export tax on wheat of 25 euros per
ton during the period from January 15 to May 1,
2004. Several other wheat exporters also imposed
restrictions on wheat exports, including Hungary,
India, and Ukraine. As with the previous actions,
the policies were intended to protect domestic sup-
plies and control prices. All came at times when
world prices were rising and the availability of sup-
plies was uncertain. Such actions send the signal
that access to wheat exports cannot be relied upon
during periods of shortages and high prices.
Domestic support
Because domestic support commitments under the
URAA apply to the whole of agriculture rather than
to individual commodities, countries have been
able to protect their most politically sensitive sec-
tors by keeping support high. According to OECD
estimates, domestic support to OECD wheat pro-
ducers averaged $17.3 billion per year during
1999–2001 (table 11.5), compared with $18.7 bil-
lion per year during the 1986–88 base period of the
URAA. Domestic support in 1999–2001 accounted
for 41 percent of the value of wheat production at
farm-gate prices. The European Union and the
United States provided the largest absolute support
to wheat,amounting to $9.6 billion and $4.9 billion
per year, respectively. However, support represent-
ing a higher percentage of the value of wheat
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TABLE 11.5 Support to OECD Wheat Producers, 1999–2001
Producer Support
OECD Country/Region (millions of dollars) PSE Percentage Producer NPC Producer NAC
OECD 17,331 41 1.16 1.70
Australia 119 5 1.01 1.05
Canada 358 15 1.01 1.17
Czech Republic −10 −3 0.87 0.97
European Union 9,565 48 1.15 1.95
Hungary 53 13 1.06 1.15
Japan 822 86 6.38 7.20
Mexico 237 39 1.44 1.64
Norway 67 71 2.63 3.58
Poland 251 21 1.22 1.27
Slovak Republic 5 5 0.86 1.06
Switzerland 191 63 2.33 2.82
Turkey 551 26 1.30 1.41
United States 4,928 46 1.12 1.86
Note: Producer support was converted from local currency to U.S. dollars using period average annual
exchange rates from International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics, 2002 Yearbook.
PSE percentage is producer support estimate, an indicator of the annual monetary value of gross transfers
from consumers and taxpayers to support agricultural producers, measured at farm-gate level as a
percentage of the value of production arising from policy measures, regardless of their nature, objectives,
or impact on farm production or income. Producer NPC is producer nominal protection coefficient, an
indicator of the nominal rate of protection for producers measuring the ratio between the average price
received by producers (at farm gate), including payments per ton of current output, and the border price
(measured at farm-gate level). Producer NAC is producer nominal assistance coefficient, an indicator of
the nominal rate of assistance to producers measuring the ratio between the value of gross farm receipts
including support and gross farm receipts valued at world market prices without support. No calculations
were made for Canada, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway, or the Republic of Korea.
Source: OECD 2002production was provided by Japan (86 percent),
Norway (71 percent),and Switzerland (63 percent).
Major Wheat Exporters
Fivecountriesaccountedforaboutthree-quartersof
net global wheat exports in 1970–1999 (table 11.6).
The United States was the largest net exporter over
this period, but its share declined from nearly
41percentduringthe1970sto27percentduringthe
1990s. Canada was the second-largest net exporter
with an 18–19 percent share. Australia maintained
its 12 percent share throughout the period, and
Argentina expanded its share from about 4 to 6 per-
cent of global exports. The European Union ex-
ported 10 percent of global net exports during the
1990s after being a net importer of about 10 percent
of global trade during the 1970s. The emergence of
the European Union as a major exporter was attrib-
utable to highly subsidized production and exports
under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and
was largely at the expense of U.S.exports.
Wheat support policies of the major exporters
have changed since the early 1980s, with Australia
and Canada significantly reducing support to their
wheat producers,while the European Union and the
United States have decreased support more moder-
ately according to OECD estimates (table 11.7).
Argentina,which is not an OECD country and does
not have producer support estimates comparable to
the other major exporters, has historically taxed
rather than supported its wheat producers.
Canada made the largest reductions in wheat
support among major exporters between 1986–88
and 2000–02, with total producer support declin-
ing from 45 percent of the value of production to
16 percent. The country largely abandoned direct
price support to individual commodities in favor of
income support in the early 1990s (Gardiner 1999).
This led to reduced wheat production and reduced
net exports by 13 percent between 1990–95 and
1996–2001 (table 11.8).
The European Union sharply reduced wheat
intervention prices in the CAP reform of 1992 and
implemented a mandatory land set-aside policy
(Rayner and others 1999). Further reforms were
taken in 2000 and 2003. However, total support did
not decline significantly (see table 11.7), and pro-
duction continued to increase (see table 11.8).
Consumption increased because of the lower inter-
vention prices, allowing net exports to fall by
41 percent between 1990–95 and 1996–2001.
The United States undertook major reforms in
the 1980s, with the reduction in wheat loan rates
and the introduction of the Conservation Reserve
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European Union 52 46
United States 49 40
Source: OECD 2003.
TABLE 11.6 Major Wheat Exporters’ Shares of Global Wheat Net Exports
(percent) 
Exporter 1970–79 1980–89 1990–99
United States 40.9 36.1 27.1
Canada 19.5 18.4 17.9
Australia 12.1 12.8 12.0
European Union 0.0 7.8 9.9
Argentina 3.9 5.6 6.2
Total 76.4 80.7 73.1
Note: The average export shares were calculated on net exports because the European Union was both a
large importer and exporter and net exports capture the net trade situation better than gross exports.
When net exports were negative, a zero was assigned. The European Union was defined as the current
15 members even though not all of these countries were members during the entire period.
Source: FAOSTAT.Program, which removed about 10 million acres of
wheat land from production (15 percent of wheat
area) (Hoffman, Schwartz, and Chomo 1995). Net
exports declined by nearly 17 percent from
1990–95 to 1996–2001,as area declined 9.3 percent.
The 2002 U.S. Farm Bill somewhat reversed previ-
ous reforms but did continue the large wheat-land
diversion program begun in the 1980s.
ThechangesinArgentinaledtolargeinvestments
in the Argentine grain marketing system, more
intensive input use, and a 50 percent increase in net
exports from 1990–95 to 1996–2001 (Schneph,
Dohlman, and Collins 2001). The financial crisis of
2002 contributed to the profitability of exportable
agriculture, as the peso was devalued by 70 percent
after being fixed to the U.S. dollar for 10 years.
Export taxes of 20 percent were reinstated to offset
windfall profits from the currency devaluation.
The combined impacts of reduced production
support,lower export subsidies,and land set-asides
are reflected in lower production and reduced net
exports by Canada, the European Union, and the
United States (see table 11.8). These declines were
mostly offset, however, by larger exports from
Argentina and Australia.On balance,the five major
exporters reduced net wheat exports from 80 mil-
lion tons during 1990–95 to 75 million tons during
1996–2001, a decline of 6.3 percent. The largest
decline in producer support came in Canada,where
lower support led to lower area planted, produc-
tion, and net exports.
Major Wheat Importers
Globalwheatimportshavegrownbyjust1.2percent
per year since 1980,compared with nearly 6 percent
per year between 1970 and 1980 (figure 11.6).
The rapid increase in imports during the 1970s was
caused by major economic and policy changes in
several regions and countries. These include
increased wheat imports by OPEC (Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries), large net imports
bytheFSUandEasternEuropebecauseof poorpro-
duction, and policy changes in China that led to
large net imports.Most of these changes have either
been reversed or had more moderate influences on
wheat imports since 1980.
Imports by the FSU accounted for one-quarter
of global imports at their peak in 1984 and then
steadily declined to only 3 percent by 1995.Imports
by Eastern European countries,while much smaller
than those of the FSU, declined by 75 percent
during the same period (FSU+Eastern European
countries in figure 11.6).China’s imports peaked at
16 million tons in 1989 (16 percent of global trade)
and declined to 2 million tons in 2000 due to rap-
idly increasing domestic production following pol-
icy changes (see figure 11.6).
OPEC’s import increases slowed during the
1980s as oil prices fell. Imports have only recently
begun to increase with the recovery in oil prices
that began in 1999. Thus the countries that fueled
the large increase in wheat trade during the 1970s
largely accounted for its stagnation after 1980. Off-
setting these declines have been steady increases in
imports by other developing countries (shown as
Developing minus China in figure 11.6), but the
increases were not large enough to raise global
trade significantly. Imports by the developed coun-
tries have remained largely constant since 1980,
with lower imports by Western Europe offsetting
increases from high-income Asia.
Brazil, China, Egypt, Japan, and the Russian
Federation were the largest importers during
1990–2000,each with 5–7 percent of global imports
(figure 11.7). They were followed by Algeria,
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TABLE 11.8 Percentage Change of Wheat Production, Area Harvested, Yields, and Net
Exports of Major Exporters from 1990–95 to 1996–2001
Exporter Production Area Harvested Yields Net Exports
Argentina 47.2 28.0 14.7 53.8
Australia 66.2 37.5 21.7 61.9
Canada −10.0 −13.4 4.0 −13.3
European Union 12.4 3.0 9.1 −40.8
United States −2.0 −9.3 8.6 −16.7
Major exporters 10.2 1.4 8.6 −6.3
Source: Authors’ calculations.Indonesia,Iran,and Korea,each with 2–5 percent of
global imports. The 10 largest net importers during
1990–2000 accounted for 46 percent of global
imports. Many of these large importers undertook
policy reforms during the late 1980s or 1990s that
removed government monopolies on imports.
Egypt was the largest importer during
1990–2000, with average imports of slightly more
than six million tons per year. Wheat is considered
a strategic commodity in Egypt, providing more
than one-third of the daily caloric intake of
Egyptian consumers and 45 percent of protein
consumption. It is also the major staple crop pro-
duced in the country,occupying about one-third of
the total winter crop area. The government’s policy
objectives in the agricultural sector have been to
provide an adequate supply of food to all income
groups, to promote greater self-sufficiency in crop
production, and to increase farm income.
In the mid-1980s the widening food gap,stagna-
tion of the agricultural sector, and the rising costs
of the food subsidy system encouraged the govern-
ment to reform agriculture and the wheat sector
under the Agricultural Reform Program, initiated
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Source: FAO.in 1987. In the first phase of the reform, prices,
quotas, and marketing controls were partially
liberalized. Import subsidies were reduced, and
markets were opened to private investment. The
second phase of the reform coincided with the
launching of the Economic Reform and Structural
Adjustment Program in 1991,which sought to shift
Egypt from a state-controlled economy into a more
market-oriented economy in which the private
sector could play a major role (Kherallah and
others 2000).
In 1992 the Egyptian government also began to
liberalize the wheat-milling sector,which up to that
time had maintained a monopoly over the impor-
tation of all types of wheat grain and flour.In addi-
tion,around 80 percent of all industrial wheat mills
in the country belonged to the public sector—the
rest were licensed to mill for the government under
specific arrangements. The partial liberalization of
wheat trading started in the flour market in 1992,
when the government freed the prices of flour and
bread and allowed the private sector to import
wheat for the production of flour. Resale of wheat
in excess of the milling needs for flour was not
permitted. The government also allowed private
traders to import flour directly. All the remaining
restrictions on flour production and trading were
removed in 1993, allowing both the public and pri-
vate sectors to freely import, produce, distribute,
and sell flour at free-market prices. The quotas of
government-milled flour going to food-processing
factories, shops, and bakeries were also eliminated,
thus allowing these outlets to purchase their flour
freely in the market.
Brazil was the second-largest importer during
1990–2000, with imports averaging 6 million tons
per year. Before 1991 the Brazilian government
heavily subsidized wheat flour,but consumer subsi-
dies were removed in late 1991 along with other
price controls,and the mill-quota system was elim-
inated (Brandão and Salazar 2003). Brazil now
obtains nearly all of its wheat from Argentina with
a zero import duty because of its membership in
the regional trade group, Mercosur. In 2002, to
reduce wheat imports, the government introduced
a program to expand domestic wheat production to
50 percent of total consumption by 2004. The
government operates a minimum-support-price
system for wheat and other commodities. Other
policies and programs to support domestic wheat
production include subsidized loan programs for
farmers and processors to borrow against their
products at below-market-interest rates while
holding their products as collateral in accredited
warehouses.Small producers are eligible for financ-
ing of production costs at subsidized interest rates
under a program to strengthen family farms.
Longer-term support for production and process-
ing of agricultural products is available from the
Brazilian Bank for Economic and Social Devel-
opment and the Special Agency for Industrial
Financing.
Japan was the third-largest wheat importer dur-
ing 1990–2000, but unlike other importers it has
not reduced import controls or significantly
reduced producer support.Japan’s agricultural pol-
icy is strongly influenced by concerns for food
security and self-sufficiency. In addition, postwar
land reforms created a very small-scale farm struc-
ture that is inefficient by global standards; thus
income support for farmers is also a high priority.
Wheat producers receive about $1,200 per ton for
wheat—about 10 times the U.S. f.o.b. (free on
board) price and 6 times the c.i.f. (cost, insurance,
and freight) import price. Domestic wheat produc-
tion is about 10 percent of domestic consumption,
and the Japanese Food Agency imports about
6 million tons of wheat per year. Import policy has
focused on food security and diversification of sup-
plies in an effort to ensure guaranteed supplies
rather than low import prices. Domestic producers
are paid an administered purchase price for wheat,
which is then resold at higher prices to the domes-
tic milling industry. Imported wheat is resold to
millers at prices that are about double the import
price.A margin between the resale of domestic and
imported wheat is necessary to adjust for quality
differences between Japanese and imported wheat.
A new wheat policy was introduced in 1998 by
the Japanese Food Agency, with implementation
occurring during the 2000 to 2002 crop years. The
Japanese Food Agency retained control over the
pricing and marketing of domestic wheat,as well as
the importing and pricing of foreign wheat. The
new policy allows the private sector to import
wheat,whereas the Japanese Food Agency had been
the exclusive importer under the previous system.
The new policy also introduced a new compensa-
tion system for domestic wheat producers. Other
programs to improve quality allow continuous
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Food Agency and a simultaneous-buy-and-sell sys-
tem for imported feed wheat.
China was the fourth-largest importer during
the 1990–2000 period, but it has undertaken major
reforms in the past few years, lowering support
prices to near world market levels and reducing
imports by 90 percent (Crook 1996 and 1997;
USDA 1998 and 2001a). The government’s long-
standing policy has been to approximate self-
sufficiency in food staples, including wheat. This
began in the 1950s with producer quotas, but the
system changed significantly with the introduction
of the Household Responsibility System in 1978.
Under this system, local leaders began contracting
production quotas with small work units and fam-
ily farms instead of large collectives.China initiated
the Governors’ Grain-Bag Responsibility System in
1995,whereby provincial authorities were given the
task of stimulating production, stabilizing prices,
making provisions for adequate grain stocks,
reducing imports, and ensuring supplies for urban
areas and the military. These reforms led to an
increase in wheat production of about 22 percent
between 1990–92 and 1997–99 and to huge stocks
by the end of the 1990s. Since the mid-1990s, the
state grain procurement program has not been
altered to any significant degree, although there
have been revisions in some procurement proce-
dures and efforts to improve wheat quality. In 2000
the government introduced new wheat standards to
upgrade the average quality of the crop. Protected
prices were removed from spring wheat in the
north and winter wheat south of the Yangtze River.
In 2001 market reforms eliminated protected prices
in many provinces but not in the major producing
regions.
One of the most significant consequences of
China’s domestic policies has been the shift in its
cereal trade balances. The accumulation of large
grain stocks caused average annual wheat imports
to fall from 10 million tons in the early 1990s to
below 1 million tons since 2000. China became a
net exporter of wheat in 2002.
Other factors contributed to the decline in
wheat imports, including local market conditions
and government actions. China assessed a 13 per-
cent value-added tax on imported wheat (while not
collecting the tax on most domestic wheat produc-
tion), and a 1 percent import duty, thus making
imported wheat uncompetitive in some years.Dur-
ing the phase-in period after China’s entry into the
WTO in 2001,the volume of imports was regulated
by a tariff rate quota system. The initial TRQ
for wheat was 7.3 million tons in 2001; it rose to
9.64 million tons in 2004. China also agreed to
expand the role of private traders after WTO acces-
sion, but state trading enterprises would still con-
trol 90 percent of the wheat TRQ.Notwithstanding
China’s WTO commitments, however, the fill rate
of the wheat TRQ has been minimal—8 percent in
2002 and 5 percent in 2003, according to periodic
reports from the Global Agricultural Information
Network of the U.S. Department of Agriculture.
While many of the major importing countries
have reformed policies, high protection is still evi-
dent in many countries, as shown by disparities
between producer prices and U.S. fob prices (fig-
ure 11.8). Japan, has the highest producer prices,
but several other countries also have high prices.
Consumers in these countries have the most to gain
from more liberal trade policies.
Emerging Wheat Exporters
China, India, Pakistan, and several countries of the
FSU have emerged as wheat exporters. This is a
shift from the past when these countries were either
large regular importers or occasional importers.
Former Soviet Union
Several countries of the FSU have the potential to
become large exporters—among them Kazakhstan,
the Russian Federation, and Ukraine, which collec-
tively moved from being net importers of 15 mil-
lion tons of wheat in 1992 to net exporters of
23 million tons in 2002 (figure 11.9).
The emerging exporters of the FSU have many
common problems, including weak marketing sys-
tems; inefficient storage, transport, and grain han-
dling systems; lack of credit; and the challenge of
making the transition from collective farms to pri-
vate production systems. Policy reforms have been
slow and only partially effective in stimulating
private-sector initiative. Despite these problems, all
of these countries have large land areas well suited
to wheat production and low production costs.
They also have an advantage in transporting wheat
to importers in the Middle East compared with
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United States.
Kazakhstan, a major wheat producer and
exporter during the Soviet era,used intensive farm-
ing methods that relied on subsidized inputs.These
intensive farming methods, which are not prof-
itable without large subsidies, have been aban-
doned. The country has a large land area, however,
with considerable potential for expanding wheat
production and exports using low-input farming
methods. Production remains constrained by high
domestic marketing and transport costs traceable
to a lack of competition and insufficient private
sector activity. Production is mostly high-protein
spring wheat, which, with quality improvements,
could compete with the best wheat from other
exporters. Large investments during the Soviet era
left the country with considerable infrastructure
for grain transport and exports.If costs can be con-
trolled and production increased, Kazakhstan
could become a major wheat exporter (Longmire
and Moldashev 1999).
Russia accounted for one-quarter of world
wheat exports in the early years of the 20th century,
when its yields were only slightly less than those of
the United States. Whether the Russian Federation
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Brazilcan return to its former role as a major exporter
depends largely on policy developments.Input sub-
sidies and price supports were largely dismantled in
January 1992, when the transition toward a market
economy began. Decreases in real incomes and
changes in food prices led to substantial changes in
food consumption and declines in feed use. Gov-
ernment procurement of wheat declined from
nearly all before the reform to just 21 percent by
1995—in part because of lack of funds by the state
procurement agency. Private grain-trading compa-
nies have largely replaced the state. Simultaneously,
subsidies have been reversed and the agricultural
sector (including wheat) are taxed. Grains are still
produced on large farms and under the same man-
agement as before the reforms, but many of the
farms have been converted into private stock com-
panies. Regional authorities use wholesale and
retail price controls,subsidies,and barriers to inter-
regional trade to regulate prices and food stocks.
The emerging private sector must deal with the
high transaction costs of these interregional trade
restrictions. Producers have considerable potential
to increase yields if economic incentives improve.
Efficient transportation and marketing systems
could make the Russian Federation a net exporter
(Goodwin and Grennes 1999).
Ukraine emerged from a decade of adjustment
following the end of the Soviet era to become a sig-
nificant wheat exporter. In 2002–03 the country
exported about 6.6 million tons of wheat before a
production slump in 2003–04 forced a return to
imports. However, low production costs and shifts
in resource use since the Soviet era suggest that
wheat exports will likely increase in the future.
During the Soviet era, Ukraine concentrated on
livestock and poultry production, but soon after
independence in 1991 poultry and livestock num-
bers declined by more than half.Wheat production
fell as well (in part because of lower demand for
animal feed) until 2000, rebounding in the two
years before the severe drought of 2003.Production
costs are estimated by the U.S.Department of Agri-
culture (USDA) to be $50 per ton (Thursland and
Prikhodko 2002), offsetting inefficiencies in han-
dling, storage, and transport.
Policy reforms began with price liberalization in
1992, but many agricultural subsidies were contin-
ued, resulting in budget deficits and inflation.
Economywide price and trade reforms were fully
implemented, but specific agricultural and institu-
tional reforms were only partially implemented.
Land reform has been slow to develop in the years
since transfer and ownership legislation was passed
in 1994 and 1995.The result has been a slow recov-
ery of production (Debatisse and Chabot 2000).
Asia
Several Asian countries have become net wheat
exporters in recent years because of large crops and
stocks.It remains to be seen,however,whether they
can sustain exports or will revert back to being net
importers. Domestic policies in Asia remain aimed
at self-sufficiency and self-reliance rather than on
promoting surpluses for export.
India has followed a policy of self-sufficiency
since independence, increasing crop output by
expandingirrigation,improvingcropyieldsthrough
high-yielding varieties, and increasing land-use
intensity with multiple cropping. Better yields were
possible because of the Green Revolution, which
provided the high-yielding varieties that were
adopted with support from production and price
policies. To increase yields, the public sector pro-
vided agricultural inputs, such as fertilizers, power,
and water for irrigation at subsidized prices. The
government also established a system of minimum
support prices to procure wheat from farmers. Sub-
sequently,Indiamadesubstantialgainsinfoodgrain
production, and over the past 30 years wheat pro-
duction has grown by about 3.5 percent per year.
In the early 1980s, India cautiously began to lib-
eralize trade, but only since 1991 has the process of
liberalization picked up speed. In July 1991 India
introduced radical policy reforms in various eco-
nomic sectors,but trade restrictions on agricultural
products were left largely untouched. Subsequent
changes in trade policy gradually lifted restrictions
on agricultural products. Bumper wheat crops
starting in 1999 led to large accumulations of pub-
lic stocks, which eventually prompted wheat
exports,making India a net wheat exporter in 2000.
In order to be competitive in the Asian markets,the
government subsidized exports, displacing sales in
the region by the United States and other tradi-
tional suppliers. Exports reached a record 6 million
tons in 2002–03. Wheat exports were halted in
August 2003 as stocks diminished following a poor
crop in 2003.
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Exports reached 1 million tons in 2002–03, making
China a significant net wheat exporter for the first
time. Despite stagnant domestic demand, however,
domestic surpluses have been falling in recent years
in line with policy-driven production declines.
Rozelle and Huang (1999) argue that China will
remain a net importer at the levels of the early to
mid-1990s.
Pakistan has been a net wheat exporter since
2000–01, reaching 1 million tons in 2002–03, but
reverted to being a net importer during the
2003–04 season.
The Impact of Liberalization
Various studies have estimated the impact of liber-
alizing trade and reducing domestic support on the
world wheat market.Results vary and do not always
consider the full range of reforms. The Food and
Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI
2002) at Iowa State University and the University of
Missouri recently evaluated the impacts of liberal-
ization of agricultural markets using a multimarket
global agricultural model. The results for wheat are
reported here. The study considered two scenarios.
The first, full liberalization, explored the probable
effects of removing all agricultural distortions—
domestic farm programs and border measures—
including all TRQ schemes, tariffs, and direct
export subsidies such as the European Union’s
CAP. The second investigated the effects of remov-
ing only border measures. The two scenarios allow
the impact of domestic programs to be evaluated
separately from border measures. The question of
how to examine domestic programs without bor-
der measures was addressed by assuming that gov-
ernment payments would be used to provide pro-
ducers with the difference between current
domestic price floors and the lower prices that
would result without border measures.The simula-
tions did not include the 2002 U.S. Farm Bill but
instead used an extension of the previous farm bill
in the baseline simulation.Nor did they include the
reforms to the European Union’s CAP in mid-2003.
The URAA was assumed to extend after 2004,when
the final provisions are to be implemented. The
results are presented as average percentage changes
relative to the baseline simulation for the period
from 2002 to 2011.
The FAPRI results show that wheat prices (U.S.
fob Gulf) would rise from the baseline by an aver-
age of 4.8 percent under the full liberalization
scenario and by 7.6 percent in the trade-only sce-
nario. The price increase is lower under full liberal-
ization because set-asides would be removed in the
European Union and the United States, resulting in
a substantial increase in production and exports
that would dampen the price effect. Global wheat
trade would increase by 7.9 percent under full lib-
eralization and by 5.0 percent under the trade-only
scenario, with the largest export increase going to
the European Union once set-asides were removed.
China would reduce imports under both scenarios
because it would face slightly higher prices on
wheat allowed under the low in-quota tariff in its
wheat tariff rate quota. India would reduce exports
and become a net importer, because export subsi-
dies would no longer be allowed.
A USDA study (2001b) found a larger wheat
price increase from elimination of all policy distor-
tions. It concluded that wheat prices would rise by
18.1 percent from elimination of all policy distor-
tions. Removal of global tariffs would raise prices
3.4 percent; elimination of OECD domestic subsi-
dies would raise them 12.0 percent; and global
elimination of export subsidies would raise them
2.0 percent. A recent FAO study (Poonyth and
Sharma 2003) concluded that wheat prices would
rise by 11.9 percent under the U.S.-proposed WTO
reform, which is similar to the USDA’s full-
liberalization scenario.
The three studies provide a range of estimates—
from 4.8 to 18.1 percent—of the increase in world
prices that would result from eliminating all pro-
ducer support and trade distortions.
Conclusions
The global wheat market has become less distorted
since the early 1990s, as several countries have
undertaken reforms unilaterally or as a conse-
quence of commitments under the URAA.Govern-
ments in OECD countries still provide substantial
support to producers, however. The effects of that
support have been partially offset by land set-aside
programs and by the way in which support is pro-
vided; however, support policies still distort trade
and depress world prices.The European Union and
the United States have not used export subsidies in
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grams, such as nonemergency food aid and export
credits. These programs make it more difficult for
emerging exporters to compete with established
exporters.
Most importing countries have reduced wheat
tariffs or allowed duty-free imports from regional
trading partners,thus benefiting from lower prices.
A few countries, such as Japan, continue to apply
extreme protection, with internal prices more than
five times global market levels. Tariff escalation is a
major problem for countries trying to diversify
production and exports, with tariffs on flour well
above those on wheat grain, and tariffs on bakery
and pasta products even higher. Consequently,
trade in wheat products is largely confined to free
trade areas such as within the European Union or
NAFTA.
A major concern for wheat-importing countries
is the lack of assured access to wheat export mar-
kets during periods of supply shortages and high
prices. Policies such as the U.S. grain export
embargo of the 1970s,designed to protect domestic
consumers, contribute to higher global wheat
prices and increase the uncertainty of wheat-
importing countries. The threat of such policy
actions continues, with the European Union
imposing export taxes on wheat in 1995 and the
Russian Federation imposing export taxes in
2004—also to protect domestic consumers. Such
actions reinforce the calls for food security through
self-sufficiency in importing countries and deprive
those countries of the benefits from trade.
Future reforms of the global wheat market
should focus on reducing producer support in
OECD countries, reducing protection in the
remaining highly protected markets,reducing tariff
escalation on wheat products, and ensuring access
to exportable supplies during price spikes.Elimina-
tion of production subsidies and trade distortions
could raise world wheat prices by 5–18 percent
according to recent studies, but the large surplus
capacity among major wheat exporters could boost
production under policy reforms and prevent
prices from rising further.
Notes
1. More detailed trade flow tables are given in the attached
CD-ROM.
2. Note that the yields in India and the United States are not
strictly comparable because a larger share of wheat area in India
is irrigated than in the United States.
3. About 9 percent of global grain-based starch production
comes from wheat (80 percent comes from maize). “Starch—
Versatile and in Demand,”World Grain, January 2004.
4. Karnal bunt is a wheat fungus that occurs during cool,
rainy growing conditions.It is named after the city in India near
where it was first reported in the 1930s. It is not harmful to
humans or animals, but it causes an unpleasant odor in wheat
flour.
5. Exchange rate controls are another means to regulate
imports, but these are not normally commodity-specific.
6. Based on the use of wheat subsidies as reported to the
WTO.Source:USDA,ERS WTO Agricultural Trade Policy Com-
mitments Database.
7. Regressing wheat food aid (FA) on wheat prices (WP)
shows a statistically significant relationship between the quan-
tity of food aid and prices; as prices fall the quantity of food aid
increases. The OLS regression estimated was FA = 6.487 −
.023*WP.The R2 = .42 and the coefficient on prices was statisti-
cally significant at the 1 percent level of significance with t =
−4.6.
8. The United States suspended grain exports in 1974 and
again in 1975 because of low stocks, poor crop production
prospects, and concern about the inflationary impacts of high
grain prices. However, the action was directed only at the USSR
in 1974 and at the USSR and Poland in 1975 since these coun-
tries were major buyers and perceived to be disrupting the mar-
kets (USDA 1986).
9.“EU Hits Grain Exporters, Steep New Tax Aims to Protect
Supplies,”International Herald Tribune,December 8,1995.Most
recently, however, the European Union declined to impose
wheat export taxes following the 2003 production shortfall, but
did temporarily suspend grain export licenses in August 2003.
Reuters, July 31 and September 2, 2003.
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214 Global Agricultural Trade and Developing CountriesSub-Saharan Africa heavy producer taxation has
ended, and unilateral liberalization efforts are con-
tinuing, although significant protection of process-
ing remains.
The current situation raises many questions
about the future of the sector and the prospects for
various players. How will multilateral groundnut
trade liberalization affect the competitive positions
of different players? Which countries are likely to
gain and which are likely to lose? How will small
Sub-Saharan African producers be affected? 
Groundnut Production
Groundnuts are a valuable source of protein, fat,
energy, and minerals, and they generate cash
income to many poor farmers in the developing
world,especially in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia.In
Senegal, for instance, 70 percent of the rural labor
force is employed in groundnut production, which
accounts for 60 percent of households’ agricultural
income. Groundnut production and processing
represent about 2 percent of gross domestic prod-
uct and 9 percent of exports in Senegal.
Since the mid-1990s all major groundnut-export-
ing countries have been gradually liberalizing their
groundnut sectors, in part to fulfill their commit-
ments under World Trade Organization (WTO)
agreements.
1 The results have been mixed, and
trade in groundnut products remains heavily dis-
torted. Both China and India have removed some
import restrictions and allowed wider private-
sector participation in importing groundnuts.
However, tariffs on groundnut products remain
very high in India and high in China. The large
market size of both countries exacerbates these dis-
tortions and their effects on the world market.
In the United States the 2002 Farm Bill elimi-
nated many unsustainable features of previous
groundnut policies (such as the high support price
and production quotas), but it introduced new dis-
tortions, such as countercyclical payments and the
floor price mechanism. These policies subsidize
U.S. groundnut exports when world prices are low,
with the potential to depress world market prices.
Argentina still selectively subsidizes some
processed groundnut products and exports and
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China is the world’s largest groundnut producer,
with 40 percent of world production in 2001. India
accounts for 23 percent of worldwide production, a
group of Sub-Saharan African countries produces
8.4 percent, and the United States produces 5.6 per-
cent (table 12.1).Malawi,Nigeria,South Africa,and
the United States produce shelled groundnuts,
which are used as seed,consumed raw,or consumed
after having been transformed into prepared
(roasted,salted,flavored) groundnuts or groundnut
butter or paste.In contrast,Argentina,China,India,
and Senegal devote more than 60 percent of their
production to crushing groundnuts for oil and
meal.
2
Groundnut production conditions vary consid-
erably across countries, reflecting differences in
technological development, access to modern
inputs and irrigation, and farm management prac-
tices. Yields are highest in the United States and
China and lowest in Sub-Saharan Africa (except
South Africa) and India. The low yields in Africa
and India are the result of limited use of modern
inputs, including high-yielding seed varieties, and
heavy dependence on rainfall.
Driven by tremendous growth in China, global
shelled production grew 34 percent between
1981–85 and 1996–2000. Growth has been uneven
across countries (figure A12.1 on the CD-Rom).
China doubled its production between 1992 and
2000 by increasing its use of high-yielding varieties
and agricultural inputs, including fertilizers, pesti-
cides, mechanization, and irrigation (Colby and
others 1992).In India production exhibited signifi-
cantfluctuations,increasingbetween1987and1998
before returning to the production levels of the
1970s (about 6 million tons). Production in Sub-
Saharan Africa picked up in the early 1990s, after a
long period of decline. Production has been stable
sincetheearly1970sintheUnitedStates,whichpro-
duces about 2 million tons a year,and inArgentina,
whichproduces300,000tons.
The economic costs of groundnut production
vary significantly across countries. In 1993 the
average cost per acre was $694 in the United States,
more than three times the average cost in China of
$164 per acre (table 12.2). The higher economic
costs per acre for U.S. groundnuts were attributed
chiefly to production quota rent, land value, and
TABLE 12.1 Production, Use, and Export of Groundnuts, Average 1996–2001
Area Domestic Edible Crushed for Net
Harvested Yield Production Use Groundnuts Oil and Cake Exports
Country (1,000 ha) (mt/ha) (1,000 mt) (1,000 mt) (1,000 mt) (1,000 mt) (1,000 mt)
World 21,452 1.4 29,997 29,896 12,416 14,590 169
Main producers and exporters
China 4,234 2.9 12,204 11,777 4,753 6,140 427
India 7,902 0.9 7,176 7,082 534 5,581 94
United States 569 3.0 1,701 1,428 978 280 220
Argentina 280 1.5 403 191 21 155 213
Main producers in Africa
Nigeria 1,187 1.1 1,340 1,340 636 427 0
Senegal 690 1.1 722 730 317 304 −6
South Africa 98 1.7 161 123 72 32 33
Malawi 117 0.9 103 101 78 18 2
Gambia, The 89 1.0 95 80 26 54 15
Main importers
European Union 1 1.0 1 454 433 17 −449
Canada 0 0.0 0 115 115 0 −115
Japan 12 2.3 28 129 121 2 −103
Korea, Rep. of 7 2.2 15 30 30 0 −15
Note: The difference between production plus net exports and domestic utilization reflects stock variation
and feed and seed use. Ending stocks are negligible for all countries except the United States, which had
ending stocks of 28 percent of total production during 1996–2001.
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture.the costs of using and maintaining farm equip-
ment, fuel, electricity, repair, and capital replace-
ment. Quota rent and land value are not costs for
farmers in China, since there is no production
quota and land is considered public property,
belonging to local communities organized in
groups of 30–40 households (Chen and others
1997).
3 Net returns for China and the United States
are not significantly different if quota rent (irrele-
vant since the 2002 Farm Bill) is excluded from U.S.
production costs. The U.S. cost disadvantage is,
however, compensated for by higher producer
prices brought about by the groundnut program
and the higher quality of U.S. groundnuts. The
elimination of quota production (and thus quota
rent) in the 2002 Farm Bill reduces U.S.production
costs. This development, as well as the high quality
of U.S. groundnuts, which earn a high price pre-
mium in international markets, may well maintain
U.S.competitiveness with China.
4
Global Trade in Groundnuts
Domestic consumption of groundnuts is high, and
only 5 percent of world production is sold in inter-
national markets. Of the three major groundnut
products traded internationally (edible ground-
nuts, groundnut oil, and groundnut meal), edible
groundnuts are the most traded, with a volume of
1.2 million tons in 2001;trade in groundnut oil was
250,000 tons (table 12.3). The global export of edi-
ble groundnuts has increased 2.2 percent a year
since the early 1980s, while exports of groundnut
oil declined 1 percent and meal exports fell 2.5 per-
cent, despite growing global consumption of both
products.
China is the world’s largest exporter of edible
groundnuts, accounting for 32 percent of world
exports. The United States is the second-largest
exporter, with 19 percent of the world market, fol-
lowed by Argentina, at 10.5 percent. Sub-Saharan
Africa (The Gambia, Malawi, Nigeria, Senegal,
South Africa, and Sudan) has lost market share
in international edible groundnut markets and
accounts for only 5 percent of world trade. Senegal
is the world’s largest supplier of groundnut oil, but
this market has declined as other vegetable oils are
increasingly used as substitutes.
The European Union (EU) is the single largest
groundnut market, accounting for 43 percent of
world imports. The total value of net groundnut
imports in the European Union was just below
$500 million a year in 1996–2000. Canada, with
9 percent of world imports, is the second-largest
market, followed by Japan, which imports 8.2 per-
cent of world groundnuts.
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TABLE 12.2 Costs of and Revenues from Groundnuts in China and the United States
(US$ per acre)
1992 1993
Item United States China United States China
Variable costs
Seed 70.32 43.83 71.18 45.96
Fertilizer 43.27 25.03 42.40 26.13
Chemicals 89.70 3.40 92.57 3.68
Labor 89.14 71.51 86.17 75.86
Other expenses 212.84 41.43 188.54 12.82
Subtotal 505.27 185.20 480.86 164.45
Fixed costs
Land value 92.58 — 97.77 —
Quota rent 113.38 — 115.40 —
Total costs 711.23 185.20 694.03 164.45
Yield (pounds per acre) 2576 2520 1940 2135
Revenue (producer price times yield) 753.66 323.69 570.58 280.83
— Not available.
Note: More recent data are not available.
Source: Chen and others 1997.Consistent with growth in world consumption,
exports of raw edible groundnuts and prepared
groundnuts have expanded rapidly since the mid-
1980s (figures 12.1a–12.1d). Exports of edible
groundnuts increased 8 percent in the 1990s,after a
dramatic increase of more than 20 percent during
the 1980s. The pattern of growth in prepared
groundnut exports broadly mirrors that of edible
groundnuts, signaling the highly integrated nature
of these markets (figure 12.1c).
China has been the major beneficiary of this
expansion (figure 12.1b). From barely 1 percent in
1976, its global market share in exports of edible
groundnuts rose to 32 percent in 2001. During the
same period, the U.S. market share dropped from
32 percent to 19 percent. The emergence of China
as a leading exporter in the prepared groundnut
market is even more impressive (figure 12.1d).
While the international edible groundnut mar-
ket has become more concentrated (with 61 per-
cent of exports controlled by China, the United
States, and Argentina in 2001), the market for pre-
pared groundnuts has become more fragmented.
Concentration in the edible groundnut market
partially reflects the significant decrease in Sub-
Saharan Africa’s share of prepared groundnuts,
from 17 percent in 1976 to 5 percent in 2001.
Africa’s market countries (including The Gambia,
Malawi, and Nigeria) enter the edible groundnut
export market intermittently, depending on their
crop quality and world market demand.
Figures 12.1e and 12.1f show the trends in
exports and market shares of groundnut oil. Many
countries, including Brazil and China, have exited
the groundnut oil market since 1976 to focus on
edible groundnuts and other vegetable oils. Other
countries, such as the United States, have chosen
to enter the market only when the quality of
groundnuts harvested is too low for the nuts to be
sold in the edible groundnut market. Senegal and
Argentina remain the world’s leading exporters
of groundnut oil. The market has become sig-
nificantly fragmented, however. Argentina, Brazil,
Senegal, and the United States jointly supplied just
52 percent of total exports in 2001, down from
85 percent in 1976.
The decline in African countries’shares in global
groundnut markets has significantly reduced the
contribution of groundnut products to the export
earnings of many Sub-Saharan African countries.
The importance of groundnut products as a source
of export earnings has declined dramatically in
Malawi, Senegal, and South Africa since the early
1980s (table 12.4). The importance of ground-
nut products increased significantly only in The
Gambia, where they accounted for 84 percent of
total merchandise exports in 2000–02.
The volume of raw edible groundnuts exported
decreased significantly in Malawi, Nigeria, and
South Africa and stagnated in The Gambia and
Senegal (table 12.4). As a result of declining
and almost stagnant volumes, export earnings for
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TABLE 12.3 Value of Net Exports, by Groundnut Product, 1996–2000
(US$ millions)
Country Edible Groundnut Groundnut Oil Prepared Groundnut Total
EU-15 −378.47 −115.12 −4.54 −498.13
Japan −44.00 −1.85 −71.46 −117.31
Canada −76.67 −1.19 −3.31 −81.18
Korea, Rep. of −4.55 0.01 −14.31 −18.86
Malawi 0.77 0.00 0.00 0.77
Nigeria −3.29 4.64 0.00 1.35
Gambia, The  4.49 1.09 0.05 5.63
South Africa 16.01 4.68 0.27 20.95
Senegal 3.34 48.99 0.60 52.92
India 86.85 −0.13 7.27 93.99
United States 126.43 −12.77 28.26 141.92
Argentina 160.98 51.52 25.82 238.32
China 193.79 2.82 111.06 307.68
Note: Prepared groundnuts are roasted, salted, or flavored groundnuts. Peanut butter is not included.
Source: FAOSTAT.Groundnut Policies, Global Trade Dynamics, and the Impact of Trade Liberalization 219
FIGURE 12.1 Global Groundnut Consumption, Exports, and Market Shares
Source: FAOSTAT.
(a)  Global Exports and Consumption of Raw Edible
Groundnuts, 1976–2002
(1,000 metric tons)
(b)  Market Shares of Global Raw Edible
Groundnut Exports, 1976–2002
(percent)
(c)  Global Exports of Prepared Groundnuts,
1976–2002
(tons)
(d)  Market Shares of Global Prepared
Groundnut Exports, 1976–2002
(percent)
(e)  Global Exports of Groundnut Oil
(1,000 metric tons)




























































































































































Senegal Argentina United States Brazil
Argentina China United States Sub-Saharan Africa World edible export World groundnut consumption
United States China Netherlandsshelled groundnuts dwindled. The extent of the
decline suggests that unit values also decreased in
The Gambia,Malawi,and Senegal.
International Prices of Groundnuts
Prices declined sharply in The Gambia and, to a
lesser degree, in Senegal, while prices in South
Africa remained higher (figure 12.2). The discount
on groundnuts of Gambian and Senegalese origin
reflects both their lower quality and stricter EU
quality and technical standards. The European
Union has become more demanding, from both a
public health and a technical standpoint (size,
uniformity).
5 Nigeria and Senegal increased the
volume and value of their exports of groundnut oil,
whileSouthAfricaexitedthegroundnutoilmarket.
International prices of edible groundnuts and
groundnut oil in the Rotterdam market (the refer-
ence for groundnut trade) have exhibited two
distinct patterns since 1970 (figure 12.3). During
1970–81 the prices of both products were increas-
ing. Tests show no cointegration between edible
groundnut and groundnut oil during this period
(tables A12.1–A12.3 on the CD-ROM). Prices were
high, and the world market was dominated by
the United States, which supplied 45 percent of
exports, and Sub-Saharan Africa, which supplied
18 percent. China exported no edible groundnuts
or groundnut oil.
In sharp contrast with the 1970s, groundnut
prices over the past 20 years have been stable,
constantly reverting to their mean values following
shocks (tables A12.4 and A12.5 on the CD-ROM).
Two subperiods can be distinguished. Before 1994
prices of groundnuts displayed a higher level of
volatility. The coefficient of variation of prices
stood at 20 percent between 1980 and 1994, almost
three times the 7 percent level witnessed between
1995 and 2001.
What are the main causes of this price variabil-
ity? Is the change in price variability permanent?
Revoredo and Fletcher (2002b) analyze both
production instability (originating in exporting
countries) and consumption instability (originat-
ing in importing countries). They find that the
steady expansion of Chinese exports, which are
negatively correlated with exports from Argentina
and United States,was a stabilizing force in the sec-
ond half of the 1990s. This stabilization occurred
despite the fact that Argentina, India, and South
Africa now transmit a higher proportion of their
supply shocks to the world market.
Substitution between Chinese and U.S. ground-
nuts appears to have increased in recent years,
although detailed data on substitution in world
markets are not available.
In the groundnut oil market, the influence of
Senegal on world prices remains significant.Senegal
exported about 100,000 metric tons of groundnut
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TABLE 12.4 Share of Groundnut Products in Total Merchandise Exports
Item Period The Gambia Malawi Nigeria Senegal South Africa
Shelled groundnut exports
Volume (metric tons) 1980–82 27,333 14,867 1,026 2,725 41,333
2000–02 27,939 662 412 2,915 34,830
Value (US$ thousands) 1980–82 11,743 12,333 400 2,145 29,730
2000–02 5,763 436 204 1,371 22,875
Groundnut oil exports
Volume (metric tons) 1980–82 7,651 0 0 82,693 22,667
2000–02 8,633 0 1,287 98,879 1,519
Value (US$ thousands) 1980–82 6,400 0 0 60,285 14,071
2000–02 6,333 0 797 63,007 1,053
Share of groundnuts in 1980–82 59.62 4.65 0.003 16.17 0.21
total exports (percent) 2000–02 84.64 0.10 0.006 8.16 0.08
Note: The share of groundnuts in total goods exports includes exports of groundnut meal.
Source: Production and groundnut exports data, FAOSTAT; total goods exports, World Bank.oil in 2000–01, representing one-third of world
exports and more than 60 percent of demand from
the European Union,Senegal’s main export market.
While 2000–01 was an exceptional production year,
econometric tests strongly indicate that variations
in Senegal’s exports were transmitted into the vari-
ability in international prices and that the reverse
was not true.
Groundnut oil markets are broadly integrated
with markets for other vegetable oils (soy oil, rape-
seed oil, palm oil, and sunflower oil). Integration
seems to be much stronger for other oilseeds than
for groundnuts, however.
Domestic Groundnut Policies of
Major Countries in World Markets
Domestic producer support and taxation and trade
policies determine excess supply and trade flows.
It is important to examine these policies—in
Argentina, China, India, Sub-Saharan Africa, and
the United States—in some detail to anticipate the
Groundnut Policies, Global Trade Dynamics, and the Impact of Trade Liberalization 221
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Source: FAOSTAT.
FIGURE 12.3 Rotterdam Prices of Groundnuts, 1970–2000
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Source: Oil World, various issues.potential implications of policy changes on the dis-
tribution of gains and losses across countries.
Groundnut Policies in the United States
Groundnut products are a minor sector nationally,
but they are a key component of agriculture and
rural development in the southern part of the
United States. Based on the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA) Census of Agriculture, many
counties in the South derive 50–70 percent of their
agricultural income from groundnuts. Shelling is
performed locally, as are many groundnut product
manufacturing activities (Fletcher 2001). Ground-
nut policies have played a major role in maintain-
ing rural income in these counties.
The foundation of U.S. groundnut policy is the
U.S. peanut program, which traces its roots to the
1930s. Until the enactment of the 2002 Farm Bill,
the pillars of the system were production regulation
through quotas, high producer support prices, and
import control. The groundnut support program
existed as a two-tier price support program. The
support price for edible groundnuts was $610 per
short ton paid for production under quota. Other
groundnuts (“additionals”), which could be either
exported at world prices or sold to the domestic
crushed groundnut industry, were eligible for a
lower support price ($132 in 2001). The quota
farm-gate price tended to be higher than the pre-
vailing export prices (table 12.5).
The average annual aggregate measure of sup-
portforU.S.groundnutswasestimatedat$330mil-
lion during 2000–01, $31 million more than in
1996–2001. The average cost of aggregate support
in 1996–01 stood at $206 per metric ton of ground-
nuts produced in the United States (table 12.6).
The 2002 Farm Bill eliminated groundnut pro-
duction quotas (with a quota buyout), converted
the price support program to a system of direct and
countercyclical payments,and set a price floor with
a production subsidy (nonrecourse loans, with
marketing loan provisions). The key features of the
new program include the following:
• All current groundnut producers have equal
access to a marketing loan program under which
producers can pledge their crops as collateral to
obtain a marketing loan rate equal to $355 per
short ton.Producers may repay the loan at a rate
that is the lesser of the USDA–set repayment
rate plus interest or the marketing loan rate plus
interest, or they can forfeit the loan.
• For producers with a history of groundnut pro-
duction, a new direct and fixed payment of $36
per short ton is available. Historic producers are
those who were engaged in groundnut produc-
tion between 1998 and 2001.Eligible production
equals the product of average yields in the base
period and 85 percent of base-period acres.
These so-called decoupled payments are made
regardless of current prices or the actual crop
planted,as long as the farm remains in approved
agricultural uses.
• Producers with a history of groundnut produc-
tion are also eligible for a new countercyclical
payment when market prices are below an estab-
lished target price of $495 per short ton minus
the $36 per ton direct payment. The payment
rate is the difference between the target price
($495 per short ton) minus the direct fixed pay-
ment ($36 per ton) and the higher of the 12-
month national average market price for the
marketing year for groundnuts or the marketing
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TABLE 12.5 U.S. Producer Support Prices for Groundnuts, 1993–94 to 1998–99
(US$ per pound)
Item 1993–94 1994–95 1995–96 1996–97 1997–98 1998–99
Quota price 0.388 0.339 0.339 0.305 0.305 0.305
“Additional” price 0.660 0.660 0.660 0.660 0.660 0.660
Average farm price 0.304 0.289 0.293 0.281 0.283 0.280
CCC
a export price  0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200
Export unit value 0.330 0.286 0.292 0.322 0.327 0.328
Rotterdam cif price 0.371 0.292 0.336 0.316 0.360 0.290
a. Commodity Credit Corporation.
Source: Skinner 1999.Groundnut Policies, Global Trade Dynamics, and the Impact of Trade Liberalization 223
TABLE 12.6 U.S. Aggregate Support to Groundnuts, 1986–88 to 2000–01
Aggregate Measure of Support  Aggregate Measure of Support per 







Source: Skinner 1999; Hart and Babcock 2002 for 2000–01 aggregate measure of support; USDA database
for production data.
TABLE 12.7 U.S. Edible Groundnut Tariff Rate Quota Allocation, 1995–2008
(metric tons)
Argentina Mexico Other Total
Uruguay Round NAFTA Tariff Uruguay Round NAFTA + Uruguay 
Year Tariff Rate Quota Rate Quota Tariff Rate Quota Round
1995 26,341 3,478 4,052 33,871
1996 29,853 3,582 5,043 38,478
1997 33,364 3,690 6,034 43,088
1998 36,877 3,801 7,024 47,702
1999 40,388 3,915 8,015 52,318
2000 43,901 4,032 9,005 56,938
2001 43,901 4,153 9,005 57,059
2002 43,901 4,278 9,005 57,184
2003–07 43,901 4,278 9,005 —
2008 43,901 unrestricted 9,005 —
— Not available.
Source: USDA.
assistance loan rate ($355 per short ton). The
total countercyclical payment to each eligible
producer is calculated as the product of the pay-
ment acres (85 percent of base acres), the base-
year average yield, and the payment rate.
• Owners of groundnut quotas under the previ-
ous legislation receive compensation payments
for the loss of quota asset value. Payments may
be made in five annual installments of $220 per
short ton during fiscal years 2002–06, or the
quota owner may opt to take the outstanding
payment due in a lump sum. These payments
are based on quota owners’ 2001 quota, as long
as they owned a farm eligible for the groundnut
quota (Wescott,Young, and Price 2002).
Beginning in 1994, under the Uruguay Round
and NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agree-
ment), the United States gradually increased the
quantities of groundnut imports through a tariff
rate quota system. For edible groundnuts the total
tariff rate quota in 2001 was 57,059 metric tons, or
4 percent of domestic consumption, allocated first
to historical importers and then on a first-come,
first-served basis (table 12.7). In-quota tariffs for
edible and prepared groundnuts range between
$.066 and $.0935 per kilogram. Out-of-quota
tariffs are very high (131.8–163.0 percent under the
Uruguay Round; table 12.8).
6
The phase-out of groundnut trade barriers
under NAFTA and the Uruguay Round is limited inscope, but it continues to have a dramatic impact
on U.S. imports. Edible groundnut imports by the
United States—which were almost zero before
1994—have increased dramatically (table 12.9).
Argentina’s average fill rate was 87 percent and
Mexico’s, 77 percent, but out-of-quota imports
were quite important, averaging 25,000 metric tons
annually during 1996–2001. Edible groundnut
imports represented 6 percent of U.S. groundnut
consumption in 2001.
The initial impacts of the 2002 Farm Bill are also
reflected in the collapse of imports in 2003 (see
table 12.9). The elimination of production quotas
decreased the price paid by U.S.processors,increas-
ing domestic consumption of groundnuts (fig-
ure 12.4). It also removed the incentive to import
edible groundnuts (Fletcher and Revoredo 2003;
Revoredo and Fletcher 2002a).
Groundnut Policies in Argentina,China,and India
Since the mid-1990s Argentina, China, and India
have gradually reduced potentially market-distorting
direct government intervention in the production
and marketing of groundnut products (table 12.10).
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TABLE 12.8 U.S. Over-Quota Tariffs, 1994–2008
(percent)
Uruguay Round
NAFTA Prepared Groundnuts and 













a. Note: This indicates the base tariff levels from which the agreed cuts will be made.
— Not available.
Note: Prepared groundnuts are roasted, salted, or flavored groundnuts.
Source: USDA.
TABLE 12.9 U.S. Imports of Edible Groundnuts
Over-the- Argentina Mexico
Total Total Quota
Year Imports Quota Imports Quota Imports Quota Imports
1996 38,270 29,853 4,710 3,583 57,000 38,478 18,522
1997 40,622 33,365 6,148 3,690 64,000 43,088 20,912
1998 34,465 36,875 4,834 3,801 70,000 47,702 22,298
1999 39,494 40,388 4,916 3,915 82,000 52,318 29,682
2000 72,230 43,901 4,864 4,032 97,000 56,938 40,062
2001 37,557 43,901 3,611 4,153 81,000 57,059 23,941
2002 29,927 43,901 4,406 4,278 46,795 57,184 Not filled
2003 4,692 43,901 292 4,278 5,698 57,184 Not filled
Source: USDA.Argentina. Argentina’s groundnut trade policy
contrasts sharply with that of India and China, as
almost all the distortions are associated with
exports, which are subject to a 3.5 percent tax on
raw groundnuts. With the peso devaluation of
2001, export tax retention on groundnut exports
increased to 20 percent. This export tax may coun-
tervail the positive signal sent to groundnut
exporters through the peso devaluation. Argentina
maintains import tariffs on groundnut products,
which exhibit some escalation (5 percent on edible
groundnuts, 8 percent on groundnut meal, and
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FIGURE 12.4 U.S. Domestic Groundnut Prices, 1993–2003















TABLE 12.10 Groundnut Trade Policy Distortions in Argentina, China, and India
(percent)
Country Product Description 1999/2002
Argentina
Edible groundnuts Import tariff 5
Groundnut oil Import tariff 13
Groundnut meal Import tariff 8
Edible groundnuts  Export tax 3.5
Groundnut meal Export rebate 3.2
Groundnut oil (refined) Export rebate 2.3
China
Raw edible groundnuts  Import tariff 15
Processed edible groundnuts Import tariff 30
Groundnut oil Import tariff 10
Groundnut meal Import tariff 5
VAT on edible groundnuts and groundnut oil VAT 17
India
Edible groundnuts  Import tariff 45
Groundnut oil Import tariff 35
Groundnut meal  Import tariff 45
Note: India raised its tariff on oil to 65 percent in 2002 and 85 percent in 2003. Raw edible
groundnuts are raw, not roasted or cooked, in shell or shelled groundnuts. Processed groundnuts
are bleached, preserved, or otherwise prepared groundnuts, including roasted, salted, and
groundnut butter.
Source: WTO; WITS; USDA GAIN Report.13 percent on groundnut oil). These tariffs are
often redundant,since the country is a net exporter
of groundnut products.
China. Like India, China liberalized groundnut
trade to some degree in recent years. Before 1999
six public agencies were the only importers of
groundnut products; today,private firms are free to
import groundnuts. However, while the govern-
ment has committed to cap and reduce trade-
distorting domestic subsidies as part of its WTO
accession commitments, guaranteed prices and
government procurement schemes remain in
place.
7 Furthermore, border protection remains
high for processed groundnuts (30 percent). The
tariff on raw groundnuts was only 15 percent in
2001, and many regions of China are natural
exporters of groundnuts, making the tariff redun-
dant.In-quota tariffs on groundnut oil (10 percent)
and groundnut meal (5 percent) were much lower.
USDA attaché reports have repeatedly raised the
issue of the uneven application of the Chinese
value-added tax (VAT) on imported and domestic
products. The VAT is significant, ranging from 13
to 17 percent, depending on the product, and there
is ample room for tax evasion (USDA FASa, USDA
FASb). The lack of uniformity in application pre-
vents a more accurate measure of the impact. The
quantitative policy analysis presented in the next
section examines several cases with and without
theVAT.
China’s state trading imposes quantitative
restrictionsthroughquotasandlicensesonground-
nut oil imports, and it imposes tariff barriers on
seeds, meal, and oil. These barriers create a wedge
between domestic and world market prices.
Domestic prices of most oils, including groundnut
oil, are significantly higher than international mar-
ket prices. Tariffs and rents on import licenses
explain the price differentials.
8
India. India removed most restrictions on
domestic trade, storage, and export of groundnuts
by 1998 and permitted trading in groundnut
futures. However, import tariff levels remain very
high for all three groundnut products.Moreover,in
response to declines in prices, India has intensified
its use of trade policy measures to protect its pro-
ducers and processors. India is now the largest
source of distortions in these product markets.
Tariffs on edible groundnuts and groundnut
meal stood at 45 percent,while the tariff on ground-
nut oil was 35 percent in 2001 (see table 12.10).
Since 2002 India has reversed its trade liberalization
course on vegetable oil, increasing applied tariffs
on groundnut oil to 65–75 percent in 2002–03
and 85 percent in 2003–04 (Gulati, Pursell, and
Mullen, 2003; Pursell, 2003). The bound tariff is
100 percent.
Regulatory burdens increase domestic costs and
prices. Producers are obligated to sell and purchase
groundnuts only in the agricultural produce
wholesale market.
9 The “small-scale reservation”
policy in groundnut processing sets limits on fixed
assets in plant and machinery, preventing the
domestic processing industry from realizing
economies of scale.
Groundnut Policies of Key African Exporters
After decades of extensive intervention in the
groundnut sector, to varying degrees African coun-
tries underwent market reforms in the 1980s under
structural adjustment plans. One of the main
objectives of market reforms was to eliminate
direct and indirect taxation of farmers that had
undermined production incentives in the 1970s
and early 1980s and led to underutilized processing
capacities in many groundnut producing countries
(Badiane and Kinteh 1994).
Reforms have been piecemeal and partial. Gov-
ernments have generally withdrawn from input
markets, making it difficult for producers to obtain
certified seeds and fertilizer in countries such as
The Gambia and Senegal, where there are market
failures (in the credit market and elsewhere) and
high transactions costs (Akobundu 1998). Govern-
ments have been reluctant to liberalize groundnut
processing, for which privatization efforts started
only recently (in The Gambia and Senegal). In The
Gambia and Senegal producer prices are still set by
the government.
African governments have traditionally used
pricing policies as convenient levers to tax or subsi-
dize farmers based on their industrial policies and
political circumstances.
10 Taxation of groundnut
farmers was high in the 1970s but has been reversed
since the early 1990s in most countries, while real
world prices have trended downward (Badiane and
Kinteh 1994).In The Gambia and Senegal the main
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sector has been to safeguard the viability of state-
owned processing mills. Consequently, the share of
the export price to groundnut farmers has consis-
tently been less than 60 percent in these countries.
This policy has been counterproductive for the
state-owned enterprises, since farmers have
bypassed large public processing companies, creat-
ing excess capacity and financial difficulties.
Trade policies vary widely among traditional
groundnut exporters in Africa. Malawi and Senegal
apply high tariffs on processed groundnuts to
encourage domestic processing or oil production
(table 12.11). In contrast, The Gambia and Nigeria
have liberal trade policies, with no tariffs or export
taxes.South Africa’s tariff structure exhibits a slight
escalation, with processed groundnuts subject to a
tariff of 6 percent while unprocessed groundnuts
enter duty free. In The Gambia and Senegal unoffi-
cial cross-border trade is significant, with farmers
frequentlycrossingtheborderdependingmainlyon
producer prices and domestic supply levels in the
twocountries.Groundnutoilimportsfacea20per-
cent tariff in Malawi,Senegal,and SouthAfrica.
African countries are facing difficulties meeting
EU standards on aflatoxin and stricter product and
quality standards. In The Gambia and Senegal
groundnut varieties were originally selected for oil
production,which can accommodate lower-quality
seeds, and raw groundnuts. A seed variety in
Malawi proved successful in producing better
yields, but it lacked commercially viable character-
istics. Groundnuts exported from most African
countries are sold at a discount relative to the high-
quality groundnuts sold in the European Union.
African producers may be able to shift out of
groundnut oil and upgrade the quality of their
edible groundnuts. Unlike demand for groundnut
oil and meal, demand for confectionery groundnut
(the higher-quality edible groundnut) has been ris-
ing and is expected to continue to increase in the
medium term. Confectionery groundnuts receive a
price premium of as much as 100 percent over
grades used for oil and meal. In Senegal 1 ton of
first-grade confectionery groundnuts sells for
$800–$900, equivalent to the price of groundnut
oil. It takes three tons of unshelled groundnuts to
produce 1 ton of oil. However, fob (free on board)
prices of Gambian groundnuts are about $300 for
crushing, $450 for birdfeed, and $600 for edible
groundnuts. Were The Gambia able to upgrade
50 percent of its 10,000 tons of exports from crush-
ing to edible groundnuts, it would increase its
revenues by $1.5 million.
Groundnut Trade Policies of High-Income
Importers
Despite a general pattern of tariff escalation, trade
barriers are not a major obstacle to high-income
groundnut importers: the European Union and
Canada have a zero tariff for unprocessed ground-
nuts and low tariffs for processed groundnut for
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TABLE 12.11 Tariffs on Groundnut




Country Product Tariff 1999–2002
Gambia, The
Edible groundnuts  0
Groundnut meal 0
Groundnut oil (refined) 0
Malawi
Raw edible groundnuts  5
Processed edible 25 
groundnuts
Groundnut meal 0
Groundnut oil (refined) 20
Nigeria
Edible groundnuts  0
Groundnut meal 0
Groundnut oil (refined) 0
Senegal
Raw edible groundnuts  5
Processed edible  20
groundnuts
Groundnut meal 0
Groundnut oil (refined) 20
South Africa
Raw edible groundnuts  0
Processed edible  6
groundnuts
Groundnut meal 0
Groundnut oil (refined) 20
Note: Raw edible groundnuts are raw, not roasted
or cooked, in-shell or shelled groundnuts.
Processed groundnuts are bleached, preserved, or
otherwise prepared groundnuts, including roasted
and salted groundnuts and groundnut butter.
Source: World Trade Organization database. generalized system of preferences (GSP) and low-
income developing countries (table 12.12). Assess-
ment of market access in these countries must,
however, take into account the strict quality
standards.
In contrast to the European Union and Canada,
Japan and the Republic of Korea have high tariff
regimes for groundnuts. Japan applies a high tariff
on processed groundnuts and offers a very limited
preference margin of 4 percent for groundnut
exports from low-income developing countries.
Korea has very high tariffs on both raw and pro-
cessedgroundnuts,withtariffsonrawgroundnutsof
more than 200 percent. This high tariff may reflect
the government’s desire to stimulate production,
which has plummeted since the mid 1980s. In con-
trast to edible groundnuts, groundnut oils and meal
enter all of these high-income countries duty free.
Impact of Groundnut Product
Policy Reforms on World Prices,
Trade Flows, and Welfare
Several key findings emerge from the quantitative
analysis of distortions in groundnut markets.(For a
full description of the model,see Beghin and others
2003.) The main results obtained under the most
plausible assumptions underlying the model are
presented first, followed by sensitivity analysis test-
ing the effects of U.S. policy and uncertainty about
protection by China (VAT and protection of
processed groundnuts).
Policy Reform Scenarios
Several scenarios are analyzed:
• Full multilateral trade liberalization for ground-
nuts, meal, and oil, with and without elimina-
tion of the U.S. peanut program (FMTL&US
and FMTL)
• Multilateral trade liberalization of groundnuts,
with and without elimination of the U.S.peanut
program (GMTL&US and GMTL)
• Full trade liberalization in the two largest and
most distorted groundnut markets, China and
India (CIFTL)
Summary results of these five scenarios are pre-
sented in tables 12.13 and 12.14.Detailed results for
each scenario are presented in the longer report on
the CD-ROM.
Analysis Results
In countries with high groundnut protection, the
combined effect of the world price increase and
elimination of their own protection is beneficial to
final users of groundnuts, other things being equal.
For countries with moderate or no protection
before reform,tariff elimination and changes in the
terms of trade result in an increase in domestic
groundnut prices, handicapping groundnut users
(consumers and crushers).A similar logic holds for
groundnut oil and meal, for which the combined
effect of world price increases and the elimination
of tariffs has to be assessed. These substantial
terms-of-trade effects have a significant impact on
trade and welfare. Allocative efficiency gains in
domestic markets can be offset by large price
increases originating in postreform world markets.
In countries with high protection of groundnut
oil or meal (such as India),tariff elimination,net of
the world price hike, induces lower domestic prices
and reduces margins on crushed groundnuts. As a
result, the domestic excess supply of groundnuts
228 Global Agricultural Trade and Developing Countries
TABLE 12.12 Average Tariffs on Edible Unprocessed and Processed Groundnuts
(percent)
Most-Favored-Nation  Generalized System of  Low-Income Developing-
Tariffs Preferences Tariffs Countries Tariffs
Importer Unprocessed Processed Unprocessed Processed Unprocessed Processed 
Canada 0 4 0 4 0 3.2
European Union 0 13 0 9 0 0
Japan 3.7 19 3.7 19 3.7 15
Korea, Rep. of 243 65 243 65 243 65
Source: WTO.crushed into oil and meal decreases, increasing
imports.In contrast,countries with moderate or no
protection in their oil and meal markets face a net
price increase for oil and meal after full trade liber-
alization. Their final consumption of these value-
added products decreases, and crushing increases,
as the crush margin improves. Their excess supply
of these products increase, and they increase
exports.
The two full trade liberalization scenarios with
and without the elimination of the U.S.farm policy
(FMTL&US and FMTL) induce strong price
increases for all three products: 10 percent for
groundnuts, 18 percent for groundnut meal, and
27 percent for groundnut oil (see table 12.13). The
welfare impact of the FMTL&US and FMTL
reforms is influenced by the change in the ground-
nut oil price,which affects the crush margin.Crush
margins narrow in the European Union and India,
decreasing supply, but they may increase in China,
The Gambia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, and
the United States.
Trade patterns change dramatically. China
expands its exports of the three products.The large
increase in the price of groundnut oil improves the
crush margin, stimulating crushing in China.
Higher prices for groundnut oil in world markets
translate into larger exports. In India the lower
crush margin reduces groundnut oil production
and meal production; lower consumer prices for all
groundnut products stimulate groundnut oil pro-
duction and increase demand and eventually
imports.African producers expand their exports of
value-added products. Malawi and Senegal
decrease their exports of groundnuts because of
increased domestic use, while India experiences a
trade reversal, becoming a large importer of
groundnut oil and meal. Aggregate trade in
groundnuts increases 16 percent, and trade in
value-added products more than doubles.
The aggregate net welfare effects of FMTL&US
and FMTL amount to about $791 million at 1995
prices in each scenario (see table 12.14). China and
India experience the largest welfare gains—not sur-
prisingly, since they have the two largest and most
distorted groundnut product markets. China’s wel-
fare gains are about $666 million, India’s are about
$213 million. The “moderate” magnitude of global
welfare gains first comes from offsets—some coun-
tries gain in aggregate whereas some others, chiefly
the European Union-15, lose. For many countries
other than China and India, individual net gains
and losses are moderate, mostly because of the
small size of the groundnut markets and their
price-inelastic nature, which produces large
transfers but small deadweight losses. Indeed,
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TABLE 12.13 Welfare Effects of Policy Scenarios, 1999–2001 Average
(millions of 1995 US$)
Country FMTL&US FMTL GMTL&US GMTL CIFTL
Argentina 16.07 15.94 9.97 9.84 12.66
EU-15 −51.83 −51.27 −34.40 −33.82 −58.87
China 666.25 668.76 650.65 653.33 716.25
India 213.27 214.11 196.57 197.79 228.59
Rest of the world −126.69 −127.06 −4.21 −4.86 −71.06
Canada −5.94 −5.87 −4.88 −4.81 −4.59
Mexico −7.43 −7.34 −6.11 −6.01 −5.73
Senegal 41.03 40.96 21.93 21.86 21.39
Nigeria 15.93 15.77 7.22 7.07 13.45
South Africa 2.30 2.28 2.19 2.17 0.53
Malawi 7.45 7.45 7.60 7.61 −1.06
The Gambia 0.43 0.42 0.24 0.24 0.36
USA 20.18 16.70 21.71 18.40 12.39
Africa-5 total
1 67.14 66.89 39.18 38.95 34.67
Total 791.01 790.87 868.48 868.79 864.32
1. Denotes the aggregate of Senegal, Nigeria, South Africa, Malawi, and the Gambia.
Source: USDA.230 Global Agricultural Trade and Developing Countries
TABLE 12.14 Impact of Different Liberalization Scenarios on Groundnut Trade and Prices
(percent)
FMTL&US FMTL GMTL&US GMTL CIFTL
(percent except welfare)




Argentina 7 6 22 22 −6
China 36 34 42 41 13
Gambia, The 11 11 31 30 3
India −62 −64 −556 −557 −94
Malawi −80 −82 −93 −95 84
Nigeria 3667 3564 7470 7358 1776
Senegal −287 −298 −8 −20 −708
South Africa 22 22 20 20 14
United States 8 15 48 55 2
Total net exports 16 16 −17 −16 −4
Net Importers
Canada −5 −5 −4 −4 −4
European Union −3 −3 −3 −3 −2
Mexico −8 −8 −7 −7 −6
Rest of the world 63 65 −47 −45 −7
Residual 0 0 0 0 0
Total net imports 16 16 −17 −16 −4
Peanuts Price US Run. 10 10 8 8 8
40/50 cif Rotterdam
$ per mt
Peanut Meal Trade 
(1,000 metric tons)
Net Exporters
Argentina 13 13 −6 −61 8
China 741 739 −144 −146 759
Gambia, The 22 21 −2 −22 2
India −1702 −1703 344 342 −1690
Malawi 9 8 1 1 46
Nigeria 2867 2862 −193 −196 2867
Senegal 5 5 −1 −11 4
South Africa 95 95 −7 −7 139
United States 484 487 −380 −376 563
Rest of World 499 499 −70 −69 385
Total Net Exports −9 −9 0 0.4 −9
Net Importers
European Union −12 −12 1 1 −13
Residual 0 0 0 0 0
Total net imports −9 −90 0 −9
Meal Price 48/50 cif 18 18 0 0 18
Rotterdam $ per mt
Peanut Oil Trade 
(1,000 metric tons)
Net exporters
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substantial offsetting transfers occur between con-
sumers, crushers, and producers.
Price effects induced by the reforms have a simi-
lar impact large welfare transfer (rectangles) and
small net welfare effects (triangles), even in coun-
tries with undistorted markets. In Nigeria, for
example,following full multilateral trade liberaliza-
tion without elimination of the U.S. peanut pro-
gram, groundnut producers gain $34 million in
quasi-rents, consumers experience welfare losses of
$65 million (because of higher oil and processed
groundnut prices), crushers gain $51 million, and
meal users (feed users) lose about $3 million. In
aggregate the country is better off by $16 million.
Under multilateral trade liberalization for all
three products, elimination of the U.S. program
TABLE 12.14 (Continued)
FMTL&US FMTL GMTL&US GMTL CIFTL
(percent except welfare)
for 3 years for 3 years for 3 years
China 3469 3459 −705 −713 3354
Gambia, The 589 587 −5 −6 567
India −24288 −24304 4591 4558 −24481
Malawi 43 43 0 0 185
Nigeria 123 123 −6 −6 120
Senegal 5 5 −1 −11 9
South Africa 49 49 −4 −4 224
United States 288 290 −194 −192 326
Rest of world 861 864 −103 −99 665
Total net exports −6 −60 0 −8
Net importers
European Union −9 −90 0 −12
Residual 0 0 0 0 0
Total net imports −6 −60 0 −8
Peanut Oil Price cif 27 27 0 0 26 
Rotterdam $ per mt
welfare(million dollars) 791 791 868 869 864
Argentina 16.07 15.94 9.97 9.84 12.66
EU-15 −51.83 −51.27 −34.40 −33.82 −58.87
China 666.25 668.76 650.65 653.33 716.25
India 213.27 214.11 196.57 197.79 228.59
Rest of world −126.69 −127.06 −4.21 −4.86 −71.06
Canada −5.94 −5.87 −4.88 −4.81 −4.59
Mexico −7.43 −7.34 −6.11 −6.01 −5.73
Senegal 41.03 40.96 21.93 21.86 21.39
Nigeria 15.93 15.77 7.22 7.07 13.45
South Africa 2.30 2.28 2.19 2.17 0.53
Malawi 7.45 7.45 7.60 7.61 −1.06
Gambia, The 0.43 0.42 0.24 0.24 0.36
United States 20.18 16.70 21.71 18.40 12.39
Africa-5 total
a 67.14 66.89 39.18 38.95 34.67
Total 791.01 790.87 868.48 868.79 864.32
Note: Table totals are average changes for three years totaled in each column. Results are percentage
changes from the baseline. Baseline and simulations were run for three years (1999–2001) and averaged.
a. Totals are three-year averages.
Source: computed by the authors
a. Denotes the aggregate of Senegal, Nigeria, South Africa, Malawi, and The Gambia.affects trade flows, terms of trade, and welfare. The
strong price effects of trade liberalization invalidate
the price floor established by the U.S.loan rate.The
only remaining production-distorting element is
the fixed payment (fully coupled to production in
the model), which is small. Results under both sce-
narios (full trade liberalization with and without
elimination of the U.S. peanut program) are quali-
tatively identical, except for the United States,
which experiences additional welfare gains of $3.5
million (gains to U.S.taxpayers net of losses by U.S.
producers) by eliminating its domestic distortions.
The world price impacts of the FMTL scenario
are identical to those of FMTL&US (a 10 percent
increase for groundnuts, an 18 percent increase for
meal, and a 27 percent increase for groundnut oil).
Trade flows are barely affected by the elimination of
the U.S. domestic program under free trade. U.S.
groundnut exports are about 15,000 metric tons
lower in the FMTL&US scenario than in the FMTL
scenario. Given that the parameterization of U.S.
farm policy assumes full coupling to production for
payments received by producers, the assessment
provides an upper bound on the effect of the cur-
rent U.S. peanut program.
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Many agricultural negotiations during the Doha
Round of the WTO revolve around narrow issues of
substantial importance to developing countries.
Hence it is useful to assess what a narrow agricul-
tural liberalization encompassing the value-added
products of groundnut oil and meal would achieve
relative to full trade liberalization.
The GMTL&US and GMTL scenarios consider
these reforms and their impacts. Much is achieved
by groundnut trade liberalization alone, but with a
large second-best component, since distortions are
present in the value-added markets. In these
groundnut liberalization scenarios, the prices of
meal and oil are little affected, and crush margins
are driven primarily by changes in groundnut
prices. Margins improve in India but deteriorate in
countries with limited groundnut distortions.
Consumer welfare implications are also differ-
ent in these trade scenarios. In highly protected
groundnut oil markets, prices are higher under the
groundnut trade (GMTL) scenarios than they are
under all-product trade liberalization (FMTL sce-
narios). In countries with no oil distortions, prices
remain roughly at their baseline level, and con-
sumers do better under the groundnut trade
liberalization than under the full liberalization
scenarios. The rest of the world fares much better
under the groundnut trade liberalization scenarios
than under the full liberalization scenarios. In con-
trast, African economies do much better under the
full liberalization scenarios than with groundnut
trade liberalization reforms. The potential welfare
gains for Africa-5 (The Gambia, Malawi, Nigeria,
Senegal, and South Africa) nearly double by mov-
ing from groundnut trade liberalization to full
liberalization scenarios.
If China and India liberalized alone (the CIFTL
scenario), the qualitative results of the full liberal-
ization scenarios hold. What is striking in this last
scenario is the importance of India’s—and to a
lesser extent China’s—distortions and market size
on welfare, trade, and price effects. As suggested by
table 12.13, FMTL really hinges on the elimination
of distortions in India and China. With liberaliza-
tion in India and China, world prices would rise
8 percent for groundnuts, 18 percent for meal, and
26 percent for oil. The major welfare differences
occur in the rest of the world,where consumers are
worse off than they would be under the multilat-
eral groundnut trade liberalization scenario, since
groundnut oil prices are higher. Africa-5 improves
its lot in aggregate but by less than it would under
the full liberalization scenario, since groundnut
prices are lower and distortions within Africa-5
remain in place.
Two key assumptions in the model—the prevail-
ing groundnut market price in the U.S. market and
the level of protection of the groundnut market in
China—were investigated. The model was cali-
brated on 2002–03 U.S. prices ($389 per metric
ton) to see if the new U.S. policy under the 2002
Farm Bill would have had a stronger impact on the
world market under lower prevailing prices (farm
prices in the United States were 25 percent lower in
2002–03 than in 2001–02). The loan rate, counter-
cyclical payments, and fixed payments were elimi-
nated (countercyclical payments and fixed pay-
ments are assumed to be fully coupled to provide
an upper bound on the effect of the U.S. program),
while all distortions in all other countries were
retained. The price floor provided by the loan rate
is effective under the lower 2002–03 farm price.
U.S. output decreases 7 percent under the new
prices,and U.S.exports decrease 52 percent,induc-
ing a 0.9 percent increase in the world price of
groundnuts and negligible price impacts in the
other markets. The aggregate net welfare effect is
232 Global Agricultural Trade and Developing Countriesnegligible and negative. Higher world prices exac-
erbate distortions in other markets or increase
import costs in net importing countries. The
United States gains about $22 million (program
cost savings net of producer loss).
The same change was also tested with all other
distortions removed in all countries (FMTL&US
scenario). In this scenario the world price of
groundnuts was 0.5 percent higher than under free
trade plus the 2002 U.S. Farm Bill. The results sug-
gest that removing the 2002 Farm Bill incentives in
a free trade world would decrease U.S. production
about 4 percent and exports about 31 percent. The
aggregate welfare gains vary by less than $1 million.
Hence the conclusion that the new U.S. groundnut
policy is more benign than its predecessor remains
unaltered under much lower prices.
The sensitivity analysis on China’s protection
structureismorepivotaltotheconclusionsreached,
especially the protection of the groundnut sector.
Protection of groundnut producers is now assumed
tobe15percent(thetariff isredundantintheorigi-
nal model). Without assistance the Chinese farm
sector is no longer assumed to be a net exporter.
Underthisnewassumptionandfollowingfulltrade
liberalization (FMTL&US), China becomes a net
importerof groundnuts,becausedemandforedible
and crushed groundnuts increases. China’s welfare
gains are $1,029 million;aggregate welfare gains are
$1,160 million. World prices increase 18 percent
for groundnuts,19percentformeal,and29percent
for oil.
A second sensitivity analysis examines the effect
of providing baseline protection of processed
groundnuts with a 15 percent ad valorem tariff (the
original tariff was 30 percent and the VAT was 17
percent).Under this assumption welfare gains from
FMTL are only $266 million in China, and aggre-
gate gains are just $388 million. The world price of
groundnuts increases 9 percent in this modified
scenario, down from 10 percent under the original
run. The major change in welfare occurs in China,
because Chinese consumers gain much less from
trade liberalization relative to the initial situation.
Conclusions and Policy Implications
The groundnut market has historically been dis-
torted by heavy government intervention in both
industrial and developing countries. In the United
States the 2002 Farm Bill eliminated some unsus-
tainable features of earlier policies, but it intro-
duced new distortions that have some limited
potential to depress world market prices and subsi-
dize U.S. groundnut exports. India and China have
succeeded in stimulating production and exports,
capturing a growing share of the international mar-
ket. In India these gains have been artificial,
because the groundnut industry relies on heavy
protection. In contrast, in Sub-Saharan Africa and
Argentina, government intervention has hurt
the sector.
Unlike U.S. policy for cotton, dairy, rice, and
sugar, the current U.S. domestic peanut program is
now largely a domestic support program with some
distortive impact. The scenario analysis suggests
that developing countries would gain little by try-
ing to negotiate further U.S. groundnut policy
reform, as these changes would prove ineffective
unless groundnut prices fell to very low levels.Only
then would the countercyclical U.S. policy further
destabilize world prices, sending the wrong market
signal to U.S. producers. Under prevailing market
conditions, U.S. producers would actually bene-
fit from multilateral trade liberalization in ground-
nut product markets. Hence it would be rational
for the United States to support foreign groundnut
producers in their attempt to liberalize. As a
bloc most OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development) countries would
experience welfare losses after trade liberalization,
with moderate gains in the United States offset by
losses in Canada,Mexico,and the European Union-
15. Mexico, Canada, and the European Union-15
would lose from trade liberalization because there
are few distortions in these markets, so consumers
would be penalized by price increases for ground-
nut products.
Elimination of trade distortions by the two
largest developing economies, India and China, is
essential. The size of their markets—and the huge
distortions in India—substantially depress world
prices of the three globally traded groundnut prod-
ucts.Following elimination of these distortions,net
buyers of these products would be worse off, but
most Sub-Saharan African countries that export
groundnuts would gain.
Full trade liberalization would increase world
market prices about 10 percent for groundnuts,
18 percent for groundnut meal, and 27 percent for
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16 percent, and trade in oil and meal would more
than double.
Although the net world welfare effects of liberal-
izing markets in the United States,China,and India
are moderate, they remain significant for small
agrarian economies in Sub-Saharan Africa.Liberal-
ization would thus produce welfare gains in the
countries in which they are most needed.
The simulations show that liberalization of the
value-added markets is essential to achieve larger
welfare gains in African countries. Although the
bulk of the world welfare gains occur with ground-
nut trade liberalization, elimination of distortions
in value-added markets doubles net welfare gains
in Africa by yielding larger profits to producers
and exporters of groundnuts and groundnut oil.
African countries modeled in the trade liberaliza-
tion analysis would experience aggregate welfare
gains of $67 million, with Senegal and Nigeria
reaping most of these gains. Groundnut and
groundnut oil consumers in Africa tend to be
urban, whereas groundnut production generates
income in rural areas as a cash crop. African
groundnut producers modeled in the analysis gain
$50 million–$150 million of farm income, depend-
ing on the assumptions underlying the model.
These figures are significant for small African
economies and represent an important opportu-
nity to expand rural development in these areas. In
the scenarios tested,the rest of the world would fare
worse under full trade liberalization, because con-
sumers are required to pay higher groundnut prod-
uct prices. Groundnuts are not without substitutes,
however, and the price increase may induce
increases in demand for other oils.
Recent changes present both challenges and
opportunities for major countries in the market.
The United States is likely to continue to dominate
the high end of the international confectionery
market under its new peanut program. Argentina
and China have established strong groundnut sec-
tors that can compete favorably under free market
conditions. Chinese exports played a stabilizing
role in world markets in the 1990s.
All developing countries except Argentina face
the challenge of meeting the quality requirements
of the expanding confectionery markets. This is
particularly so for African countries, which are
missing out on the opportunities and rewards
created by the expansion of the edible groundnut
exports market because of inadequate quality.
Notes
1. Groundnuts are also known as peanuts, earthnuts,
goobers, pinders, and Manila nuts. The groundnut plant is a
hairy, tap-rooted, annual legume that measures 1–1.5 feet in
height.
2. Groundnut oil is an excellent cooking oil, with a high
smoke point and neutral flavor and odor. Groundnut meal is
used as animal feed.
3.Any grower in the group is eligible to farm a certain num-
ber of acres of land. Farmers who use the land are obligated,
however, to pay agricultural tax in kind and sell a certain
amount of their products to the state government at regulated
prices.
4. Export markets reflect relatively high-quality premiums
and discounts. Prices of U.S. groundnuts set a ceiling for inter-
national prices, because the quality is high. Edible U.S. ground-
nuts commanded a 40 percent premium on world markets over
shelled Chinese groundnuts in 2000 (FAO 2002).
5. In 1998 the EU harmonized country regulations on the
maximum permissible level of aflatoxin,setting levels at the low-
est possible level (0.002 milligrams for B1 type aflatoxin for edi-
ble groundnuts). Aflatoxin is a cancer-causing chemical pro-
duced by species of aspergillus molds that can contaminate
groundnuts. The spores of these molds, present anywhere in the
air and the soil, require specific temperature, moisture, and
nutrient substrates to germinate. Aflatoxin contamination of
groundnuts can occur during cultivation in the field, as well as
during harvesting, postharvesting, storage, or processing. While
aflatoxin disappears with crushing, it remains in edible ground-
nuts and groundnut meal. Technical processes exist to reduce
aflatoxin contamination (with ammoniac, for example, which
Senegal uses on groundnut meal), but the best method is to
improve farm practices through use of best-quality and resistant
seeds, proper management of farms, and appropriate storage to
avoid exposure to high temperature and humidity.See chapter 6
in this volume for a discussion of food safety and agricultural
health standards.
6.The levels of quota and tariff for the period after 2003 are
currently under negotiation.
7. According to the FAO (Food and Agriculture Organiza-
tion), these policies provide little incentive to expand produc-
tion due to unattractive administrative price levels and greater
involvement of the private sector in marketing operations. Data
on the magnitude of domestic support are not available.
8. The international price of groundnut oil in Hong Kong
(China) was $728 a ton in 1998, and the wholesale price in
China was 67.8 percent higher (Fang and Beghin 2002).
9. This regulation imposes a significant burden on farmers
and processors. Even if they are located very close to one
another, they have to travel to the wholesale market and pay an
“agent commission” and other marketing fees before the trans-
action is processed.
10. Taxation of producers was direct (that is, marketing
boards or similar agencies captured the rent, equal to the differ-
ence between the net world price and the producer price) or
indirect (through appreciation of the real exchange rate). This
taxation was generally mitigated by input subsidies and border
protection.
11. Eliminating U.S. distortions under existing trade distor-
tions produces a 0.13 percent increase in the world price of
234 Global Agricultural Trade and Developing Countriesgroundnuts and virtually no increase in world cake and oil
prices. U.S. groundnut exports decrease by 10 percent, or about
20,000 metric tons a year. Thus in contrast to the effect of U.S.
subsidies on rice, cotton, and sugar, the impact of the current
U.S. farm program on the world price of and trade in ground-
nuts is negligible.
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fibers.
This chapter highlights major global, regional,
and product-specific trends in the trade in fruit and
vegetable products, and examines the major policy
and other factors that have affected this trade over
the past two decades.
1 Particular attention is given
to the performance and position of developing
countries in this trade and the policies,institutions,
and infrastructure they need to succeed.
Fruit and Vegetable Production
and Trade Growth
For the purpose of this study, we group fruits and
vegetables in four main categories: fresh fruits,
fresh vegetables, processed fruits, and processed
vegetables. These categories comprise all SITC
(Standard International Trade Classification) Revi-
sion 1, Chapter 5 items except nuts, roots, and
tubers. They correspond to most products in
Chapter 7 (edible vegetables and certain roots
and tubers), Chapter 8 (edible fruits and nuts;
peel of citrus fruits or melons) and Chapter 20
(preparations of vegetables, fruit, nuts, or other
parts of plants) of the Harmonized System (HS)
nomenclature.
Trade in fruit and vegetable products has been
among the most dynamic areas of international
agricultural trade, stimulated by rising incomes and
growing consumer interest in product variety,fresh-
ness, convenience, and year-round availability.
Advances in production, postharvest handling, pro-
cessing, and logistical technologies—along with
increased levels of international investment—have
played a facilitating role. For developing countries,
trade in these products has been attractive in the
face of highly volatile or declining long-term trends
in the prices for many traditional export products.
Although many developing-country suppliers have
entered the field,relatively few have achieved signif-
icant, sustained success, reflecting the fact that the
industry is highly competitive and rapidly changing.
Still, the aggregate picture is favorable. Fresh and
processedfruitandvegetableproductsaccountedfor
16.7percentof totalagriculturalexportsfromdevel-
oping countries in 1980–81. By 2000–01, this share
had increased to 21.8 percent. Only for one other
product category—fish and fisheries products—are
developingcountriesmoresignificantexporters(see
chapter 1). Fruit and vegetable exports from devel-
oping countries are now more than double exports
for tropical beverages, three times exports of grains,
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Trends in World Production and Trade
World production of fruit and vegetables grew by
30 percent between 1980 and 1990 and by 56 per-
cent between 1990 and 2003, reaching 1,274 mil-
lion tons by 2003. Much of this growth occurred in
China, where production grew by 134 percent in
the 1980s and by 200 percent in the 1990s. China is
currently the world’s largest producer of fruits and
vegetables, with a share of 34 percent, followed by
Latin America and the Caribbean (11 percent),
India (10 percent), and Africa and the European
Union (EU) (both at 9 percent) (figure 13.1).
The structure of world trade in fruits and veg-
etables does not fully mirror that of production.
Many of the largest producers are not significant
traders due to a combination of domestic demand
and geographical and logistical factors. For exam-
ple, in China and India, where strong domestic
demand is fueled by growing income and a large
and rapidly growing urban population,only a small
percentage of fruit and vegetable production is
exported. In contrast, Latin American countries
(such as Mexico, Chile, and Costa Rica) are among
the world’s leading exporters of fruits and vegeta-
bles, mainly because of their proximity to the large
U.S. market.
World trade in fruits and vegetables, fresh and
processed, has increased by 30 percent since 1990,
reaching $71.6 billion in 2001 (table 13.1). This
followed even more robust growth in the 1980s,
when trade in fruits and vegetables doubled.World
trade in all categories of fruits and vegetables
has grown strongly, with only slight changes in
its broad composition. In 2001 fresh produce
accounted for 63 percent of the total, whereas
processed products accounted for 37 percent. The
complexity of these definitions must be kept in
mind, however. Both in Europe and the United
States,one of the fastest-growing product segments
is semi-prepared and packed fresh produce,includ-
ing preassembled salads, vegetable dips, and sliced
or mixed fruit products.
Taking all fruit and vegetable products com-
bined, the value of world imports grew at 2–3 per-
cent a year during the 1990s, a sharp deceleration
from the 7–8 percent annual growth during the
previous decade (figures 13.2–13.5). As elaborated
below, the slower growth in world imports during
the 1990s reflects two primary factors: a decline in
world prices for many important fruit and veg-
etable products in the latter half of the 1990s, and
stagnation in EU import demand due to market
saturation.
Within the fresh fruit category, the deceleration
has been sharpest for apples,grapes,and citrus (fig-
ure 13.2). Comparatively more dynamic trade has
remained for various tropical fruits (especially
papaya, mango, and pineapple), with average
annual growth in the 1990s remaining at 8 percent.
FIGURE 13.1 Production of Fruit and Vegetables by Region 
(million of tons)














Source: United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization.Still, these latter products represent a relatively
small proportion of world fresh fruit trade (7 per-
cent in 2001), which is still heavily concentrated in
particular lines, including bananas (25 percent of
the total), citrus fruit (20 percent), grapes (11 per-
cent), and apples (10 percent). A large number of
other fresh fruits,not separated in the statistics,col-
lectively represent 28 percent of world fresh fruit
imports. Prominent items in this category include
melons,various types of berries,and other temper-
ate fruits.
World import values for fresh vegetables grew at
6.9 percent a year during the 1980s, yet decelerated
to 2.4 percent a year in the 1990s (figure 13.3). The
deceleration affected most individual commodities.
World vegetable trade is fragmented among a large
number of individual items. The largest single item
is tomatoes, which account for 17 percent of the
total. The category of beans, peas, and lentils
accounts for another 14 percent. Other relatively
major commodities in the fresh vegetable trade
include onions, potatoes, asparagus, mushrooms,
and various types of sweet and pungent peppers.
The evolution of trade in processed fruit and
vegetable products mirrors that for fresh produce.
The annual growth rate in trade value was 8.3 per-
cent a year during the 1980s, yet only 3 percent
during the 1990s (figure 13.4). All categories of
processed products saw a deceleration in trade
expansion, although fruit and vegetable juices and
preserved fruits and jams fell most sharply.
Processed vegetables (such as canned mushrooms,
dried mushrooms, and tomato paste) account for
55 percent of world trade in all these products,fruit
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Source: COMTRADE.
TABLE 13.1 World Fruit and Vegetable Imports, 1980–2001 
(US$ millions)
Percent Share Percent Share Percent Share
Category 1980–81 in Total 1990–91 in Total 2000–01 in Total
Fresh fruits 10,971 40 20,981 38 27,978 39
Processed fruits 4,441 16 9,916 18 13,176 18
Fresh vegetables 6,805 25 13,315 24 16,914 24
Processed vegetables 5,424 20 10,883 20 13,577 19
Total 27,641 100 55,094 100 71,644 100
Source: COMTRADE.
















1980–81 to 1990–91 1990–91 to 2000–01and vegetable juices for some 20 percent, and sev-
eral smaller categories for the balance.
Price played a role in the observed trends. The
unit values of fresh fruit and of fresh and prepared
vegetables dropped sharply in the second half of
the 1990s after an extended period of increase dat-
ing from the early 1980s (figure 13.5). These trends
suggest that price factors played a very significant
role in the declining rate of growth in the value of
fruit and vegetable imports during the 1990s.
Indeed,for each of the most important traded fresh
fruits and vegetables, the rate of import volume
growth was modestly higher in the 1990s than in
the 1980s (table 13.2).
Part of the decline in world prices is a statistical
matter. The data above are recorded in U.S. dollars.
During the latter half of the 1990s, the U.S. dollar
appreciated vis-à-vis the yen and most European
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a. The corresponding value for 1990–91 to 2000–01 has the value of 0%.
Source: COMTRADE.
Source: COMTRADE.currencies, deflating Japanese and European
import values upon conversion into U.S. dollars.
For some commodities, however, the unit import
values into Japan, Europe, and elsewhere actually
did decline in local currency terms—in some cases
substantially. For example, from 1996 to 2001, the
average unit value of Japanese fresh vegetable
imports fell by 25 percent, while that of processed
vegetable imports fell by 8 percent.
2 A major factor
in this decline was the rapidly expanding supply of
low-cost production in China. During the 1990s
China accounted for virtually all of the incremental
expansion in Japan’s vegetable trade, taking market
share from other suppliers. Declining unit import
values for various products in Europe can be attrib-
uted to at least three factors: the slow economic
growth in the region (especially in Germany, the
leading importer); competitive and structural
changes in fruit and vegetable distribution systems,
which put downward pressures on trader and
manufacturer margins; and greater availability of
product and intensified international competition.
Sources and Destinations of
Exported Fruits and Vegetables
The European Union, NAFTA (North American
Free Trade Agreement), and a few middle-income
countries dominate trade in fruits and vegetables
(table 13.3). Eight categories of countries are dis-
tinguished. China, India, Japan, and the European
Union are singled out. The United States, Canada,
and Mexico are grouped together in the NAFTA
category. The developing-country group minus
China and India is split between low-income coun-
tries and middle-income ones.
Global Trade Patterns
The European Union is the world’s largest market
and supplier of fresh and processed fruits and veg-
etables. In 2001 its 15 member countries accounted
for $37 billion in imports, or 51 percent of world
imports, while exports stood at $28 billion, or
39.5 percent of world exports.
3 EU trade in fruits
and vegetables is, however, largely intraregional.
Intra-EU imports represent 64 percent of EU
imports,while 83 percent of EU export trade occurs
among its 15 member states. Still, with its affluent
Fruits and Vegetables: Global Trade and Competition in Fresh and Processed Product Markets 241
TABLE 13.2 Average Annual Growth Rates









Green beans 4.59 5.98
Source: FAOSTAT.
FIGURE 13.5 World Unit Values for Fresh Fruits, Fresh Vegetables, and Prepared Vegetables 
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Prepared vegetables Fresh fruit Fresh vegetables
Source: FAOSTAT.and aging population, its high factor costs, and its
coldwinters,thisregionrepresentsoneof thelargest
fruit and vegetable markets for non-EU countries
($13.2 billion), especially for low- and middle-
income countries, which exported $1.08 and $9 bil-
lion, respectively, to the European Union in 2001.
Major middle-income suppliers to the European
Union market include banana-exporting coun-
tries (mainly Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire,
Ecuador, and Panama
4) and counterseasonal-
supplying countries such as Argentina, Chile, and
South Africa. Led by South Africa, the latter three
countries dominate exports of apples, grapes, and
pears to the European Union.
Intraregional trade is also significant in NAFTA,
the world’s second-largest fruit and vegetable
market. Trade between Mexico, Canada, and the
United States accounted for 49 percent of NAFTA’s
imports and 53 percent of its exports in 2001.
Intra-NAFTA trade is most important for fresh
vegetables. For this commodity group, 90 percent
of exports and 86 percent of imports occur within
the trade group (Huang 2004). Still, middle-
income countries (excluding Mexico) have a strong
foothold in this market. By securing 71 percent of
the $7.25 billion extra-NAFTA import market in
2001, middle-income countries are major players.
Interestingly, thanks to growing incomes in the
1990s, middle-income countries have seen their
ownmarketbecomeamajordestinationof fruitand
vegetable exports from other countries,with import
demand totaling $11 billion in 2001. South-South
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TABLE 13.3 Import and Export of Fruits and Vegetables by Region or Country
(US$ billions)
Exporters
Low- Middle- European Other Total
Importers Year Income Income Union Japan NAFTA Industrial China India Imports
Low-income 1980–81 0.05 0.14 0.09 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.37
1990–91 0.02 0.12 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.34
2000–01 0.08 0.19 0.10 0.00 0.13 0.09 0.14 0.05 0.78
Middle- 1980–81 0.10 2.24 0.88 0.18 0.84 0.21 0.39 0.09 4.94
income 1990–91 0.14 2.77 0.91 0.10 1.12 0.33 0.79 0.12 6.27
2000–01 0.44 4.69 2.22 0.05 1.88 0.58 1.04 0.17 11.08
European 1980–81 0.42 4.36 8.63 0.02 0.75 1.08 0.24 0.02 15.52 
Union 1990–91 0.75 8.86 20.59 0.01 1.07 1.71 0.50 0.02 33.51
2000–01 1.08 9.19 23.45 0.01 1.19 1.09 0.55 0.11 36.67
Japan 1980–81 0.02 0.68 0.05 0.00 0.49 0.07 0.13 0.00 1.43
1990–91 0.01 1.49 0.17 0.00 1.21 0.25 0.56 0.00 3.69
2000–01 0.04 1.49 0.25 0.00 1.69 0.36 1.93 0.00 5.76
NAFTA 1980–81 0.04 1.64 0.29 0.05 1.97 0.09 0.05 0.00 4.12
1990–91 0.07 3.94 0.75 0.06 3.59 0.23 0.13 0.01 8.80
2000–01 0.12 5.20 1.15 0.05 7.10 0.27 0.36 0.10 14.35
Other 1980–81 0.01 0.31 0.61 0.00 0.13 0.11 0.02 0.00 1.20
industrial 1990–91 0.03 0.55 1.16 0.00 0.17 0.21 0.04 0.01 2.17
2000–01 0.03 0.56 1.10 0.00 0.23 0.21 0.08 0.01 2.22
China 1980–81 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
1990–91 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06
2000–01 0.06 0.32 0.01 0.00 0.12 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.56
India 1980–81 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06
1990–91 0.08 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.24
2000–01 0.10 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.23
Total 1980–81 0.65 9.41 10.55 0.25 4.21 1.58 0.85 0.13 27.64
exports 1990–91 1.12 17.86 23.62 0.18 7.22 2.83 2.06 0.20 55.09
2000–01 1.95 21.66 28.29 0.12 12.41 2.65 4.10 0.45 71.64
Source: COMTRADE.trade—trade between developing countries,exclud-
ing China and India—totaled $5.4 billion in 2001,
accounting for 45 percent of developing countries’
imports. Japan has also emerged as a significant
market for fruits and vegetables over the 1990s,with
import demand culminating at $5.8 billion in 2001.
China has emerged as a major supplier of horticul-
ture to Japan with its market share doubling from
16 percent in the 1980s to 33 percent in the 1990s.
While import penetration increased in the
United States and other regions, EU import
demandgrewlittleinthe1990s.Astable13.3shows,
a salient feature of world import dynamics is the
sharp increase in imports of developing countries
(6 percent a year) and NAFTA (5 percent a year),
and the stagnation of EU imports (1 percent a year)
over the 1990s. Focusing on the United States, the
importpenetrationratiohasincreasedsteadilyover
time for fresh produce (figure 13.6). In contrast,
e x t r a - E Ui m p o rtd e m a n dg r e wb yj u s t0 . 2p e r c e n ta
year between 1990 and 2001, indicating that the
bulk of the small increase in the European Union’s
horticultural trade, shown in table 13.3, occurred
internally. This is a major change from the 1980s,
when EU imports almost doubled.Closer examina-
tion of the data shows that the European Union’s
import deceleration is largely driven by Germany,
which represents 25 percent of the EU’s fruit and
vegetable market. Germany’s imports dropped by
1.4 percent annually over the 1990s, reflecting its
slow pace of economic growth during this decade.
5
Income and population composition and
dynamics are the major drivers of import demand.
Demand for fruits and vegetables—derived from a
combination of broad demand dynamics,domestic
supply trends, and trade policies—is relatively
income elastic. Higher incomes typically induce
increased expenditures on a broader array of fresh
and processed fruit and vegetable products. In
addition to income, other important factors
include the size, age, ethnic composition of the
population, cultural and religious factors, lifestyle
factors(includingworkpatternsandurbanization),
and consumer education about health matters.
Although not all of these factors can be exam-
ined statistically, we attempt here to quantify the
importance of most of the factors that explain
the observed cross-country differences in growth
in imports of fresh fruits, fresh vegetables, and
processed fruits over the 1990s. The analysis, based
on a sample of 49 major importers, uses the stan-
dard imperfect substitutes model (Goldstein and
Khan 1985), which assumes that imports are not
perfect substitutes for domestic goods for the coun-
tries under consideration.
6
It is well known that economic growth strongly
stimulates imports of fruits and vegetables, whereas
inflation reduces them (Goldstein and Khan 1985).
7
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FIGURE 13.6 Import Penetration Ratios in U.S. Fruit and
Vegetable Markets, 1970–2001  
(percent)
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Source: USDA.But it is urbanization, not growth per se, that exer-
cises the strongest and most significant influence on
imports of fresh fruits (with the nuance that it plays
a major role in developing countries only given the
population shifts that are still occurring in these
countries,see the Result Table A1 on the CD-ROM).
Several factors could explain this relationship. First,
urbanization helps to reduce the logistical and
transaction costs to service demand from interna-
tional sources, especially if the major cities are
located in close vicinity to major ports or along effi-
cient transport nodes. Second, with urbanization,
there is greater demand for convenience in meeting
food needs.Many fresh and processed fruit and veg-
etable products can be consumed with little or no
further household preparation. Plus, these products
feature heavily in menus of restaurants and catering
services, most of which are in urban areas. Third,
urban populations tend to be more heterogeneous
in ethnic and other composition than is typical in
any single rural setting. This mixing of populations
increases consumer exposure to new or even exotic
products, some of which may only be sourced in
large quantities from abroad.
As expected, tariffs negatively affect fresh fruit
trade, but the elasticity is not significantly different
from zero. In sharp contrast, tariffs have a negative
and statistically significant effect on processed fruit
trade, highlighting the high degree of tariff escala-
tion affecting trade in fruits and vegetables.
Developing Countries’Performance
Although many countries have entered the fresh
fruit and vegetable export markets, only a few
middle-income countries have succeeded on a sus-
tained basis. The average shares of developing
countries in world exports of fresh fruits and veg-
etables hide the heavy domination of trade by just a
handful of middle-income countries.Between 1997
and 2001, just four Latin American countries—
Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Mexico—
accounted for 43 percent of developing-country
exports of fresh fruit (FAO 2003). These countries
are leading players in the most internationally
traded fruit products (table 13.4). While exports of
vegetables are similarly concentrated, the geo-
graphical distribution of exporters is wider.Mexico
is the world’s leading exporter of tomatoes, Kenya
supplies 25 percent of the world’s green beans,
while Guatemala and Kenya jointly lead the world
market for green peas.
8 Between 1997 and 2001,
four suppliers—Argentina, China, Mexico, and the
Syrian Arab Republic—accounted for 67 percent of
fresh vegetable exports by developing countries
(FAO 2003).
9
A small number of medium-income countries
have been successful in the processed segment of
the export market, but as a group, developing
countries account for a relatively lowshare in world
exports of these products (36 percent in 2001).
Chile, China, Thailand, and Turkey account for
58 percent of developing countries’ exports of
processed fruit and vegetable products (FAO 2003).
Secondary, yet still significant exporters include
Argentina, Indonesia, Mexico, and the Philippines
(a combined 14 percent of developing countries’
exports). Trade by developing countries in specific
processed products is relatively highly concentrated
(table 13.5).
244 Global Agricultural Trade and Developing Countries
TABLE 13.4 Concentration of Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Exports among Developing
Countries, 2001
Joint Percentage of
Product Leading Suppliers World Exports (value)
Asparagus  Peru, Mexico, Thailand 94
Mangoes Brazil, Mexico, Philippines  62
Pineapples Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire 61
Bananas Ecuador, Colombia, Costa Rica  60
Avocados Chile, Mexico 53
Tomatoes Mexico, Syria 52
Grapes Chile, China, Mexico  38
Green beans Jordan, Kenya, Mexico  49
Green peas Guatemala, Kenya, Zimbabwe  38
Source: FAOSTAT.Policy Factors Shaping International
Trade Patterns
Domestic Support and Export Subsidies
Government interventions for fruits and vegetables
are significantly lower than in other agricultural
sectors.Consistently,domestic subsidies to produc-
ers are relatively low in OECD (Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development) coun-
tries. Of the major industrialized regions, only the
European Union reports an aggregate measure of
support related specifically to several fruits and
vegetables, while Japan and Canada indicate mod-
erate levels of aggregate support for a few com-
modities.
10 The European Union’s budgetary out-
lays for fruits and vegetables totaled $1.55 billion in
1999. Those expenditures covered compensation
for surplus withdrawals; production aid to produc-
ers of bananas, peas, lentils, beans, pineapples,
grapes, and stone fruits; and aid to producers of
certain products intended for processing (toma-
toes, peaches, pears) and to processors who pay
producers at least the minimum price fixed each
year (for dried figs and certain prunes, for exam-
ple). Japan reported price support for starches
($179 million for potatoes and sweet potatoes in
1998) and direct payments to the vegetable and
fruit sectors, but the aggregate measure of support
was below the de minimis level. Similarly, in
Canada, only its support for dry beans was above
the de minimis levels (WTO 2000a).
Unlike in many other agricultural sectors, the
use of export subsidies is not pervasive in horticul-
ture. The export subsidy expenditures notified to
the WTO in 2000 (WTO 2000b) (table 13.6) are
well below those reported for other agricultural
categories. In only one country, Switzerland, were
expenditures large relative to horticultural exports,
with export subsidies accounting for 21 percent of
that country’s exports. The European Union’s
export subsidies represented less than 1 percent of
the value of its total exports. Although it did not
supply information to the WTO, the United States
indirectly subsidized horticultural exports, albeit
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TABLE 13.5 Concentration of Processed Fruit and Vegetable Exports among Developing
Countries
Joint Percentage of
Product Leading Suppliers World Exports (value)
Orange juice concentrated Brazil 91
Canned pineapples  Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand 74
Canned mushrooms China 52
Dried mushrooms China 52
Dried fruits Chile, China, Thailand 35
Tomato paste Chile, China, Turkey 35
Apple juice, concentrated Argentina, Chile, Turkey 31
Source: FAO 2003.
TABLE 13.6 Export Subsidy Expenditures for Horticultural Products
Export Total Horticultural Export Expenditures as a
Expenditure Exports Percent of Total Horticultural
Country (US$ millions) (US$ millions) Export Value
European Union 40 5,301 0.8
Switzerland 14 69 20.6
Colombia 13 521 2.4
Turkey 11 2,348 0.0
Source: WTO 2000b and subsequent WTO notification updates. Export data from FAOSTAT.to a very limited degree, through export credit
guarantees.
Tariffs and Other Import Restrictions
Regulating market access is the main instrument
used to protect the fruit and vegetable sector. The
European Union, Japan, and the United States use,
to varying degrees,similar protection tools: low but
highly dispersed ad valorem tariffs, specific duties,
seasonal tariffs, tariff escalation, and preferential
access along with tariff-rate quotas. Tariffs for a
specific range of products depend on numerous
factors,including the date of entry (seasonality fac-
tor),the degree of processing (escalation phenome-
non), and the relationships with exporting coun-
tries (preferential agreements and regional and
bilateral free trade agreements—FTAs).
Average applied most-favored-nation (MFN)
tariffs are very low in all countries of the Quad—
Canada, the European Union, Japan, and the
United States. These tariffs range between 0.9 per-
cent for fresh fruits in Canada to 9.2 percent in the
European Union for the same product category
(table 13.7). The average tariffs, however, do not
accurately reflect the level of actual protection
caused by the wide dispersion in tariffs and the
prevalence of high peaks.Closer examination of the
tariff structure highlights the importance of tariff
peaks, especially in the European Union and the
opacity of protection. Tariff peaks in the European
Union,for example,can reach as high as 128 percent
for fresh fruits and 132 percent for fresh vegetables.
Viewed in closer detail, the protection structure
of several OECD countries is opaque. Canada,
Japan, and the United States have the lowest tariffs,
with, for instance, 85 percent of U.S. tariffs under
10 percent. In sharp contrast, the Republic of Korea
and the European Union apply high tariffs on many
products. For instance, in the Republic of Korea,
59 percent of fresh fruit and vegetable tariff lines lie
between 20 and 50 percent and 37 percent of the
lines are over 100 percent. Protection of fruits
remains relatively nontransparent,as well,especially
in Canada and the European Union (table 13.8).
The percentage of fresh fruit tariff lines that are spe-
cific, compound, or mixed stands at 31 percent in
Canada and 25 percent in the European Union.
Fresh vegetable exports face, in general, higher
levels of protection,reflecting the fact that tariffs on
temperate horticultural commodities are higher
than they are for tropical commodities, dominated
by fruits. The EU tariffs are particularly high for
many commodities,as 60 percent of vegetable tariff
lines are in the 20–50 percent range and 23 percent
of the latter are greater than 50 percent. This
reflects the large number of items that are subject
to ad valorem tariffs (including seasonal) aug-
mented by specific tariffs under the European
Union’s minimum entry price scheme (box 13.1).
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TABLE 13.7 Applied MFN Tariffs for Fresh Fruit and Vegetables in the Quad
Countries, 1999 and 2001
(percent)
Average ad Percentage of Number of
Valorem All Rates Lines Standard Total
Country Rate Average Covered Maximum Deviation Lines
European Fruits 7.3 9.2 75.0 127.6 15.4 89
Union Vegetables 5.5 6.8 98.0 131.8 10.7 200
(1999)
United States Fruits 6.1 4.6  100.0 29.8 7.0 70 
(2001) Vegetables 4.1 3.1 98.0 24.3 5.0 189
Japan (2001) Fruits 8.7 8.7  100.0 32.0 6.8 56
Vegetables 3.9 3.9 94.0 40.0 5.6 185
Canada Fruits 0.9 0.9  72.0 8.5 2.5 67
(2001) Vegetables 1.1 1.1 74.0 16.0 2.7 216
Source: WTO Integrated Data Base at the original tariff line level (6- to 11-digit tariff line depending on
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TABLE 13.8 Percentage of Tariff Lines on Fresh Fruits and Vegetables in Selected OECD
Countries by Tariff Levels
Tariff Levels Canada United States European Union Japan Korea, Rep. of
(percent) (2001) (2001) (1999) (2001) (2001)
Fresh fruits
Duty free 60 19 2 7 0
1–10 9 66 49 64 0
11–20 0 9 22 20 0
21–50 0 6 0 9 59
Over 50 0 0 1 0 37
Specific, compound, 31 1 25 0 5
mixed
Fresh vegetables
Duty free 47 16 0 10 3
1–10 7 59 11 69 42
11–20 1 14 1 11 47
21–50 0 1 60 7 1
Over 50 0 0 23 0 1
Specific, compound, 45 9 5 2 5
mixed
Note: Average applied out-of-quota ad valorem and ad valorem equivalent of non-ad-valorem tariffs for
those equivalent data reported.
Source: WTO IDB database.
Current basic rules governing trade in fruits and
vegetables were defined as part of the European
Union’s 1996 Common Market Organization
(CMO) reform. One of the most prominent fea-
tures of this reform is the “minimum entry price”
system. This complex tariffication system applies
to imports of a large number of fruits and veg-
etables, including fresh or chilled tomatoes,
courgettes, cucumbers, apples, grapes, pears,
peaches, plums, apricots, cherries, and citrus
fruits. Under the system, the European Union cal-
culates an entry price for each of the commodi-
ties covered by the program. The tariffs levied for
each item depend on its import price compared
with the calculated price.
11 Fruits and vegetables
imported at prices equal to or greater than the
established entry price are charged an ad valorem
duty only. Commodities valued below the entry
price are charged a specific tariff in addition to
the ad valorem duty. In the latter case, two situa-
tions are distinguished: if the import price is more
than 8 percent below the entry price, a large
specific tariff (called the maximum tariff equiva-
lent) is levied against the shipment, most likely
prohibiting its importation. If the entry price
stands between 92 and 100 percent of the entry
price, an additional specific duty is levied.
Through this system, applied tariffs are actu-
ally linked to the delivered price and the season.
For instance, fresh tomatoes imported between
June 1 and October 30 and priced 8 percent
below the reference price of €52.6 per100 kilo-
grams face tariffs amounting to 57 percent of
the import price (Sallyards 2001). The entry
prices are generally highest during the EU pro-
duction season and lowest during the off-
season, and the difference can be very large. The
entry price for courgettes, for instance, increases
from a base level of €450 a metric ton to €730 a
metric ton in April and May. This system strongly
restricts an exporter’s ability to increase market
shares in the European Union based on lower
prices and efficiency, especially during the
European production season. 
BOX 13.1 The European Union’s Entry Price Scheme: Hindering
Cost-Based Competition in the EU MarketThe tariff structures of the European Union,
Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States
also feature a high degree of escalation. All EU
processed fruit tariffs are above 20 percent, and the
majority of processed fruit products entering the
European Union face a tariff of greater than 50 per-
cent (table 13.9).There is also tariff escalation in the
European Union for processed vegetables, with
88 percent of these products facing a tariff in the
range of 21–50 percent.The European Union’s esca-
lating tariffs for tomato and apple-based products
inhibit a potentially large level of trade by nonmem-
ber countries. Tariffs facing most processed fruit
and vegetable products entering Canada, Japan,
Korea, and the United States are below 20 percent.
These low tariffs do not exclude the use of high
levels of protection for particular products, as illus-
trated by U.S. protection of its own orange juice
industry (box 13.2).
In most middle-income countries, the tariff
structure is more transparent than in the Quad,but
average tariff levels are higher (table 13.10), posing
a challenge to would-be external suppliers. Average
applied MFN tariffs in Brazil, India, and Morocco,
for example,are far higher than in the high-income
countries analyzed above. Ninety-four percent of
MFN tariff lines for fresh fruits in India are
between 21 and 50 percent, while all “MFN” fruits
entering Morocco face a tariff of more than 50 per-
cent. (In contrast, Indonesia and South Africa have
tariff structures similar to those of Japan and the
United States, with most tariff lines falling between
zero and 10 percent.) The potential hindrance of
these high tariffs to developing-country exports
should not be underestimated. As seen above,
South-South trade in fruits and vegetables is grow-
ing rapidly and now represents about one-fifth of
developing countries’exports.
Preferential Market Access and Magnitude
of Preference
The protection structure just described does not
apply equally to all exporting countries. Many
high-income countries maintain a complex system
of preferential access (that is, better-than-MFN
access) designed to provide privileged partners
with favorable entry without undermining the
protection of domestic producers. The product
coverage of preferential access schemes is wide, but
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TABLE 13.9 Percentage of Tariff Lines on Processed Fruits and Vegetables in Selected
OECD Countries by Tariff Levels
Tariff Levels Canada United States European Union Japan Korea, Rep. of
(percent) (2001) (2001) (1999) (2001) (2001)
Processed fruits
Duty free 35 1 0 7 1
1–10 43 14 0 62 2
11–20 20 43 0 24 44
21–50 0 34 47 4 40
Over 50 0 0 53 4 2
Specific, compound, 2 7 0 0 10
mixed lines
Processed vegetables
Duty free 22 3 0 8 3
1–10 31 39 6 65 6
11–20 40 50 0 24 76
21–50 0 6 88 3 5
Over 50 0 0 3 0 3
Specific, compound,  7 2 3 0 8
mixed lines
Note: Average applied out-of-quota ad valorem and ad valorem equivalents of non-ad-valorem tariffs for
those equivalent data reported.
Source: WTO IDB database.entry is often limited by quotas for “sensitive prod-
ucts”such as those put in special protocols (such as
bananas).
The major EU preferential access schemes rele-
vant to trade in fruits and vegetables include the
Everything but Arms (EBA) initiative that benefits
the 48 UN-defined least-developed countries
(LDCs); the EU-ACP Lomé Conventions, under
which the European Union grants unilateral prefer-
ential access to 75 African, Caribbean, and Pacific
(ACP) countries, bilateral agreements such as the
Euro-Med Agreements between the European
Union and many Mediterranean countries, and the
EU-South Africa free trade area; and the general-
ized system of preferences (GSP).
A large number of countries also enjoy preferen-
tial access to the United States through formal
regional, bilateral, and preferential trade agree-
ments. These include NAFTA, the African Growth
Opportunity Act (AGOA), the Caribbean Basin
Economic Recovery Act (CBERA), the Andean
Trade Preference Act (ATPA), and free trade agree-
ments with Israel and Chile. Since NAFTA was
signed, tropical fruits shipped from Mexico (man-
goes, guavas, avocados, and papayas) have been
subject to steadily reduced tariffs. Since January
2003 they have entered the U.S.market free of duty.
While these different agreements are not always
directly comparable, it is clear that they provide
varied degrees of preference to the suppliers
involved. Figure 13.7, adapted from Stevens and
Kennan (2000), highlights the hierarchy of prefer-
ences within the European Union’s fruit and veg-
etable import regime as of 2003.The major changes
since 2000 include the promulgation of the EBA
initiative and the multiplication of bilateral agree-
ments, which erode the preferences of those on top
of the pyramid. The ranking of preferences
depends on the difference between preferential ver-
sus MFN tariffs (that is, the margin of preference),
the breadth of product coverage, the extent of
quota limitations, and the degree of certainty of
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The world market for orange juice is basically a
duopolistic market structure, with only two play-
ers, the United States (mainly Florida) and Brazil,
supplying roughly 85 percent of the world mar-
ket. Over 95 percent of Brazil’s production is
exported, whereas more than 95 percent of U.S.
orange juice is consumed domestically. Of the
U.S. imports of concentrated orange juice, some
90 percent comes from Brazil. Imported orange
juice is mixed with U.S. juice to improve its color
and make up for seasonal supply shortfall. This
trade pattern reflects Brazil’s production cost
advantages, which in turn mirror lower labor
costs in Brazil, reinforced in recent years by the
devaluation of the real. The United States levies a
tariff of 7.85 cents per liter on Brazilian orange
juice. In addition, an antidumping order remains
in effect, with dumping duties ranging from
2 percent to 27 percent on imports of the
Brazilian product.
Furthermore, Brazilian exporters pay a “Florida
equalizing excise tax” on frozen orange juice con-
centrate, from which domestic producers in
Arizona, California, and Texas whose juice is also
blended with Florida orange juice are exempt.
The proceeds of the tax are allocated by statute
to the exclusive promotion of Florida-grown
citrus products. According to one estimate, the
combined tax and duty accounts for nearly
50 percent of the cost of a ton of Brazilian con-
centrate. This discrimination between imported
and domestic products has prompted Brazil to
initiate a dispute settlement process at the WTO.
In March 2002 the government of Brazil
requested bilateral consultations under WTO aus-
pices with the United States regarding the
“equalizing excise tax.” Brazil argued that the
incidence of the tax on imported processed citrus
products and not on domestic products consti-
tutes a de facto violation of most-favored-nation
and national treatment provisions of GATT (Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) (Articles II:
1(a), III.1 and III:2, GATT 1994).
Interestingly, the private sector has already
taken pragmatic actions to deal with these
problems, through joint investments and joint
production. In an increasingly common tariff-
jumping tactic, the Brazilian producers in the
early 1990s began to invest directly in the Florida
industry. It is estimated that foreign—mainly
Brazilian—companies own as much as 40 per-
cent of the Florida processing industry. The U.S.
presence in Brazil’s citrus industry started in the
1960s, when winter freezes prompted U.S.
growers to seek out Brazil for planting.
Source: Thunder Lake Management 2002.
BOX 13.2 The U.S.-Brazilian Trade Dispute over Orange Juicepreferences. The key characteristics of the Euro-
pean Union’s preference system are:
• Duty-free and quota-free access for LDCs under
the EBA initiative.
12 The beneficiary countries
generally lack the capacity to provide reliable
supplies, in part because of poor infrastructure
and other behind-the-border constraints. Even
with EBA,they accounted in 2002 for only 1 per-
cent of the European Union’s imports of fruits
and vegetables from outside the EU.
• Generous access for ACP countries, account-
ing for 8 percent of the European Union’s
third-country imports. Just a few countries—
including Cameroon,Côte d’Ivoire,and Kenya—
account for the bulk of this trade.
• ACP access for bananas is limited by quotas.
ACP countries enjoy, within the allocated quota
of 850,000 tons, duty-free access to the EU
banana market (until 2008), whereas third-
country suppliers face a duty of €75/ton.
13
• Preferential access for many countries comes
through bilateral agreements. The concessions
granted under these agreements are typically
restricted to certain tariff quotas or to certain
periods of the year,depending on the EU season.
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TABLE 13.10 Percentage of Tariff Lines at Different Levels in Selected Developing
Countries, 2001
Tariff Levels (percent) Brazil India Indonesia Morocco South Africa
Fresh fruits
Duty free 0 0 0 0 15
1–10 0 0 100 0 47
11–20 100 3 0 0 29
21–50 0 94 0 0 9
Over 50 0 3 0 100 0
Specific, compound, 0 0 0 0 0
mixed lines
Fresh vegetables
Duty free 24 0 2 0 46
1–10 0 0 98 0 6
11–20 76 85 0 13 30
21–50 0 15 0 19 13
Over 50 0 0 0 68 0
Specific, compound, 0 0 0 0 6
mixed lines
Note: Average applied out-of-quota ad valorem and ad valorem equivalents of non-ad-valorem tariffs for
those equivalent data reported.
Source: WTO IDB database.
FIGURE 13.7 The Hierarchy of Preferences in the European Fruits and Vegetables
Market
MFN
GSP (14 percent of EU imports)
Bilateral agreements
ACP countries (8 percent of EU imports)
EBA countries (1 percent of EU imports)
Source: Authors’ calculations using COMTRADE data and based on Stevens and Kennan 2000.Tensions between opening markets for privi-
leged partners and protecting domestic producers
have led to a widespread use of tariff rate quotas
(TRQs) in fruit and vegetable trade. In 2000 devel-
oped countries applied 355 TRQ schemes to
imported fruits and vegetables, compared with 56
for tropical beverages and processed agricultural
products (Jabati 2003). Quotas are typically set at
low levels with low in-quota tariffs and prohibitive
over-the-quota tariffs. A good example is that of
winter seedless grapes, a product exported by some
Southern Hemisphere suppliers, including South
Africa and Namibia. Namibia may export only
900 tons per year to the European Union from
November to end of January (Jabati 2003). Any
over-the-quota export is subject to an import tariff
of 16.4 percent. The tariff and period restrictions
clearly constitute a constraint for Namibia if it
wants to increase its exports.
Analysis of the value of ACP and AGOA prefer-
ences show heterogeneous situations among ACP
countries,while South Africa stands out as the only
country taking significant advantage of the AGOA
preference. It has been argued that preferential
treatment has contributed to the successful pene-
tration of some developing countries into the EU
market (Stevens and Kennan 2000). We examine
here the effectiveness of ACP and AGOA prefer-
ences for fruits and vegetables exported to the
European Union and United States, respectively.
These indicators are preferred over changes in
MFN tariffs, which do not capture the variety of
specific trade regimes in the European Union and
the United States that are relevant for many devel-
oping countries.
The value of an ACP preference can be defined
as the product of the value of exports for which
preferences have been requested and the preferen-
tialmargin(figure13.8).Thevalueof theACPpref-
erence in fruits and vegetables represented 12 per-
cent of ACP country exports, with a great deal of
variation around the average.
14 The ACP “rent”
stood at less than 5 percent for Ethiopia, Madagas-
car, and Namibia, but between 28 and 42 percent
for major banana producers such as Cameroon,the
Caribbean islands,and Côte d’Ivoire.
In terms of scope, about 82 percent of ACP fruit
and vegetable exports to the European Union are
eligible for preference. Use of this preference is
quite high, with an average 75 percent of eligible
exports requesting preference.Use rates vary widely
across ACP countries, however.
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Source: World Bank staff calculations based on the EU Commission Database.
FIGURE 13.8 Value of Fruit and Vegetable Preference for Major ACP Exporters, 2002
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St. VincentIn sharp contrast with the ACP scheme, the use
of the AGOA preference to export fruits and vegeta-
bles to the United States is not yet a widespread
practice in Africa, since only 14 of 38 AGOA coun-
tries exported fruits and vegetables to the United
States in 2002. Among those having done so, how-
ever, the use of the AGOA preference was high,
averaging 73 percent (see annex table A3).The very
small number of countries that have exported fruits
and vegetables under AGOA is associated with the
constrained logistics on African–U.S. trade in
perishable products, the very limited degree of U.S.
private investment in Africa in this field, and
stringent U.S. phytosanitary requirements.
Not surprisingly, countries that have more
advanced logistical systems and stronger inter-
national marketing ties (for example, South
Africa) are better placed to benefit from AGOA.
In fact, South Africa is the only AGOA country
for which the preference “rent” represents a signifi-
cant share of export values (74 percent) (fig-
ure 13.9). Few other African countries have a com-
parative advantage in servicing the U.S.market and,
given comparative freight costs and availability,find
the European market a more attractive outlet. We
analyze these issues further in the next section.
As more and more countries are enjoying better-
than-MFN access to the EU market,preferences are
erodingandcompetitionisstiffer—asillustratedby
the experience of large middle-income exporters
(figure 13.10). Morocco, South Africa, and Turkey
arelargeexportersof fruitsandvegetablesthatenter
the European Union under bilateral agreements
with limitations on some products.
15 Morocco,
among the first countries to sign preferential agree-
ments with the European Union in the late 1960s,
has lost ground in the EU market to Turkey since
Turkey’s free-trade agreement with the European
Union was signed in 1998. South Africa recently
unseated Turkey in the EU market and is now the
largest third-country supplier of fruits and vegeta-
bles to the European Union (with a 31 percent
share). Turkey holds a slightly lower share (29 per-
cent), while Morocco lags far behind (22 percent,
down from 37 percent in 1980).In several products
(citrus fruit, tomato products, dried fruit, and fruit
juice),these suppliers have competed directly.
Determinants of Success in Fruit
and Vegetable Export Markets
Many developing countries have sought to take
advantage of emerging international markets for
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FIGURE 13.9 Value of Fruit and Vegetable Preference under AGOA  
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Source: World Bank staff calculations based on USITC Database.fresh and processed fruit and vegetable products.
Yet, as noted above, relatively few have achieved
dominance in a range of such products. In Sub-
Saharan Africa several dozen countries have
participated in this trade, yet just three—Côte
d’Ivoire, Kenya, South Africa—accounted for
nearly 90 percent of the region’s trade in recent
decades. Only a few other countries in the region
have been able to sustain growth in their horticul-
tural trade over time; none has emerged as a major
player in the international market.
Success Factors
To succeed in exporting fruits and vegetables, a
country must have important assets that provide an
initial comparative advantage. Among those assets
are favorable agroclimatic conditions and ample
and accessible land and water resources; a physical
location on the sea or close to a major market;
ample and relatively inexpensive labor; and a class
of entrepreneurs with commercial experience.
Many countries may possess some or even most of
these assets. But translating them into a competi-
tive horticultural industry that maintains or im-
proves its competitiveness over time requires a
distinctive set of investments and institutional
structures, a range of facilitative government poli-
cies, and, usually, a bit of luck (Jaffee 2003; Gabre-
Madhin and Minot 2003; FAO 2003; Huang 2004).
Jaffee (1993) examines the ingredients common
to the initial growth and subsequent maturation of
some of the developing world’s leading fresh and
processed fruit and vegetable success stories—
among them Brazil, Chile, Kenya, Mexico, and
Taiwan (China). In each case, the initial take-off
occurred during a period of stable macroeconomic
conditions and the presence of a favorable invest-
ment climate. Important initial catalysts for export
growth included sudden shortfalls in major over-
seas markets, new foreign direct investment or
strategic partnerships, and improvements in inter-
national logistics capacity. International technical
and marketing partnerships provided a vehicle for
the transfer of technology,for new market penetra-
tion, and for creating an identity for the products
from the exporting country.
Many countries have experienced short-term
spurts in horticultural exports; few have been able
to consolidate their early gains. Those that have
done so invested in research and adopted interna-
tional technologies, expanded and upgraded logis-
tical facilities, strengthened vertical supply chains,
developed industry organizations for collective
action, and built credible systems for quality assur-
ance and food safety management.Industry expan-
sion induced the development of associated indus-
tries, such as packaging, equipment supply, and
technical consulting, which in turn contributed to
the underlying competitiveness of the industries.
Further investments were made in the industries’
underlying assets, for example, through irriga-
tion development and worker and management
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Source: COMTRADE.training. Synergies have generally developed
between export horticulture and complementary
industries such as domestic catering and tourism.
With certain historical exceptions,in most of the
long-standing industries the private sector domi-
nates the commercial dimensions of the business,
while governments play a substantial and multidi-
mensional facilitative role. In the early stages of
industry development, the public sector has been
critical in improving transportation and port/
airportinfrastructure,investinginresearchandfarm
advisory services,facilitating access by investors and
farmers to suitable land, helping to transfer tech-
nologies and skills, and advancing the broad array
of policies that make for a conducive investment
climate(box13.3).Overtime,otherimportantfunc-
tionsforgovernmenthaveemerged,notablysanitary
and phytosanitary control, promotion of competi-
tionwithintheindustryandincriticalsupportserv-
ices, negotiation of favorable international market
access,andresolutionof tradedisputes.
Explaining Intercountry Differences in Export
Performances
Focusingonthefactorsidentifiedintheliteratureas
influencing export performance, this section
attempts to quantify their importance in determin-
ing the value of fruit and vegetable exports across a
sample of 45 developing countries. The theoretical




The variables assumed to have a significant
impactonthevalueof freshandprocessedfruitand
vegetable exports are grouped into supply-capacity
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Once the leaders of Peru’s asparagus industry and
government specialists realized that it was in the
best interest of the country, they worked together
to bring national standards in line with interna-
tional norms. The industry—and Peru—have
greatly benefited as a result. Over the past
decade, Peru has quickly risen to become one of
the world’s largest exporters of asparagus. In
2002 earnings reached $187 million, represent-
ing nearly 25 percent of Peru’s total agricultural
exports. Peru is able to produce quality asparagus
year-round, yet because of high transportation
costs, its exporters are unable to match prices
with inexpensive asparagus from some other
countries. Nonetheless, they have continued to
increase exports and gain market share by grow-
ing asparagus of consistently higher quality that
can be internationally certified. By meeting inter-
national standards, Peruvian exporters have
increased production and worker efficiency,
gained access to industrialized country markets,
built customer loyalty, and drastically reduced the
industry’s risk of trade disruptions caused by poor
quality, food safety hazards, and plant disease.
In 1997 Spanish health authorities asserted
that two cases of botulism had been caused by
consumption of canned Peruvian asparagus.
Despite assurances from the Peruvian govern-
ment and companies, press coverage of the
botulism scare left an unfavorable impression
among consumers in European markets, causing
sales to slump in Peru’s leading market. The
incident helped motivate the industry and gov-
ernment to take action, by reinforcing the fact
that one careless exporter could disrupt markets.
Beginning in 1998, officials of the Peruvian
Commission for Export Promotion (PROMPEX)
convinced the asparagus industry to implement
the Codex code of practice on food hygiene, not
because it was the easiest but because it was the
most appropriate. PROMPEX specialists worked
closely with industry leaders and production
managers to ensure proper implementation of
good hygiene standards. The industry soon saw
improved production methods, greater worker
efficiency, and better product quality. 
Thus, when the national fresh asparagus
norms were published in early 2001, because
the industry was already familiar with the con-
cept of national standards, producers quickly
complied with little argument. The first national
norms—for fresh asparagus—established a qual-
ity and performance baseline for the industry
that allowed many to generate the skills and
experience needed to voluntarily certify under
more stringent international standards, includ-
ing HACCP (hazard analysis and critical control
point), traceability systems, and Good Agricul-
tural Practice (GAP) certification. Many large
exporters have reached the level where they
can now be certified under the even stricter
EUREPGAP protocol.
Source: Tim O’Brien, Interamerican Institute
for Cooperation in Agriculture.
BOX 13.3 Peruvian Asparagus Exports—A Standard Success Story?variables and market-access variables. Supply-
capacity variables include:
• Domestic market size, captured by the size of
urban population.
• Infrastructure, proxied by the percentage of
paved roads and access to telephones.
• Institutional quality and setting, captured by
two variables: the number of days to enforce a
contract and whether or not the country is a sig-
natory of the International Plant Variety Protec-
tion Convention (a dummy variable).
• Human capital, captured by two separate vari-
ables: availability of semi-skilled labor, captured
by the adult literacy rate, and managerial capac-
ity, proxied here by the level of manufacturing
exports.
Market-access variables include:
• Geographic variables: landlocked status
(dummy), which increases distance and cost to
reach markets.
• Volume of air transport freight (in millions of
tons per kilometer). This variable attempts to
capture freight space availability and the
economies of scale in international transport
(Clark, Dollar, and Micco 2002). The higher the
volume of freight, the higher the economies of
scale realized by shippers and the lower the
transport cost.
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• Existence of a preferential agreement with the
European Union or the United States (dummy
variable).
Table 13.A2 (on the accompanying CD-ROM)
reports our estimations of the equation for fresh
fruit and vegetable exports and for processed fruits
and vegetables.Common factors—notably distance
(landlocked status) and the level of human capi-
tal—explain success in both fresh and processed
export markets.
• Literacy and managerial capabilities exert a
strong,robust,and statistically significant impact
on export of fresh and processed fruits and veg-
etables. This result reflects two facts. First, horti-
culture is a knowledge-intensive business. Sec-
ond, success in world markets requires the
availability of a skillful class of entrepreneurs.
• Remoteness (that is,being landlocked) has a sig-
nificant adverse effect on fruit and vegetable
exports, corroborating the literature on geogra-
phyandtrade—forexample,FrankelandRomer
(1999),whoshowedthatcountriesthatareland-
locked or remote from major markets tend to
trade less than those that are not.
• Domestic market size comes out with a negative
sign in almost all estimations (although at a sta-
tistically insignificant level), apparently contra-
dicting the usual argument that exporting fruits
and vegetables requires the prior or parallel
development of domestic markets and experi-
ence in brand name merchandising (see, for
example, Jaffee 1993).
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There are sharp differences in the factors
explaining the intercountry performance in exports
of fresh versus processed fruits and vegetables.
Holding all else constant, the economies of scale
obtained through large volumes of air freight are a
key success factor for fresh fruit and vegetable
exports but do not appear significant for processed
horticultural exports (annex table A4 on the
CD-ROM). This is because economies of scale
translate into lower transportation costs, which
claim a larger share of final value for fresh products
than for processed products. Clearly, higher
spoilage and handling costs make fresh produce
much more expensive to transport, explaining why
more countries tend to import fresh produce from
the closest producers (Huang 2004). In contrast,
because they are easier to handle and are almost
universally shipped by sea, transport costs are
smaller for processed products, making the geo-
graphical outreach of processed trade much larger.
The other factor that has a differentiated impact
on fresh versus processed exports is the level of pro-
tection. While preferential access to the European
Union or the United States has a positive and sig-
nificant impact on export of processed horticul-
tural products, it is not statistically significant at
5 percent for fresh product exports. This result is
consistent with the structure of tariffs analyzed
above, which features a high degree of escalation in
OECD countries.
In conclusion, our estimations show the critical
importance of proximity to major export markets
and availability of human capital as common fac-
tors explaining success in exports of both fresh and
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cate that countries wishing to boost exports of fresh
products should invest in high-quality logistics,
whereas those seeking success in processed markets
need to develop or tie in with leading product
brands and circumvent tariff escalation through
preferential agreements with major trading
partners or within the framework of multilateral
negotiations.
Conclusion
This chapter has highlighted the major global,
regional, and product-specific trends in fruit and
vegetable products trade and examined major
structural and policy factors that have affected this
trade over the past two decades. Growth in world
imports was 2–3 percent a year in the 1990s, repre-
senting a deceleration in the rate of growth from
the 1980s. This slower growth in world trade in the
1990s was strongly affected by the European Union,
which experienced relatively low growth in popula-
tion and income during the decade and had many
mature and saturated product markets. Adverse
price movements for fresh and processed products
from the mid-1990s onward also contributed sub-
stantially to the overall deceleration in the growth
of trade values. Robust growth in trade has contin-
ued among NAFTA countries, for sales to high-
income Asian countries, and between developing
countries.
For developing countries, fresh and processed
fruits and vegetables is now one of the most impor-
tant categories for agro-food trade, accounting for
about 22 percent of their exports in 2000–01. This
is far larger than their current level of trade in many
traditional commodities. Still, although many
developing-country suppliers have entered this
field, relatively few countries have achieved sus-
tained success at a high level—testimony that the
industry is highly competitive and rapidly chang-
ing, and that it requires sustained investments in
infrastructure, human capital, technology, and
good governance.
Unlike the situation in many other agricultural
sectors, production and export subsidies are not
common in horticulture. Instead, domestic fruit
and vegetable producers are protected through reg-
ulation of market access. The European Union,
Japan, and the United States use, to varying
degrees, complex protection tools—among them
highly dispersed ad valorem tariffs, specific duties,
seasonal tariffs, tariff escalation, and preferential
access along with tariff-rate quotas.A complex sys-
tem of preferential access in many rich countries
provides privileged partners with favorable entry
without undermining protection of domestic pro-
ducers. The product coverage of preferential access
schemes is wide but quotas for “sensitive products”
often limit entry. Tariff escalation for processed
fruit and vegetable products is widespread,
although its extent varies significantly between
regions.
Because horticultural sectors throughout the
world have traditionally seen a low level of direct
government interventions, changes in domestic
support cannot affect the sector broadly or signifi-
cantly. Reductions in tariffs and other import
restrictions,however,are critical in determining the
impact of trade agreements and policies on world
horticultural trade. Further tariff liberalization
efforts would need to reduce tariff peaks, especially
in the European Union and the Republic of Korea.
Past trends suggest that the main beneficiaries from
such reforms will be a limited number of middle-
income countries that have developed strong pro-
duction, postharvest processing, logistical market-
ing, and sanitary and phytosanitary management
systems over the years and that continue to attract
new investment. With only a few exceptions, low-
income countries still face enormous supply-side
challenges in taking advantage of existing and
future international market opportunities.
Notes
1. More detailed tables on trade flows and tariffs are pre-
sented on the attached CD-ROM.
2.“Statistics on Foreign Trade of Vegetables.”Vegetable Sup-
ply Stabilization Fund. Tokyo. October 2002.
3. This reflects the heavy influence of Spain, which is the
global leader in fresh fruit exports (mainly oranges and clemen-
tines). Italy is also a significant exporter of grapes, apples, and
peaches.
4. Bananas accounted for more than 80 percent of the fresh
fruit imported by the European Union from these countries
(Huang 2004).
5.Between 1993 and 2003,gross domestic product growth in
Germany averaged 1.4 percent, the lowest among EU member
states.
6. See box A1 in annex to this chapter in the CD-ROM.
7. Lacking a better alternative, food prices are considered
here as a proxy for the prices of fruits and vegetables. The main
caveat associated with this is that the range of goods covered in
256 Global Agricultural Trade and Developing Countriesthe food-price index is wider than what a proper (and exoge-
nous) fruits and vegetables import price index would cover.
8.Mexico remains the world’s top exporter of many smaller
vegetable products—among them asparagus, eggplant, and
onions.
9. The bulk of Syria’s trade is with other Middle Eastern
countries; Argentina’s is targeted primarily to other Latin
American countries.
10. The aggregate measure of support was defined in the
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture as an aggregate sub-
sidy measure, designed to quantify and compare countries’
annual levels of domestic support. It aggregates the effects of all
trade-distorting policies (direct subsidies plus implicit subsidies
from border measures) into a single measure of support.
11.An importer can choose one of the three following meth-
ods to calculate entry price: the standard import value (SIV),
calculated daily by product and by origin and published in EU’s
Official Journal; the f.o.b. price of the product in the country of
origin; the effective resale value of the shipment concerned.
12. Bananas are the only exception in the fruit and vegetable
category. For this product, duty-free access is phased in between
2002 and 2006 by a 20 percent yearly tariff reduction. This is
unlikely to have a significant impact in the short run, however,
as all LDCs producing bananas of export quality belong to the
ACP group, which enjoys duty-free access.
13. This preferential access has allowed countries like
Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, and Dominican Republic to compete
with lower-cost Latin American suppliers (Costa Rica,Ecuador).
14. For more details regarding the definitions and estima-
tions of these indicators, see chapter 4 of this volume.
15.A recent study has identified three categories of products
that receive different treatments under the European Union and
Mediterranean countries trade agreements: first, the products
for which the preferential margin (tariff difference with MFN) is
granted without quantitative restriction but with seasonal
restrictions (such as tomatoes); second, the products for which
the tariff reduction applies solely if the entry price is higher than
a reference price in EU; and a third group for which the impact
of tariff reductions are severely limited by quota restrictions
(such as bananas and olives). Chahed and Drogué (2002).
16.The empirical model and its derivation from the Redding
and Venables’ theoretical model is described in box A2 of the
annex to this chapter in the attached CD-ROM.
17.Lack of data prevented us from using the volume of mar-
itime freight.
18. As noted earlier, a large and rapidly growing urban pop-
ulation (as in China and India) can absorb very large quantities
of fruit and vegetables and lead entrepreneurs to focus on serv-
icing the domestic market.
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1960 and 1972, the polyester price indicator
declined from $12 to $2.50 per kilogram, mainly a
reflection of the technological improvements (and
consequent cost reductions) that took place in the
chemical fiber industry. After reaching parity with
cotton prices in 1972, the ratio of polyester to cot-
ton prices has increased at an average rate of 1 per-
cent per year, implying that while cotton and
polyester are priced at similar levels, polyester has
made small pricing gains (see figure 14.1).
The Global Cotton Balance
Cotton is produced in many countries, but the
Northern Hemisphere accounts for 90 percent of
global output. More than two-thirds of the world’s
cotton is produced by developing countries.
Between 1960 and 2001, global cotton output
doubled—from 10.2 million to 20 million tons.
Most of this growth came from China and India,
which tripled and doubled their production,
respectively, during this 40 year period. Other
countries that significantly increased their share
of cotton production were Turkey, Greece, and
Pakistan. Some new entrants also contributed.
Australia,whichproducedonly2,000tonsof cotton
Cotton—by far the most common natural fiber of
the 19th and 20th centuries—has been used as a
raw material for clothing for at least 5,000 years. Its
use expanded significantly after 1793, when the
invention of the cotton gin introduced mechanical
separation of lint from seed. The industrial revolu-
tion, which reduced the cost of producing textiles,
accelerated cotton’s progress.
1
Cotton’s most important competitors are natural
and synthetic man-made fibers such as rayon and
polyester.
2 Although large-scale commercial pro-
ductionof man-madefibersdidnotbeginuntilafter
World War II, experimentation was taking place as
earlyasthelate1800s.In1925,rayon,anaturalman-
made fiber produced from cellulose, accounted for
1.6 percent of the world’s total fiber consumption.
Twenty years later, this share had increased to
11.8 percent. The share of all man-made fibers in
total fiber consumption reached 22 percent in 1960
and now stands at about 57 percent.
As production of man-made fibers expanded,
cotton’s share fell (figure 14.1). Between 1960 and
2002, man-made fiber consumption grew at an
annual rate of 4.7 percent, compared to just
1.8 percent for cotton.
Synthetic (noncellulose) man-made fibers such






John Baffes260 Global Agricultural Trade and Developing Countries
in 1960, averaged 650,000 tons a year during the
late 1990s. Francophone Africa, which produced
less than 100,000 tons in the 1960s, now produces
almost1milliontons.Thetwodominantproducers
during the 1960s, the United States and the Central
Asian republics of the Soviet Union, have main-
tained their output levels at about 3.5 million and
1.5 million tons, respectively, thereby halving their
shares. Several Central American countries that
used to produce almost 250,000 tons of cotton
annually now produce almost none. The share of
East African cotton producers, too, has declined
considerably during this period.
The two largest cotton producers,China and the
United States, each account for approximately
20 percent of world output, followed by India
(12 percent), Pakistan (8 percent), and Uzbekistan
(5 percent). Other significant cotton producers are
the countries of Francophone Africa, Turkey,
Brazil, Australia, and Greece, which account for a
combined 18 percent of global output.
The consumption pattern of cotton is primarily
determined by the size of the textile industries of
the dominant cotton consumers.China,the leading
textile producer, absorbed more than a quarter of
global cotton output during the late 1990s. Other
major textile producers (and hence major cotton
consumers) are India, the United States, and
Turkey, which, together with China, account for
three-quarters of global cotton consumption.
Several East Asian countries have emerged recently
as important cotton consumers. For example,
Indonesia, Thailand, the Republic of Korea, and
Taiwan (China) consumed only 130,000 tons in
1960 (1.2 percent of global consumption), but
1.5 million tons in 2002 (7.2 percent of global
consumption).
Growth in the demand for cotton has been slow.
Between 1960 and 2000,cotton demand grew at the
same rate as population (1.8 percent a year),imply-
ing that per capita cotton consumption has
remained stagnant.
Stocks, which historically have fluctuated
between 20 and 50 percent of global output, have
affected the cotton market considerably, especially
in the area of price variability. The stockholding
policies of the United States and China, the two
major holders of cotton stocks, have affected the
level and volatility of prices. Two major cotton
destocking episodes are associated with periods of
considerable price variability: the 1985 shift in U.S.
policy from stockholding to price support and the
1999 reforms in China.
One-third of cotton production is traded inter-
nationally. The four dominant exporters—United
States, Uzbekistan, Francophone Africa, and
Australia—account for more than two-thirds of the
world’s exports. Four major producers, China,
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Source: International Rayon and Synthetic Fibers Committee.India, Pakistan, and Turkey do not export cotton
and occasionally import to supply their textile
industries. Imports of cotton are more uniformly
distributed than exports.
During the 2000–01 season, the eight largest
importers (Indonesia, India, Mexico, Thailand,
Turkey, Russia, Italy, Korea) accounted for more
than one-half of world cotton imports. Apart
from Russia (which before 1990 was considered a
major producer but not an importer because Cen-
tral Asian cotton production was considered
internal trade), most of the remaining cotton
importers are new in the sense that they have been
importing cotton to supply newly developed
textile industries. For example, four East Asian
textile producers (Indonesia, Thailand, Taiwan,
and Korea) accounted for less than 3 percent of
world cotton imports in 1960, compared to
22 percent in 2002.
The International Cotton Advisory Committee
(ICAC)collectsdatacomparingcostsof production
among cotton producers. Its most recent 2001 sur-
vey, based on a questionnaire of 28 cotton-
producing countries, suggests that West Africa
(especiallyBenin,Mali,andBurkinaFaso),Uganda,
andTanzaniaareamongthelowest-costcottonpro-
ducers. High-cost producers are the United States,
Israel,and Syria.The two European cotton produc-
ers, Greece and Spain, are probably the world’s
highest-cost cotton producers, although they did
not participate in the survey. Calculating and com-
paring the costs of producing cotton in various
countries is, admittedly, a difficult task, involving
assumptions about the cost of land and capital as
well as various hidden subsidies and distortions.
The ICAC (2001) warns that its data must be used
carefully:“Differencesinproductionpractices,vari-
ations in the input supply among countries, and
direct and indirect technical and financial support
to farmers in the form of free seed,technical advice,
etc.,make comparisons difficult among countries.”
Population growth for the current decade is
projected at 1.2 percent a year. In the absence of
policy reforms by major players, ICAC (2003a and
2003b) projects that annual consumption growth
during the decade will be about 1.8 percent, imply-
ing that by 2010 world cotton consumption will be
23.6 million tons.That may be optimistic,however,
considering that for the last 15 years cotton con-
sumption grew at an annual rate of just 0.7 percent.
Price Trends and Variability
Real cotton prices over the last two centuries have
followed a declining pattern showing temporary
spikes and troughs. The reasons for the long-term
decline are similar to those behind the price
declines in most primary commodities—reduction
in the costs of production due to technological
improvements, slow demand growth, and strong
competition from substitutes (in this case,chemical
fibers). The declining pattern of cotton prices has
not been smooth, and it appears that a structural
break took place in the mid-1980s. Between 1960
and 1984 real cotton prices averaged $2.62 per kilo-
gram. Following a sharp decline in 1984 (from
$2.45 per kilogram in 1984 to $1.83 in 1985 and
$1.27 in 1986), they have been fluctuating around
$1.49 per kilogram. Between 1985 and 2002, prices
declined 0.9 percent a year (as opposed to just
0.2 percent a year during 1960–84).
Reductions in the costs of production stem pri-
marily from yield increases—from 300 kilograms
per hectare in the early 1960s to 600 kilograms per
hectare in the late 1990s. The phenomenal yield
growth is attributable to the introduction of im-
proved cotton varieties, expansion of irrigation, use
of chemicals and fertilizers, and mechanical har-
vesting. To these improvements one should add
developments in genetically modified seed technol-
ogy and precision farming during the late-1990s,
which are expected to further reduce the costs of
production. Innovations in transportation and in-
formation technology have lowered costs of trans-
porting cotton and reduced the need to hold large
inventories. Substantial technological improve-
ments in the textile sectors have made it possible to
obtain high-quality fabric from lower-quality cot-
ton, a trend that holds for many products whose
main input is a primary commodity.
The prime movers behind the 1984–85 decline
in cotton prices were the structural shift in the sup-
port policy of the United States and the shift in
China’s trade policy (MacDonald 1997).During the
1950s the U.S. Commodity Credit Corporation
bought and sold most American cotton. For exam-
ple,between 1962 and 1966,it accounted for almost
two-thirds of cotton stocks. Although its role was
reduced after 1970,the United States still accounted
for 35 percent of world cotton stocks (exclusive of
Chinese stocks). Following enactment of the 1985
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rates,”the equivalent of a floor price) were substan-
tially reduced, and most of the U.S. stocks were
released to the market, depressing the world prices.
1985 also marked the beginnings of large exports
by China, which for the previous 20 years had been
a net importer. In fact between 1980 and 1985,
China went from the world’s largest importer to the
world’s largest exporter.
Visual inspection of the 1984–85 price decline
suggests a structural break in the series, something
also supported by statistical tests. However, it may
be argued that if the policy shift in the United
States, which caused massive destocking, had been
the main reason behind the price decline, a new
stock equilibrium level would have brought a price
increase,making the 1984–85 decline temporary.In
reality, the U.S. policy shift accelerated a price
decline that would have taken place even without it.
Real cotton prices did rise somewhat after the shift
but never reached pre-1984 levels.
While falling, cotton prices have been volatile.
Admittedly, measuring volatility is a difficult (and
often tricky) task precisely because prices have
shown a long-term, nonlinear decline, making it
difficult to isolate a meaningful average around
which variability can be defined.Defining volatility
as variability from one year to another shows that
during 1985–2002 volatility was 2.5 times higher
than in 1960–72 but only half of the level in
1973–84. Note that 1973 reflects the commodity
price boom, while 1985 coincides with the U.S.
change in cotton policy and the subsequent dis-
posal of large cotton stocks. In summary, cotton
prices were very stable before 1974, highly volatile
until 1985,and then less volatile,but not as stable as
before 1974.
Cotton and the Developing
Countries
Although cotton trade is insignificant on a global
scale—accounting for just 0.12 percent of total
merchandise trade—it is an important cash crop
for several developing countries at both the farm
and national levels. Cotton accounted for between
30 and 44 percent for total merchandise exports
in five West African countries (Burkina Faso,
Benin, Chad, Mali, Togo) during 1998–99
(table 14.1). The corresponding figures for
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan are 32,
15, and 12 percent. Cotton’s contribution to the
gross domestic product (GDP) of these countries
has been substantial, ranging between 3.6 percent
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Millions of  Merchandise Percent of Exports (millions Per Capita
Country
a Dollars Exports GDP of dollars) GDP
b
Burkina Faso 127 43.9 5.1 289 249
Benin 164 39.1 7.1 419 398
Uzbekistan 1,038 32.2 6.5 3,227 467
Chad 76 32.2 4.7 236 224
Mali 180 29.5 6.7 611 285
Togo 67 21.3 4.7 315 341
Tajikistan 97 15.1 8.2 643 352
Turkmenistan 110 12.3 3.6 891 1,126
Tanzania 44 7.6 0.5 576 185
Syrian Arab Rep. 214 6.7 1.4 3,177 858
Sudan 41 6.0 0.4 688 290
a. Countries ranked by decreasing order of cotton exports in merchandise exports; b. Constant 1995 U.S.
dollars.
Source: FAOSTAT, and World Bank, World Development Indicators, various years.(Turkmenistan) and 8.2 percent (Tajikistan). With
the exception of Turkmenistan and Syria, the per
capita annual GDP in these countries is well below
$500. In most (especially in Africa), cotton is typi-
cally a smallholder crop and the main cash crop. It
is grown in rain-fed land with minimal use of pur-
chased inputs such as chemicals and fertilizers.
According to FAO (Food and Agriculture Orga-
nization) estimates, as many as 100 million rural
households may have been involved in cotton pro-
duction during 2001. In China, India, and Pakistan
about45,10,and7millionruralhouseholds,respec-
tively, were engaged in cotton production. The total
number of rural households depending on cotton
in major African producing countries, including
Nigeria, Benin, Togo, Mali, and Zimbabwe, was
6 million.
The high dependence on cotton in these coun-
tries has important ramifications for poverty, espe-
cially when prices change suddenly. In a study of
Benin, Minot and Daniels (2002) estimated that a
40 percent reduction in farm-gate cotton prices—
equivalent to the price decline that occurred
between December 2000 and May 2002—implied a
7 percent reduction in rural per capita income in
the short run and a 5–6 percent reduction in the
long run. They also estimated that the incidence of
poverty among cotton growers will rise in the short
run from 37 percent to 59 percent, while the aver-
age incidence of rural poverty (among cotton
growers and other farmers) will increase from
40 percent to 48 percent.
In terms of policy interventions, the cotton sec-
tor in developing countries has been traditionally
taxed either explicitly through export taxes or
implicitly through price-fixing arrangements or
exchange-rate misalignments. The pattern, how-
ever, changed somewhat during the 1990s, as a
number of cotton producers undertook policy
reforms. However, several African and all Central
Asian cotton producers still tax their cotton sectors.
Nonconventional Cotton
Production
Recent trends in growing cotton focus on cost
reductions through less intensive use of inputs,
especially chemicals. These include the use of
genetically modified seed technology and organic
methods of production. Genetically modified
cotton (sometimes referred to as Bt cotton) has not
faced the degree of opposition faced by genetically
modified food crops, allowing more rapid adop-
tion. Organic cotton has been embraced enthusias-
tically by environmental activists but not by  con-
sumers. Hence, while there is plenty of room for
expanding genetically modified cotton, the scope
for expanding organic cotton appears to be limited.
Genetically modified cotton, a result of techno-
logical developments of the 1990s, has the potential
of reducing the cost of production and hence
increasing profitability of the early adopters of
this technology. Like other genetically modified
products,itprovidesinsuranceagainstpests,insects,
and weeds.Growers pay a premium for the resistant
seed,as they would when buying insurance.
Genetically modified cotton was first grown in
the United States in 1996. Among the cotton-
producing countries that have introduced it since
then are China, India, and Mexico in the Northern
Hemisphere and Argentina, Australia, and South
Africa in the Southern. Other countries are in the
process of approval or at the trial stage, including
Brazil, Indonesia, Israel, Pakistan, and Turkey.
Major producers that had not used or approved
genetically modified cotton as of 2003 were the
European Union, Central Asia, and Francophone
Africa (except Burkina Faso, which is conducting
trials).
It is estimated that about 22 percent of the
world’s cotton plantings are now in genetically
modified varieties, up from 2 percent in 1996–97.
The largest user of such cotton is the United States,
which during the 2003–04 season is estimated to
have sown 70 percent of its cotton area with geneti-
cally modified varieties. In Australia about 44 per-
cent of cotton area was sown to such varieties
in 2002–03,up from 40 percent two years earlier.In
China, which adopted the new technology at an
experimental stage in 1996, more than 20 million
hectares were planted with genetically modified
varieties in 2002, corresponding to more than
20 percent of cotton acreage. In addition to the
imported genetically modified varieties, China has
developed 11 of its own varieties.According to Pray
and others (2001), the major share of the benefits
from growing Bt cotton in China went to farmers
(most of whom are smallholders).In contrast,most
of the benefits associated with genetically modified
products in the other cotton-producing countries
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that the increased use of genetically modified cot-
ton in China was associated with considerable pos-
itive health effects—notably fewer hospitalizations
from pesticide poisoning. Farmers who did not use
Bt cotton had to spray 12 times on average,whereas
farmers who used Bt cotton had to spray only
3–4 times. If the conversion to genetically modified
cotton varieties continues at rates experienced dur-
ing the last few years,as much as half of the world’s
cotton (from 40 percent of total cotton acreage)
will be of genetically modified origin within five
years.
The second trend, organic cotton, may be a
small market niche to be exploited by developing
countries.Many developing countries can be classi-
fied as “organic” cotton producers without altering
their current production practices because of their
low reliance on chemicals and fertilizers. The
potential for organic cotton appears to be limited,
however. Organic cotton initiatives have taken
place in many countries, including in Africa, but
the scale is still insignificant compared to global
production of conventional cotton. Myers and
Stolton (1999) reported that in 1997, about 8,150
tons of certified organic cotton fiber was produced
worldwide—2,600 tons was produced in the United
States, 1,175 in India, 1,800 in Turkey, 1,570 in
Africa, and 845 in Latin America.
Significant expansion of organic cotton faces
difficulties on both the supply and demand sides.
On the supply side, the certification process (espe-
cially in African cotton-producing countries where
the majority of growers are smallholders) is costly
to implement and monitor. On the consumption
side, demand for organic cotton is not as strong as
it is for other commodities such as coffee and tea.
There are three reasons for this.First,there is a “dis-
tance” in the eyes of the consumer between the
primary product (cotton) and the final product
(cloth).Second,consumers of clothing (as opposed
to consumers of, say, beverages) must pay attention
to a host of factors before they make their purchas-
ing decision. The decision involves brand, color,
style, size, type of cotton (typically identified by its
country of origin), content (for example, 80 per-
cent cotton,20 percent polyester),and care instruc-
tions. Adding to that already congested list infor-
mation on whether the cotton is of organic origin is
rather difficult. Note that this decision-making
process compares unfavorably with much simpler
labeling for, say, coffee or tea where something like
“Organically grown from Costa Rica” or “Organic
of Kenyan origin”is likely to suffice. Third, organic
products are typically associated with health-
related benefits that do not apply to nonfood prod-
ucts such as cotton.
Distortions in the Cotton Market
Cotton has been subject to various marketing and
trade interventions. Townsend and Guitchounts
(1994) estimated that in the early 1990s, more than
two-thirds of cotton was produced in countries
that had some type of government intervention,
including taxation and subsidization policies. The
ICAC (2002 and 2003),which has been monitoring
the level of assistance to cotton production by
major producers since 1997–98, found that eight
countries provided direct support to cotton
production—Brazil, China, Arab Republic of
Egypt, Greece, Mexico, Spain, Turkey, and the
United States (table 14.2). For 2001–02, direct gov-
ernment assistance to U.S. cotton producers
reached $3.9 billion; China’s support totaled
$1.2 billion; and the European Union’s was almost
$1 billion. Producers in Brazil, Egypt, Mexico, and
Turkey received a combined total of $150 million in
support. India also supported its cotton sector in
2001–02 with an estimated $0.5 billion.
In addition to domestic support, some border
restrictions apply, mainly in the form of import
tariffs. Most countries that impose import quotas
are cotton exporters, some with large textiles sec-
tors. Import tariffs rates for 2003 were: Argentina
(7.5 percent); Brazil (7.5 to 10 percent); China
(3 percent within quota, 90 percent outside
quota
3); Egypt (5 percent); India (10 percent);
United States (4.4 cents per kilogram within quota
and 31.4 cents per kilogram outside quota
4);
Uzbekistan (10 percent); and Zimbabwe (15 per-
cent duty plus 5 percent import tax).
The remainder of this section analyzes the struc-
ture and degree of interventions in the United
States, European Union, and China. It also looks at
Uzbekistan, a country that taxes its cotton sector.
United States
The main channels of support in the United States
are decoupled payments (formerly known as
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payments (through the loan-rate mechanism),
insurance, subsidies to domestic mills (the so-
called Step-2 mechanism, also referred to as
export subsidy), and emergency payments (intro-
duced in 1998 to compensate for the loss of
income caused by low commodity prices but
made “permanent” under the 2002 Farm Bill)
(table 14.3). Direct payments, predetermined
annual payments based on historically enrolled
areas of cotton, were introduced with the 1996
Farm Bill to compensate farmers for “losses”
stemming from elimination of earlier loan defi-
ciency payments. Market price payments are
designed to compensate cotton growers for the
difference between the world price and the loan
rate (the target price) when the latter exceeds the
former. Export subsidies, or Step-2 market pay-
ments, are made to eligible cotton exporters and
domestic end users of cotton when domestic U.S.
prices exceed c.i.f. (cost, insurance, and freight)
prices in northern Europe by a certain level and
the world price is within a certain level of the base
loan rate. The objective of the Step-2 payment is
to bridge the gap between higher U.S. domestic
prices and world prices so that U.S. exporters and
textile mills maintain their competitiveness.
In 2002 the U.S.Congress passed a farm bill that
is expected to be in place for the next six years. The
2002 Farm Bill retained the earlier support through
various loans, flexibility contracts, and insurance,
as well as the Step-2 payment, while legitimizing
emergency assistance under the term “countercycli-
cal payments.” If cotton prices remain at their
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TABLE 14.2 Direct Government Assistance to Cotton Producers, 1997–98 to 2002–03
(US$ millions)
Country 1997–98 1998–99 1999–2000 2000–2001 2001–02 2002–03
United States 1,163 1,946 3,432 2,148 3,964 2,620
China 2,013 2,648 1,534 1,900 1,196 750
Greece 659 660 596 537 735 718
Spain 211 204 199 179 245 239
Turkey — 220 199 106 59 57
Brazil 29 52 44 44 10 —
Mexico 13 15 28 23 18 7
Egypt, Arab Rep. 290 — 20 14 23 33
— Not available. Data for 2001–02 are preliminary.
Source: ICAC 2002 and 2003, U.S. Department of Agriculture, and European Union.
TABLE 14.3 Government Assistance to U.S. Cotton Producers, 1995–96 to 2002–03
(US$ millions)
Policy Instrument 1995–96 1996–97 1997–98 1998–99 1999–2000 2000–01 2001–02 2002–03
Coupled payments 3 0 28 535 1,613 563 2,507 248
PFC/DP 0 599 597 637 614 575 474 914
Emergency/CCP 0 0 0 316 613 613 524 1,264
Insurance 180 157 148 151 170 162 236 194
Step-2 34 3 390 308 422 236 196 —
Total 217 759 1,163 1,946 3,432 2,148 3,964 2,620
— Not available.
Note: PFC denotes production flexibility contracts, DP denotes direct payments, CCP denotes countercyclical
payments.
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture (assistance); International Cotton Advisory Committee (production);
and author’s calculations.2001–02 levels, then U.S. support to its cotton sec-
tor is expected to be in the order of $3.5 billion to
$4.0 billion for the next six years, implying the U.S.
cotton producers will be receiving close to twice the
world market price.
European Union
In the 1960s there were three cotton producers in
Europe. Greece and Spain produced an average of
85,000 tons each; Bulgaria produced 25,000 tons.
Throughout the 1970s Bulgaria’s output declined,
while that of Greece and Spain stayed at the levels
seen during the 1960s. Cotton production by the
three countries taken together declined by 0.4 per-
cent a year between 1960 and 1982.With the Euro-
pean Union’s expansion and the subsequent acces-
sion of Greece and Spain, cotton production grew
by an annual average of 7.3 percent during the
1990s,averaging 325,000 and 78,000 tons in Greece
and Spain,respectively.
Under the EU Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP),support is given to cotton growers based on
the difference between the market price and a
guide (support) price.Advance payments are made
to ginners based on estimates of seed cotton pro-
duction. They pass the subsidy on to growers by
paying higher prices.The policy also influences the
quantity of cotton produced by setting a maxi-
mum guaranteed quantity of seed cotton for which
assistance is provided—782,000 tons of seed cot-
ton for Greece, and 249,000 for Spain, approxi-
mately equivalent to 255,000 and 82,000 tons of
cotton lint.
The European Union reformed its cotton pro-
gram in 1999 (European Commission 2000).While
the guide price level and the maximum guaranteed
quantity of seed cotton for which assistance is pro-
vided have been maintained, “penalties” (that is,
reductions in subsidy) for excess production over
the maximum guaranteed quantity increased.
Under the reformed policy, for each 1 percent of
excess production,the level of subsidy is lowered by
0.6 percent of the guide price as opposed to 0.5 per-
cent prior to 1999. As production increases, the
penalty becomes stiffer, effectively, putting an
upper limit on the budgetary outlays to the cotton
sector. It is important to note that this quantitative
restriction (the so-called maximum quantity guar-
anteed) applies at the aggregate (that is, country)
level, implying that when this restriction is con-
verted to individual basis, it creates not only
administrative complexities but also leads to misal-
location of resources (see chapter 5 on decoupling
for more on this issue). Karagiannis and Pantzios
(2002) found that the current system failed as a sur-
plus containment mechanism and also resulted in
farm income losses.
Between 1995–96 and 1999–2000 the budgetary
expenditure on cotton aid ranged between €740
million and €903 million, implying that, on aver-
age, EU cotton producers received more than twice
the world price of cotton.Note that even in periods
of high prices, EU cotton producers would receive
support since the amount allocated to the cotton
sector had to be disbursed. In addition to output
subsidies,EU cotton producers receive subsidies on
inputs such as credit for machinery purchase,
insurance, and publicly financed irrigation. On
September 23, 2003, the EU Commission proposed
to reform its cotton, sugar, and tobacco sectors
(European Commission 2003). Under the cotton
reform proposal, EU support to the cotton sector
will consist of the following parts: a single farm
payment scheme; a production aid scheme,granted
as an area payment; and development measures.
China
China is currently the largest producer, consumer,
and stockholder of cotton. China’s cotton sector
became fully government-controlled in 1953 after
the introduction of the first Five-Year Plan (Zhong
and Fang 2003). The central planning policies
adopted then were similar to those of the Soviet
Union and remained in place for the next 35 years.
The central government set production targets and
procurement quotas. This monopoly was easily
exercised because all ginning facilities were owned
by the cooperatives.A step to boost cotton produc-
tion was taken in 1978 by increasing the price of
cotton as well as supplying more fertilizer.A second
boost came in 1980 with the partial abolition of the
communal production system under the House-
hold Responsibility System, which gave land use
rights to individual farmers.
Evidence suggests that the government of China
protects its cotton sector through support prices,
import tariffs, export subsidies, and public stock-
holding. The government sets a reference price for
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maintains tariffs on imports that bridge the gap
between domestic and world prices. Following
its WTO (World Trade Organization) accession
arrangements the tariffs will be reduced to 15 per-
cent, but at the same time a tariff-related quota
system will be implemented to manage imports.
The International Cotton Advisory Committee
found that support to the cotton sector in the six
seasons beginning in 1997–98 ranged from $0.8 bil-
lion to $2.6 billion. Huang, Rozelle, and Chang
(2004) estimated that during 2001 the nominal
rate of protection for cotton averaged 17 percent.
Fang and Beghin (2003), however, estimated that
between 1997 and 2000, the nominal protection
coefficient for cotton has averaged 0.80, implying
that China taxes its cotton sector by 20 percent.The
different views on the nature and degree of inter-
vention, however, should not be surprising given
the complexities of China’s agricultural policies as
well as the unreliability of the data.
In September 1999 the government of China
announced reform measures which included the
creation of a cotton exchange to facilitate domestic
spot trading; the reduction of prices paid to pro-
ducers; and a reduction in stocks. In some sense
the reforms have worked: China’s stocks declined
from 4.1 million tons in 1998–99 to 2.3 million
tons in 2000–01. In September 2001 further
reforms were announced and are currently under
way (Zhong and Fang 2003).First,the internal cot-
ton market would be open to cross-regional trade.
Second, various enterprises would be allowed to
buy cotton directly from producers with approval
granted by the provincial government. Third,
ginning operations would be separated from
marketing cooperatives, in effect making them
commercial enterprises.
Uzbekistan
Uzbekistan, the world’s fifth largest cotton pro-
ducer and second largest cotton exporter, produces
more than 1 million tons of cotton annually, most
of which is exported. During 1998–99 cotton
exports accounted for one-third of total merchan-
dise exports, while the sector contributed an aver-
age of 6.4 percent to the country’s GDP. Before
1991 all aspects of Uzbekistan’s cotton sector were
under state control (of the Soviet Union). Most
cotton was either consumed by mills in Russia
(then considered domestic trade) or shipped to
Eastern European countries under barter arrange-
ments. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union,
Uzbekistan began exporting its cotton to Western
countries in exchange for foreign currency (until
1996 some cotton still went to Russia in barter
trade terms).
Although 12 years have passed since the change
in the trade regime, most aspects of production,
marketing,and trade of the sector closely resemble
pre-1991 arrangements. Numerous entities are
involved in all postproduction activities of cotton.
The three most important ones are the state
company handling ginning; the state trading
organizations handling exports; and the Ministry
of Foreign and Economic Relations, handling
financial transactions.
All pre- and post-ginning operations of cotton
are handled by UzKhlopkoprom/UzPakhtasanoitish
(UKP), a state company that used to be a ministry.
UKP is responsible for collecting, storing, ginning,
and classifying cotton,making payments to growers,
and providing inputs. UKP owns considerable
assets, including all ginning and storage facilities as
well as handling machinery and equipment.
The second important entities are the three state
trading organizations (STOs) in charge of handling
all aspects of cotton exports. The main responsibil-
ities of these organizations include contracting cot-
ton merchants for the sale of cotton,organizing the
availability and shipment of cotton, receiving pay-
ments and converting them into local currency,and
paying UKP. Although these organizations have a
number of other responsibilities (such as purchas-
ing machinery and equipment on behalf of the gov-
ernment), exporting cotton is their core activity.
Because each organization has been allocated a
quota of cotton to be exported,there is no competi-
tion involved in the export process.
The third important entity is the Ministry of
Foreign Economic Relations,which reports directly
to the government. Its main function is to manage
cotton export operations, including setting prices,
selecting buyers, and monitoring dollar receipts.
Several other entities are involved in the sector
including the state company responsible for
domestic and international transportation of cot-
ton, the organization responsible for quality moni-
toring, and the customs agency.
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both directly through the lower price received by
UKP (which,in turn,receives a fixed price from the
STOs, as dictated by the Ministry) and indirectly
through the exchange rate regime. A recent study
(Uzbekistan 2003) found that at an ex-ginnery
price of $1.03 a kilogram, the STOs receive the
equivalent of $0.63 a kilogram (these calculations
were based on a Cotlook A Index (price) of $1.24 a
kilogram). With respect to the difference between
$1.03 and $0.63 a kilogram, the study concluded:
“It is not clear exactly where this profitability figure
is allocated.It is alleged that,after a marketing fee is
deducted, the balance is paid to the Ministry of
Finance as an export duty.”The declared price to be
paid to farmers by UKP is 126,000 Sum per ton of
seed cotton, which, at an exchange rate of 960 Sum
per U.S. dollar and a 32 percent ginning out-turn
ratio, implies a price of $0.41 a kilogram, about
one-third of the A Index.
Perhaps, it is not unreasonable to conclude that
even though cotton exports from Uzbekistan
moved from a barter to a commercially oriented
structure, the sector is still tightly controlled by the
government. Moreover, growers are taxed heavily,
receiving only about one-third of the export price
of cotton.
Impact of Distortions and
Prospects for Reform
The ICAC (2003a) concluded that in the absence of
direct subsidies, average cotton prices during the
2000–01 and 2001–02 seasons would have been 17
and 31 cents a pound higher, respectively. If the
United States alone removed its subsidies during
these two seasons, world cotton prices would have
been 6 and 11 cents higher, respectively. These fig-
ures imply cotton prices 30 and 71 percent higher
than the actual averages of 57.2 and 41.8 cents a
pound. The study, which is based on a short-run
partial equilibrium analysis, does acknowledge that
while removal of subsidies would result in lower
production in the countries that receive them (and
hence higher prices in the short term), such impact
would be partially offset by shifting production to
nonsubsidizing countries in the medium to longer
terms; similarly higher prices are likely to reduce
the growth of cotton consumption, making the
long-run impact less striking.
Quirke (2002) estimated that removal of pro-
duction and export subsidies by the United States
and the European Union are likely to induce a
20 percent reduction in U.S.cotton production and
a 50 percent reduction in U.S. cotton exports, with
much higher figures for the European Union. He
also estimated that if support was not in place,
world cotton prices would be 10.7 percent higher
compared to their 2001–02 levels.
Based on a partial equilibrium model, Tokarick
(2003) found that multilateral trade liberalization
in all agricultural markets (including cotton) is
expected to induce a 2.8 percent increase in the
world prices of cotton, with 0.8 percent coming
from the removal of market price support and the
remaining 2 percent coming from the removal of
production subsidies (removal of market price sup-
port most likely applies to the United States Step-2
payment). Tokarick also calculated that global
reforms would lead to $95 million in total change
in welfare a year.
FAPRI (2002) found that under global liberal-
ization (that is, removal of trade barriers and
domestic support of all commodity sectors), the
world cotton price would increase over the baseline
scenario by an average of 12.7 percent over the
10-year period (table 14.4). The largest gains in
trade would go to Africa, which would increase its
exports by an average of 12.6 percent.Exports from
Uzbekistan and Australia would increase by 6.0 and
2.7 percent, respectively, while exports from the
United States would decline by 3.5 percent. The
most dramatic impact is on the production side
where the European Union’s cotton output would
decline by more than 70 percent. The latter out-
come should not be a complete surprise, consider-
ing that the European Union’s cotton output
during the late 1990s was,on average,three times as
much as it was before CAP took effect on the cotton
sector.
Prospects for policy reforms by major producers
subsidizing the sector are mixed. Support for cot-
ton in the European Union is unlikely to increase
for two reasons.First the countries expected to join
the EU are not cotton producers and hence there
will be no budgetary pressure. Second, the current
support scheme is subject to an upper spending cap
that appears to be a binding constraint; both
Greece and Spain, being among the world’s
highest-cost cotton producers, are unlikely to
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would receive if they exceed the current output
levels. At the same time, support is not expected to
be eliminated because it supposedly goes to low-
income areas and hence it is regarded as a poverty
reduction program.
The nature of support is shifting away from
direct price support toward partially decoupled pay-
ments. Beginning in 2006, the EU cotton sector will
go through another reform.Under the Luxembourg
Council’s decisions of April 22, 2004 (which was
based on the September 2003 proposal), an esti-
mated €700 million will fund two support meas-
ures,with 65 percent of the total coming in the form
of a single farm payment decoupled from current
production decisions and the remaining 35 percent
in the form of an area payment. Eligibility for the
decoupled payment will be limited to growers who
produced cotton during the three-year period from
1999 to 2001. The area payment will be given for a
maximum area of 380,000 hectares in Greece,
85,000 hectares in Spain,and 360 hectares in Portu-
gal and will be proportionately reduced if claims
exceed the maximum area allocated to each country.
To receive decoupled payments, cotton growers
must keep the land in good agricultural use. To
receive area payments they must plant (not neces-
sarily produce) cotton. Karagiannis (2004) esti-
mated that the reformed regime is likely to reduce
EU cotton production between 10 and 25 percent
(depending on the assumed elasticity of supply).
The United States took a step in the right direc-
tion with the replacement of the deficiency pay-
ment system by decoupled payments in 1996, but
all progress was eliminated with the 2002 Farm Bill,
which effectively legitimized emergency payments
introduced in 1998–99 following the sharp decline
in prices; renamed them as countercyclical pay-
ments; increased target prices; and made it more
convenient for larger farmers to increase the sup-
port they receive. Historically, U.S. farm bills either
give what they promise or give more than they
promise (as the recent experience showed). Hence,
if history is any guide,it is reasonable to expect that
U.S. cotton farmers will be receiving generous sup-
port for the next six years, unless the support
exceeds WTO commitments,in which case the U.S.
secretary of agriculture has the discretion to inter-
vene and reduce it.
A number of factors may induce some early
reforms, however. First, the substantial increase of
the support to the U.S. cotton sector along with
30-year record low prices and the fact that 10 per-
cent of U.S.cotton growers receive 90 percent of the
support (hence falsifying the claim that support
preserves the small farm), is likely to put pressure
for altering the nature of policy sooner. Second,
Brazil’s request for consultations at the WTO re-
garding U.S.cotton subsidies may create some pres-
sure to lower subsidies (WTO 2002). Third, four
West African cotton-producing countries (Benin,
Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali) pressed for removal
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TABLE 14.4 Estimated Effect of Removal of Distortions
(percentage changes over baseline)
Variable 2003–04 2005–06 2007–08 2009–10 2011–12 Average
a
World price 15.6 13.7 13.0 12.2 11.7 12.7
Exports
Africa 12.1 15.1 14.0 13.1 12.3 12.6
Australia 3.9 3.0 2.7 2.3 2.1 2.7
United States −8.4 −6.6 −4.0 −1.5 0.9 −3.5
Uzbekistan 5.4 6.9 6.7 6.4 6.2 6.0
World 3.9 5.6 6.2 6.7 7.3 5.8
Production
Africa 4.5 7.5 7.1 6.7 6.3 6.0
European Union −77.4 −77.7 −78.3 −78.8 −79.0 −70.5
United States −18.3 −7.9 −5.9 −4.1 −2.3 −6.7
Uzbekistan 3.1 4.7 4.6 4.4 4.2 4.0
a. Average is taken over the 10-year period 2001–02 to 2010–11.
Source: FAPRI 2002.of support to cotton sector through the WTO.In an
unusual move, the president of Burkina Faso
addressed the WTO on June 10, 2003, asking for
financial compensation for cotton-producing low-
income countries to offset the injury caused by
support. This compensation, according to the
request, should be in place for as long as subsidies
are in place.
China appears to be the most promising case of
reform. The reforms undertaken in 1999 and more
recently in 2001 indicate that its cotton sector will
be soon exposed to internal and external competi-
tion. China is also in the process of establishing a
cotton futures exchange, indicating that market
forces within the sector are likely to play a more sig-
nificant role in the future (Shuhua 2003).
On the international side,while the phase-out of
the Agreements on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) is
supposed to end the distortions imposed on the
location of the textile industries, it is uncertain
whether the expected benefits will be fully realized.
• First, ATC is back-loaded, with most of the
reforms expected to take place in the last year,
thus increasing the risk of noncompliance.
• Second, a number of (mainly European Union)
countries have repeatedly sought to impose
antidumping duties on textile imports from Asia
in recent years.
• Third, a number of provisions under the ATC
allow for the imposition of temporary duties in
the case that current domestic textiles suffer
“significant damage”following the phaseout.
Reform Initiatives in Africa
During the 1990s, a number of African cotton-
producing countries undertook substantial reforms.
The reform process and its outcome have been stud-
ied extensively. See, for example, Kähkönen and
Leathers (1997) for Zambia and Tanzania; Sabune
(1996) and Lundbæk (2002) for Uganda; Larsen
(2002) for Zimbabwe; Baffes (2001) for Uganda,
Zimbabwe, and Tanzania; Baffes (2000), Badiane
and others (2002), and Goreux and Macrae (2003)
for Francophone Africa; Baffes (2004) and Gibbon
(1999) for Tanzania. Poulton and others (2004)
looked at the cotton sectors of six African countries,
while Shepherd and Farolfi (1999) reviewed export
commodity sectors for a number of sub-Saharan
African countries.
Reforms in East African cotton-producing
countries were in response to the inefficiencies
faced by the parastatals that used to handle most
(and in some occasions all) aspects of marketing
and trade. For the most part, policy reforms meant
elimination of the monopoly powers of the paras-
tatals. Although the outcome of these reforms
appears to have been mixed, if one considers that
the countries that undertook reforms also faced the
most difficulties, one may argue that reforms have
been successful. For example, during the eight-year
period staring in 1995–96,cotton output in Uganda
has averaged 17,000 tons, an almost three-fold
increase compared with the eight seasons before
1995–96. The corresponding world price average
before 1995–96 was $1.56 a kilogram; after it was
$1.40 a kilogram.The farmers’share in world prices
rose from less than 50 percent to 70 percent after
the reforms, while a number of new traders and
exporters entered the sector. This success came
despite the failure of most credit mechanisms that
were launched after the reforms.
In Zimbabwe reforms appear to have been suc-
cessful. First, cotton production is up substantially.
During the eight seasons since 1995–96, cotton
output has averaged 115,000 tons, 50 percent
higher than the eight-year period average before
1995–96. Some 30 percent of the 1997–98 cotton
harvest was marketed entirely by private entities.
Private companies now transport most of the
cotton. Competition has pushed the price farmers
receive to close to 80 percent of international
prices, and producers are being paid faster.
Zimbabwe has also retained the premium for qual-
ity it used to receive in the world market.
The outcome of cotton reforms in Tanzania has
been mixed. On the positive side, the share of pro-
ducer prices increased to 51 percent (from 41 per-
cent before the reforms). Furthermore, cotton
growers receive payments quickly, a major achieve-
ment compared with the delays encountered before
the reforms. Contrary to what many reports show,
quality of cotton appears not to have suffered con-
siderably. At the same time, cotton production
since1995–96hasaveragedlessthanbeforereforms
(55,000 after, compared with 61,000 tons before).
On the policy side,the Cotton Board along with the
two line ministries (Agriculture and Food Security,
and Cooperatives) still play a major role in the sec-
tor that goes far beyond the regulatory role they are
supposed to play. Collection and dissemination of
270 Global Agricultural Trade and Developing Countriesdata (as well as accuracy of statistics) are poor even
by the government’s own admission.
Reforms are also under way in West Africa. The
World Bank has argued that the discipline and
responsibility that a free-entry competitive system
imposes on market participants would make for a
more resilient, flexible, self-reliant, and innovative
national cotton sector. Improved competition
through market reforms offers important oppor-
tunities for regional trade and cooperation, the
latter in areas such as research,phytosanitary regu-
lations, and seed development and certification.
Most important, improved sector performance
would contribute to alleviating poverty by raising
cotton prices to levels enjoyed by farmers else-
where in the world.
Significant developments have taken place dur-
ing the last few years, which indicate the future
direction of institutional changes in the region’s
cotton sector.Three countries,Benin,Côte d’Ivoire,
and Togo, have now opened their sector to private
ginners. Benin and Côte d’Ivoire have eliminated
the monopoly power of their national companies
and transferred key responsibilities to the private
sector.
Summary and Conclusions
Cotton is very important to a number of low-
income African and Central Asian countries, in
some cases contributing as much as 40 percent to
merchandise exports and between 5 and 10 percent
to GDP. Considering that in most countries cotton
is a smallholder crop, the implications of price
changes (either induced by market forces or policy
interventions) as well as changes in market share
are enormous. For example, a 40 percent reduction
in price (the equivalent of the price decline that
took place from December 2000 to May 2002)
implies a 7 percent reduction in rural income in
Benin—a typical cotton-producing country in
West Africa. Cotton also faces intense competition
from chemical fibers, especially following techno-
logical improvements in the early 1970s that
brought their prices down to cotton price levels.
Since 1975, polyester and cotton have been traded
at roughly the same price levels. Currently, the
share of cotton in total fiber consumption is 40 per-
cent (down from 68 percent in 1960).
Although cotton faces minimal border restric-
tions, there is considerable domestic support.
Major subsidizers are the United States, $3.96 bil-
lion in 2001–02 and the European Union—Greece
and Spain—$0.98 billion (compare this to $20 bil-
lion, the value of world’s cotton production, evalu-
ated at 2001 prices and quantities). This level of
support implies that prices received by U.S.and EU
cotton producers are 87 and 160 percent above
world prices.China reportedly has been supporting
its cotton sector during the last few seasons by an
estimated $1.5 billion annually. Many cotton-
producing countries have reacted to low prices by
introducing offsetting support. Support in Turkey,
Brazil,Mexico,Egypt,andIndia,totaled$0.6billion
during 2001–02. Further, Brazil initiated a WTO
consultation process claiming losses to its cotton
exports due to subsidies by the United States.WTO
determined in its interim ruling that indeed the
U.S.cotton program has violated theAgreement on
Agriculture. Not only is this decision an important
victory for Brazil, but it may also trigger similar
cases, especially in view of the expiration of the
Peace Clause in the Uruguay Round Agreement on
Agriculture. More recently, four West African
cotton-producing countries (Benin, Burkina Faso,
Chad, and Mali) pressed for removal of support to
the cotton sector through the WTO (the so-called
“cotton initiative”). This compensation, according
to the request,should be in place for as long as sub-
sidies are in place.
Given the highly distorted nature of the cotton
market and the fact that millions of rural poor
households in developing countries depend on this
commodity, what are the alternatives? As discussed
earlier, a number of developing countries, espe-
cially in Sub-Saharan Africa have undertaken pol-
icy reforms during the 1990s. Setting aside the
lively debate on the motives of the reforms,in many
respects the reforms have been successful. For
example, in the few cases reviewed here, cotton
growers received a higher share of f.o.b.prices,they
also received payments more promptly, and there
was considerable supply response. In an environ-
ment of declining commodity prices, these are not
trivial achievements. In a number of cases, how-
ever, the reform process has either not been com-
pleted (Tanzania), has been reversed (Zimbabwe),
has been slow (West Africa),or has not even started
(Uzbekistan). In these cases further reforms are the
only feasible alternative.
A second issue that should receive attention is
the enabling policy environment regarding the use
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ple, where genetically modified cotton is used
extensively by smallholders, the costs of producing
cotton declined by 20–25 percent. This cost reduc-
tion meant doubling the net income for cotton
growers. One should also note that genetically
modified cotton has not been subject to negative
consumer reaction as has been the case with genet-
ically modified food products.
A third issue (and one closely related to geneti-
cally modified cotton) is organic cotton. Producers
of organic products typically command significant
premiums. However, organic cotton production
has not been as profitable as other organic crops
(such as coffee and tea). The main reason is weak
demand, which appears to be a reflection of the
“distance” between the farm product—cotton—
and the final product—cloth. It is because of this
distance that genetically modified cotton has not
faced resistance by the consumers, which further
reinforces the conclusion that genetically modified
cotton is something that developing countries
should consider seriously.
The price prospects (and consequently the
export shares of low-cost producers, including
many African countries) can be improved consid-
erably if support by developed countries is reduced
substantially or eliminated altogether. Given the
low probability of eliminating support, however,
a second-best alternative would be for support to
be given in a nondistortionary manner. A type of
support with minimal distortionary effects—the
so-called decoupled support mechanisms—has
regained popularity recently. Income transfers
under decoupled mechanisms are based on past
production and prices and thus have no effect on
current production decisions. What makes decou-
pled support in the cotton sector an interesting
(and potentially applicable) alternative is that
almost all support comes in the form of domestic
measures. Therefore, changing the nature of sup-
port does not require changing the sources of fund-
ing, as it would in the case of border measures.
Notes
1. A more detailed version of this chapter is presented in
Annex 14 of the attached CD-ROM.
2. Fibers include a wide variety of products that can be
divided into two broad categories: natural and man-made. Nat-
ural fibers can be further divided into fibers of plant origin
(such as cotton and linen) and fibers of animal origin (such as
wool and silk). Likewise, man-made fibers can be further
divided into inorganic and organic fibers. Inorganic fibers are
materials such as ceramic, glass, and carbon (typically not used
in garments.) Organic man-made fibers, on the other hand, are
mostly used in garment production either as substitutes or as
complements to natural fibers. Organic fibers are further subdi-
vided into natural and synthetic polymers. Natural polymers
(often called cellulosic) are made from wood. The most com-
mon natural polymer is viscose, also known as rayon. The syn-
thetic polymers are made from crude oil. The most common
synthetic polymers are polyester, acrylic, and polyamide (also
known as nylon).Per capita chemical fiber consumption in 1960
and 2000 was 1.75 and 4.52 kilograms, respectively. China is the
world’s dominant producer of chemical fibers, accounting for
6.7 million tons each year.
3. China’s 2003 tariff rate quota of 856,250 tons was
exhausted.
4. The U.S. tariff rate quota for 2002 was 73,207 tons, while
cotton imports totaled 6,295 tons.
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year in Southeast Asia, whereas it will remain con-
stant or decline in developed countries (Delgado
and others 2003).
The goal of this chapter is to present the struc-
ture and important features of the global seafood
market, including illustrations of the complexities
of the market, followed by a discussion of the
impacts of trade liberalization, with a particular
focus on developing countries. Developing coun-
tries play a very important role in international
seafood trade (FAO 2002b). Many rely on seafood
for export earnings—among them the Maldives,
Mozambique, Peru, Senegal, and Sierra Leone.
Fisheries production, both caught and farmed, has
doubled in the last 30 years, and most of that
increase has come from developing countries. Over
half of global fish exports by value come from Latin
America and the Caribbean and the developing
nations of Asia and Africa, and the majority of that
production goes to developed nations.
With rapid growth in production and trade have
come the overexploitation of fish stocks and a rapid
In many ways,fish as a commodity is treated differ-
ently from agricultural products.For one thing,it is
not part of the agricultural negotiations of the
World Trade Organization (WTO). That it contin-
ues to be treated as an industrial product in negoti-
ations may be a mixed blessing—leading to lower
trade protection but less discipline on domestic
subsidies. Yet fish is the most important source of
protein for many around the globe.Seafood consti-
tutes the biggest category of food and agriculture
exports from developing countries, at an annual
average of $33 billion (2000–01), or 18 percent of
exports—more than combined exports of coffee,
cocoa,tea,spices and nuts,cotton,and sugar.Glob-
ally, per capita consumption of fish is estimated at
14.3 kilograms per year (Delgado and others 2003).
Per capita consumption in 1997 was led by Japan,
with 62.6 kilograms per year, and China, at 26.5
kilograms per year (up from 8.1 in 1985). The
European Union (EU) consumes 23.6 kilograms
per year per capita, and Southeast Asia 23 kilo-
grams, up from 19.8 in 1985. By 2020 per capita
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expansion of aquaculture. Both have had severe
impacts on the environment (FAO 2002c). Thus,
the issue of trade liberalization in seafood markets
relates directly to sustainability of fish production
and, by implication, the sustainability of interna-
tional trade in fish products.
Production
Production of fish (finfish, mollusks, and crus-
taceans) takes two forms, aquacultured (or farm
raised) and captured. The vast majority of captured
fish (by volume) are marine, while the majority of
aquacultured fish are freshwater species.The fishing
sector has expanded considerably in the past
50 years, with capture fisheries landing 19 million
(metric) tons in 1950 to 98 million tons in 2000
(FAO 2002b). During this time the importance
of developed countries in the fishing sector has
declined relative to the developing nations because
of overfishing of waters contiguous to developed
countries and an increase in fishing in the develop-
ing world. Aquaculture has further expanded
the seafood industry, increasing production from
2.5milliontonsin1970tomorethan35milliontons
in2000,withmostoftheincreaseoccurringindevel-
oping nations (FAO 2002b).Production of carp and
mollusksdominatedaquacultureproductionduring
the1990s,butshrimphavethehighestvalue.
Thus, with the combination of capture fisheries
and aquaculture, the volume of world production
has doubled in the last 30 years. Most of the growth
in aquaculture is occurring in developing countries,
especially China,where it is destined predominantly
for domestic consumption. Marine aquaculture has
grown very slowly in developed countries, largely
because of limited available shoreline.
China is the world’s largest producer of captured
fish, marine and inland, at 17 million tons (fig-
ure 15.1). Peru and Chile follow, primarily captur-
ing anchoveta, largely used to produce meal and oil
for industrial use. U.S. fleets catch large volumes of
low-value pollock off Alaska.Most of the catch goes
intosurimi,arefined,stabilizedfishprotein concen-
trate used in making imitation crab meat and
processedfishsuchasbreadedfishsticksandpatties.
China is the leading producer of carp. The
majority of that harvest is retained for domestic
consumption. Norway, Chile, Scotland, Ireland,
and Canada are the leading producers of farmed
salmon and trout, and most of that production is
traded on the international market.
China and Thailand produce almost 50 percent
of the world’s supply of shrimp (figure 15.2), with
other developing countries supplying most of the
rest. Shrimp and prawns account for just 6.4 per-
cent of the volume of the world fish trade but about
20 percent of its value (OECD 2003a). The global
FIGURE 15.1 Fish Catches by Leading Countries, 1991–2000 
(millions of metric tons)
Source: FAO. Fishstat Database.
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United States Chile Japan Peru Chinashrimp trade is valued at more than $10 billion
annually.
It is estimated that more than 60 percent of
Asia’s mangroves have already been converted to
aquaculture farms, primarily for the production of
shrimp (ESCAP and ADB 2000), degrading habi-
tats and land. Because shrimp is such an impor-
tant export earner for Southeast Asia and South
America and has such a marked negative effect on
their environments, it is worthwhile to discuss its
production in some detail.
Sustainable Shrimp Aquaculture in Bangladesh
and Thailand
Subsistence fishermen have caught shrimp in
Bangladesh for hundreds of years. But since the
mid-1980s the cultivation of shrimp for export has
grown significantly.In 1972–73 exports of captured
shrimp were valued at $2.9 million. By 1985 ex-
ports had growth to $90 million, primarily from
aquaculture. In 2000 the figure was $330 million
(FAO 1999, 2002b).
Some of the credit for this rise goes to a struc-
tural adjustment program in which Bangladesh
received a World Bank loan of $1.76 billion over
the period 1979–96 (UNEP 1999b).Under the pro-
gram, policies that had limited trade were replaced
with new policies that encouraged exports. The
changes created an environment in which private
investments in shrimp culture, shrimp processing,
and shrimp exports flourished.
Shrimp now accounts for almost 91 percent of
fish exports from Bangladesh (FAO 2002b). It is
generally agreed, however, that this rapid expansion
has had considerable environmental costs. The area
under shrimp culture tripled in 10 years, from the
mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, covering 130,000 hec-
tares by 1999 (UNEP 1999a). In the process, man-
groves have been removed and replaced by coastal
ponds.The ponds have increased the salinity of adja-
cent land,jeopardizing its future productivity.
The costs of restoration would likely be very
high. Disappearing mangroves have deprived the
marine ecosystem of valuable habitat and nursery
areas for fish reproduction.In addition,sustainable
shrimp farming is threatened by its reliance on the
collection of wild shrimp fry, which are then
“grown out”to appropriate sizes for export, a prac-
tice that threatens the sustainability of wild shrimp
stocks as well. Disease sometimes breaks out in
shrimp ponds and may spread to the wild shrimp
population. Finally, the feed for cultured shrimp is
based on fish meal, which is produced from fully
used, if not overused, stocks of anchovies, herring,
menhaden, and sardines.
Recognizing the negative externalities caused by
shrimp culture in Bangladesh, the U.N. Environ-
ment Programme (UNEP) recommended that ef-
fective environmental policies with proper enforce-
ment should be implemented to ensure that trade
liberalization did not lead to externalities that re-
duced overall welfare (UNEP 1999a).
Thailand is the world’s largest producer of
shrimp, with approximately 23,413 farms covering
an area of 72,663 hectares (in 1996) (FAO 2000).By
2000, Thailand was exporting 249,638 metric tons
of shrimp, valued at some $2.7 billion, to the world
market. Shrimp production in India, Indonesia,
and Vietnam combined equal what Thailand pro-
duces in export value. The same environmental
issues highlighted for Bangladesh apply to
Thailand—satisfying the huge export market for
cultivated shrimp has led to significant environ-
mental damage.
The Shrimp Industry in Madagascar
Madagascar’s shrimp industry is the country’s lead-
ing foreign exchange earner.Exports grew from $20
million in 1980 to $102 million in 1999 and now
account for 7 percent of gross domestic product
(GDP).Approximately one-half of the shrimp pro-
duced are from capture fisheries, the other half
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FIGURE 15.2 World Aquaculture Production
of Shrimp, by Volume, 2000
Source: FAO. Fishstat Database.
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Ecuador 5%from aquaculture. The industry provides direct
employment for approximately 53,000 people and
indirectly for another 30,000 people (World Bank
2003).
In the shrimp capture industry, there are three
types of fisheries: traditional, artisanal, and indus-
trial. The bulk of employment occurs in traditional
fisheries,in which fishers have no motorized equip-
ment. Entry into the fishery is open; no license is
required.Most of the catch of traditional fishermen
is consumed domestically. Production was about
3,400 tons in 2000 (World Bank 2003).
The cost of the license required to ply the arti-
sanal fisheries depends on the power of the fishing
boat’s motor.Most artisanal boats belong to a com-
pany rather than being individually owned. Indus-
trial trawlers that fish in Madagascar’s waters are
mostly foreign owned and have processing facilities
on board. In 2000, approximately 8,200 tons of
shrimp were captured by artisanal and industrial
fisheries, which directly employed some 10,500
people.Virtually all of the shrimp captured in these
two fisheries are exported, with France and Japan
being the primary markets (World Bank 2003).
Industrial Products
Developing countries are important exporters and
importers of fish meal.Fishmeal and oil are derived
from small,wild-caught pelagic fish such as capelin
from the North Atlantic, anchovies from the South
Pacific, and other species such as menhaden and
herring found around the globe. In processing the
fish are cooked, pressed, dried, and milled. The
dry remainder is fishmeal; oil is extracted from
pressing.
Fishmeal and fish oil, used in animal feeds (for
both terrestrial livestock and aquacultured fish) but
not for human consumption, are industrial prod-
ucts. Demand for fish meal from the farmed fish
industry has increased dramatically in the last
20 years. Growing poultry and pig industries in
China and Southeast Asia also create strong de-
mand for fish meal.
The primary producer of fish meal has long
been Latin America, with a total of 2.8 million tons
produced in 1997 and an annual growth rate of
1.7 percent between 1985–97 (Delgado and others
2003). Much of that production, from Chile and
Peru, is susceptible to the vagaries of El Niño. The
most heavily exploited fish is the Peruvian
anchoveta (figure 15.3). World production in 1997
was 6.1 million tons, with the balance after Latin
America made up primarily by China, Southeast
Asia, Japan, and the European Union.
If world markets and production do not change
substantially over the next 17 years,fish meal prices
are projected to rise by 18 percent (Delgado and
others 2003).Conversely,if aquaculture expands by
50 percent, then the price of fish meal will increase
by 42 percent. Greater efficiency in the use of fish
meal in animal feed could push prices down. In the
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FIGURE 15.3 World Aquaculture Production by Value, 1991–2000












Carps SalmonTrout Shrimp Tilapia Molluskworst-case scenario,in which the world experiences
an ecological collapse in fisheries yielding fishmeal
and oil, the price will rise by 134 percent (Delgado
and others 2003). Any of these potential price
changes would dramatically affect livestock pro-
duction in developing countries.
International Markets
Fish is one of the most traded food commodities in
the world.The value of world imports of fish prod-
ucts was $60 billion in 2000, greater than interna-
tional trade in many agricultural products (fig-
ure 15.4).The most valuable component of seafood
trade is shrimp, with world trade in 2000 valued at
more than $10 billion (FAO 2002b).
A myriad of issues underlies fisheries and aqua-
culture production. Capture fisheries still supply
the majority of fish production,but fully 60 percent
of the world’s fisheries are already being fished at or
over capacity (Grainger and Garcia 1996). Even
with the establishment of 200-mile exclusive eco-
nomic zones (EEZs) in 1977, which brought one-
third of the world’s oceans under the jurisdiction of
coastal states, most fisheries management plans
have not achieved their stated goal of maintaining
sustainable fisheries.Many countries,mostly devel-
oping, do not have management policies or lack
resources to enforce them.
Fish and fish products have not always been
major internationally traded products. Several
influences led to the rapid expansion in interna-
tional trade beginning in 1975. Certainly the pass-
ing of the International Law of the Sea and the
institution of the 200-mile EEZ in 1977 had a large
impact. The establishment of the EEZs effectively
created importers out of countries, such as Japan,
with very large distant water fleets, and created ex-
porters out of those countries, such as the United
States, that had large marine resources and rela-
tively low domestic demand.
The most important trade commodities in order
of their value in 2000 are shrimp ($10.8 billion),
salmon and trout ($5.2 billion),tuna ($4.8 billion),
groundfish ($4.4 billion), crabs and lobsters
($3.8 billion), mollusks ($2.8 billion), cephalopods
($2.7 billion), fish meal ($2.1 billion), small pelag-
ics ($1.6 billion), large pelagics ($1.1 billion) and
flatfish ($1.1 billion) (Anderson 2003).
Thailand is the world’s top exporter of food fish
in the world, followed by China, Norway, and the
United States (see figure 15.4). Seventy-four per-
cent of Africa’s exports are destined for the
European Union, while exports from Central and
South America go primarily to the United States,
Canada, and the European Union.
The major importing nations are the European
Union ($19.5 billion),Japan ($15.5 billion),and the
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US$ billionUnited States ($10.4 billion). Within the European
Union, imports go to Spain ($3.35 billion), France
($3.0 billion), Italy ($2.5 billion), Germany ($2.3
billion), the United Kingdom ($2.2 billion), and
Denmark ($1.8 billion) (FAO 2002b).
Crustaceans account for 19 percent of the
weight of exports but 33 percent of the value. Fin-
fish, by contrast, contribute 63 percent of volume
but only 45 percent of value (figure 15.5).The most
widely traded processed seafood products are items
such as canned tuna, canned crab and lobster
meats, canned herring and sardines, roe (such as
caviar), shelled and deveined shrimp, and dried or
salted finfish.
Significant reexporting occurs in the world
seafood markets. Thailand, for example, imports a
significant amount of the world’s tuna catches,
processes it into cans,and then exports it.Similarly,
China is a major reprocessing market for U.S. and
Norwegian seafood.
For low-income, food-deficit countries, exports
are far larger in value than imports.When fish meal
and oil are excluded from export values,the picture
changes only slightly, since their value is not high
and many of these countries do not participate in
fish meal or fish oil production. Among the devel-
oping countries that rely on exports of seafood as
a primary source for export earnings are the
Maldives, Mozambique, Peru, Senegal, and Sierra
Leone (FAO 2002b). Thus, reductions in the stocks
of fish in developing countries because of poor
management have the potential to jeopardize the
food supply while reducing household incomes and
export earnings.
Institutional Influences on International
Trade in Fishery Products
Even though most caught, farmed, and traded fish
are clearly food products, no fish is included in the
WTO Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture
(URAA). The concern among some nations is that
fishing as an industry involves not only market
access, but also resource access on a scale unprece-
dented in other areas of agriculture. Therefore,
negotiations regarding trade liberalization for fish
have proceeded far differently from those on agri-
cultural commodities.
Tariffs on fish products, in contrast to those on
agricultural products, have been reduced with
every successive trade round. And international
agreements on sanitary and phytosanitary meas-
ures,technical barriers to trade,antidumping,rules
of origin, import licensing, and safeguards have
all been applied to trade in fish. Subsidies in the
fishing industry fall under the GATT (General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) Agreement on
Subsidies,whereas in agriculture they fall under the
URAA.
This section of the chapter discussed the domes-
tic and international policies and institutions most
relevant to global trade in fish and fish products.
The domestic policy interventions are fisheries
management policies, fishing subsidies, and trade
barriers, including tariffs, technical barriers to
trade, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, and
antidumping and countervailing measures.
Fisheries Management Policies
To fully understand the impact of trade liberaliza-
tion on fishery products,one first must understand
the factors influencing supply.The impacts of trade
liberalization will differ depending on several fac-
tors, including production method (capture or
aquaculture) and domestic fisheries management
policies.
Fish in capture fisheries belong to a common
pool. Before 1977 jurisdiction of most nations over
fishing grounds extended only 12 nautical miles
from shore. Expansion to 200-mile EEZs was dis-
cussed and agreed to in 1977 by nations at the
Third Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS-III,
1973–1982) (Hannesson 1996). EEZs cover 40 per-
cent of the world’s oceans and 90 percent of its liv-
ing marine resources (Deere 2000).
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FIGURE 15.5 World Food Fish Exports by
Value of Major Commodity
Group, 2000
Source: FAO 2002b.
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mollusks, canned 7%UNCLOS assigns the exclusive right to coastal
statestomanageandexploitmarinelivingresources
and to regulate fisheries resources through a com-
prehensive management system. There is consider-
abledebateovertheeffectivenesswithwhichcoastal
nations have managed their EEZs with respect to
the sustainability of production. Creating an EEZ
does not remove the common-pool property of the
resource; it simply redistributes the use of the
resource to new (domestic) market entrants. Many
nations, especially developed nations, encouraged
expansion of the domestic fleet to increase the
national capacity to catch fish that foreign nations
wouldhavecaughtinthepast.Catchesquicklygrew
asthenumberandsizeof fishingboatsincreased.In
ensuing years, however, supplies in many fisheries
decreased drastically as fish stocks were reduced
beyond the sustainable limit and the remaining fish
became harder to find.
An often-quoted statistic is that fully 60 percent
of the world’s major fisheries resources are already
being exploited at or above capacity (Grainger and
Garcia 1996). Fish stocks in OECD (Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development)
countries, in particular, have been subject to large
fishing pressure over the years and are mostly over-
fished (OECD 2003b). The problem derives not
from a lack of regulations per se, but rather from a
lack of effective regulations.
In a fishery where there is no restriction on
entry into fishing, the management system (or lack
of it) is referred to as open access. It is well known
from economic theory and experience that open
access will lead to overexploitation of the fish stock,
as individual fishermen have little incentive to
restrain their fishing efforts to promote a sustain-
able fishery, because the fish forgone by one fisher-
man will simply be captured by someone else
(box 15.1). Most fisheries in the United States and
European Union operate under some form of lim-
ited access or limited harvest.
Management policies can be categorized as
being either an input or output control. Input con-
trols, the oldest type of fishery management tool,
are designed to limit either the number of people
fishing or the efficiency of fishing (National
Research Council 1999). Input controls generally
lead to inefficient outcomes. They raise the cost of
fishing but generally do not reduce effort or
capacity.
Output controls are designed to limit directly
the volume of the catch from a given fishery. The
critical necessity for this form of management is
the ability to monitor the catch. In some fisheries,
managers may have personnel at the dockside to
count the number (or weight) of fish caught as they
are landed. In other cases, on-board observers may
monitor the catch. In either case, once the total
allowable catch (TAC) is reached,the fishery is gen-
erally closed for the season.
Management by TAC has at least three short-
comings.First,itinducesfisherstocompetetocatch
as much as possible before the TAC is reached. Sec-
ond,as fishers become more intensively capitalized,
the TAC is reached in a shorter time, leading to a
backlog of fish for processors that pushes down
fishermen’s prices and reduces product quality.
Third,idle vessels may move to fish in another fish-
ery, leading to overcapitalization in yet additional
fisheries (Conrad 1999).
The management systems of fisheries have
caused vexing trade and environment issues, and
several cases have landed before dispute panels dis-
cussions with the WTO and format GATT.The dis-
putes below (drawn from Robb 2001) were directly
related to fisheries management policies.
• Canada v.U.S.—Prohibition of Imports of Tuna
and Tuna Products from Canada, 1982.
• Canada v U.S.—Measures Affecting Exports of
Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, 1988.
• Mexico v. U.S.—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna
(Tuna/Dolphin I), 1991.
• European Economic Community and Netherlands
v.U.S.—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (Tuna/
Dolphin II), 1994.
• India,Malaysia,Pakistan,and Thailand v.U.S.—
Import Prohibitions of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products—1998.
Because of poor management and other factors,
the status of fish stocks worldwide is alarming. The
implications of trade liberalization for capture fish-
eries are many, but the most obvious implication is
that the current level of catches from capture fish-
eries is unsustainable. Should trade liberalization
provide incentives to fishermen to catch even more
fish, it would simply speed up the overfishing and
depletion process,leading to unsustainable interna-
tional markets as well.This is not to say that further
Seafood: Trade Liberalization and Impacts on Sustainability 281liberalization should not occur, but rather that
overfishing and other externalities must be consid-
ered in free-trade discussions.
Fishing Subsidies
The most sensitive issue related to capture fisheries
before the WTO Committee on Trade and the Envi-
ronment (CTE) is fishing subsidies. Subsidies exist
in the fishing sector globally and have come to be
recognized as having a significant impact on the
quantities of fish traded,largely because they lead to
unsustainable fishing practices. At the WTO High-
Level Symposium on Trade and Environment in
March 1999, five WTO member nations (Australia,
Iceland, New Zealand, the Philippines, and the
United States) submitted a joint statement on the
need to eliminate “environmentally damaging and
trade-distorting subsidies” in the fisheries sector
(WTO 1999, 2000, 2001). In 2001, at the Fourth
Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar, the WTO
explicitly included fisheries subsidies in the negoti-
ating agenda to improve current discipline on
subsidies—this as a result of discussions in the
CTE. The Doha Declaration states that the need to
“clarify and improve WTO disciplines on fisheries
subsidies, taking into the account the impor-
tance of this sector to developing countries” (WTO
2003a: 28).
In an excellent review of fisheries subsidies,
Schrank (2003: 49) cites three implications.
Three implications are noted: (1) countries that
do not subsidize and that restrain total catch to
maintain the resource lose the extra catch to
countries that subsidize and do not restrain total
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BOX 15.1 Impacts of Trade Liberalization in Uganda’s Fishing Industry
Economywide liberalization and reforms in
Uganda’s trade regimes have made the fisheries
industry one of the country’s most important in
terms of employment and export earnings. The
fisheries sector is Uganda’s second-largest
national export producer, with export values
growing from $1.4 million in 1990 to $78 mil-
lion by 2001 (UNEP 2002a). More than 1 million
workers are directly engaged in harvesting,
transporting, processing, distributing, and mar-
keting fish (UNEP 1999b). 
With success have come problems common to
fishing industries elsewhere. Uganda’s fish come
from the country’s many lakes and rivers. Current
legislation allows open access to lake fishing.
There are relatively few restrictions on who may
fish, and few technical measures to control fishing
mortality. Poor data make it difficult to determine
the amount of fish that can be taken without
depleting the stocks beyond a sustainable level,
particularly in Lake Victoria, which borders not
only Uganda but also Kenya and Tanzania. Thus it
has been difficult to establish harvest limits. The
U.N. Environment Programme recommends that
Uganda should determine the level of fish stocks
it currently has, establish a total allowable catch
that is in line with sustainable harvests in each of
the major water bodies, and implement an indi-
vidual transferable quota system. 
Overfishing is not the only problem in
Uganda. According to UNEP, unsustainable fish-
ing practices are on the rise, as the catch of
native fish has declined. For example, exotic
species are being introduced to lakes and rivers.
In another example, poisons are being used, ille-
gally, to stun the fish, bringing them to the sur-
face, making them easy to scoop up in nets. The
poisoning has led the European Union to impose
a ban on fish exports from Uganda due to food
safety concerns.
Other issues related to food safety include a
lack of refrigeration facilities to preserve fish after
harvest. Transportation to processing facilities is
made difficult and slow by poor road conditions,
further degrading the quality and safety of the
fish prior to processing.
Other environmental concerns include efflu-
ent pollution from fish-processing industries.
Raw, untreated waste is dumped directly into
the very rivers and lakes from which the fish are
being pulled, contaminating the environments
for tomorrow’s catch. 
Social problems also threaten the fishing
industry, as most of the products are destined
for export markets, where they fetch higher
prices. Much of the local population can afford
only fish rejected by processors for the export
market. Food security concerns have been
raised, as well, as Nile perch feed heavily on
freshwater shrimp that are also caught and used
as animal feed. 
Source: UNEP 1999b.catch; (2) competition from subsidized distant
water fleets can make it economically unviable
for developing countries to develop their own
fisheries and therefore to realize the benefits of
their own 200-mile zones of fishery jurisdiction;
(3) subsidies can contribute to stock depletion,
with negative economic, trade, and environ-
mental effects for other countries that have an
interest in the stock.
The greatest contrast to agricultural subsidies is
the effect noted in Schrank’s first point. Fishing
subsidies create not only a trade distortion in the
markets, but also, in the case of straddling or
migratory fish stocks, a negative externality on the
nation competing to capture the fish.
The relationship between fisheries subsidies and
their environmental and social impacts is obviously
complex. According to Hussein Abaza, who heads
UNEP’s Economics and Trade Branch, “It is
becoming clear that developing countries stand to
gain a great deal from trade in fisheries products,
but only if trade and fisheries policies are reformed
to support sustainable management of these
resources” (UNEP 2002a). The policy recommen-
dation is simple—eliminate trade and domestic
distortions while adopting environmental policies
that address overfishing. But the implementation
of sound environmental management is the real
policy challenge.
Fishing Access
In a form of fishing subsidies, the European Union
signed its first fishing access agreement with
Senegal in 1979, shortly after nations exercised
their rights to the 200-mile EEZ. Since many devel-
oping nations with EEZs did not have the capacity
to make use of their resources, they opted to sell
access to these resources to third parties. The Euro-
pean Union has been predominant in negotiating
these agreements on behalf of its member countries
and has been paying the access fees.
Most fishing access agreements have been
reached between the European Union and African
countries and a few other nations. In these access
agreements, an amount is negotiated to guarantee
access to foreign waters by portions of the EU
industrial fishing fleet. During 1999–2000, the
European Union had agreements with 20 different
nations for a total value of more than €400 million.
The countries with the largest negotiated fees in
2000 were Morocco (€114 million), Mauritania
(€54 million, box 15.2), Argentina (€16 million),
Angola (€13 million), and Senegal (€12 million)
(OECD 2003a). The primary beneficiaries of the
access agreements are Spain and France. Portugal,
Italy, and Greece have also benefited.
The agreements are very controversial. Fishing
access agreements have been seen as a way to reduce
capacity in the European Union while securing
employment and supplies of fish for the European
market (Institute for European Environmental Pol-
icy 2002b). On the environmental side, catch limits
are either not imposed on the foreign fleets or the
limits are not enforced, and so the sustainability of
stocks of fish in accessed waters is in doubt in many
nations.
Trade Barriers: Tariffs
Tariffs in OECD member countries are important
barriers to the developing nations that export to
them. But a good deal of South-South trade is also
affected by tariffs.
1
Tariffs on seafood in developing countries are
generally higher and more transparent than those
in OECD countries. The structures of the tariff
regimes, however, differ considerably among devel-
oping countries. Among developing countries,
Thailand has the highest tariff levels on seafood
products (60 percent across all product forms),fol-
lowed by India, whereas Chile and Malaysia gener-
ally apply the lowest duty rates. Yet all developing
countries for which detailed tariff schedules are
available implement transparent tariff structures
with all product lines subject only to ad valorem
duties.
After the Uruguay Round, average weighted
import tariffs on fish products in developed
countries were reduced to around 4.5 percent (Lem
2003). This average hides a number of tariff issues,
however, including some tariff escalation and tariffs
on specific items (such as canned tuna in the United
States). The European Union and the Republic of
Korea have the highest tariffs (ranging from 4 per-
cent to 33 percent), whereas the United States and
Canada have the lowest (0–5 percent) (figure 15.6).
Butdespitetheirrelativelyhightariffs,bothKorea
andtheEuropeanUnionhaveverytransparenttariff
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ad valorem duties. In comparison, Japan and the
United States implement more complex tariff struc-
tures.In Japan about 20 percent of the tariff lines on
intermediate seafood products are either per-unit-
specificorcompoundduties.Similarly,38percentof
U.S.tarifflinesonintermediateseafoodproductsare
per-unit-specific or compound. The U.S. tariffs do
not seem to be aimed at concealing protection,since
their average ad valorem equivalent is only a little
more than 2 percent.At the same time,the products
that receive tariff protection in the United States,
such as canned tuna, are protected only through
highadvaloremtariffs.
Most industrial countries offer preferential
access to developing countries’ seafood exports.
The European Union offers free access to all
seafood products from the least-developed coun-
tries and partial tariff exemption to most of
seafood exports from Africa-Caribbean-Pacific
(ACP) countries and other developing countries.
The United States grants free access for all develop-
ing countries for all seafood products. Japan also
grants free access to some seafood imports from the
least-developed countries and maintains only one
seafood tariff line for other developing countries
(table 15.1).
Table 15.1 shows that the trade-weighted tariff
averages across the OECD countries exhibit some
trade escalation for imports from developing coun-
tries and all other countries, but not for the least-
developed countries. However, in the context of
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BOX 15.2 Foreign Fishing Access Agreements Involving Mauritania
The fishing sector in Mauritania accounts for
more than 40 percent of exports and about
6 percent of gross domestic product. The only
major export items are squid and octopus, with
an export value of $68 million in 2000 (FAO
2002b). Only $639,000 were fish products
exported in processed form and that was for
dried, salted, or smoked products. Total fish
product exports were $74 million.
The primary source of earnings from the fish-
ery sector in Mauritania is not from exports but
from access fees. The European Union pays for
its fleet to fish in Mauritanian waters. In a sense
one might say that Mauritania exports its fish re-
sources, while they are still in their habitat, di-
rectly to the European Union fishing fleet. Eighty
percent of fish in Mauritania, or 450,000 tons,
were landed by industrial vessels in 2001 (WWF
2003). A new agreement on fishing access by
The European Union was enacted in 2001 and
is effective until August 2006. The European
Union is paying €430 million, creating access
to Mauritanian water for 248 vessels, target-
ing hake, squid, crawfish, and tuna. The EU
vessels are predominately from Spain and
France, but also from Italy, Portugal, Greece, the
Netherlands, Germany and, to a minor extent,
Ireland.
In addition to the access fees, vessel owners
are required to pay €29 per ton of catch taken
by freezer tuna seiners, and €19 per ton for
catches from pelagic fish trawlers. A license fee is
also payable, based on tonnage per year in some
cases and a flat annual fee for tuna vessels.
In response to critics, the European Union has
begun to increase the value of the access pay-
ments (for Mauritania up 61 percent over the
previous agreement) and to work toward agree-
ments that promote sustainable development of
the fisheries in the target nations. To that end,
the agreements, by design, allow the Mauritan-
ian authorities to inspect and control fishing
activities—requiring a daily log of catches by the
foreign vessels and setting up a system of
observers on board vessels. These opportunities
for Mauritania are not fully taken advantage of.
Restricted fishing zones have increased in size.
There remain no catch limits.
Determining economic benefits for either
party to the agreement is uncertain, as there is
little information on catch statistics. However,
based on the previous agreement between the
European Union and Mauritania, for each euro
paid to Mauritania in 1996, the value of the
catch was two times greater. In 1997, the value
of the catch was three times greater than the
cost of access. Little of the access money
appears to be utilized to build within Mauritania
a domestic infrastructure to nationalize its
resources rather than selling foreign access. In
addition, reports from nongovernmental organi-
zations, such as the World Wildlife Fund, indicate
that the agreements have negative effects
on local communities and on sustainable
development. 
Source: Institute for European Environmental
Policy (2002a and b);
www.integratedframework.org.tariffs on agricultural goods, tariffs in seafood
products are lower and the level of tariff escalation
is very moderate.
Trade Barriers: Technical Barriers
In recent years, there has been a large increase in
policies that could potentially come under the
heading of technical barriers to trade.Among them
are labeling programs and the resultant tracing
capability they require. The programs are typically
found in developed countries but can have poten-
tially large impacts on developing countries.
Among the labeling programs are ecolabeling,
country-of-origin labeling, and other labeling
related to the production process,such as “organic.”
A great deal of regulatory activity concerning
country-of-origin labels is occurring in the United
States and European Union. Ecolabeling and
organic labeling are voluntary programs, but the
WTO is interested in whether such labels constitute
a nontariff trade barrier. Currently, these labels are
not considered to be trade barriers as long as they
are nondiscriminatory (WTO 2003b).
Trade Barriers: Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures
Import regulations based on hazard-analysis,
critical-control-point (HACCP) principles,adopted
by many of the major importing nations, are
regarded as nontariff barriers by many developing
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FIGURE 15.6 Tariff Structure by Level of Processing, (1998–2001)
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TABLE 15.1 Trade-Weighted Tariff Averages for Developing Countries’ Fish Product
Exports to OECD Countries, by Processing State
(percent)
Level of Processing Least-Developed Developing All Other
All 2.5 2.9 3.2
Unprocessed 2.5 2.5 2.5
Fillets 2.8 2.5 2.0
Semi-processed 0.5 1.9 1.4
Processed 1.7 4.3 8.0
Total value (US$ millions) 437 10,689 21,992
Source: OECD 2003a.countries, as the investment required to bring pro-
cessing plants up to code can be substantial (Filhol
2000). During 1997–98, the European Union im-
posed bans on the import of seafood from India,
Bangladesh, Kenya, Madagascar, Mozambique,
Tanzania, and Uganda, citing food safety concerns
both in processing and in possible contamination
prior to catch in both capture fisheries and aquacul-
ture (Filhol 2000).
For example, most of the fish caught in Kenya
are from Lake Victoria; the majority of that catch is
Nile perch (FAO 2002b).
2 Nile perch are also the
main export from Kenya, earning about $50 mil-
lion annually.Of the 18 fish processing and export-
ing firms now in Kenya, 10 specialize in Nile perch
and 8 in marine products such as shrimp, other
crustaceans,and tuna.In 1997 the European Union
became concerned about the safety of fish from
Kenya when Spain and Italy both banned fish
imports because of the presence of salmonella.
Some other members of the European Union con-
tinued to import from Kenya, but exports declined
by 34 percent between 1996 and 1997. In 1998 the
European Union banned imports of fish from
Kenya because of a cholera outbreak, causing a
66 percent drop in fish exports to the European
Union. In 1999 the European Union banned fish
from Lake Victoria yet again, this time because of
the presence of pesticides, causing another 68 per-
cent decline in fish exports.In 1997 Kenyan exports
were $52 million, in 1998 $39 million, and in 1999
$32 million. In 2000 they were back up to $39 mil-
lion (FAO 2002a).
In response to the requirement for a HACCP
program to export to many nations, Kenya has
instituted stringent quality control procedures.The
Fisheries Department controls quality though pro-
visions of the Kenya Fisheries Act and the Fish
Quality Assurance Regulation of 2000. However,
fish quality comes at a cost. There are strict regula-
tions on production, handling, processing, packag-
ing, and transportation of fishery products. In
addition, strict regulations govern construction of
buildings, equipment, purification tanks, and stor-
age facilities. Costs were incurred to train workers
in hygiene related to fish handling.There is also the
additional cost of electricity to maintain strict tem-
perature controls. Finally, the cost to fishermen is
significant. They must invest in newer boats that
have chillers to maintain the quality of caught fish.
Kenya has adapted to the new realities by
restricting the number of facilities handling fish to
be exported.Only five fishing villages (out of nearly
300) are authorized to handle fish landings. This
causes fishermen from elsewhere to incur higher
transportation costs to land their catch.
The costs of exporting to nations with strict
quality controls are not trivial,but Kenya has had to
incur those costs to remain in the international
market. As long as Nile perch continues to be in
demand in the world market,it is likely that Kenyan
producers can more than cover their costs. Should
the prices rise too far, however, other white-fleshed
fish will become competitive substitutes. The inter-
national seafood market in white-fleshed fish is
very competitive, particularly now that farmed
tilapia and catfish are available in large quantities.
Trade Barriers: Antidumping and Countervailing
Measures
Astariff barriershavebeenrelaxedandtheaquacul-
ture industry has boomed globally, more and more
fishing industries in the United States have found
themselves competing with lower-priced imports.
Thus, the United States in particular has been quite
active in pursuing antidumping and countervailing
duty suits against foreign competitors. The United
States brought antidumping and countervailing
charges against imports of Norwegian farmed
salmon in 1990, Chilean farmed salmon in 1997,
crawfish from China in 1997, and farmed catfish
fromVietnam in 2003.A petition was filed with the
U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) in
December 2003 against six exporters of farmed
shrimp.Details on several of these cases follow.
Crawfish from China. The imported product was
defined as freshwater crawfish tail meat in all its
forms, grades, and sizes. China supplied 62 percent
of all imports by the United States in 1997 and
92 percent in 2001. U.S. production of crawfish in
1996 was 12.5 million pounds; in 1997, 23 million
pounds (U.S. Department of Commerce 1997).
Meanwhile imports of crawfish from China were
2.6 million pounds in 1996 and 5.8 million pounds
in 1998.
3 The average value per pound of imports
from China was $1.85 in 1997, compared with
$5.82 per pound for the domestically produced
product. As a result, antidumping duties of
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However, Chinese crawfish continue to dominate
imports to the U.S. market, with sales of 8 million
pounds in 2001 and 7.5 million pounds in 2002,
worth a total of $38.7 million in 2001 and $22.2
million in 2002. The ruling was reviewed in 2003,
and it was determined that the antidumping duties
should remain in place.
Catfish from Vietnam. In 2002, independent
processors and the Catfish Farmers of America, a
tradeassociationof U.S.catfishfarmersandproces-
sors, brought a petition to the USITC regarding
dumping of frozen catfish fillets into the U.S. mar-
ket byVietnam.Catfish farming is the largest aqua-
culture industry in the United States.Production in
2000 was 150.6 million pounds (USITC 2003a).
The primary producing states are Mississippi,
Arkansas, Louisiana, and Alabama. Prior to 1999
imports were largely absent from the U.S. market.
In 1999, Vietnam exported fewer than 2 million
pounds of what theVietnamese call catfish into the
U.S. market. By 2001 that number had increased to
15.9 million pounds. Although the Vietnamese
product was successfully labeled and marketed as
catfish, the Latin names of the imported species
were Pangasius bocurti, Pangasius pangasius, and
Pangasius micronemus. American catfish are from
the Ictaluridae family.
A problem in world markets for fish is that once
fish is processed, it is very difficult to determine its
species. Some fish marketed as red snapper are not,
in fact, red snapper, a high-value fish. Due to many
cases of intentional and unintentional fraud in
seafood markets, in which consumers were falsely
led to believe that they were buying a certain prod-
uct or confused by the same product being mar-
keted under different names, the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration has become more rigorous in
its regulations of appropriate names for fish.
Vietnam is now required to label its fish not as
catfish, but instead as basa and  tra.
1 However,
Vietnamese basa and tra are still considered similar
enough to American catfish to be subject to
antidumping measures. Producers have had to pay
antidumping duties of between 36.84 percent and
63.88 percent.
Shrimp from some developing countries. As of
December 2003, the Southern Shrimp Alliance
(SSA), a group of shrimp harvesters and processors
in the United States, filed antidumping petitions
with the USITC, alleging that Brazil, China,
Ecuador, India, Thailand, and Vietnam were dump-
ing shrimp (primarily farmed) with an approximate
annual value of $2.4 billion into the U.S. market.
The SSA is petitioning for tariffs on imports of
shrimp from these countries ranging from 30 per-
cent to 267 percent. It argued that “a variety of
financial incentives provided by national govern-
ments and international institutions over a number
of years have overstimulated the infrastructure and
production of farm-raised shrimp in these coun-
tries” (emphasis added) (McGovern 2003). Thus it
seems that the investment by organizations such as
the World Bank and others in helping build an
export industry in some of these countries is per-
ceived to have created unfair subsidies for these
shrimp-exporting nations.
Impacts of Trade and Domestic
Policy Reforms
The previous section makes clear that the primary
trade barriers for capture and aquaculture fisheries
are tariffs, countervailing and antidumping meas-
ures, and the discriminatory potential of ecolabel-
ing, country-of-origin labeling, and sanitary and
phytosanitary measures for seafood safety.
To analyze the impacts of trade liberalization on
trade in seafood, particularly on seafood from
developing countries,one must distinguish between
the impacts of trade liberalization on seafood de-
rived from capture fisheries and on seafood from
aquaculture. This is because of their distinct attrib-
utes. Capture fisheries are generally ill-managed. As
such, changes in trade policies may create changes
in welfare that differ between the short and long run
because of the sustainability of fish stocks. With
respect to the effects of trade liberalization,aquacul-
ture is more similar to agriculture. However, to the
extent that aquaculture is dependent on feed de-
rived from capture fisheries or seed stock from wild
fisheries, trade liberalization may have a different
effect on aquaculture than on agriculture.
Whereas the research literature on markets for
fish is extensive (Wessells and Anderson 1992;
Kinnucan and Wessells 1997), there has been little
empirical analysis of the impacts of trade liberaliza-
tion through tariff reductions related to fish and
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nature of the global seafood market, partly because
of a lack of data, and partly because of a govern-
mental and academic focus diverted away from
seafood markets toward the economics of manage-
ment of capture fisheries. In addition, although
nongovernmental organizations and international
development agencies have produced many studies
on trade liberalization and its impacts on the agri-
cultural sector in developing countries, there is
a spectacular lack of quantitative information on
the impacts of trade liberalization for developing
countries with respect to fish.
The study by Cox, Stubbs, and Davies (2000) is
the notable exception. This section begins by dis-
cussing its findings on trade liberalization in Asia
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) countries.
Trade Liberalization in APEC Countries
Cox, Stubbs, and Davies (2000) investigate the
short-run effects of trade liberalization on seafood
products in the APEC countries. These countries
maintain a tariff and other trade barriers against
fish and fish products. With the conclusion of the
Uruguay Round, WTO member nations agreed to
lower tariff rates. However, the APEC agenda was
more ambitious. Under the 1994 Bogor Declara-
tion, APEC made a commitment to fully liberalize
all markets by 2020, with 2010 as the deadline for
developed countries. This was followed by “early,
voluntary sectoral-liberalization”(EVSL) proposals
in which nine sectors, including fisheries, would
accelerate tariff removals beyond the Bogor Decla-
ration. Rather than having 2010 and 2020 as dead-
lines for developed and developing countries,
respectively, the timeline was moved to December
31, 2005.
Cox, Stubbs, and Davies (2000) developed a
simulation model to evaluate the impact of seafood
tariff removals under the Bogor Declaration,EVSL,
and another scenario wherein only the developed
countries in APEC would remove their tariffs while
those of developing countries remained the same.
The model included all the APEC countries and the
rest of the world as sources and destinations.
Seafood products were generally grouped together
except for a focus on species particularly important
to Australia such as tuna, lobsters, and shellfish.
As expected the results show that there would be
significant increases in export volumes (and prices)
under the Bogor Declaration and the ESVL relative
to the baseline. If only the developed countries
removed their tariffs, the simulation shows that
there would be little difference from the baseline
because developed-country tariffs are generally
small. The greatest change would occur under the
EVSL scenario, at least initially. By 2020 the effects
of the Bogor and EVSL agreements would be the
same (tables 15.2 and 15.3).
Significant benefits from import tariff reduc-
tions accrue to the “Other APEC” countries of
Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand,
Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, the Russian
Federation, Singapore, and Vietnam.
Removing Subsidies in Capture Fisheries
The previous section discussed the types of subsi-
dies found in the fishing sector and the concern of
the WTO CTE about fishing subsidies as a potential
distorter of trade and contributor to unsustainabil-
ity of fish stocks around the globe. To analyze the
trade impacts of these subsidies, a logical place to
begin may be to calculate producer subsidy equiva-
lents (PSEs).According to the OECD,“the PSE is an
indicator of the value of the transfers from domes-
tic consumers and taxpayers to the producers
resulting from a given set of agricultural policies at
a point in time”(FAO 2003).
The PSE also may be useful in assessing the
advantages of producer subsidies in the fisheries
sector. The complicating factor is management. In
agriculture, it is assumed that subsidies are com-
pared to a subsidy-free world characterized by eco-
nomically efficient allocation of goods at various
prices.However,if the fishery is managed under an
open-access system, for example, then the subsidy-
free world is not economically efficient, because
that system does not lead to efficient allocation. To
be truly efficient, the subsidies would not exist and
there would be perfect management of fish stocks
so that all negative externalities were incorporated
into the price of each fish. PSEs for fisheries prod-
ucts have not been calculated because fish are
highly heterogeneous and reference prices to
measure market-price support are hard to pin
down.
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TABLE 15.2 Simulated Changes in the Real Value of World Exports in 1995 Prices
(percent)
Annual Growth Developed APEC
in Base EVSL Bogor Countries
Type of Export (1995–2020) 2010 2020 2010 2020 2010 2020
Unprocessed
Tuna 1.3 5.0 4.8 1.5 4.8 1.6 1.5
Other fish 8.2 32.4 28.0 0.4 28.0 −1.9 −1.9
Rock lobster 1.4 1.5 1.5 0.7 1.5 0.7 0.7
Prawns 2.6 11.3 15.5 0.4 15.5 0.4 0.4
Other crustaceans 7.1 38.5 51.2 1.3 51.2 1.3 0.7
Abalone 3.4 20.2 21.9 2.6 21.9 2.6 2.0
Scallops 6.2 15.5 23.5 0.5 23.5 0.6 0.1
Other mollusks 3.9 22.5 23.7 1.3 23.7 1.3 1.4
Processed
Tuna 2.4 0.4 0.8 0.3 0.8 0.3 0.3
Other fish 4.4 11.7 17.0 2.6 17.0 2.6 1.5
Rock lobster 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0
Prawns 1.2 0.6 0.7 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.3
Other crustaceans 1.6 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
Mollusks 3.0 8.4 9.4 4.0 9.4 4.0 3.9
Total 5.1 20.4 24.1 1.0 24.1 0.2 −0.4
Source: Cox, Stubbs, and Davies 2000.
TABLE 15.3 Simulated Benefits from Tariff Reductions, by Country
(percent)
Growth Developed EVSL and Developed
in Base EVSL Bogor APEC Countries Bogor APEC Countries
Country (1995–2020) 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010
Australia 2.7 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.7 0.1
Canada 2.4 1.9 0.1 0.0 5.9 0.1
Chile/Peru 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0
China 9.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 −0.3 0.0
Hong Kong (China) 4.8 −0.3 0.0 0.0 −1.4 0.1
Japan 1.9 −0.3 −0.2 −0.2 0.0 −0.3
Korea, Rep. of 3.7 1.1 0.1 0.0 2.5 0.0
United States 1.7 0.6 0.0 0.0 2.9 −0.1
Other APEC 4.6 1.0 0.0 −0.1 0.9 −0.2
Total APEC 5.4 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 −0.1
Non-APEC 1.8 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0
World 4.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0
Note: These benefits represent changes in the sum of consumer surplus, producer surplus, and import
tariff revenue.
Source: Cox, Stubbs, and Davies 2000.The impact of removing subsidies may be ana-
lyzed according to the type of subsidy.For subsidies
that lower the costs of production (such as govern-
ment-paid fishing access fees, low-cost vessel con-
struction loans, and tax exemptions), removal will
increase costs of production. A large portion of
the world’s subsidized fishing fleet is from the
European Union, Japan, Russia, China, and other
nations that subsidize (Milazzo 1998). A reduction
in these subsidies would almost certainly benefit
fish stocks—as well as decreasing trade.
Milazzo (1998) provides an excellent summary
of the benefits to developing nations of removing
subsidies.
• Subsidies that pay for access arrangements
support continued operations primarily by
European and East Asian distant-water fleets
off Africa and in the Western Pacific. These
subsidized operations reduce the fishing oppor-
tunities available to local fishermen. In most
cases,the payments probably do not compensate
adequately for the full economic value of the
resources.
• There is scattered evidence that subsidized
access arrangements are beginning to compro-
mise local food needs.
• The combination of developed countries’ subsi-
dies to their distant-water fleets and to their
domestic (coastal) fleets minimizes to some
extent trade opportunities that should be avail-
able to developing countries.
• Fishing subsidies are highly nontransparent in
the sense that more than three-quarters of the
subsidies are not budgeted, and a good share of
budgeted subsidies are controlled by govern-
mental agencies other than those responsible for
fisheries.
• Environmentally harmful subsidies outweigh
the effect of subsidies that are environmentally
benign or positive.Milazzo’s estimates show that
possibly no more than 5 percent of all subsidies
support conservation.
Influence of Management Regime on Effects of
Trade Liberalization in Capture Fisheries
An alternative means of looking at impacts of trade
liberalization is to assess their implications un-
der different management programs. Rögnvaldur
Hannesson (OECD 2003a) has investigated the
effects of liberalizing trade in fish, fishing services,
and investments in fishing vessels. Three styles of
fisheries management are defined: open access,
catch control,and efficient management.As we saw
earlier, under open access fishermen are free to
respond to prices by increasing or decreasing their
catch. Increased prices will invite entry into the
fishery by more participants,so that in the long run
the fishery will be overfished. Under catch control
and efficient management, total supplies are fixed
and will not change with changes in prices. This is
because a TAC will have been set to guide the fish-
ing effort and guarantee a sustainable fishery. The
difference between catch control and efficient man-
agement is that the TAC catch control imposes no
constraint on each fisherman, who retains the
incentive to catch as much as he can, as fast as he
can, before the TAC is reached and the fishery
closed. Catch control alone is economically in-
efficient because it allows too many fishermen in
the fishery, and the capitalization and effort are
too high.
If trade barriers are removed—that is, if fish-
importing countries lift their barriers—prices
decline in the importing country and rise in the
exportingcountrytoaglobalequilibrium(account-
ing for transportation costs).What are the impacts
of suchadevelopment,assumingadequatemanage-
ment measures? Table 15.4 shows the expected
outcome.
The “double dividend” refers to the gain in the
importing country from getting fish at a lower
price and redirecting resources from the domestic
fishing industry to higher-value uses. Although
there is no reason to assume that both the import-
ing and exporting countries share the same type of
management regime, if both have an effective
regime then the results will be very similar to the
classic outcome of agricultural trade liberalization.
With open access and catch control, under
which a change in prices induces increased effort in
the exporting country,it is conceivable that a coun-
try could end up worse off with trade liberaliza-
tion (Brander and Taylor 1997a, 1997b, 1998;
Hannesson 2000).This is because the total quantity
caught in the open-access fishery will increase at
first but then decline as the fishery becomes over-
fished. With a decline in prices resulting from the
elimination of import barriers, however, the effort
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giving fish stocks a chance to recover. This is not
necessarily the predicted outcome.Indeed,in many
cases, as the price of fish has decreased, fishermen
have actually increased their effort to maintain total
revenue, at least in the short run.
The results above were premised on two sepa-
rate stocks of fish—one in the importing country
and one in the exporting country. The discussion
can be made much more complicated by assuming
that several countries share the resource.
Consider the European Union and Uganda as
trading partners. Much of Uganda’s fisheries prod-
ucts come from Lake Victoria and are exported to
the European Union. Uganda has an open-access
management regime on Lake Victoria and shares
the lake with Kenya and Tanzania. If trade were to
be liberalized, the amount traded would increase.
Fishing pressure on Lake Victoria and its stock of
Nile perch would increase, putting further pressure
on the fish stock from both Uganda and Kenya.The
price of the fish would rise as fewer and fewer fish
were found. Food security would decline as the
local community found it increasingly difficult to
afford Nile perch.Unless some type of enforcement
management regime were set up to limit total catch
from the lake, this source of export earnings might
be short-lived. Holding all else constant, trade lib-
eralization would deplete stocks in Lake Victoria
more quickly than if trade were not liberalized.
Impact of Trade Liberalization in Aquaculture
The implications of trade liberalization in aquacul-
ture would likely be very similar to those in agricul-
ture, because aquaculture shares many of the
resource constraints and externalities of agriculture
(tables 15.5 and 15.6). Certainly, if tariffs in the
European Union, the Republic of Korea, and Japan
were reduced, the quantity of aquacultured prod-
ucts sold to those countries would grow.
The concern among many is that increased trade
in cultivated shrimp has had a large and negative
effect on the environment and that the effect rises
with production and exports. The same is true for
salmon farming. Chile, Norway, Scotland, Canada,
and Ireland are the largest producers of farmed
salmon, with Chile and Norway being by far
the largest. Environmental groups are concerned
not only about pollution but also about effects on
the genetic diversity of wild fish from escaped
farmed fish that may not be indigenous to the area
(Porter 2003).
Both salmon and shrimp production rely on fish
meal for feed. Any increase in aquaculture produc-
tion of either species will have an impact on
demand for fish meal. I have already discussed the
various issues associated with fish meal production,
including the growing concern that the stocks of
fish from which fish meal is produced (herring,
anchovies, capelin, menhaden) are themselves
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TABLE 15.4 Effects of Relaxing Trade Barriers
Fish-Exporting Country Fish-Importing Country
Catch Efficient Catch Efficient
Regime Open Access Control Management Open Access  Control Management
Short-term Increased Increased No change in Lower effort, Lower effort, No change in
effects effort, larger effort, no effort unless smaller no change in effort unless
catches, more change in higher allowed catches, catch, lower smaller allowed
trade gains catch, higher catch, gains more trade, profits, gains catch, gains from
from trade profit gains from trade, gains from from trade trade, lower
from trade higher market trade market value of
value of quotas quotas and
and licenses licenses
Long-term Fish stocks Increased Same as above Fish stocks Reduction of Same as above
effects decline, catch investment in recover, fishing fleets,
may decline, fishing boats, catch may no change in
possibly loss no change in increase, catch, double
from trade catch, small double dividend from
gains from dividend trade
trade from trade
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TABLE 15.5 Effects of a Rise in the Price of Cultivated Fish on Aquaculture Output and
Fisheries Catch If Feed Is Held Constant
Management Regime Effect on Output Effect on Output in Capture
in Capture Fisheries in Aquaculture Fisheries for Consumption Fish
Open access Output rise for sufficiently low Lower stocks of feed fish lead to 
prices, but as the price of feed less growth of consumption fish.
fish increases, the stocks will Higher price of consumption fish
ultimately be exploited beyond leads to less supply as stocks are
MSY
a, supply of feed falls, and pushed beyond MSY
aquaculture output falls
Capture fisheries Output rise and flattens out Output of consumption fish
for feed fish and as supply of feed cannot be falls as the price exceeds
consumption fish further augmented a certain level
managed separately
All capture fisheries As above, but aquaculture As above, but output of capture
managed as a whole is initiated at a higher price fisheries continues to rise with price
longer before starting to fall.
a. Maximum Sustainable Yield.
Source: OECD 2003a: 204.
TABLE 15.6 Effects on Price and Quantities of Market Liberalization: Relaxing Border
Measures in the Importing Country
(two-country situation)
Exporter Importer
Fishery managed by TAC Increase price, no change Decrease price, no change
set without reference to in quantity in quantity
economic factors
Open access
a) Stock above MSY Increase price and quantity Decrease price and quantity
b) Stock at MSY Increase price, decrease quantity Decrease price and quantity
c) Stock less than MSY Increase price, decrease quantity Decrease price, increase quantity
Aquaculture
a) Feed available without Increase price and quantity Decrease price and quantity
significant price rise
b) Managed fishery for Increase price and increase Decrease price and decrease
captured feed fish or leave unchanged quantity or leave unchanged quantity
c) Open access fishery for Same as open access above Same as open access above
captured feed fish
Source: OECD 2003a, page 200.
overfished. Unless effective management of the
total catch in those fisheries is instituted, the sus-
tainability of aquaculture may not be possible until
an alternative to fish meal is developed.
This section has focused so far on carnivorous
fish (salmon and shrimp), and the impact of trade
liberalization on the source of feed. However, a
large portion of the world’s aquaculture produc-
tion consists of herbivores such as carp. Carp con-
tribute significantly to food security in China and
other nations, particularly as they tend not to be
found on the export market, so trade liberalization
is likely to have little impact.
The other face of aquaculture is farmed shell-
fish, which makes up a good proportion of aqua-
culture production worldwide. In Thailandproduction of green mussels, blood cockle, oysters,
and other shellfish doubled from 73,976 million
tons in 1988 to 138,202 million tons in 2000 valued
at approximately $47 million (Chalermwat,Szuster,
and Flaherty 2003). Because the primary concern
with these products is the placement of the farms in
unpolluted areas, the WTO Agreement on Sanitary
and Phytosanitary Measures is likely to have the
largest effect on this sector. Table 15.6 summarizes
the discussion in this section.
Conclusions
Global seafood markets are truly international.
Production, consumption, imports, and exports
cover the globe, just as several species of fish
migrate around the globe. Because the global mar-
ket for fish and fish products has specific dynamics
and issues separate from global agriculture, under-
standing the impacts of trade liberalization on
seafood and fishery products requires an under-
standing of the differentiated markets for the vari-
ous products.
Key aspects of trade liberalization on global
seafood, fish meal, and fish oil markets have
emerged from the discussion. Impacts of trade lib-
eralization on the welfare of countries depends
critically on the fisheries management systems of
the producing countries, since negative externali-
ties in global seafood markets are much larger and
more detrimental than those specific to agriculture.
Open access, the management regime in many
developing countries, invariably leads to overfish-
ing. Any event that raises prices for fish from
exporting developing countries creates incentives
to fish even more, exacerbating overfishing and
leading quickly to collapses in stocks. Even trade
liberalization in the aquaculture industries is not
immune from the effects of fisheries management
regimes to the extent that the feed for that produc-
tion is derived from a poorly managed capture
fishery.
Increased trade in aquacultured products, inde-
pendent of issues with feed, can lead to increased
environmental degradation from conversion of
land from benign agricultural use to less benign
aquaculturaluse.Littlehassofarbeendonetointer-
nalize the negative externalities caused by excess
fishing,unintendedtrappingof othermarinelife,or
waterpollutionfromaquacultureoperations.
As stocks in developed countries have declined,
their fleets have gone elsewhere to capture fish.The
governments of the European Union, for example,
have paid several developing countries for access to
their fishing territory.While the developing nations
gain access fees, enforcement of fish-management
policies to limit the catches of the foreign fleets are
minimal, resulting in an overfishing of these fish
stocks. Thus, developing countries derive a short-
term gain by allowing foreign fleets to fish in their
waters; that value disappears in the long run.
Removing foreign access from developing coun-
tries’ waters may not be the complete answer, even
though foreign access is usually subsidized by the
foreign fleets’ governments. Developing countries
have fisheries resources within their exclusive eco-
nomic zones. Removing foreign fleets from those
waters is good for the fish stocks, but if the country
itself has no means to capture the value of the
resource, it gains little else. Two options present
themselves under such circumstances: first, to
negotiate better access agreements to ensure that
the true value of the resource is being paid to the
developing country, and, second, to invest in the
developing country’s fishing capacity so that it can
take advantage of its rightful resource. It should go
without saying that in either case an effective man-
agement system must be put in place to prevent
overfishing.
Tariffs in global seafood markets have come
down significantly and may no longer be a prime
trade barrier, except perhaps in South-South trade.
In the United States, as the markets for certain
seafood species has become more competitive,
industries in the United States have increasingly
turned to antidumping and countervailing duty
measures to protect themselves from competition
from developing countries.
The WTO has the opportunity to use its purview
over subsidies through the Agreements on Subsi-
dies and Countervailing Measures to encourage
members to drop fishing subsidies and thus to cure
the trade distortions caused by the subsidies while
encouraging sustainability of fish stocks globally.In
addition, from the developing countries’ perspec-
tive,an important focus in WTO negotiations must
be the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
and the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures.The processes by which developed coun-
tries impose technical barriers to trade must be
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oping countries need resources to assist them to
meet current sanitary and phytosanitary measures
by building infrastructure that permits them to
meet the requirements and training workers to
maintain the proper measures.
Finally,international trade in fish and fish prod-
ucts also has an impact on food security. Often the
domestic market in exporting developing countries
retains only the inferior fish, while the better, more
valuable fish are sold abroad.A collapse in the stock
of the fish consumed domestically may lead to sig-
nificant food security problems. Similarly, if fish
meal prices were to rise for any reason, the increase
would have an impact on the ability of some
nations to feed terrestrial livestock.
Everyone has an interest in ensuring that fish-
eries and aquaculture are managed in a sustainable
way. As externalities are internalized into the pro-
duction process and their value incorporated into
the prices of fish products,then it is likely that trade
liberalization will bring about a net benefit to trad-
ing partners. The distribution of benefits across
countries, producers, and consumers can best be
judged after effective management measures are in
place. That distribution is not easily judged today.
Notes
1.The primary source for the material in this section is Abila
2003.
2. www.st.nmfs.gov/webpls.
3. The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002
(Farm Bill) states that for the purposes of the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act,“the term ‘catfish’ may only be consid-
ered to be a common or usual name (or part thereof) for fish
classified within the family Ictaluridae” (USITC 2003a).
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Seafood: Trade Liberalization and Impacts on Sustainability 295There are two types of coffee. Arabica, grown at
high altitudes in Latin America (including Brazil)
and northeastern Africa, accounts for two-thirds of
total world output. It has a strong aroma and low
level of caffeine. Robusta, with a much stronger
taste than arabica, is grown in humid areas at low
altitudes in Asia, western and southern Africa, and
Brazil. During the last decade, production of
robusta, which is particularly suitable for instant
coffee, has increased (table 16.1).
1
During the last decade, the coffee market has
gone through a number of structural changes. On
the supply side, Brazil’s production capacity
expanded enormously, with new plantations in the
north that are less affected by frosts and, because
of irrigation, not affected by droughts. Vietnam
entered the coffee market in a major way in the
1980s—it currently supplies more than 12 million
bags, making it the world’s second-largest coffee
exporter.On the demand side,consumption of spe-
cialty coffees has expanded, currently accounting
for an estimated 6–8 percent of total consumption.
Demand for low-quality coffee beans has also
increased, primarily reflecting new technologies
that enable roasters to remove the harsh taste of
robustas for normal coffee while continuing to
All coffee is produced in the tropics, primarily by
smallholders. Most is consumed in high-income
countries. Latin America accounts for 60 percent of
global output, followed by Asia (24 percent), and
Africa (16 percent). More than half of global coffee
output is accounted for by the three dominant pro-
ducers: Brazil (33 percent), Colombia (10 percent),
and Vietnam (10 percent). Some other African and
Latin American countries, however, are heavily
dependent on their exports of coffee, despite their
low share in global output. For example, coffee
accounts for more than half of total merchandise
exports in Burundi, Rwanda, and Ethiopia and
more than 20 percent in Guatemala, Honduras, and
Nicaragua. More than 80 percent of coffee produc-
tion is traded internationally. Historically, coffee is
the second most traded primary commodity after
crude oil, generating more than $15 billion in
export revenue (evaluated at 1997–98 average prices
and volumes). Overall, consumption volumes have
stagnated in the mature markets, in which the
United States accounts for about 18 percent, fol-
lowed by Brazil (10 percent), Germany (9 percent),
Japan (6 percent), and France and Italy (5 percent
each). However, consumption has been increasing
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meet the increasing demand for instant and fla-
vored coffees, which primarily use robusta coffees.
For most of the 20th century the coffee market
has been subject to various supply-control schemes.
The most important were the price-stabilization
schemes implemented by Brazil at the beginning of
the century, the Inter-American Coffee Agreements
implemented during and after the Second World
War, the agreements administered by the Interna-
tional Coffee Organization (ICO) from 1962 to
1989, and more recent attempts by the Association
of Coffee Producing Countries (ACPC). Although
the stated objective of these arrangements was to
stabilize prices, prices often ended up being higher
than they would have been in the absence of
the arrangements. The most influential of these
schemes were the International Coffee Agreements
(ICAs) under the auspices of the ICO, the last of
which collapsed in 1989. Government intervention
in domestic markets was also prevalent in many
countries through parastatals that controlled mar-
keting and trade in the coffee industry. Following
the collapse of the last ICA, most parastatals were
either dismantled or their roles diminished. Cur-
rently,the global coffee market is,to a large extent,a
distortion-free market. On the trade side, import
restrictions are nonexistent, except some tariff esca-
lation in coffee products (such as instant coffee).
Global Balance and Price Trends
Brazil, by far the largest coffee producer and
exporter and the second-largest consumer,
accounts for one-third of global output and
TABLE 16.1 The Changing Structure of the Coffee Market  
(thousands of 60-kg bags)
Arabica
Year Colombian Milds Other Milds Naturals Subtotal Robusta Total
1992 16,959 25,122 23,317 65,398 27,291 92,689
1993 13,256 23,398 28,555 65,209 26,989 92,198
1994 15,059 24,582 29,300 68,941 27,901 96,842
1995 15,503 27,525 18,545 61,573 27,193 88,766
1996 12,489 27,040 27,126 66,655 37,033 103,688
1997 13,498 27,965 23,436 64,899 32,753 97,652
1998 12,509 27,380 35,024 74,913 33,506 108,419
1999 11,821 31,698 30,178 73,697 39,706 113,403
2000 12,026 28,480 30,717 71,223 45,638 116,861
2001 13,229 26,123 28,540 67,892 42,834 110,726
2002 13,179 25,585 43,667 82,431 41,720 124,151
2003 13,352 26,318 26,217 65,887 39,945 105,232
Market share (percent)
1992 18 27 25 71 29 100
1993 14 25 31 71 29 100
1994 16 25 30 71 29 100
1995 17 31 21 69 31 100
1996 12 26 26 64 36 100
1997 14 29 24 66 34 100
1998 12 25 32 69 31 100
1999 10 28 27 65 35 100
2000 10 24 26 61 39 100
2001 12 24 26 61 39 100
2002 11 21 25 66 34 100
2003 13 25 25 63 37 100
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture.produces both arabica and robusta coffee. It is fol-
lowed by Colombia (arabica) and Vietnam
(robusta), each accounting for about 10 percent of
global output. Other significant producers are
Indonesia and Mexico (6 percent each) and India
(4 percent) (table 16.2).
The technology of coffee production has
changed significantly in the past 30 years, but not
all countries have shared equally in the changes.
Average yields in Asia are double those in Sub-
Saharan Africa, and yields in Latin America are
60 percent higher than in Africa. Annual yield
growth during the 1990s was 2.6 percent in Asia,
1.7 percent in Latin America, and 1.1 percent in
Sub-Saharan Africa, according to data from the
U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).
On the demand side, the United States con-
sumes about 18 percent of global output, followed
by Brazil (10 percent), Germany (9 percent), Japan
(6 percent), France and Italy (5 percent each). On a
per capita basis, Scandinavian countries consume
about 10 kilograms a year, followed by Germany
(8 kilograms), and France, Italy, and Spain with
approximately 5.5 kilograms each. U.S. per capita
consumption fluctuates between 4 and 5.5 kilo-
grams; in the United Kingdom and Japan it is
between 2.5 and 3 kilograms. Only five coffee pro-
ducers consume a substantial portion of their
output: Brazil and Ethiopia (30 percent each),
Indonesia (23 percent), Mexico (19 percent), and
Colombia (11 percent), which together account for
about 20 percent of global output; the remaining
80 percent is internationally traded.
Vietnam’s emergence as a major robusta pro-
ducer altered the landscape of the global coffee
market in a permanent way. In 1980 Vietnam pro-
duced 77,000 bags—less than 0.1 percent of world
production. In 2000, it exceeded 15 million bags—
more than 13 percent of world production.
Vietnam entered the coffee market in response to a
series of policy reforms in the early 1990s that
changed the balance of incentives toward export
crops. These reforms facilitated land ownership
and liberalized input and output markets. Follow-
ing the reforms, for example, fertilizer prices
declined by almost 50 percent. Other reforms
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TABLE 16.2 Coffee Production, Selected Years
(thousands of 60-kg bags)
Country 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2002 2004
Brazil 29,800 11,000 21,500 31,000 34,100 51,600 42,400
Vietnam 53 39 77 1,200 15,333 11,167 12,000
Colombia 7,260 8,000 13,500 14,500 10,500 11,712 11,600
Indonesia 1,327 2,327 5,365 7,480 6,495 6,140 5,750
India 1,225 1,914 1,977 2,970 5,020 4,588 4,835
Mexico 2,100 3,200 3,862 4,550 4,800 4,350 4,500
Ethiopia 1,687 2,589 3,264 3,500 3,683 3,693 4,000
Guatemala 1,500 1,965 2,702 3,282 4,564 3,802 3,671
Uganda 1,925 2,667 2,133 2,700 3,205 2,910 3,200
Peru 598 1,114 1,170 1,170 2,824 2,760 2,980
Honduras 291 545 1,265 1,685 2,821 2,661 2,753
Costa Rica 951 1,295 2,140 2,565 2,502 2,207 2,050
Nicaragua 437 641 971 460 1,610 997 1,500
Côte d’Ivoire 0 4,414 3,973 4,734 5,700 3,568 1,444
El Salvador 1,452 2,054 2,940 2,603 1,624 1,351 1,285
Papua New Guinea 61 426 889 969 1,051 1,118 1,210
Cameroon 855 1,180 1,860 1,450 1,113 801 1,100
Kenya 566 999 1,568 1,455 864 926 1,085
Thailand 1 19 201 785 1,692 757 950
Ecuador 594 1,255 1,517 1,830 1,005 790 750
Total 64,999 58,838 85,738 99,911 116,861 124,151 117,650
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture.(known as Doi Moi) encouraged internal migra-
tion to the Central Highlands because of easy access
to new land (eventually to be used for coffee pro-
duction). These reforms, combined with the 1994
coffee price spike, made Vietnam an important
player in the coffee market. It is worth noting that
Vietnam’s coffee expansion took place without
assistance from either national or multilateral
funding. However, some help came from the Soviet
Union and Eastern European countries in the form
of technical assistance during the early 1980s.
Because neither Vietnam nor these countries were
ICO members, and hence not bound by any quota
obligations, they could expand coffee production
and trade without any restriction. The expansion
was also aided by the desire of the Soviet Union and
Eastern European countries to have access to coffee
without paying hard currency.
Brazil has been able to maintain unprecedented
output levels, averaging more than 35 million bags
during the last four seasons. Extensive mechaniza-
tion of coffee harvesting, along with the develop-
ment of high-yielding varieties, has reduced costs
of production, while shifting production to the
north, away from the frost-prone areas of the
south, has reduced the likelihood of weather-
related supply disruptions. Extensive use of irriga-
tion in areas such as Bahia and the Cerrado has
stabilized and sustained yields. Another signifi-
cant development in Brazil is emergence of semi-
washed arabicas; a process that makes better coffee.
About 3 million bags of semi-washed arabicas
compete directly with higher-quality coffee from
Central America.
Given that bothVietnam and Brazil are low-cost
producers, they are unlikely to reduce coffee pro-
duction. Consequently production cutbacks to
restore the balance of supply and demand are now
coming from the higher-cost African and Central
Americanproducers.InCentralAmerica,forexam-
ple, production of the lower-altitude, lower-quality
coffees that can be easily replaced in commercial
blends by Brazilian arabicas have fallen sharply.
2
While Latin America and Asia have increased
their shares in global coffee output, Africa’s share
has declined from 33 percent in 1970 to 18 percent
in 2000. Africa’s coffee output has never surpassed
its peak in 1972.After remaining almost constant at
20 million bags for two decades following that
peak, it has been in slow decline since then.
Numerous studies have identified several factors
that are likely to further influence coffee process-
ing and consumption patterns (see, for example,
IADB/USAID/World Bank 2002, and Lewin,
Giovannucci,and Varangis 2004).First,roasters are
able to work with a lower level of stocks. Second,
new technology enables them to remove the harsh
taste of robustas,achieving the same level of quality
with lower-quality beans. Third, roasters have been
more flexible in their ability to make short-term
switches between coffee types, implying that the
premiums commanded by certain types of coffee
cannot be retained for long. Finally, a small seg-
ment of the market has emerged that focuses on
product differentiation, such as organic, gourmet,
and shade coffee. The implication of all this is that
the demand outlook is likely to be different for dif-
ferent coffee producers. Specifically, if any expan-
sion in coffee demand takes place,it is likely to be at
the two ends of the spectrum: lower-quality beans
(reflecting improved technology and increased
demand for soluble coffee) and specialty coffees
(reflecting expansion to niche markets).
3 Efforts to
increase coffee consumption may also come at the
expense of tea consumption, a commodity pro-
duced mainly by low-income (and often coffee-
producing) countries.
Coffee prices are highly volatile. (figures 16.1a
through d). During the 1990s arabica prices ranged
from $1.17 a kilogram in August 1992 to $5.89 a
kilogram in May 1997. Robusta prices ranged from
$0.82 a kilogram in June 1992 to $4.03 a kilogram
in September 1994. The price volatility stems in
part from weather conditions in Brazil, where frost
affects crops every five to six years and severe
droughts also occur periodically. While short-
selling and buying by hedge funds are sometimes
cited as a reason for the high volatility of coffee
prices, this activity probably contributes only to
short-term volatility.
4
Coffee prices have declined considerably since
1998(figure16.1).InJanuary2002robustadropped
to $0.50 a kilogram (the lowest nominal level since
the $0.49 a kilogram price of May 1965 and 86 per-
cent below its high four years earlier), while in
October 2001 arabica averaged $1.24 a kilogram, a
nine-year low and 76 percent below its high four
years earlier. The combination of increased avail-
ability fromVietnam and Brazil,as well as domestic
policies in many producing countries that retard
300 Global Agricultural Trade and Developing Countriesexit from the market of uncompetitive producers,
led to these historically low prices, which, in the
absence of any international supply control mecha-
nism, gave rise to the so-called coffee crisis and
probably prolonged its length.
Exports from small coffee producers are a
minuscule proportion of global trade in coffee but
can loom large in the exporters’ economies. For
example, three African countries (Burundi,
Rwanda, and Ethiopia) derive more than half of
their total merchandise exports from coffee. The
poverty implications of coffee in these countries
are enormous—in seven coffee-dependent African
countries, per capita gross domestic product
(GDP) ranged between $112 and $336 (table 16.3).
Areas with relatively high labor costs and large
farms that are heavily dependent on seasonal labor,
especially in Central America, can feel the effects
of changing prices in a significant way (Lewin,
Giovannucci, and Varangis 2004). For example, the
rural labor employed in the coffee sectors of five
Central American countries represented, on
Coffee: Market Setting and Policies 301






































































Source: World Bank.average,28 percent of the labor force in those coun-
tries (Nicaragua, 42 percent; Guatemala, 31 per-
cent; Costa Rica, 28 percent; Honduras, 26 percent;
El Salvador, 17 percent).
The Policy Environment
The coffee market has been subject to considerable
intervention at the international and national lev-
els. Those interventions are the subject of the next
two subsections.
The International Environment
Regulation of coffee supplies at the international
level has a long history (box 16.1). Calls for supply
controls were made as early as 1902 following price
declines due to Brazil’s oversupply (Hutchinson
1909).At least three successful stabilization schemes
took place in Brazil between 1905 and 1921.
However, the coffee market became depressed
following the crash of 1929. Attempts by Brazil to
convince other coffee producers to coordinate
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(c) Nominal Price Indexes for Coffee and Other Commodities, 1990–2002  
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BOX 16.1 Coffee Supply Controls in the Twentieth Century
Calls for supply controls in the coffee market
came as early as 1902 at an (unsuccessful) Inter-
national Coffee Conference held in New York
following price declines due to Brazil’s oversup-
ply (Hutchinson 1909). At the time, Brazil
accounted for more than 85 percent of world’s
coffee output of 18.2 million bags. Chronic
oversupplies prompted the state of São Paulo,
which accounted for three-quarters of Brazil’s
coffee, to initiate a price stabilization scheme in
1905—called valorization—and to prohibit new
plantings. The stockholding mechanism that
regulated sales of coffee was financed by the
federal government and several foreign banks.
The scheme not only stabilized prices but also
kept them at levels higher than demand and
supply would have supported. A second val-
orization was undertaken in 1917 (following the
disruption of coffee consumption in Europe dur-
ing World War I), and a third in 1921. These
schemes were very profitable for their promot-
ers. However, greater stability in the coffee mar-
ket arising from the supply controls encouraged
the rapid extension of new plantings in Brazil
and led to new calls for even more state inter-
vention (Wickizer 1943: 143). Thus, São Paulo’s
coffee problem became Brazil’s coffee problem.
Following the success of the valorization
schemes, a permanent supply-control scheme
was envisaged for the newly created São Paulo
Coffee Institute. The institute began buying cof-
fee after the 1927–28 bumper crop and con-
vinced other states that had become important
suppliers to join in. It withdrew from coffee pur-
chasing after the crash of October 1929, when
coffee consumption plummeted and financing
dried up. The Brazilian government then
attempted to convince other Latin American cof-
fee producers (which had increased their market
shares considerably) to find ways to regulate
exports. Two Pan-American Coffee conferences
(in Bogotá in 1936 and Havana in 1937) ended
with no agreement. In the meantime, several
coffee destruction schemes were undertaken by
Brazil using public funds. During 1931–38, a
total of 68.7 million bags were destroyed—twice
the world’s annual coffee output. Following
inaction by other coffee producers (not surpris-
ingly, since they were enjoying the benefit of
controls), Brazil abandoned restrictions in favor
of free entry and competition. However,
30 years of controls had taken a toll: Brazil’s
share in the export market of coffee had fallen
from 87 percent in 1905 to 55 percent in 1940.
Brazil’s coffee problem had become Latin
America’s coffee problem.
Weak demand from Europe during the Second
World War, coupled with the desire of the United
States to keep Latin America on the side of the
Alliance, led to the formation of the Inter-
American Coffee Agreement. Its membership
consisted of the two dominant coffee producers
(Brazil and Colombia) and several smaller produc-
ers in Central America (Wickizer 1943). A second
agreement was negotiated after the war. The two
agreements had the same outcome. Supply
restrictions and investment activity by European
countries in their colonies brought African pro-
ducers into the market. Latin America’s coffee
problem became the Western world’s coffee
problem.
In 1962 coffee-producing countries account-
ing for 90 percent of global output and almost
all developed consuming countries formed the
International Coffee Organization and signed
the International Coffee Agreements (ICAs). The
objective of the ICAs was to stabilize coffee
prices through mandatory export quotas. The
United States enthusiastically backed the agree-
ment, considering it a means of increasing the
income of Central American coffee producers,
hoping that this would contain the spread of
communism. Consumer-country support for
export quotas was also encouraged by large
importers, who benefited from export-tax
rebates offered by the Instituto Brazilieno de
Café in return for high-volume purchase com-
mitments. Western European countries viewed
the ICAs with sympathy, believing that high cof-
fee prices were a good way to aid their former
colonies (Bates 1997). To satisfy their quota
obligations, governments of coffee producers
bought stocks using part of their coffee tax
revenues. The export-quota system, first imp-
lemented in 1963, continued intermittently
until 1989. 
After Vietnam entered the world market in
the 1980s, with assistance from the Soviet
Union, the West’s coffee problem became the
world’s coffee problem.supply-containing mechanisms failed. Brazil then
introduced a number of coffee destruction schemes.
Between 1931 and 1938, a total of 68.7 million bags
were destroyed—twice the world’s annual global
coffee output. Following years of weak demand
from Europe during the Second World War, Brazil
negotiated two agreements with other produc-
ing countries in Latin America. Those agreements
were largely unsuccessful. The countries that agreed
to restrict their exports in return for Brazil’s
coffee stock destruction did not respect their
commitments.
In the early 1960s most coffee-producing coun-
tries (accounting for 90 percent of global output)
and almost all developed coffee-consuming coun-
tries formed the ICO, which attempted to stabilize
coffee prices through mandatory export quotas
under the International Coffee Agreements. The
export quota system, first implemented in 1963,
was temporarily suspended in 1972 as coffee prices
soared. Quotas were restored in 1980 and sus-
pended again in 1986 due to soaring prices. They
were reintroduced in 1987 and suspended indefi-
nitely in 1989. These agreements kept coffee prices
higher than they otherwise would have been
(Gilbert 1995).
Following the collapse of the last International
Coffee Agreement, several coffee producers—
including Brazil and Colombia but not Vietnam
and Mexico—formed the Association of Coffee
Producing Countries in September 1993. In the
following year,export restrictions did contribute to
the price increase already under way, but the agree-
ments were overtaken by the price rises that
followed the Brazilian frosts in 1994. During 2000
and 2001 the ACPC worked to persuade coffee-
producing countries to retain part of their exports
so as to staunch the decline in coffee prices that had
started in 1998 and accelerated in 2000. Following
some initial enthusiasm, ACPC’s efforts failed, and
the association was dissolved in February 2002,one
month after robusta prices reached their historic
low. The ACPC failed for several reasons, but a
principal one was that in a liberalized market, the
institutional structure necessary to ensure compli-
ance in the member countries—a single-desk mar-
keting agency—had been dismantled. There was
also the problem of free-riding by nonmembers.
The ICO attempted once again in 2002 to reduce
coffee availability in a new agreement under which
coffee producers are to remove low-quality beans
from the market. Regulation 407 of the ICO states
minimum specifications for export qualities, but it
will depend entirely on voluntary compliance for
its success.
A final consequence of the ICAs was that they
gave rise to rent-seeking behavior by governments
and marketing boards. The extent of this problem
was revealed in the late 1980s, shortly before the
collapse of the last ICA, when the Instituto
Brazilieno de Café decided to auction 10 percent of
its export quotas. The very high prices exporters
paid for the quotas revealed to the entire domestic
coffee industry the extent of the rents being
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TABLE 16.3 Coffee’s Importance to Developing Countries, 1997–2000 Averages
Percent of Merchandise Exports Per Capita GDP
Country Merchandise Exports (millions of current US$) (constant 1995 US$)
Burundi 72.2 64 143
Rwanda 58.1 65 227
Ethiopia 51.5 520 112
Uganda 40.1 509 336
Sierra Leone 29.7 11 161
Nicaragua 25.4 613 435
Honduras 21.7 1,398 715
Guatemala 20.2 2,505 1,535
El Salvador 18.2 2,580 1,737
Tanzania 13.4 637 185
Madagascar 11.1 616 241
Source: International Coffee Organization.extracted. A common consequence in many coun-
tries of the end of the ICA was an end to opportu-
nities for rent seeking—this led to significant shifts
in domestic support policies in several producing
countries.
Domestic Policies
Since the collapse of the ICAs, domestic policies of
coffee producers have focused on the reform and
liberalization of marketing systems, and more
recently on helping producers survive periods of
low prices, sometimes through state intervention.
Akiyama (2001) reported that only 15 of the
world’s 51 coffee-producing countries had private
marketing systems in 1985. Twenty-five countries
soldcoffeethroughstate-ownedenterprises,includ-
ing marketing boards and stabilization funds, and
another 11 countries had mixed state and private-
sector marketing bodies. Most aspects of coffee
marketing and trade, especially in Sub-Saharan
Africa, were handled by government-controlled
agencies, which typically resulted in heavy taxation
of the sector. Although the reasons behind the tax
policiesvaried,themainoneswerelowpriceelastic-
ityof short-runsupply,implyingminimalimpactof
taxation on supply; less social and political resist-
ance to taxation for cash crops than for food crops;
therelativesimplicityof taxcollection,facilitatedby
the single marketing channel; and support for the
government budget and balance of payments
throughforeignexchangeearnings.
Many coffee-producing countries undertook
reforms during the 1990s by removing or redefin-
ing the role of the parastatals. A combination of
falling prices and rent-seeking activities by some
of the marketing boards led several countries to
reform their coffee sectors altogether. The outcome
of these reforms has been mixed and mirrors the
outcome of similar efforts in other export crop sec-
tors (Akiyama and others 2003; Shepherd and
Farolfi 1999). Bohman, Jarvis, and Barichello
(1996) showed that in many cases, prices paid to
growers were lower under the ICAs compared with
what they would have been under a free market.
Krueger (1990) showed that this was the case for
other commodities as well. Krivonos (2003), who
evaluated the impact of reforms undertaken in
14coffee-producing countries during the late 1980s
and early 1990s, concluded that in most cases
domestic prices adjusted faster after the reforms
than they did before the reforms. In addition to
higher prices, considerable private investment in
the marketing, processing, and transportation sec-
tors took place.Increased supply response also took
place in most occasions.
At the same time, the gap created by the with-
drawal of the state has not been filled in all cases—
the quality of public-sector services has deterio-
rated. It has been often argued that the quality of
coffee declined after the reforms,but this cannot be
substantiated from the data. Quality may have
declined after the collapse of the ICAs,since during
the coffee agreements, quality improvements were
the only means of increasing revenue.
5
Uganda undertook sweeping reforms in 1990
(Akiyama 2001). An overvalued exchange rate, the
inefficiencies of the country’s Coffee Board, politi-
cal instability, and the price decline of 1989 made
reform the only viable alternative. Under the
reforms, producer prices rose from 40–50 percent
of export prices to 70–80 percent. The supply
response has been considerable, and many entre-
preneurshaveenteredthemarket.Regulation,qual-
ity control, and promotion issues were assigned to
the newly established Uganda Coffee Development
Authority. In addition to increased output, Uganda
regained its reputation as a reliable robusta pro-
ducer,commanding a premium for its exports.
Reforms in neighboring Tanzania have been less
successful. Before 1990 the Tanzania Marketing
Board and the cooperative unions handled all mar-
keting (including input provision, transportation,
and processing) and trade aspects of the sector.The
cooperatives were also responsible for managing
the large estates nationalized in the early 1970s.
Some reforms were introduced in 1990, but they
affected only inputs, price announcements, and
retention of export earnings. More comprehensive
reforms begun in 1994 allowed private traders to
purchasecoffeedirectlyfromgrowersandprocessit
intheirownfactoriesforthefirsttimeinmorethan
30 years. The outcome of these reforms has been
mixed. Growers receive a higher share of f.o.b. (free
onboard)prices,theyarepaidpromptly,andentre-
preneurial activity has increased enormously. But
the Tanzanian coffee sector is still plagued by over-
regulation (including mandatory auction), high
taxation, and ad hoc decisions by the Tanzanian
Coffee Board (Baffes forthcoming).
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remain sensitive to international developments as
well as to local pressures, and consequently distor-
tionary domestic policies appear in many coun-
tries.Although coffee prices have been in long-term
decline, the volatility discussed above can make it
difficult to determine whether price changes are
temporary or a genuine shift in market fundamen-
tals.Under such circumstances it is equally difficult
to determine the correct policy response. An addi-
tional complication is that the shift to lower-cost
producers has been paralleled by the fact that those
countries with greater market power have lower
dependency on coffee export volumes. This makes
defensive policymaking difficult for countries with
greater dependency.
The approaches taken to recent domestic policy-
making are varied. Among the larger producing
countries, Brazil has long had a policy of preferen-
tial credit access but more recently has been auc-
tioning put options to farmers at well below fair
value; these options are exercisable as sales of coffee
to the government. In Central America govern-
ments have bailed out the banks that had lent heav-
ily to the coffee sector, but because most loans had
been made to larger, more creditworthy farmers,
the bailout failed to have much impact on the poor-
est, except by maintaining employment in larger
estates.
Niche Markets and Changing
Patterns of Consumption
The last decade has witnessed the emergence of
nontraditional channels of production, marketing,
and consumption of “new coffees”—gourmet (or
specialty
6), organic, fair trade, eco-friendly (shade-
grown or bird-friendly),and other certified coffees.
Lewin, Giovannucci, and Varangis (2004: 99) make
the following distinction between differentiated
and mainstream coffees:
“Differentiated coffees are those that can be
clearly distinguished because of distinct origin,
defined processes, or exceptional characteristics
such as superior taste or zero defects. In con-
trast, mainstream coffees are nearly always pre-
ground blends that are often unidentified in
terms of origin. These are usually, though not
always, distributed through mainstream chan-
nels such as supermarkets, foodservice, and
other institutions and they compete strongly on
the basis of price.Differentiated coffees are often
distinguished by a closer and sometimes direct
relationship with a roaster or buyer rather than
being traded in bulk or via the commodity
markets.
Differentiated coffees can help the cof-
fee industry compete with other beverages by
leveraging unique characteristics that in-
clude: (1) geographic indications of origin
(appellations); (2) gourmet and specialty;
(3) organic; (4) fair trade; (5) eco-friendly
or shade-grown; (6) private or corporate
standards.”
The expansion of differentiated coffees has two,
often overlapping, dimensions. The first is social.
Rising consumption of fair-traded, eco-friendly,
shade-grown, or bird-friendly coffees is driven by
social concerns. Consumers wish to ensure that
coffee growers receive higher prices (fair trade)
or to improve the effects of coffee growing on
the environment (shade-grown or bird-friendly
coffee). The second dimension relates to taste or
preference. Here, increasing consumption derives
from geographic indications of origin as well as
gourmet and specialty coffees (such as Kona coffee
or Kilimanjaro coffee). Consumers are willing to
pay a premium for these coffees because of their
superior characteristics. Quite often these two
dimensions overlap in the sense that consumers
may demand specialty coffee that also satisfies cer-
tain social criteria.
Certificationof nontraditionalcoffeesiscompli-
cated and often contentious. Currently, no govern-
ment agency or international organization has the
official mandate to certify nontraditional coffees.
With the exception of organic coffee, all certifica-
tioncomesfromnongovernmentalorganizations—
hence some of the value of the certified coffee rests
with the reputation of the certifying organizat-
ion. Organic coffee carrying a legally protected
trademark is regulated in the European Union,
Japan,and the United States.
The rise of self-certification by large supermar-
ket chains, often with standards below those set by
the independent certification agencies, raises the
issue of credibility and thus of the further expan-
sion of niche markets. Parallel to the question of
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buyers that require producers to meet certain sus-
tainability criteria but do not offer a price premium
for doing so.
Firm estimates of the market share of differenti-
ated coffee do not exist, but the figure is probably
between 6 and 8 percent of global coffee consump-
tion. Organic consumption in major consuming
countriesreached700,000bagsin2002–03(orabout
0.6 percent of global coffee consumption). In terms
of market share the highest rates of consump-
tion were in Denmark (2.8 percent), Switzerland
(2.3 percent), Austria (2.0 percent), and Germany
(1.2 percent), followed by the United States and
Canada(1.1percenteach).Japan’ssharewas0.5per-
cent. In the fair-trade coffee market about 240,000
bags were traded in 2001, 43 percent of which were
consumedbyGermanyandtheNetherlands.
To summarize, several characteristics of these
“new” markets must be highlighted. First, the phe-
nomenal growth of these markets reflects, in part,
a low base—implying that as a share of global
output, niche markets are small. Second, supply
and demand conditions will soon saturate these
markets—there is increasing evidence of falling
premiums for these coffees in some markets.Third,
the benefits usually accrue to producers with some
organizational structure, who are usually not the
poorest.
Synthesis
The coffee market may have been subject to supply
controls longer than any other important com-
modity. Apart from stabilizing (and perhaps rais-
ing) prices in the short term, these agreements
brought new entrants into the coffee market. With
few exceptions, the trade and marketing regimes
of coffee-producing countries are largely free of
domestic support or taxation measures. At the
international level, there are no tariffs or quantita-
tive restrictions, with the exception of some tariff
escalation on coffee products (such as soluble cof-
fee). This escalation is very small compared to
other commodities, however.
During the 1990s Brazil expanded its coffee out-
put to less frost-prone areas, thus reducing the
probability of weather-induced supply disruptions.
Vietnam emerged as the dominant supplier of
robusta coffee; it now produces as much coffee as
Colombia.At the same time, numerous niche mar-
kets have emerged. Currently 6 to 8 percent of cof-
fee output is traded outside traditional marketing
channels. On the other hand, new technologies
have enabled roasters to be more flexible in their
ability to make short-term switches among coffee
types, implying that premiums for certain types of
coffee cannot be retained for long.
Given the inability of the various supply-control
measures to arrest the decline in coffee prices, and
in the absence of any new international initiative or
distorting domestic policies by dominant produc-
ers, the outlook for the coffee market rests entirely
on supply and demand. Neither the supply nor the
demand outlook favors a reversal of the events that
shaped the coffee market during the last decade.
Per capita coffee consumption in high-income
countries, where more than three-quarters of coffee
isconsumed,hasremainedvirtuallyunchangedover
the past decade, implying a near-zero income elas-
ticity for coffee. According to recent International
Coffee Organization calculations, per capita coffee
consumption in Western Europe declined from
5.8 kilogramsayearin1993to5.5kilogramsin1999
andintheUnitedStatesfrom4.5kilogramsayearto
4.2 kilograms (table 16.4). That is the same as the
1910–20average.Annualpercapitacoffeeconsump-
tionintheUnitedStatespeakedatabout8kilograms
after World War II and declined to 6.5 kilograms
during the 1960s, before returning to its 1910–20
average (Pan-American Coffee Bureau 1970).
Like tea, coffee faces strong competition from
the soft drink industry. In 1970 annual per capita
consumption of soft drinks in the United States was
86 liters; in 1999 it exceeded 200 liters, according
to the U.S. Department of Agriculture. With the
exception of a few coffee producers, low-income
countries that have high income growth potential
and high income elasticities for food do not con-
sume much coffee. Efforts to penetrate new mar-
kets (China and Russia, for example) have only
recently begun. Even if such efforts succeed, two
points must be made.First,success is likely to come
at the expense of tea consumption, which is often
produced by the same countries that produce coffee
(the tea industry has also engaged in efforts to
increase consumption). Second, any increase in
coffee consumption by developing countries is
likely to come in the form of soluble coffee, which,
as mentioned earlier, requires lower quality beans.
Coffee: Market Setting and Policies 307With the aggressive production prospects of
major Asian producers, especially Vietnam; with
Brazil’s expansion, considerable efficiency gains,
and reduced likelihood of frosts; and with weak
demand prospects due to low income elasticity and
strong competition from soft drinks, the outlook
for the coffee market is poor. While prices are
expected to recover from their current lows when
the downward adjustment of supply takes place,
prices are unlikely to reach the highs experienced
during the boom years of the late 1970s or the
mid-1990s.
Notes
1. Arabica typically commands a highly volatile premium
over robusta. However, a bivariate time series error-correction
model that examined the comovement of arabica and robusta
prices using monthly data from January 1983 to September 2001
found extremely low comovement. In the 1990s, for example,
the price differential fluctuated between 13 percent in October
1995 and 156 percent in August 1997.
2. The concentration of coffee production has increased
(from 0.11 in 1970 to 0.14 in 2000), mainly reflecting the
increased shares of Brazil and Vietnam. The concentration
index, also known as the Herfindahl index, is defined as the
squared sum of production shares of all countries. A value of
unity indicates that a single country accounts for the entire pro-
duction. Values close to zero indicate that a large number of
countries have equal shares.
3. There has been some concern that the increasing concen-
tration of the coffee industry has allowed for rent-seeking by the
coffee industry. Evidence cited includes the very high profits
made by the coffee industry in times of low prices and the “stick-
iness”of retail prices,which do not fall as fast as world green cof-
fee prices.It is claimed that this reduces final demand because of
higher-than-necessary retail prices, thus holding down world
demand for any given level of supply. Although recent work by
RIAS (2002) found no evidence of collusion or a cartel, it is also
the case that the coffee industry wishes to sell the volume that
maximizes profits, which appears not to be the highest possible
volume.
4. Highly liquid coffee futures contracts, where the hedge
fund activity takes place, are traded at the New York Board of
Trade for arabica and at the London International Financial
Futures and Options Exchange for robusta. Less liquid coffee
contracts are traded at the São Paulo Commodity Exchange,
Singapore Commodity Exchange, Bangalore Commodity
Exchange, and Tokyo Grains Exchange.
5. Quality deterioration has been presented as a negative
consequence of policy reforms. However, the two studies that
have looked at the issue in some detail, albeit for different com-
modities found little or no evidence of lower quality of cocoa in
Cameroon (Gilbert and Tollens 2003) and cotton in Tanzania
(Baffes 2004) after the reforms.
6. UNCTAD (2002: 65) describes specialty coffees:“It is fair
to say that ‘specialty coffee’has become a generic label covering a
range of different coffees, which either command a premium
price over other coffees or are perceived by consumers as being
different from widely available mainstream brands of coffee.
The term has become so broad that there is no universally
accepted definition of what constitutes ‘specialty coffee’, and it
frequently means different things to different people. Given this
lack of precision in definition it is extremely difficult to describe
the market in a global way.”
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